xz: Move sandboxing code to sandbox.c and improve Landlock sandbox.

Landlock is now always used just like pledge(2) is: first in more
permissive mode and later (under certain common conditions) in
a strict mode that doesn't allow opening more files.

I put pledge(2) first in sandbox.c because it's the simplest API
to use and still somewhat fine-grained for basic applications.
So it's the simplest thing to understand for anyone reading sandbox.c.

7 files changed, 355 insertions, 213 deletions

diff --git a/src/xz/Makefile.am b/src/xz/Makefile.am
index 847405d7..4ff061f3 100644
--- a/src/xz/Makefile.am
+++ b/src/xz/Makefile.am
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ xz_SOURCES = \
 	options.c \
 	options.h \
 	private.h \
+	sandbox.c \
+	sandbox.h \
 	signals.c \
 	signals.h \
 	suffix.c \
diff --git a/src/xz/file_io.c b/src/xz/file_io.c
index 876ee4de..678a9a5c 100644
--- a/src/xz/file_io.c
+++ b/src/xz/file_io.c
@@ -28,15 +28,6 @@ static bool warn_fchown;
 #	include <utime.h>
 #endif
 
-#ifdef HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT
-#	include <sys/capsicum.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H
-#	include <linux/landlock.h>
-#	include <sys/syscall.h>
-#endif
-
 #include "tuklib_open_stdxxx.h"
 
 #ifdef _MSC_VER
@@ -92,11 +83,6 @@ typedef enum {
 /// If true, try to create sparse files when decompressing.
 static bool try_sparse = true;
 
-#ifdef ENABLE_SANDBOX
-/// True if the conditions for sandboxing (described in main()) have been met.
-static bool sandbox_allowed = false;
-#endif
-
 #ifndef TUKLIB_DOSLIKE
 /// File status flags of standard input. This is used by io_open_src()
 /// and io_close_src().
@@ -181,159 +167,6 @@ io_no_sparse(void)
 }
 
