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a0613532 secure_pwd_reader: Add proper Unicode handling [Ryo contribution] (fireice-uk)
579383c2 simplewallet: Add Unicode input_line [Ryo backport] (fireice-uk)
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25e5890d wallet: fix --generate-from-json using wrong password (moneromooo-monero)
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Coverity 188408
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Those use the extra nonce without a payment id
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'outputs' option allows to specify the number of
separate outputs of smaller denomination that will
be created by sweep operation.
rebased by moneromooo
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- device name is a new wallet property
- full device name is now a bit more structured so we can address particular device vendor + device path. Example: 'Ledger', 'Trezor:udp', 'Trezor:udp:127.0.0.1:21324', 'Trezor:bridge:usb01'. The part before ':' identifies HW device implementation, the optional part after ':' is device path to look for.
- new --hw-device parameter added to the wallet, can name the hardware device
- device reconnect added
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The secret spend key is kept encrypted in memory, and
decrypted on the fly when needed.
Both spend and view secret keys are kept encrypted in a JSON
field in the keys file. This avoids leaving the keys in
memory due to being manipulated by the JSON I/O API.
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to match those used by the various transfer functions
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Many people are using this as a "let's see what this does" command
when something doesn't work as they thought it should, and thus
destroying info that they might still need.
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Subaddresses are better for privacy
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avoids people thinking it's somehow a generic AE system
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Takes advantage of caching
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For some reason, this confuses and kills ASAN on startup
as it thinks const uint8_t ipv4_network_address::ID is
defined multiple times.
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This is based on how much an attacking miner stands to lose in block
rewardy by mining a private chain which double spends a payment.
This is not foolproof, since mining is based on luck, and breaks
down as the attacking miner nears 50% of the network hash rate,
and the estimation is based on a constant block reward.
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for privacy reasons, so an untrusted node can't easily track
wallets from IP address to IP address, etc. The granularity
is 1024 blocks, which is about a day and a half.
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config::testnet::X : stagenet ? config::stagenet::X : config::X
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Otherwise the previous daemon's trustedness would carry over.
If not specified, the local address check is performed again.
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- unsigned_txset, signed_txset in transfer / submit_transfer / sign_transfer
- export_outputs, import_outputs
Squashed commits:
[f4d9f3d4] wallet-rpc: do_not_relay removed from submit_transfer
[5b16a86f] wallet-rpc: review-fix - method signature changes, renaming
[b7fbb10a] wallet-rpc: naming fixes (unsigned vs signed), consts renamed
[8c7d2727] wallet-rpc: sign_transfer added
[481d024a] wallet2: sign_tx splitted to work with strings and structs, more granular
[2a474db9] wallet-rpc: wallet2::load_unsigned_tx split to load from str, file
[b1e3a018] wallet-rpc: review fix, load_tx_from_str variable rename
[1f6373be] wallet-rpc: review fix: save_tx_to_{str,file}
[2a08eafc] wallet-rpc: review comments fixes
- redundant this removed from wallet2.cpp
- load_tx_from_str, load_tx_from_file
[43498052] wallet-rpc: submit_transfer added
[9c45d1ad] wallet-rpc: watch_only check, return unsigned_txset
[62831396] wallet2: added string variants to load_tx, save_tx
- analogously to save_multisig_tx
- required for monero-wallet-rpc to support watch-only wallet
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wallet
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given
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Change the wallet's 'show_transfers' command to always output the transaction date with timestamp (24 hour UTC).
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When creating/restoring wallet, if --restore-height option is not used the current estimate
height is used for starting the scan. In other words it is assume we are creating a new account.
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On some Windows systems, displaying language names in their own
languages freezes the display.
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via user setting first, then DNS TXT record, hardcoded fallback
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lookahead in order to avoid
so looooong time of set-up when creating a HW based wallet.
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It can now take a txid (to display rings for all its inputs),
and will print rings in a format that set_ring understands
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This is so one can set rings for spent key images in case the
attackers don't merge the ring matching patch set.
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If a pre-fork output is spent on both Monero and attack chain,
any post-fork output can be deduced to be a fake output, thereby
decreasing the effective ring size.
