diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/ringct')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/ringct/bulletproofs.cc | 761 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/ringct/bulletproofs.h | 47 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/ringct/rctOps.cpp | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/ringct/rctOps.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp | 147 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/ringct/rctSigs.h | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/ringct/rctTypes.h | 87 |
8 files changed, 1017 insertions, 52 deletions
diff --git a/src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt b/src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt index f9862ac80..1452e5367 100644 --- a/src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt @@ -30,14 +30,16 @@ set(ringct_sources rctOps.cpp rctSigs.cpp rctTypes.cpp - rctCryptoOps.c) + rctCryptoOps.c + bulletproofs.cc) set(ringct_headers) set(ringct_private_headers rctOps.h rctSigs.h - rctTypes.h) + rctTypes.h + bulletproofs.h) monero_private_headers(ringct ${crypto_private_headers}) @@ -51,4 +53,5 @@ target_link_libraries(ringct cncrypto cryptonote_basic PRIVATE + ${OPENSSL_LIBRARIES} ${EXTRA_LIBRARIES}) diff --git a/src/ringct/bulletproofs.cc b/src/ringct/bulletproofs.cc new file mode 100644 index 000000000..51cf9e3be --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ringct/bulletproofs.cc @@ -0,0 +1,761 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2017, The Monero Project +// +// All rights reserved. +// +// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are +// permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +// +// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of +// conditions and the following disclaimer. +// +// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list +// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other +// materials provided with the distribution. +// +// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be +// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific +// prior written permission. +// +// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY +// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL +// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, +// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, +// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF +// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +// +// Adapted from Java code by Sarang Noether + +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <openssl/ssl.h> +#include <boost/thread/mutex.hpp> +#include "misc_log_ex.h" +#include "common/perf_timer.h" +extern "C" +{ +#include "crypto/crypto-ops.h" +} +#include "rctOps.h" +#include "bulletproofs.h" + +#undef MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY +#define MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY "bulletproofs" + +//#define DEBUG_BP + +#define PERF_TIMER_START_BP(x) PERF_TIMER_START_UNIT(x, 1000000) + +namespace rct +{ + +static rct::key vector_exponent(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b); +static rct::keyV vector_powers(rct::key x, size_t n); +static rct::key inner_product(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b); + +static constexpr size_t maxN = 64; +static rct::key Hi[maxN], Gi[maxN]; +static ge_dsmp Gprecomp[64], Hprecomp[64]; +static const rct::key TWO = { {0x02, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 } }; +static const rct::keyV oneN = vector_powers(rct::identity(), maxN); +static const rct::keyV twoN = vector_powers(TWO, maxN); +static const rct::key ip12 = inner_product(oneN, twoN); +static boost::mutex init_mutex; + +static rct::key get_exponent(const rct::key &base, size_t idx) +{ + static const std::string salt("bulletproof"); + std::string hashed = std::string((const char*)base.bytes, sizeof(base)) + salt + tools::get_varint_data(idx); + return rct::hashToPoint(rct::hash2rct(crypto::cn_fast_hash(hashed.data(), hashed.size()))); +} + +static void init_exponents() +{ + boost::lock_guard<boost::mutex> lock(init_mutex); + + static bool init_done = false; + if (init_done) + return; + for (size_t i = 0; i < maxN; ++i) + { + Hi[i] = get_exponent(rct::H, i * 2); + rct::precomp(Hprecomp[i], Hi[i]); + Gi[i] = get_exponent(rct::H, i * 2 + 1); + rct::precomp(Gprecomp[i], Gi[i]); + } + init_done = true; +} + +/* Given two scalar arrays, construct a vector commitment */ +static rct::key vector_exponent(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b) +{ + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() <= maxN, "Incompatible sizes of a and maxN"); + rct::key res = rct::identity(); + for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) + { + rct::key term; + rct::addKeys3(term, a[i], Gprecomp[i], b[i], Hprecomp[i]); + rct::addKeys(res, res, term); + } + return res; +} + +/* Compute a custom vector-scalar commitment */ +static rct::key vector_exponent_custom(const rct::keyV &A, const rct::keyV &B, const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b) +{ + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(A.size() == B.size(), "Incompatible sizes of A and B"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == A.