 
-#ifdef ENABLE_SANDBOX
-extern void
-io_allow_sandbox(void)
-{
-	sandbox_allowed = true;
-	return;
-}
-
-
-/// Enables operating-system-specific sandbox if it is possible.
-/// src_fd is the file descriptor of the input file.
-static void
-io_sandbox_enter(int src_fd)
-{
-	if (!sandbox_allowed) {
-		// This message is more often annoying than useful so
-		// it's commented out. It can be useful when developing
-		// the sandboxing code.
-		//message(V_DEBUG, _("Sandbox is disabled due "
-		//		"to incompatible command line arguments"));
-		return;
-	}
-
-	const char dummy_str[] = "x";
-
-	// Try to ensure that both libc and xz locale files have been
-	// loaded when NLS is enabled.
-	snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s%s", _(dummy_str), strerror(EINVAL));
-
-	// Try to ensure that iconv data files needed for handling multibyte
-	// characters have been loaded. This is needed at least with glibc.
-	tuklib_mbstr_width(dummy_str, NULL);
-
-#ifdef HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT
-	// Capsicum needs FreeBSD 10.2 or later.
-	cap_rights_t rights;
-
-	if (cap_enter())
-		goto error;
-
-	if (cap_rights_limit(src_fd, cap_rights_init(&rights,
-			CAP_EVENT, CAP_FCNTL, CAP_LOOKUP, CAP_READ, CAP_SEEK)))
-		goto error;
-
-	// If not reading from stdin, remove all capabilities from it.
-	if (src_fd != STDIN_FILENO && cap_rights_limit(
-			STDIN_FILENO, cap_rights_clear(&rights)))
-		goto error;
-
-	if (cap_rights_limit(STDOUT_FILENO, cap_rights_init(&rights,
-			CAP_EVENT, CAP_FCNTL, CAP_FSTAT, CAP_LOOKUP,
-			CAP_WRITE, CAP_SEEK)))
-		goto error;
-
-	if (cap_rights_limit(STDERR_FILENO, cap_rights_init(&rights,
-			CAP_WRITE)))
-		goto error;
-
-	if (cap_rights_limit(user_abort_pipe[0], cap_rights_init(&rights,
-			CAP_EVENT)))
-		goto error;
-
-	if (cap_rights_limit(user_abort_pipe[1], cap_rights_init(&rights,
-			CAP_WRITE)))
-		goto error;
-
-#elif defined(HAVE_PLEDGE)
-	// pledge() was introduced in OpenBSD 5.9.
-	//
-	// main() unconditionally calls pledge() with fairly relaxed
-	// promises which work in all situations. Here we make the
-	// sandbox more strict.
-	if (pledge("stdio", ""))
-		goto error;
-
-	(void)src_fd;
-
-#elif defined(HAVE_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H)
-	int landlock_abi = syscall(SYS_landlock_create_ruleset,
-			(void *)NULL, 0, LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION);
-
-	if (landlock_abi > 0) {
-		// We support ABI versions 1-3.
-		if (landlock_abi > 3)
-			landlock_abi = 3;
-
-		// We want to set all supported flags in handled_access_fs.
-		// This way the ruleset will initially forbid access to all
-		// actions that the available Landlock ABI version supports.
-		// Exceptions can be added using landlock_add_rule(2) to
-		// allow certain actions on certain files or directories.
-		//
-		// The same flag values are used on all archs. ABI v2 and v3
-		// both add one new flag.
-		//
-		// First in ABI v1: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE = 1ULL << 0
-		// Last in ABI v1: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM = 1ULL << 12
-		// Last in ABI v2: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER = 1ULL << 13
-		// Last in ABI v3: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE = 1ULL << 14
-		//
-		// This makes it simple to set the mask based on the ABI
-		// version and we don't need to care which flags are #defined
-		// in the installed <linux/landlock.h>.
-		const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
-			.handled_access_fs = (1ULL << (12 + landlock_abi)) - 1
-		};
-
-		const int ruleset_fd = syscall(SYS_landlock_create_ruleset,
-				&attr, sizeof(attr), 0U);
-		if (ruleset_fd < 0)
-			goto error;
-
-		// All files we need should have already been opened. Thus,
-		// we don't need to add any rules using landlock_add_rule(2)
-		// before activating the sandbox.
-		//
-		// NOTE: It's possible that the hack at the beginning of this
-		// function isn't be good enough. It tries to get translations
-		// and libc-specific files loaded but if it's not good enough
-		// then perhaps a Landlock rule to allow reading from /usr
-		// and/or the xz installation prefix would be needed.
-		//
-		// prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, ...) was already called in
-		// main() so we don't do it here again.
-		if (syscall(SYS_landlock_restrict_self, ruleset_fd, 0U) != 0)
-			goto error;
-	}
-
-	(void)src_fd;
-
-#else
-#	error ENABLE_SANDBOX is defined but no sandboxing method was found.
-#endif
-
-	// This message is annoying in xz -lvv.
-	//message(V_DEBUG, _("Sandbox was successfully enabled"));
-	return;
-
-error:
-#ifdef HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT
-	// If a kernel is configured without capability mode support or
-	// used in an emulator that does not implement the capability
-	// system calls, then the Capsicum system calls will fail and set
-	// errno to ENOSYS. In that case xz will silently run without
-	// the sandbox.
-	if (errno == ENOSYS)
-		return;
-#endif
-	message_fatal(_("Failed to enable the sandbox"));
-}
-#endif // ENABLE_SANDBOX
-
-
 #ifndef TUKLIB_DOSLIKE
 /// \brief      Waits for input or output to become available or for a signal
 ///
@@ -889,7 +722,8 @@ io_open_src(const char *src_name)
 
 #ifdef ENABLE_SANDBOX
 	if (!error)
-		io_sandbox_enter(pair.src_fd);
+		sandbox_enable_strict_if_allowed(pair.src_fd,
+				user_abort_pipe[0], user_abort_pipe[1]);
 #endif
 
 	return error ? NULL : &pair;
diff --git a/src/xz/file_io.h b/src/xz/file_io.h
index b16a8faa..ae7e2f38 100644
--- a/src/xz/file_io.h
+++ b/src/xz/file_io.h
@@ -99,12 +99,6 @@ extern void io_write_to_user_abort_pipe(void);
 extern void io_no_sparse(void);
 
 
-#ifdef ENABLE_SANDBOX
-/// \brief      main() calls this if conditions for sandboxing have been met.
-extern void io_allow_sandbox(void);
-#endif
-
-
 /// \brief      Open the source file
 extern file_pair *io_open_src(const char *src_name);
 
diff --git a/src/xz/main.c b/src/xz/main.c
index 3d3d11d7..c3e81467 100644
--- a/src/xz/main.c
+++ b/src/xz/main.c
@@ -12,12 +12,6 @@
 #include "private.h"
 #include <ctype.h>
 
-// prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, ...) is required with Landlock but it can be
-// activated even when conditions for strict sandboxing aren't met.
-#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H
-#	include <sys/prctl.h>
-#endif
-
 