The segregate-per-fork-outputs option, on by default, allows
selecting only pre-fork outputs in this case, so that the same
ring can be used when spending it on the other side, which does
not decrease the effective ring size.
This is intended to be SET when intending to spend Monero on the
attack fork, and to be UNSET if not intending to spend Monero
on the attack fork (since it leaks the fact that the output being
spent is pre-fork).
If the user is not certain yet whether they will spend pre-fork
outputs on a key reusing fork, the key-reuse-mitigation2 option
should be SET instead.
If you use this option and intend to spend Monero on both forks,
then spend real Monero first.
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This maps key images to rings, so that different forks can reuse
the rings by key image. This avoids revealing the real inputs like
would happen if two forks spent the same outputs with different
rings. This database is meant to be shared with all Monero forks
which don't bother making a new chain, putting users' privacy at
risk in the process. It is placed in a shared data directory by
default ($HOME/.shared-ringdb on UNIX like systems). You may
use --shared-ringdb-dir to override this location, and should
then do so for all Monero forks for them to share the database.
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A malicious daemon (or MITM) could attempt to add spurious errors
so the wallet tries again, sending another set of fake outs.
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calls to wallet2
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When #3303 was merged, a cyclic dependency chain was generated:
libdevice <- libcncrypto <- libringct <- libdevice
This was because libdevice needs access to a set of basic crypto operations
implemented in libringct such as scalarmultBase(), while libringct also needs
access to abstracted crypto operations implemented in libdevice such as
ecdhEncode(). To untangle this cyclic dependency chain, this patch splits libringct
into libringct_basic and libringct, where the basic crypto ops previously in
libringct are moved into libringct_basic. The cyclic dependency is now resolved
thanks to this separation:
libcncrypto <- libringct_basic <- libdevice <- libcryptonote_basic <- libringct
This eliminates the need for crypto_device.cpp and rctOps_device.cpp.
Also, many abstracted interfaces of hw::device such as encrypt_payment_id() and
get_subaddress_secret_key() were previously implemented in libcryptonote_basic
(cryptonote_format_utils.cpp) and were then called from hw::core::device_default,
which is odd because libdevice is supposed to be independent of libcryptonote_basic.
Therefore, those functions were moved to device_default.cpp.
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Speeds up refresh when you have a lot of in/out transactions
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wallets
Previously, a file containing the unencrypted Monero address was
created by default in the wallet's directory. This file might pose
as a privacy risk. The creation of this file is now opt-in and can
be enabled by providing
--create-address-file
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- save the new keys file as FOO-watchonly.keys, not FOO.keys-watchonly
- catch any exception (eg, I/O errors) and error out
- print the new keys filename in simplewallet
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The basic approach it to delegate all sensitive data (master key, secret
ephemeral key, key derivation, ....) and related operations to the device.
As device has low memory, it does not keep itself the values
(except for view/spend keys) but once computed there are encrypted (with AES
are equivalent) and return back to monero-wallet-cli. When they need to be
manipulated by the device, they are decrypted on receive.
Moreover, using the client for storing the value in encrypted form limits
the modification in the client code. Those values are transfered from one
C-structure to another one as previously.
The code modification has been done with the wishes to be open to any
other hardware wallet. To achieve that a C++ class hw::Device has been
introduced. Two initial implementations are provided: the "default", which
remaps all calls to initial Monero code, and the "Ledger", which delegates
all calls to Ledger device.
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And also use uint64_t instead of int for heights where appropriate
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Coverity 182493
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not full)
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cryptonote:: instead
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Fixes #3080
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Avoids surprising the user with "sending 0 to..."
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Change some confirmation dialog to look like other ones (add symbol ":" and space)
So, it will look like: (Y/Yes/N/No): y
Now it look: (Y/Yes/N/No)y
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Signed-off-by: Maxithi <34792056+Maxithi@users.noreply.github.com>
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'export_multisig_info'
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This ensures we can't get races
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They are hex rather than words, because they are a lot longer
than "normal" seeds, as they have to embed a lot more information
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It exports raw transactions, so they may be used by other tools,
for instance to be relayed to the network externally.