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and A"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() <= maxN, "Incompatible sizes of a and maxN"); + rct::key res = rct::identity(); + for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) + { + rct::key term; +#if 0 + // we happen to know where A and B might fall, so don't bother checking the rest + ge_dsmp *Acache = NULL, *Bcache = NULL; + ge_dsmp Acache_custom[1], Bcache_custom[1]; + if (Gi[i] == A[i]) + Acache = Gprecomp + i; + else if (i<32 && Gi[i+32] == A[i]) + Acache = Gprecomp + i + 32; + else + { + rct::precomp(Acache_custom[0], A[i]); + Acache = Acache_custom; + } + if (i == 0 && B[i] == Hi[0]) + Bcache = Hprecomp; + else + { + rct::precomp(Bcache_custom[0], B[i]); + Bcache = Bcache_custom; + } + rct::addKeys3(term, a[i], *Acache, b[i], *Bcache); +#else + ge_dsmp Acache, Bcache; + rct::precomp(Bcache, B[i]); + rct::addKeys3(term, a[i], A[i], b[i], Bcache); +#endif + rct::addKeys(res, res, term); + } + return res; +} + +/* Given a scalar, construct a vector of powers */ +static rct::keyV vector_powers(rct::key x, size_t n) +{ + rct::keyV res(n); + if (n == 0) + return res; + res[0] = rct::identity(); + if (n == 1) + return res; + res[1] = x; + for (size_t i = 2; i < n; ++i) + { + sc_mul(res[i].bytes, res[i-1].bytes, x.bytes); + } + return res; +} + +/* Given two scalar arrays, construct the inner product */ +static rct::key inner_product(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b) +{ + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b"); + rct::key res = rct::zero(); + for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) + { + sc_muladd(res.bytes, a[i].bytes, b[i].bytes, res.bytes); + } + return res; +} + +/* Given two scalar arrays, construct the Hadamard product */ +static rct::keyV hadamard(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b) +{ + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b"); + rct::keyV res(a.size()); + for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) + { + sc_mul(res[i].bytes, a[i].bytes, b[i].bytes); + } + return res; +} + +/* Given two curvepoint arrays, construct the Hadamard product */ +static rct::keyV hadamard2(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b) +{ + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b"); + rct::keyV res(a.size()); + for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) + { + rct::addKeys(res[i], a[i], b[i]); + } + return res; +} + +/* Add two vectors */ +static rct::keyV vector_add(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b) +{ + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b"); + rct::keyV res(a.size()); + for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) + { + sc_add(res[i].bytes, a[i].bytes, b[i].bytes); + } + return res; +} + +/* Subtract two vectors */ +static rct::keyV vector_subtract(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b) +{ + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b"); + rct::keyV res(a.size()); + for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) + { + sc_sub(res[i].bytes, a[i].bytes, b[i].bytes); + } + return res; +} + +/* Multiply a scalar and a vector */ +static rct::keyV vector_scalar(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::key &x) +{ + rct::keyV res(a.size()); + for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) + { + sc_mul(res[i].bytes, a[i].bytes, x.bytes); + } + return res; +} + +/* Exponentiate a curve vector by a scalar */ +static rct::keyV vector_scalar2(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::key &x) +{ + rct::keyV res(a.size()); + for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i) + { + rct::scalarmultKey(res[i], a[i], x); + } + return res; +} + +static rct::key switch_endianness(rct::key k) +{ + std::reverse(k.bytes, k.bytes + sizeof(k)); + return k; +} + +/* Compute the inverse of a scalar, the stupid way */ +static rct::key invert(const rct::key &x) +{ + rct::key inv; + + BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + BIGNUM *X = BN_new(); + BIGNUM *L = BN_new(); + BIGNUM *I = BN_new(); + + BN_bin2bn(switch_endianness(x).bytes, sizeof(rct::key), X); + BN_bin2bn(switch_endianness(rct::curveOrder()).bytes, sizeof(rct::key), L); + + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(BN_mod_inverse(I, X, L, ctx), "Failed to invert"); + + const int len = BN_num_bytes(I); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES((size_t)len <= sizeof(rct::key), "Invalid number length"); + inv = rct::zero(); + BN_bn2bin(I, inv.bytes); + std::reverse(inv.bytes, inv.bytes + len); + + BN_free(I); + BN_free(L); + BN_free(X); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + +#ifdef DEBUG_BP + rct::key tmp; + sc_mul(tmp.bytes, inv.bytes, x.bytes); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(tmp == rct::identity(), "invert failed"); +#endif + return inv; +} + +/* Compute the slice of a vector */ +static rct::keyV slice(const rct::keyV &a, size_t start, size_t stop) +{ + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(start < a.size(), "Invalid start index"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(stop <= a.size(), "Invalid stop index"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(start < stop, "Invalid start/stop indices"); + rct::keyV res(stop - start); + for (size_t i = start; i < stop; ++i) + { + res[i - start] = a[i]; + } + return res; +} + +/* Given a value v (0..2^N-1) and a mask gamma, construct a range proof */ +Bulletproof bulletproof_PROVE(const rct::key &sv, const rct::key &gamma) +{ + init_exponents(); + + PERF_TIMER_UNIT(PROVE, 1000000); + + constexpr size_t logN = 6; // log2(64) + constexpr size_t N = 1<<logN; + + rct::key V; + rct::keyV aL(N), aR(N); + + PERF_TIMER_START_BP(PROVE_v); + rct::addKeys2(V, gamma, sv, rct::H); + PERF_TIMER_STOP(PROVE_v); + + PERF_TIMER_START_BP(PROVE_aLaR); + for (size_t i = N; i-- > 0; ) + { + if (sv[i/8] & (((uint64_t)1)<<(i%8))) + { + aL[i] = rct::identity(); + } + else + { + aL[i] = rct::zero(); + } + sc_sub(aR[i].bytes, aL[i].bytes, rct::identity().bytes); + } + PERF_TIMER_STOP(PROVE_aLaR); + + + // DEBUG: Test to ensure this recovers the value +#ifdef DEBUG_BP + uint64_t test_aL = 0, test_aR = 0; + for (size_t i = 0; i < N; ++i) + { + if (aL[i] == rct::identity()) + test_aL += ((uint64_t)1)<<i; + if (aR[i] == rct::zero()) + test_aR += ((uint64_t)1)<<i; + } + uint64_t v_test = 0; + for (int n = 0; n < 8; ++n) v_test |= (((uint64_t)sv[n]) << (8*n)); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(test_aL == v_test, "test_aL failed"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(test_aR == v_test, "test_aR failed"); +#endif + + PERF_TIMER_START_BP(PROVE_step1); + // PAPER LINES 38-39 + rct::key alpha = rct::skGen(); + rct::key ve = vector_exponent(aL, aR); + rct::key A; + rct::addKeys(A, ve, rct::scalarmultBase(alpha)); + + // PAPER LINES 40-42 + rct::keyV sL = rct::skvGen(N), sR = rct::skvGen(N); + rct::key rho = rct::skGen(); + ve = vector_exponent(sL, sR); + rct::key S; + rct::addKeys(S, ve, rct::scalarmultBase(rho)); + + // PAPER LINES 43-45 + rct::keyV hashed; + hashed.push_back(A); + hashed.push_back(S); + rct::key y = rct::hash_to_scalar(hashed); + rct::key z = rct::hash_to_scalar(y); + + // Polynomial construction before PAPER LINE 46 + rct::key t0 = rct::zero(); + rct::key t1 = rct::zero(); + rct::key t2 = rct::zero(); + + const auto yN = vector_powers(y, N); + + rct::key ip1y = inner_product(oneN, yN); + rct::key tmp; + sc_muladd(t0.bytes, z.bytes, ip1y.bytes, t0.bytes); + + rct::key zsq; + sc_mul(zsq.bytes, z.bytes, z.bytes); + sc_muladd(t0.bytes, zsq.bytes, sv.bytes, t0.bytes); + + rct::key k = rct::zero(); + sc_mulsub(k.bytes, zsq.bytes, ip1y.bytes, k.bytes); + + rct::key zcu; + sc_mul(zcu.bytes, zsq.bytes, z.bytes); + sc_mulsub(k.bytes, zcu.bytes, ip12.bytes, k.bytes); + sc_add(t0.bytes, t0.bytes, k.bytes); + + // DEBUG: Test the value of t0 has the correct form +#ifdef DEBUG_BP + rct::key test_t0 = rct::zero(); + rct::key iph = inner_product(aL, hadamard(aR, yN)); + sc_add(test_t0.bytes, test_t0.bytes, iph.bytes); + rct::key ips = inner_product(vector_subtract(aL, aR), yN); + sc_muladd(test_t0.bytes, z.bytes, ips.bytes, test_t0.bytes); + rct::key ipt = inner_product(twoN, aL); + sc_muladd(test_t0.bytes, zsq.bytes, ipt.bytes, test_t0.bytes); + sc_add(test_t0.bytes, test_t0.bytes, k.bytes); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(t0 == test_t0, "t0 check failed"); +#endif + PERF_TIMER_STOP(PROVE_step1); + + PERF_TIMER_START_BP(PROVE_step2); + const auto HyNsR = hadamard(yN, sR); + const auto vpIz = vector_scalar(oneN, z); + const auto vp2zsq = vector_scalar(twoN, zsq); + const auto aL_vpIz = vector_subtract(aL, vpIz); + const auto aR_vpIz = vector_add(aR, vpIz); + + rct::key ip1 = inner_product(aL_vpIz, HyNsR); + sc_add(t1.bytes, t1.bytes, ip1.bytes); + + rct::key ip2 = inner_product(sL, vector_add(hadamard(yN, aR_vpIz), vp2zsq)); + sc_add(t1.bytes, t1.bytes, ip2.bytes); + + rct::key ip3 = inner_product(sL, HyNsR); + sc_add(t2.bytes, t2.bytes, ip3.bytes); + + // PAPER LINES 47-48 + rct::key tau1 = rct::skGen(), tau2 = rct::skGen(); + + rct::key T1 = rct::addKeys(rct::scalarmultKey(rct::H, t1), rct::scalarmultBase(tau1)); + rct::key T2 = rct::addKeys(rct::scalarmultKey(rct::H, t2), rct::scalarmultBase(tau2)); + + // PAPER LINES 49-51 + hashed.clear(); + hashed.push_back(z); + hashed.push_back(T1); + hashed.push_back(T2); + rct::key x = rct::hash_to_scalar(hashed); + + // PAPER LINES 52-53 + rct::key taux = rct::zero(); + sc_mul(taux.bytes, tau1.bytes, x.bytes); + rct::key xsq; + sc_mul(xsq.bytes, x.bytes, x.bytes); + sc_muladd(taux.bytes, tau2.bytes, xsq.bytes, taux.bytes); + sc_muladd(taux.bytes, gamma.bytes, zsq.bytes, taux.bytes); + rct::key mu; + sc_muladd(mu.bytes, x.bytes, rho.bytes, alpha.bytes); + + // PAPER LINES 54-57 + rct::keyV l = vector_add(aL_vpIz, vector_scalar(sL, x)); + rct::keyV r = vector_add(hadamard(yN, vector_add(aR_vpIz, vector_scalar(sR, x))), vp2zsq); + PERF_TIMER_STOP(PROVE_step2); + + PERF_TIMER_START_BP(PROVE_step3); + rct::key t = inner_product(l, r); + + // DEBUG: Test if the l and r vectors match the polynomial forms +#ifdef DEBUG_BP + rct::key test_t; + sc_muladd(test_t.bytes, t1.bytes, x.bytes, t0.bytes); + sc_muladd(test_t.bytes, t2.bytes, xsq.bytes, test_t.bytes); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(test_t == t, "test_t check failed"); +#endif + + // PAPER LINES 32-33 + hashed.clear(); + hashed.push_back(x); + hashed.push_back(taux); + hashed.push_back(mu); + hashed.push_back(t); + rct::key x_ip = rct::hash_to_scalar(hashed); + + // These are used in the inner product rounds + size_t nprime = N; + rct::keyV Gprime(N); + rct::keyV Hprime(N); + rct::keyV aprime(N); + rct::keyV bprime(N); + const rct::key yinv = invert(y); + rct::key yinvpow = rct::identity(); + for (size_t i = 0; i < N; ++i) + { + Gprime[i] = Gi[i]; + Hprime[i] = scalarmultKey(Hi[i], yinvpow); + sc_mul(yinvpow.bytes, yinvpow.bytes, yinv.bytes); + aprime[i] = l[i]; + bprime[i] = r[i]; + } + rct::keyV L(logN); + rct::keyV R(logN); + int round = 0; + rct::keyV w(logN); // this is the challenge x in the inner product protocol + PERF_TIMER_STOP(PROVE_step3); + + PERF_TIMER_START_BP(PROVE_step4); + // PAPER LINE 13 + while (nprime > 1) + { + // PAPER LINE 15 + nprime /= 