Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|
c9b13fbb tests/trezor: HF9 and HF10 tests (Dusan Klinec)
a1fd1d49 device/trezor: HF10 support added, wallet::API (Dusan Klinec)
d74d26f2 crypto: hmac_keccak added (Dusan Klinec)
|
|
- import only key images generated by cold signing process
- wallet_api: trezor methods added
- wallet: button request code added
- const added to methods
- wallet2::get_tx_key_device() tries to decrypt stored tx private keys using the device.
- simplewallet supports get_tx_key and get_tx_proof on hw device using the get_tx_key feature
- live refresh enables refresh with trezor i.e. computing key images on the fly. More convenient and efficient for users.
- device: has_ki_live_refresh added
- a thread is watching whether live refresh is being computed, if not for 30 seconds, it terminates the live refresh process - switches Trezor state
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
9acf42d3 Multisig M/N functionality core tests added (naughtyfox)
9f3963e8 Arbitrary M/N multisig schemes: * support in wallet2 * support in monero-wallet-cli * support in monero-wallet-rpc * support in wallet api * support in monero-gen-trusted-multisig * unit tests for multisig wallets creation (naughtyfox)
|
|
* support in wallet2
* support in monero-wallet-cli
* support in monero-wallet-rpc
* support in wallet api
* support in monero-gen-trusted-multisig
* unit tests for multisig wallets creation
|
|
amount and offset (instead of pubkey)
|
|
|
|
6e6ffc06 wallet2_api: bring up to latest wallet api (moneromooo-monero)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Also added notes to WalletManager::verifyWalletPassword (which afaik seems unused
by anyone at the moment) regarding the need to unlock the keys file beforehand.
|
|
|
|
8787fd8 WalletApi: publicMultisigSignerKey method (naughtyfox)
|
|
b21bc00 Wallet: added methods to sign and verify arbitrary message with multisig public signer's key (libwallet & wallet api) (naughtyfox)
|
|
47fdb74 WalletApi: getMultisigInfo entry for gui wallets... (naughtyfox)
47fdb74 Refactored: work with wallet api statuses to make setting and getting operations atomic along with error strings (naughtyfox)
|
|
|
|
public signer's key (libwallet & wallet api)
|
|
|
|
reconnectivng every time
|
|
WalletApi: makeMultisig call introduced
WalletApi: finalizeMultisig call introduced
WalletApi: new calls exportMultisigImages and importMultisigImages
WalletApi: method to return multisig wallet creation state
WalletApi: create multisig transaction, sign multisig transaction, commit transaction and get multisig data are added
WalletApi: identation and style fixes
|
|
operations atomic along with error strings
WalletApi: added method statusWithErrorString to atomically retrieve error with error string
|
|
It can now take a txid (to display rings for all its inputs),
and will print rings in a format that set_ring understands
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1ff35fda Wallet API: make nettype non-defaulted to disambiguate from deprecated versions (and make libwallet_api_tests compilable) (stoffu)
|
|
e0cda74a wallet2_api: add info/error/warning entry points (moneromooo-monero)
|
|
|
|
versions (and make libwallet_api_tests compilable)
|
|
0e7ad2e2 Wallet API: generalize 'bool testnet' to 'NetworkType nettype' (stoffu)
af773211 Stagenet (stoffu)
cc9a0bee command_line: allow args to depend on more than one args (stoffu)
55f8d917 command_line::get_arg: remove 'required' for dependent args as they're always optional (stoffu)
450306a0 command line: allow has_arg to handle arg_descriptor<bool,false,true> #3318 (stoffu)
9f9e095a Use `genesis_tx` parameter in `generate_genesis_block`. #3261 (Jean Pierre Dudey)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
not full)
|
|
a9cae0ab Wallet API: remove unused enum Priority from UnsignedTransaction (stoffu)
|
|
939629e8 Wallet API: all recover options with password (m2049r)
|
|
|
|
|
|
also renamed memo => mnemonic in api method parms
|
|
|
|
|
|
Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
|
|
51895fd7 split wallet and wallet_api (moneromooo-monero)
|
|
This speeds up building a lot when wallet2.h (or something it
includes) changes, since all the API includes wallet2.h
|