| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
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Implemented strategy splits total amount into N equal parts,
where N is a specified number of outputs. If N > 1, dummy
change output is NOT created.
rebased by moneromooo
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'outputs' option allows to specify the number of
separate outputs of smaller denomination that will
be created by sweep operation.
rebased by moneromooo
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- device name is a new wallet property
- full device name is now a bit more structured so we can address particular device vendor + device path. Example: 'Ledger', 'Trezor:udp', 'Trezor:udp:127.0.0.1:21324', 'Trezor:bridge:usb01'. The part before ':' identifies HW device implementation, the optional part after ':' is device path to look for.
- new --hw-device parameter added to the wallet, can name the hardware device
- device reconnect added
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Reported by QuarksLab.
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Also constrains bulletproofs to simple rct, for simplicity
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It cuts down on txn commits, and speeds up blackballing substantially
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It would switch to a new set of blocks and fail, getting out of sync
with the hash chain in the process
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This ensures it can't end up filled with the actual placeholders
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The two vectors should be the same size anyway, so add an assert
to catch any case where they aren't
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The secret spend key is kept encrypted in memory, and
decrypted on the fly when needed.
Both spend and view secret keys are kept encrypted in a JSON
field in the keys file. This avoids leaving the keys in
memory due to being manipulated by the JSON I/O API.
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xref https://github.com/ryo-currency/ryo-currency/pull/86
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All daemons will not support pruned blocks
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also some minor speedup
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That takes a lot of time for even not so large wallets
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This can happen when there's a very large reorg on the daemon
(ie, on testnet)
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Subaddresses are better for privacy
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This should be proof against any way one might get to multiple
processing, such as generating the same derivation from the
same pubkey, etc
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as per "An Empirical Analysis of Linkability in the Monero
Blockchain", by Miller et al.
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Also added notes to WalletManager::verifyWalletPassword (which afaik seems unused
by anyone at the moment) regarding the need to unlock the keys file beforehand.
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Takes advantage of caching
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This is based on how much an attacking miner stands to lose in block
rewardy by mining a private chain which double spends a payment.
This is not foolproof, since mining is based on luck, and breaks
down as the attacking miner nears 50% of the network hash rate,
and the estimation is based on a constant block reward.
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Speeds up syncing with a lot of outgoing outputs as key generation
runs Cryptonight.
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Decrease the number of worker threads by one to account
for the fact the calling thread acts as a worker thread now
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key derivation and checking for incoming outputs are threaded
in batch before adding blocks to the local blockchain. Other
minor bits and bobs are also cached.
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Processing typically is the bottleneck
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also use reserve where appropriate
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This would cause crashes when trying to tag an account that was
just created
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for privacy reasons, so an untrusted node can't easily track
wallets from IP address to IP address, etc. The granularity
is 1024 blocks, which is about a day and a half.
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config::testnet::X : stagenet ? config::stagenet::X : config::X
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Cold signing was always using Borromean range proofs, causing
a larger tx, and an incorrect fee
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- unsigned_txset, signed_txset in transfer / submit_transfer / sign_transfer
- export_outputs, import_outputs
Squashed commits:
[f4d9f3d4] wallet-rpc: do_not_relay removed from submit_transfer
[5b16a86f] wallet-rpc: review-fix - method signature changes, renaming
[b7fbb10a] wallet-rpc: naming fixes (unsigned vs signed), consts renamed
[8c7d2727] wallet-rpc: sign_transfer added
[481d024a] wallet2: sign_tx splitted to work with strings and structs, more granular
[2a474db9] wallet-rpc: wallet2::load_unsigned_tx split to load from str, file
[b1e3a018] wallet-rpc: review fix, load_tx_from_str variable rename
[1f6373be] wallet-rpc: review fix: save_tx_to_{str,file}
[2a08eafc] wallet-rpc: review comments fixes
- redundant this removed from wallet2.cpp
- load_tx_from_str, load_tx_from_file
[43498052] wallet-rpc: submit_transfer added
[9c45d1ad] wallet-rpc: watch_only check, return unsigned_txset
[62831396] wallet2: added string variants to load_tx, save_tx
- analogously to save_multisig_tx
- required for monero-wallet-rpc to support watch-only wallet
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wallet
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My intention is to mitigate #3761 by returning "bad signature", rather than throwing an error, as the error is triggered inappropriately in the case of checking a different txid than the one used to create the signature, which causes issues for monerophp: https://github.com/monero-integrations/monerophp/issues/72 & my temp fix: https://github.com/monero-integrations/monerophp/pull/74
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public signer's key (libwallet & wallet api)
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This should cache the vast majority of calls for long running wallets
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When additional keys was needed, the TX scan failed because the
derivation data was always recomputed with the main tx_key and not
the corresponding additional one.