2; + + // PAPER LINES 16-17 + rct::key cL = inner_product(slice(aprime, 0, nprime), slice(bprime, nprime, bprime.size())); + rct::key cR = inner_product(slice(aprime, nprime, aprime.size()), slice(bprime, 0, nprime)); + + // PAPER LINES 18-19 + L[round] = vector_exponent_custom(slice(Gprime, nprime, Gprime.size()), slice(Hprime, 0, nprime), slice(aprime, 0, nprime), slice(bprime, nprime, bprime.size())); + sc_mul(tmp.bytes, cL.bytes, x_ip.bytes); + rct::addKeys(L[round], L[round], rct::scalarmultKey(rct::H, tmp)); + R[round] = vector_exponent_custom(slice(Gprime, 0, nprime), slice(Hprime, nprime, Hprime.size()), slice(aprime, nprime, aprime.size()), slice(bprime, 0, nprime)); + sc_mul(tmp.bytes, cR.bytes, x_ip.bytes); + rct::addKeys(R[round], R[round], rct::scalarmultKey(rct::H, tmp)); + + // PAPER LINES 21-22 + hashed.clear(); + if (round == 0) + { + hashed.push_back(L[0]); + hashed.push_back(R[0]); + w[0] = rct::hash_to_scalar(hashed); + } + else + { + hashed.push_back(w[round - 1]); + hashed.push_back(L[round]); + hashed.push_back(R[round]); + w[round] = rct::hash_to_scalar(hashed); + } + + // PAPER LINES 24-25 + const rct::key winv = invert(w[round]); + Gprime = hadamard2(vector_scalar2(slice(Gprime, 0, nprime), winv), vector_scalar2(slice(Gprime, nprime, Gprime.size()), w[round])); + Hprime = hadamard2(vector_scalar2(slice(Hprime, 0, nprime), w[round]), vector_scalar2(slice(Hprime, nprime, Hprime.size()), winv)); + + // PAPER LINES 28-29 + aprime = vector_add(vector_scalar(slice(aprime, 0, nprime), w[round]), vector_scalar(slice(aprime, nprime, aprime.size()), winv)); + bprime = vector_add(vector_scalar(slice(bprime, 0, nprime), winv), vector_scalar(slice(bprime, nprime, bprime.size()), w[round])); + + ++round; + } + PERF_TIMER_STOP(PROVE_step4); + + // PAPER LINE 58 (with inclusions from PAPER LINE 8 and PAPER LINE 20) + return Bulletproof(V, A, S, T1, T2, taux, mu, L, R, aprime[0], bprime[0], t); +} + +Bulletproof bulletproof_PROVE(uint64_t v, const rct::key &gamma) +{ + // vG + gammaH + PERF_TIMER_START_BP(PROVE_v); + rct::key sv = rct::zero(); + sv.bytes[0] = v & 255; + sv.bytes[1] = (v >> 8) & 255; + sv.bytes[2] = (v >> 16) & 255; + sv.bytes[3] = (v >> 24) & 255; + sv.bytes[4] = (v >> 32) & 255; + sv.bytes[5] = (v >> 40) & 255; + sv.bytes[6] = (v >> 48) & 255; + sv.bytes[7] = (v >> 56) & 255; + PERF_TIMER_STOP(PROVE_v); + return bulletproof_PROVE(sv, gamma); +} + +/* Given a range proof, determine if it is valid */ +bool bulletproof_VERIFY(const Bulletproof &proof) +{ + init_exponents(); + + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() == proof.R.size(), false, "Mismatched L and R sizes"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() > 0, false, "Empty proof"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() == 6, false, "Proof is not for 64 bits"); + + const size_t logN = proof.L.size(); + const size_t N = 1 << logN; + + // Reconstruct the challenges + PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY); + PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_start); + rct::keyV hashed; + hashed.push_back(proof.A); + hashed.push_back(proof.S); + rct::key y = rct::hash_to_scalar(hashed); + rct::key z = rct::hash_to_scalar(y); + hashed.clear(); + hashed.push_back(z); + hashed.push_back(proof.T1); + hashed.push_back(proof.T2); + rct::key x = rct::hash_to_scalar(hashed); + PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_start); + + PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_60); + // Reconstruct the challenges + hashed.clear(); + hashed.push_back(x); + hashed.push_back(proof.taux); + hashed.push_back(proof.mu); + hashed.push_back(proof.t); + rct::key x_ip = hash_to_scalar(hashed); + PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_60); + + PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_61); + // PAPER LINE 61 + rct::key L61Left = rct::addKeys(rct::scalarmultBase(proof.taux), rct::scalarmultKey(rct::H, proof.t)); + + rct::key k = rct::zero(); + const auto yN = vector_powers(y, N); + rct::key ip1y = inner_product(oneN, yN); + rct::key zsq; + sc_mul(zsq.bytes, z.bytes, z.bytes); + rct::key tmp, tmp2; + sc_mulsub(k.bytes, zsq.bytes, ip1y.bytes, k.bytes); + rct::key zcu; + sc_mul(zcu.bytes, zsq.bytes, z.bytes); + sc_mulsub(k.bytes, zcu.bytes, ip12.bytes, k.bytes); + PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_61); + + PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_61rl); + sc_muladd(tmp.bytes, z.bytes, ip1y.bytes, k.bytes); + rct::key L61Right = rct::scalarmultKey(rct::H, tmp); + + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.V.size() == 1, false, "proof.V does not have exactly one element"); + tmp = rct::scalarmultKey(proof.V[0], zsq); + rct::addKeys(L61Right, L61Right, tmp); + + tmp = rct::scalarmultKey(proof.T1, x); + rct::addKeys(L61Right, L61Right, tmp); + + rct::key xsq; + sc_mul(xsq.bytes, x.bytes, x.bytes); + tmp = rct::scalarmultKey(proof.T2, xsq); + rct::addKeys(L61Right, L61Right, tmp); + PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_61rl); + + if (!