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Scheme by luigi1111:
Multisig for RingCT on Monero
2 of 2
User A (coordinator):
Spendkey b,B
Viewkey a,A (shared)
User B:
Spendkey c,C
Viewkey a,A (shared)
Public Address: C+B, A
Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a
A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)
A and B watch for incoming outputs
B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)
B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.
A also creates "half" key images:
I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)
Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D
Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).
A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).
At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).
B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).
B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.
NOTE:
A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).
2 of 3
User A (coordinator)
Shared viewkey a,A
"spendkey" j,J
User B
"spendkey" k,K
User C
"spendkey" m,M
A collects K and M from B and C
B collects J and M from A and C
C collects J and K from A and B
A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)
B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate
Address: N+O+P, A
The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.
Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
A gives j to B
B gives k to C
C gives m to A
Address: J+K+M, A
3 of 3
Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
or send it back to A.
N-1 of N
Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
(using either the secure or insecure method).
For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
[4 of 5]
User: spendkey
A: a
B: b
C: c
D: d
E: e
a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A
Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.
You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.
The process is somewhat cumbersome:
To create a N/N multisig wallet:
- each participant creates a normal wallet
- each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
- each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)
As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:
- each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
- each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants
Then, a transaction may be initiated:
- one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
- this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
- the initiator sends this file to another participant
- that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
- the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
- if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
- the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
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Scheme by luigi1111
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The shared RPC code is now moved off into a separate lib
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If no subaddress index is given, consider all of them
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Monero.ts: Fewer pleases in seed NOTE
Monero_it.ts: Fewer pleases in seed NOTE
Monero_fr.ts: Fewer pleases in seed NOTE
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- refactoring: proof generation/checking code was moved from simplewallet.cpp to wallet2.cpp
- allow an arbitrary message to be signed together with txid
- introduce two types (outbound & inbound) of tx proofs; with the same syntax, inbound is selected when <address> belongs to this wallet, outbound otherwise. see GitHub thread for more discussion
- wallet RPC: added get_tx_key, check_tx_key, get_tx_proof, check_tx_proof
- wallet API: moved WalletManagerImpl::checkPayment to Wallet::checkTxKey, added Wallet::getTxProof/checkTxProof
- get_tx_key/check_tx_key: handle additional tx keys by concatenating them into a single string
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Avoids turning it to a huge number
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Missed a crypto::null_pkey in PR#2629
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Missed an input_line() change
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wallet2 is a library, and should not prompt for stdin. Instead,
pass a function so simplewallet can prompt on stdin, and a GUI
might display a window, etc.
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It was only used there, and this removes one part of the common
dependency on libreadline
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This ensures they don't go out of sync when adding/changing them,
and makes the code easier to deal with.
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It's nasty, and actually breaks on Solaris, where if.h fails to
build due to:
struct map *if_memmap;
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wallet2::get_payments etc
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It'd be interpreted as a huge one (~0 fake outs)
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This yields a clear error message rather then some possibly
confusing more technical errors down the line
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Transactions in the txpool are marked when another transaction
is seen double spending one or more of its inputs.
This is then exposed wherever appropriate.
Note that being marked with this "double spend seen" flag does
NOT mean this transaction IS a double spend and will never be
mined: it just means that the network has seen at least another
transaction spending at least one of the same inputs, so care
should be taken to wait for a few confirmations before acting
upon that transaction (ie, mostly of use for merchants wanting
to accept unconfirmed transactions).
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Executing 'sweep_all' with no arguments segfaulted before.
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They are actually wrong if the wallet is setup in a different
denomination, and it's incursion of extrinsic lingo where monero
fits perfectly in the first place.
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Fix #1530
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It'd be set to the current wallet default instead
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Also mention those options in the start_mining help line
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CID 175308
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Also, set_log without parameters now prints the log categories
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This uses luigi1111's CN_Add method.
See https://xmr.llcoins.net for details.
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including expected transaction backlog at different priorities
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Suspend readline when refreshing
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Add `--mnemonic-language` command-line arg so it's possible to generate a wallet
without interacting with the CLI.
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