 /// Exit status to use. This can be changed with set_exit_status().
 static enum exit_status_type exit_status = E_SUCCESS;
@@ -148,32 +142,6 @@ read_name(const args_info *args)
 int
 main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
-#ifdef HAVE_PLEDGE
-	// OpenBSD's pledge(2) sandbox
-	//
-	// Unconditionally enable sandboxing with fairly relaxed promises.
-	// This is still way better than having no sandbox at all. :-)
-	// More strict promises will be made later in file_io.c if possible.
-	if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath fattr", "")) {
-		// Don't translate the string or use message_fatal() as
-		// those haven't been initialized yet.
-		fprintf(stderr, "%s: Failed to enable the sandbox\n", argv[0]);
-		return E_ERROR;
-	}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H
-	// Prevent the process from gaining new privileges. This must be done
-	// before landlock_restrict_self(2) in file_io.c but since we will
-	// never need new privileges, this call can be done here already.
-	//
-	// This is supported since Linux 3.5. Ignore the return value to
-	// keep compatibility with old kernels. landlock_restrict_self(2)
-	// will fail if the no_new_privs attribute isn't set, thus if prctl()
-	// fails here the error will still be detected when it matters.
-	(void)prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
-#endif
-
 #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
 	InitializeCriticalSection(&exit_status_cs);
 #endif
@@ -187,6 +155,20 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	// even indirectly like locale and gettext initializations.
 	io_init();
 
+#ifdef ENABLE_SANDBOX
+	// Enable such sandboxing that can always be enabled.
+	// This requires that progname has been set up.
+	// It's also good that io_init() has been called because it
+	// might need to do things that the initial sandbox won't allow.
+	// Otherwise this should be called as early as possible.
+	//
+	// NOTE: Calling this before tuklib_gettext_init() means that
+	// translated error message won't be available if sandbox
+	// initialization fails. However, sandbox_init() shouldn't
+	// fail and this order simply feels better.
+	sandbox_init();
+#endif
+
 	// Set up the locale and message translations.
 	tuklib_gettext_init(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
 
@@ -241,7 +223,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		signals_init();
 
 #ifdef ENABLE_SANDBOX
-	// Set a flag that sandboxing is allowed if all these are true:
+	// Set a flag that strict sandboxing is allowed if all these are true:
 	//   - --files or --files0 wasn't used.
 	//   - There is exactly one input file or we are reading from stdin.
 	//   - We won't create any files: output goes to stdout or --test
@@ -255,7 +237,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	if (args.files_name == NULL && args.arg_count == 1
 			&& (opt_stdout || strcmp("-", args.arg_names[0]) == 0
 				|| opt_mode == MODE_LIST))
-		io_allow_sandbox();
+		sandbox_allow_strict();
 #endif
 
 	// coder_run() handles compression, decompression, and testing.
diff --git a/src/xz/private.h b/src/xz/private.h
index 0ab2ab4e..b370472e 100644
--- a/src/xz/private.h
+++ b/src/xz/private.h
@@ -51,11 +51,6 @@
 #	define STDERR_FILENO (fileno(stderr))
 #endif
 