(L61Right == L61Left)) + { + MERROR("Verification failure at step 1"); + return false; + } + + PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_62); + // PAPER LINE 62 + rct::key P = rct::addKeys(proof.A, rct::scalarmultKey(proof.S, x)); + PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_62); + + // Compute the number of rounds for the inner product + const size_t rounds = proof.L.size(); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rounds > 0, false, "Zero rounds"); + + PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_21_22); + // PAPER LINES 21-22 + // The inner product challenges are computed per round + rct::keyV w(rounds); + hashed.clear(); + hashed.push_back(proof.L[0]); + hashed.push_back(proof.R[0]); + w[0] = rct::hash_to_scalar(hashed); + for (size_t i = 1; i < rounds; ++i) + { + hashed.clear(); + hashed.push_back(w[i-1]); + hashed.push_back(proof.L[i]); + hashed.push_back(proof.R[i]); + w[i] = rct::hash_to_scalar(hashed); + } + PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_21_22); + + PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_24_25); + // Basically PAPER LINES 24-25 + // Compute the curvepoints from G[i] and H[i] + rct::key inner_prod = rct::identity(); + rct::key yinvpow = rct::identity(); + rct::key ypow = rct::identity(); + + PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_24_25_invert); + const rct::key yinv = invert(y); + rct::keyV winv(rounds); + for (size_t i = 0; i < rounds; ++i) + winv[i] = invert(w[i]); + PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_24_25_invert); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < N; ++i) + { + // Convert the index to binary IN REVERSE and construct the scalar exponent + rct::key g_scalar = proof.a; + rct::key h_scalar; + sc_mul(h_scalar.bytes, proof.b.bytes, yinvpow.bytes); + + for (size_t j = rounds; j-- > 0; ) + { + size_t J = w.size() - j - 1; + + if ((i & (((size_t)1)<<j)) == 0) + { + sc_mul(g_scalar.bytes, g_scalar.bytes, winv[J].bytes); + sc_mul(h_scalar.bytes, h_scalar.bytes, w[J].bytes); + } + else + { + sc_mul(g_scalar.bytes, g_scalar.bytes, w[J].bytes); + sc_mul(h_scalar.bytes, h_scalar.bytes, winv[J].bytes); + } + } + + // Adjust the scalars using the exponents from PAPER LINE 62 + sc_add(g_scalar.bytes, g_scalar.bytes, z.bytes); + sc_mul(tmp.bytes, zsq.bytes, twoN[i].bytes); + sc_muladd(tmp.bytes, z.bytes, ypow.bytes, tmp.bytes); + sc_mulsub(h_scalar.bytes, tmp.bytes, yinvpow.bytes, h_scalar.bytes); + + // Now compute the basepoint's scalar multiplication + // Each of these could be written as a multiexp operation instead + rct::addKeys3(tmp, g_scalar, Gprecomp[i], h_scalar, Hprecomp[i]); + rct::addKeys(inner_prod, inner_prod, tmp); + + if (i != N-1) + { + sc_mul(yinvpow.bytes, yinvpow.bytes, yinv.bytes); + sc_mul(ypow.bytes, ypow.bytes, y.bytes); + } + } + PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_24_25); + + PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_26); + // PAPER LINE 26 + rct::key pprime; + sc_sub(tmp.bytes, rct::zero().bytes, proof.mu.bytes); + rct::addKeys(pprime, P, rct::scalarmultBase(tmp)); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < rounds; ++i) + { + sc_mul(tmp.bytes, w[i].bytes, w[i].bytes); + sc_mul(tmp2.bytes, winv[i].bytes, winv[i].bytes); +#if 1 + ge_dsmp cacheL, cacheR; + rct::precomp(cacheL, proof.L[i]); + rct::precomp(cacheR, proof.R[i]); + rct::addKeys3(tmp, tmp, cacheL, tmp2, cacheR); + rct::addKeys(pprime, pprime, tmp); +#else + rct::addKeys(pprime, pprime, rct::scalarmultKey(proof.L[i], tmp)); + rct::addKeys(pprime, pprime, rct::scalarmultKey(proof.R[i], tmp2)); +#endif + } + sc_mul(tmp.bytes, proof.t.bytes, x_ip.bytes); + rct::addKeys(pprime, pprime, rct::scalarmultKey(rct::H, tmp)); + PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_26); + + PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_step2_check); + sc_mul(tmp.bytes, proof.a.bytes, proof.b.bytes); + sc_mul(tmp.bytes, tmp.bytes, x_ip.bytes); + tmp = rct::scalarmultKey(rct::H, tmp); + rct::addKeys(tmp, tmp, inner_prod); + PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_step2_check); + if (!(pprime == tmp)) + { + MERROR("Verification failure at step 2"); + return false; + } + + PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY); + return true; +} + +} diff --git a/src/ringct/bulletproofs.h b/src/ringct/bulletproofs.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..aca470f47 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/ringct/bulletproofs.h @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2017, The Monero Project +// +// All rights reserved. +// +// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are +// permitted provided that the following conditions are met: +// +// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of +// conditions and the following disclaimer. +// +// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list +// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other +// materials provided with the distribution. +// +// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be +// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific +// prior written permission. +// +// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY +// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL +// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, +// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, +// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF +// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +// +// Adapted from Java code by Sarang Noether + +#pragma once + +#ifndef BULLETPROOFS_H +#define BULLETPROOFS_H + +#include "rctTypes.h" + +namespace rct +{ + +Bulletproof bulletproof_PROVE(const rct::key &v, const rct::key &gamma); +Bulletproof bulletproof_PROVE(uint64_t v, const rct::key &gamma); +bool bulletproof_VERIFY(const Bulletproof &proof); + +} + +#endif diff --git a/src/ringct/rctOps.cpp b/src/ringct/rctOps.cpp index d0e0964b6..8e94b52b3 100644 --- a/src/ringct/rctOps.cpp +++ b/src/ringct/rctOps.cpp @@ -220,6 +220,11 @@ namespace rct { ge_p3_tobytes(AB.bytes, &A2); } + rct::key addKeys(const key &A, const key &B) { + key k; + addKeys(k, A, B); + return k; + } //addKeys1 //aGB = aG + B where a is a scalar, G is the basepoint, and B is a point @@ -257,6 +262,15 @@ namespace rct { ge_tobytes(aAbB.bytes, &rv); } + //addKeys3 + //aAbB = a*A + b*B where a, b are scalars, A, B are curve points + //A and B must be input after applying "precomp" + void addKeys3(key &aAbB, const key &a, const ge_dsmp A, const key &b, const ge_dsmp B) { + ge_p2 rv; + ge_double_scalarmult_precomp_vartime2(&rv, a.bytes, A, b.bytes, B); + ge_tobytes(aAbB.bytes, &rv); + } + //subtract Keys (subtracts curve points) //AB = A - B where A, B are curve points diff --git a/src/ringct/rctOps.h b/src/ringct/rctOps.h index 412450c18..3f8f6955c 100644 --- a/src/ringct/rctOps.h +++ b/src/ringct/rctOps.h @@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ namespace rct { //for curve points: AB = A + B void addKeys(key &AB, const key &A, const key &B); + rct::key addKeys(const key &A, const key &B); //aGB = aG + B where a is a scalar, G is the basepoint, and B is a point void addKeys1(key &aGB, const key &a, const key & B); //aGbB = aG + bB where a, b are scalars, G is the basepoint and B is a point @@ -133,6 +134,7 @@ namespace rct { //aAbB = a*A + b*B where a, b are scalars, A, B are curve points //B must be input after applying "precomp" void addKeys3(key &aAbB, const key &a, const key &A, const key &b, const ge_dsmp B); + void addKeys3(key &aAbB, const key &a, const ge_dsmp A, const key &b, const ge_dsmp B); //AB = A - B where A, B are curve points void subKeys(key &AB, const key &A, const key &B); //checks if A, B are equal as curve points diff --git a/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp b/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp index 946325367..cfb4aaf97 100644 --- a/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp +++ b/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include "common/threadpool.h" #include "common/util.h" #include "rctSigs.h" +#include "bulletproofs.h" #include "cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_format_utils.h" using namespace crypto; @@ -42,6 +43,15 @@ using namespace std; #define MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY "ringct" namespace rct { + Bulletproof proveRangeBulletproof(key &C, key &mask, uint64_t amount) + { + mask = rct::skGen(); + Bulletproof proof = bulletproof_PROVE(amount, mask); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(proof.V.size() == 1, "V has not exactly one element"); + C = proof.V[0]; + return proof; + } + //Borromean (c.f. gmax/andytoshi's paper) boroSig genBorromean(const key64 x, const key64 P1, const key64 P2, const bits indices) { key64 L[2], alpha; @@ -335,16 +345,41 @@ namespace rct { hashes.push_back(hash2rct(h)); keyV kv; - kv.reserve((64*3+1) * rv.p.rangeSigs.size()); - for (auto r: rv.p.rangeSigs) + if (rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof) + { + kv.reserve((6*2+10) * rv.p.bulletproofs.size()); + for (const auto &p: rv.p.bulletproofs) + { + for (size_t n = 0; n < p.V.size(); ++n) + kv.push_back(p.V[n]); + kv.push_back(p.A); + kv.push_back(p.S); + kv.push_back(p.T1); + kv.push_back(p.T2); + kv.push_back(p.taux); + kv.push_back(p.mu); + for (size_t n = 0; n < p.L.size(); ++n) + kv.push_back(p.L[n]); + for (size_t n = 0; n < p.R.size(); ++n) + kv.push_back(p.R[n]); + kv.push_back(p.a); + kv.push_back(p.b); + kv.push_back(p.t); + } + } + else { - for (size_t n = 0; n < 64; ++n) - kv.push_back(r.asig.s0[n]); - for (size_t n = 0; n < 64; ++n) - kv.push_back(r.asig.s1[n]); - kv.push_back(r.asig.ee); - for (size_t n = 0; n < 64; ++n) - kv.push_back(r.Ci[n]); + kv.reserve((64*3+1) * rv.p.rangeSigs.size()); + for (const auto &r: rv.p.rangeSigs) + { + for (size_t n = 0; n < 64; ++n) + kv.push_back(r.asig.s0[n]); + for (size_t n = 0; n < 64; ++n) + kv.push_back(r.asig.s1[n]); + kv.push_back(r.asig.ee); + for (size_t n = 0; n < 64; ++n) + kv.push_back(r.Ci[n]); + } } hashes.push_back(cn_fast_hash(kv)); return cn_fast_hash(hashes); @@ -563,7 +598,7 @@ namespace rct { // must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number // Note: For txn fees, the last index in the amounts vector should contain that // Thus the amounts vector will be "one" longer than the destinations vectort - rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk) { + rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, bool bulletproof) { CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(amounts.size() == destinations.size() || amounts.size() == destinations.size() + 1, "Different number of amounts/destinations"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(amount_keys.size() == destinations.size(), "Different number of amount_keys/destinations"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(index < mixRing.size(), "Bad index into mixRing"); @@ -572,10 +607,13 @@ namespace rct { } rctSig rv; - rv.type = RCTTypeFull; + rv.type = bulletproof ? RCTTypeFullBulletproof : RCTTypeFull; rv.message = message; rv.outPk.resize(destinations.size()); - rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size()); + if (bulletproof) + rv.p.bulletproofs.resize(destinations.size()); + else + rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size()); rv.ecdhInfo.resize(destinations.size()); size_t i = 0; @@ -585,8 +623,14 @@ namespace rct { //add destination to sig rv.outPk[i].dest = copy(destinations[i]); //compute