Moreover this patch avoid perf decreasing when not using HW device.
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This avoid massive memory consumption for huge wallets
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and get them pruned in find_and_save_rings, since it does not need
the pruned data in the first place.
Also set decode_to_json to false where missing, we don't need this
either.
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since people seem to really want to use things the wrong way.
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On client startup the device asks for authorization to export the private view key.
If user agree, the client hold the private view key allowing a fast blockchain scan.
If the user does not agree, the blockchain scan is fully done via the device.
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WalletApi: makeMultisig call introduced
WalletApi: finalizeMultisig call introduced
WalletApi: new calls exportMultisigImages and importMultisigImages
WalletApi: method to return multisig wallet creation state
WalletApi: create multisig transaction, sign multisig transaction, commit transaction and get multisig data are added
WalletApi: identation and style fixes
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The previous expression
req_t.from_height = X ? Y >= Z : 0;
forces the parameter to take the value of either 0 or 1.
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via user setting first, then DNS TXT record, hardcoded fallback
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It can now take a txid (to display rings for all its inputs),
and will print rings in a format that set_ring understands
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This will avoid careless forkers polluting the shared database
even if they make their own chain. They'll then automatically
start using another subdb, and any key-reusing fork of those
forks will reuse their subdbs.
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This is so one can set rings for spent key images in case the
attackers don't merge the ring matching patch set.
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If a pre-fork output is spent on both Monero and attack chain,
any post-fork output can be deduced to be a fake output, thereby
decreasing the effective ring size.
The segregate-per-fork-outputs option, on by default, allows
selecting only pre-fork outputs in this case, so that the same
ring can be used when spending it on the other side, which does
not decrease the effective ring size.
This is intended to be SET when intending to spend Monero on the
attack fork, and to be UNSET if not intending to spend Monero
on the attack fork (since it leaks the fact that the output being
spent is pre-fork).
If the user is not certain yet whether they will spend pre-fork
outputs on a key reusing fork, the key-reuse-mitigation2 option
should be SET instead.
If you use this option and intend to spend Monero on both forks,
then spend real Monero first.
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This maps key images to rings, so that different forks can reuse
the rings by key image. This avoids revealing the real inputs like
would happen if two forks spent the same outputs with different
rings. This database is meant to be shared with all Monero forks
which don't bother making a new chain, putting users' privacy at
risk in the process. It is placed in a shared data directory by
default ($HOME/.shared-ringdb on UNIX like systems). You may
use --shared-ringdb-dir to override this location, and should
then do so for all Monero forks for them to share the database.
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This completes and fixes various parameters docs
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invoke_http_json_rpc("/json_rpc",methodname,...) to reduce boilerplate
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When #3303 was merged, a cyclic dependency chain was generated:
libdevice <- libcncrypto <- libringct <- libdevice
This was because libdevice needs access to a set of basic crypto operations
implemented in libringct such as scalarmultBase(), while libringct also needs
access to abstracted crypto operations implemented in libdevice such as
ecdhEncode(). To untangle this cyclic dependency chain, this patch splits libringct
into libringct_basic and libringct, where the basic crypto ops previously in
libringct are moved into libringct_basic. The cyclic dependency is now resolved
thanks to this separation:
libcncrypto <- libringct_basic <- libdevice <- libcryptonote_basic <- libringct
This eliminates the need for crypto_device.cpp and rctOps_device.cpp.