-#if defined(HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT) || defined(HAVE_PLEDGE) \
-		|| defined(HAVE_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H)
-#	define ENABLE_SANDBOX 1
-#endif
-
 // Handling SIGTSTP keeps time-keeping for progress indicator correct
 // if xz is stopped. It requires use of clock_gettime() as that is
 // async-signal safe in POSIX. Require also SIGALRM support since
@@ -75,6 +70,7 @@
 #include "hardware.h"
 #include "file_io.h"
 #include "options.h"
+#include "sandbox.h"
 #include "signals.h"
 #include "suffix.h"
 #include "util.h"
diff --git a/src/xz/sandbox.c b/src/xz/sandbox.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2c40db71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/xz/sandbox.c
@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: 0BSD
+
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+//
+/// \file       sandbox.c
+/// \brief      Sandbox support
+//
+//  Author:     Lasse Collin
+//
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+#include "private.h"
+
+
+#ifndef ENABLE_SANDBOX
+
+// Prevent an empty translation unit when no sandboxing is supported.
+typedef int dummy;
+
+#else
+
+/// If the conditions for strict sandboxing (described in main())
+/// have been met, sandbox_allow_strict() can be called to set this
+/// variable to true.
+static bool strict_sandbox_allowed = false;
+
+
+extern void
+sandbox_allow_strict(void)
+{
+	strict_sandbox_allowed = true;
+	return;
+}
+
+
+// Strict sandboxing prevents opening any files. This *tries* to ensure
+// that any auxiliary files that might be required are already open.
+//
+// Returns true if strict sandboxing is allowed, false otherwise.
+static bool
+prepare_for_strict_sandbox(void)
+{
+	if (!strict_sandbox_allowed)
+		return false;
+
+	const char dummy_str[] = "x";
+
+	// Try to ensure that both libc and xz locale files have been
+	// loaded when NLS is enabled.
+	snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s%s", _(dummy_str), strerror(EINVAL));
+
+	// Try to ensure that iconv data files needed for handling multibyte
+	// characters have been loaded. This is needed at least with glibc.
+	tuklib_mbstr_width(dummy_str, NULL);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+
+#if defined(HAVE_PLEDGE)
+
+///////////////
+// pledge(2) //
+///////////////
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+
+extern void
+sandbox_init(void)
+{
+	if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath fattr", "")) {
+		// gettext hasn't been initialized yet so
+		// there's no point to call it here.
+		message_fatal("Failed to enable the sandbox");
+	}
+
+	return;
+}
+
+
+extern void
+sandbox_enable_strict_if_allowed(int src_fd lzma_attribute((__unused__)),
+		int pipe_event_fd lzma_attribute((__unused__)),
+		int pipe_write_fd lzma_attribute((__unused__)))
+{
+	if (!prepare_for_strict_sandbox())
+		return;
+
+	if (pledge("stdio", ""))
+		message_fatal(_("Failed to enable the sandbox"));
+
+	return;
+}
+
+
+#elif defined(HAVE_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H)
+
+//////////////
+// Landlock //
+//////////////
+
+#include <linux/landlock.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+
+
+// Highest Landlock ABI version supported by this file
+#define LANDLOCK_ABI_MAX 3
+
+/// Landlock ABI version supported by the kernel
+static int landlock_abi;
+
+
+// The required_rights should have those bits set that must not be restricted.
+// This function will then bitwise-and ~required_rights with a mask matching
+// the Landlock ABI version, leaving only those bits set that are supported
+// by the ABI and allowed to be restricted by the function argument.
+static void
+enable_landlock(uint64_t required_rights)
+{
+	assert(landlock_abi <= LANDLOCK_ABI_MAX);
+
+	if (landlock_abi <= 0)
+		return;
+
+	// We want to set all supported flags in handled_access_fs.
+	// This way the ruleset will initially forbid access to all
+	// actions that the available Landlock ABI version supports.
+	// Exceptions can be added using landlock_add_rule(2) to
+	// allow certain actions on certain files or directories.
+	//
+	// The same flag values are used on all archs. ABI v2 and v3
+	// both add one new flag.
+	//
+	// First in ABI v1: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE = 1ULL << 0
+	// Last in ABI v1: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM = 1ULL << 12
+	// Last in ABI v2: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER = 1ULL << 13
+	// Last in ABI v3: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE = 1ULL << 14
+	//
+	// This makes it simple to set the mask based on the ABI
+	// version and we don't need to care which flags are #defined
+	// in the installed <linux/landlock.h>.
+	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
+		.handled_access_fs = ((1ULL << (12 + landlock_abi)) - 1)
+				& ~required_rights,
+	};
+
+	const int ruleset_fd = syscall(SYS_landlock_create_ruleset,
+			&attr, sizeof(attr), 0U);
+	if (ruleset_fd < 0)
+		message_fatal(_("Failed to enable the sandbox"));
+
+	// All files we need should have already been opened. Thus,
+	// we don't need to add any rules using landlock_add_rule(2)
+	// before activating the sandbox.
+	//
+	// NOTE: It's possible that the hack prepare_for_strict_sandbox()
+	// isn't be good enough. It tries to get translations and
+	// libc-specific files loaded but if it's not good enough
