From 68bda971bb8b666a009331455fcedb4e18d837a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jia Tan Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 21:31:25 +0800 Subject: liblzma: Add overflow check for Unpadded size in lzma_index_append(). This was not a security bug since there was no path to overflow UINT64_MAX in lzma_index_append() or when it calls index_file_size(). The bug was discovered by a failing assert() in vli_ceil4() when called from index_file_size() when unpadded_sum (the sum of the compressed size of current Stream and the unpadded_size parameter) exceeds LZMA_VLI_MAX. Previously, the unpadded_size parameter was checked to be not greater than UNPADDED_SIZE_MAX, but no check was done once compressed_base was added. This could not have caused an integer overflow in index_file_size() when called by lzma_index_append(). The calculation for file_size breaks down into the sum of: - Compressed base from all previous Streams - 2 * LZMA_STREAM_HEADER_SIZE (size of the current Streams header and footer) - stream_padding (can be set by lzma_index_stream_padding()) - Compressed base from the current Stream - Unpadded size (parameter to lzma_index_append()) The sum of everything except for Unpadded size must be less than LZMA_VLI_MAX. This is guarenteed by overflow checks in the functions that can set these values including lzma_index_stream_padding(), lzma_index_append(), and lzma_index_cat(). The maximum value for Unpadded size is enforced by lzma_index_append() to be less than or equal UNPADDED_SIZE_MAX. Thus, the sum cannot exceed UINT64_MAX since LZMA_VLI_MAX is half of UINT64_MAX. Thanks to Joona Kannisto for reporting this. --- src/liblzma/common/index.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'src/liblzma') diff --git a/src/liblzma/common/index.c b/src/liblzma/common/index.c index 97cc9f95..8a35f439 100644 --- a/src/liblzma/common/index.c +++ b/src/liblzma/common/index.c @@ -661,6 +661,12 @@ lzma_index_append(lzma_index *i, const lzma_allocator *allocator, if (uncompressed_base + uncompressed_size > LZMA_VLI_MAX) return LZMA_DATA_ERROR; + // Check that the new unpadded sum will not overflow. This is + // checked again in index_file_size(), but the unpadded sum is + // passed to vli_ceil4() which expects a valid lzma_vli value. + if (compressed_base + unpadded_size > UNPADDED_SIZE_MAX) + return LZMA_DATA_ERROR; + // Check that the file size will stay within limits. if (index_file_size(s->node.compressed_base, compressed_base + unpadded_size, s->record_count + 1, -- cgit v1.2.3