Also, many abstracted interfaces of hw::device such as encrypt_payment_id() and
get_subaddress_secret_key() were previously implemented in libcryptonote_basic
(cryptonote_format_utils.cpp) and were then called from hw::core::device_default,
which is odd because libdevice is supposed to be independent of libcryptonote_basic.
Therefore, those functions were moved to device_default.cpp.
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enabled yet
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default is 0
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Fix the way the REAL mode is handle:
Let create_transactions_2 and create_transactions_from construct the vector of transactions.
Then iterate on it and resign.
We just need to add 'outs' list in the TX struct for that.
Fix default secret keys value when DEBUG_HWDEVICE mode is off
The magic value (00...00 for view key and FF..FF for spend key) was not correctly set
when DEBUG_HWDEVICE was off. Both was set to 00...00.
Add sub-address info in ABP map in order to correctly display destination sub-address on device
Fix DEBUG_HWDEVICE mode:
- Fix compilation errors.
- Fix control device init in ledger device.
- Add more log.
Fix sub addr control
Fix debug Info
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This is not a possible return from the daemon, but I want this in
now so all wallets handle this when the daemon starts doing so.
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wallets
Previously, a file containing the unencrypted Monero address was
created by default in the wallet's directory. This file might pose
as a privacy risk. The creation of this file is now opt-in and can
be enabled by providing
--create-address-file
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- save the new keys file as FOO-watchonly.keys, not FOO.keys-watchonly
- catch any exception (eg, I/O errors) and error out
- print the new keys filename in simplewallet
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The basic approach it to delegate all sensitive data (master key, secret
ephemeral key, key derivation, ....) and related operations to the device.
As device has low memory, it does not keep itself the values
(except for view/spend keys) but once computed there are encrypted (with AES
are equivalent) and return back to monero-wallet-cli. When they need to be
manipulated by the device, they are decrypted on receive.
Moreover, using the client for storing the value in encrypted form limits
the modification in the client code. Those values are transfered from one
C-structure to another one as previously.
The code modification has been done with the wishes to be open to any
other hardware wallet. To achieve that a C++ class hw::Device has been
introduced. Two initial implementations are provided: the "default", which
remaps all calls to initial Monero code, and the "Ledger", which delegates
all calls to Ledger device.
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Since commit b0426d4c refresh height for a newly created wallet
connected to a sync'd daemon was off by a month. Now we only use
the 1 month safety margin if we're unable to talk to a daemon.
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and set v7 height to 1057027 on testnet (one block earlier)
This is to easily dump current nodes since we're going to change
the v7 rules with this.
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not full)
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cryptonote:: instead
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Fixes #3080
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It can fail if it fails to parse extra, while still having filled
the returned data with partial contents
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Wallet caches and keys files are loaded with chacha8 as needed,
but only saved with chacha20. Other data (eg, cold wallet data
files, etc) will be incompatible.
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They are hex rather than words, because they are a lot longer
than "normal" seeds, as they have to embed a lot more information
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While there, move the wallet2 ctor to the cpp file as it's a huge
amount of init list now, and remove an unused one.
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Thanks to kenshi84 for help getting this work
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Useful to speed tests up and avoid unnecessary leftover files
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Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
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Scheme by luigi1111
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Partially implements #74.
Securely erases keys from memory after they are no longer needed. Might have a
performance impact, which I haven't measured (perf measurements aren't
generally reliable on laptops).
Thanks to @stoffu for the suggestion to specialize the pod_to_hex/hex_to_pod
functions. Using overloads + SFINAE instead generalizes it so other types can
be marked as scrubbed without adding more boilerplate.
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Helpful now that tx sizes are smaller
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Removing it nullified the min-outputs-{count,value} system,
and will not increase the number of attempted transactions
in the general case.
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