+	// then perhaps a Landlock rule to allow reading from /usr
+	// and/or the xz installation prefix would be needed.
+	//
+	// prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, ...) was already called in
+	// sandbox_init() so we don't do it here again.
+	if (syscall(SYS_landlock_restrict_self, ruleset_fd, 0U) != 0)
+		message_fatal(_("Failed to enable the sandbox"));
+
+	return;
+}
+
+
+extern void
+sandbox_init(void)
+{
+	// Prevent the process from gaining new privileges. This must be done
+	// before landlock_restrict_self(2) but since we will never need new
+	// privileges, this call can be done here already.
+	//
+	// This is supported since Linux 3.5. Ignore the return value to
+	// keep compatibility with old kernels. landlock_restrict_self(2)
+	// will fail if the no_new_privs attribute isn't set, thus if prctl()
+	// fails here the error will still be detected when it matters.
+	(void)prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+
+	// Get the highest Landlock ABI version supported by the kernel.
+	landlock_abi = syscall(SYS_landlock_create_ruleset,
+			(void *)NULL, 0, LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION);
+
+	// The kernel might support a newer ABI than this file.
+	if (landlock_abi > LANDLOCK_ABI_MAX)
+		landlock_abi = LANDLOCK_ABI_MAX;
+
+	// These are all in ABI version 1 already. We don't need truncate
+	// rights because files are created with open() using O_EXCL and
+	// without O_TRUNC.
+	const uint64_t required_rights
+			= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE
+			| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE
+			| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE
+			| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG;
+
+	enable_landlock(required_rights);
+	return;
+}
+
+
+extern void
+sandbox_enable_strict_if_allowed(int src_fd lzma_attribute((__unused__)),
+		int pipe_event_fd lzma_attribute((__unused__)),
+		int pipe_write_fd lzma_attribute((__unused__)))
+{
+	if (!prepare_for_strict_sandbox())
+		return;
+
+	// Allow all restrictions that the kernel supports with the
+	// highest Landlock ABI version that the kernel or xz supports.
+	enable_landlock(0);
+	return;
+}
+
+
+#elif defined(HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT)
+
+//////////////
+// Capsicum //
+//////////////
+
+#include <sys/capsicum.h>
+
+
+extern void
+sandbox_init(void)
+{
+	// Nothing to do.
+	return;
+}
+
+
+extern void
+sandbox_enable_strict_if_allowed(
+		int src_fd, int pipe_event_fd, int pipe_write_fd)
+{
+	if (!prepare_for_strict_sandbox())
+		return;
+
+	// Capsicum needs FreeBSD 10.2 or later.
+	cap_rights_t rights;
+
+	if (cap_enter())
+		goto error;
+
+	if (cap_rights_limit(src_fd, cap_rights_init(&rights,
+			CAP_EVENT, CAP_FCNTL, CAP_LOOKUP, CAP_READ, CAP_SEEK)))
+		goto error;
+
+	// If not reading from stdin, remove all capabilities from it.
+	if (src_fd != STDIN_FILENO && cap_rights_limit(
+			STDIN_FILENO, cap_rights_clear(&rights)))
+		goto error;
+
+	if (cap_rights_limit(STDOUT_FILENO, cap_rights_init(&rights,
+			CAP_EVENT, CAP_FCNTL, CAP_FSTAT, CAP_LOOKUP,
+			CAP_WRITE, CAP_SEEK)))
+		goto error;
+
+	if (cap_rights_limit(STDERR_FILENO, cap_rights_init(&rights,
+			CAP_WRITE)))
+		goto error;
+
+	if (cap_rights_limit(user_abort_pipe[0], cap_rights_init(&rights,
+			CAP_EVENT)))
+		goto error;
+
+	if (cap_rights_limit(user_abort_pipe[1], cap_rights_init(&rights,
+			CAP_WRITE)))
+		goto error;
+
+	return;
+
+error:
+	// If a kernel is configured without capability mode support or
+	// used in an emulator that does not implement the capability
+	// system calls, then the Capsicum system calls will fail and set
+	// errno to ENOSYS. In that case xz will silently run without
+	// the sandbox.
+	if (errno == ENOSYS)
+		return;
+
+	message_fatal(_("Failed to enable the sandbox"));
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/xz/sandbox.h b/src/xz/sandbox.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..795c550f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/xz/sandbox.h
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: 0BSD
+
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+//
+/// \file       sandbox.h
+/// \brief      Sandbox support
+//
+//  Author:     Lasse Collin
+//
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+#if defined(HAVE_PLEDGE) || defined(HAVE_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H) \
+		|| defined(HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT)
+#	define ENABLE_SANDBOX 1
+#endif
+
+
+/// \brief      Enables early sandboxing that can always be enabled
+///
+/// This requires that tuklib_progname() and io_init() have been called.
+extern void sandbox_init(void);
+
+
+/// \brief      Tell sandboxing code that strict sandboxing can be used
+///
+/// This function only sets a flag which will be read by
+/// sandbox_enable_strict_if_allowed().
+extern void sandbox_allow_strict(void);
+
+
+/// \brief      Enable sandboxing that allows reading from one file
+///
+/// This does nothing if sandbox_allow_strict() hasn't been called.
+///
+/// \param      src_fd          File descriptor open for reading
+/// \param      pipe_event_fd   user_abort_pipe[0] from file_io.c
+/// \param      pipe_write_fd   user_abort_pipe[1] from file_io.c
+extern void sandbox_enable_strict_if_allowed(
+		int src_fd, int pipe_event_fd, int pipe_write_fd);