range proof - rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, amounts[i]); + if (bulletproof) + rv.p.bulletproofs[i] = proveRangeBulletproof(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, amounts[i]); + else + rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, amounts[i]); #ifdef DBG + if (bulletproof) + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(bulletproof_VERIFY(rv.p.bulletproofs[i]), "bulletproof_VERIFY failed on newly created proof"); + else CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof"); #endif @@ -618,12 +662,12 @@ namespace rct { ctkeyM mixRing; ctkeyV outSk; tie(mixRing, index) = populateFromBlockchain(inPk, mixin); - return genRct(message, inSk, destinations, amounts, mixRing, amount_keys, index, outSk); + return genRct(message, inSk, destinations, amounts, mixRing, amount_keys, index, outSk, false); } //RCT simple //for post-rct only - rctSig genRctSimple(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> &inamounts, const vector<xmr_amount> &outamounts, xmr_amount txnFee, const ctkeyM & mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const std::vector<unsigned int> & index, ctkeyV &outSk) { + rctSig genRctSimple(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> &inamounts, const vector<xmr_amount> &outamounts, xmr_amount txnFee, const ctkeyM & mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const std::vector<unsigned int> & index, ctkeyV &outSk, bool bulletproof) { CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(inamounts.size() > 0, "Empty inamounts"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(inamounts.size() == inSk.size(), "Different number of inamounts/inSk"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(outamounts.size() == destinations.size(), "Different number of amounts/destinations"); @@ -635,10 +679,13 @@ namespace rct { } rctSig rv; - rv.type = RCTTypeSimple; + rv.type = bulletproof ? RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof : RCTTypeSimple; rv.message = message; rv.outPk.resize(destinations.size()); - rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size()); + if (bulletproof) + rv.p.bulletproofs.resize(destinations.size()); + else + rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size()); rv.ecdhInfo.resize(destinations.size()); size_t i; @@ -650,10 +697,16 @@ namespace rct { //add destination to sig rv.outPk[i].dest = copy(destinations[i]); //compute range proof - rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, outamounts[i]); - #ifdef DBG - verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); - #endif + if (bulletproof) + rv.p.bulletproofs[i] = proveRangeBulletproof(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, outamounts[i]); + else + rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, outamounts[i]); + #ifdef DBG + if (bulletproof) + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(bulletproof_VERIFY(rv.p.bulletproofs[i]), "bulletproof_VERIFY failed on newly created proof"); + else + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof"); + #endif sc_add(sumout.bytes, outSk[i].mask.bytes, sumout.bytes); @@ -699,7 +752,7 @@ namespace rct { mixRing[i].resize(mixin+1); index[i] = populateFromBlockchainSimple(mixRing[i], inPk[i], mixin); } - return genRctSimple(message, inSk, destinations, inamounts, outamounts, txnFee, mixRing, amount_keys, index, outSk); + return genRctSimple(message, inSk, destinations, inamounts, outamounts, txnFee, mixRing, amount_keys, index, outSk, false); } //RingCT protocol @@ -714,10 +767,13 @@ namespace rct { // must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number bool verRct(const rctSig & rv, bool semantics) { PERF_TIMER(verRct); - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull, false, "verRct called on non-full rctSig"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof, false, "verRct called on non-full rctSig"); if (semantics) { - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.rangeSigs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.rangeSigs"); + if (rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof) + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.bulletproofs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.bulletproofs"); + else + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.rangeSigs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.rangeSigs"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.ecdhInfo"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.MGs.size() == 1, false, "full rctSig has not one MG"); } @@ -736,7 +792,10 @@ namespace rct { DP("range proofs verified?"); for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++) { tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { - results[i] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); + if (rv.p.rangeSigs.empty()) + results[i] = bulletproof_VERIFY(rv.p.bulletproofs[i]); + else + results[i] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); }); } waiter.wait(); @@ -776,10 +835,13 @@ namespace rct { { PERF_TIMER(verRctSimple); - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple, false, "verRctSimple called on non simple rctSig"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "verRctSimple called on non simple rctSig"); if (semantics) { - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.rangeSigs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.rangeSigs"); + if (rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.bulletproofs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.bulletproofs"); + else + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.rangeSigs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.rangeSigs"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.ecdhInfo"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.pseudoOuts.size() == rv.p.MGs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of rv.pseudoOuts and rv.p.MGs"); } @@ -820,7 +882,10 @@ namespace rct { results.resize(rv.outPk.size()); for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++) { tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { - results[i] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); + if (rv.p.rangeSigs.empty()) + results[i] = bulletproof_VERIFY(rv.p.bulletproofs[i]); + else + results[i] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); }); } waiter.wait(); @@ -869,9 +934,17 @@ namespace rct { // uses the attached ecdh info to find the amounts represented by each output commitment // must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number xmr_amount decodeRct(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key & mask) { - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull, false, "decodeRct called on non-full rctSig"); - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.outPk and rv.ecdhInfo"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof, false, "decodeRct called on non-full rctSig"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(i < rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Bad index"); + if (rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof) + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.p.bulletproofs.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.p.bulletproofs and rv.ecdhInfo"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.p.bulletproofs[i].V.size() == 1, "Unexpected sizes of rv.p.bulletproofs[i].V"); + } + else + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.outPk and rv.ecdhInfo"); + } //mask amount and mask ecdhTuple ecdh_info = rv.ecdhInfo[i]; @@ -897,16 +970,24 @@ namespace rct { } xmr_amount decodeRctSimple(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key &mask) { - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple, false, "decodeRct called on non simple rctSig"); - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.outPk and rv.ecdhInfo"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "decodeRct called on non simple rctSig"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(i < rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Bad index"); + if (rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.p.bulletproofs.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.p.bulletproofs and rv.ecdhInfo"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.p.bulletproofs[i].V.size() == 1, "Unexpected sizes of rv.p.bulletproofs[i].V"); + } + else + { + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.outPk and rv.ecdhInfo"); + } //mask amount and mask ecdhTuple ecdh_info = rv.ecdhInfo[i]; ecdhDecode(ecdh_info, sk); mask = ecdh_info.mask; key amount = ecdh_info.amount; - key C = rv.outPk[i].mask; + key C = (rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) ? rv.p.bulletproofs[i].V.front() : rv.outPk[i].mask; DP("C"); DP(C); key Ctmp; diff --git a/src/ringct/rctSigs.h b/src/ringct/rctSigs.h index d158f06f0..46c9cb2df 100644 --- a/src/ringct/rctSigs.h +++ b/src/ringct/rctSigs.h @@ -118,10 +118,10 @@ namespace rct { //decodeRct: (c.f. http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 5.1.1) // uses the attached ecdh info to find the amounts represented by each output commitment // must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number - rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk); + rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, bool bulletproof); rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const ctkeyV & inPk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const keyV &amount_keys, const int mixin); rctSig genRctSimple(const key & message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const ctkeyV & inPk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & inamounts, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & outamounts, const keyV &amount_keys, xmr_amount txnFee, unsigned int mixin); - rctSig genRctSimple(const key & message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & inamounts, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & outamounts, xmr_amount txnFee, const ctkeyM & mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const std::vector<unsigned int> & index, ctkeyV &outSk); + rctSig genRctSimple(const key & message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & inamounts, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & outamounts, xmr_amount txnFee, const ctkeyM & mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const std::vector<unsigned int> & index, ctkeyV &outSk, bool bulletproof); bool verRct(const rctSig & rv, bool semantics); static inline bool verRct(const rctSig & rv) { return verRct(rv, true) && verRct(rv, false); } bool verRctSimple(const rctSig & rv, bool semantics); diff --git a/src/ringct/rctTypes.h b/src/ringct/rctTypes.h index 8147cb602..50dfdb432 100644 --- a/src/ringct/rctTypes.h +++ b/src/ringct/rctTypes.h @@ -161,6 +161,39 @@ namespace rct { FIELD(Ci) END_SERIALIZE() }; + + struct Bulletproof + { + rct::keyV V; + rct::key A, S, T1, T2; + rct::key taux, mu; + rct::keyV L, R; + rct::key a, b, t; + + Bulletproof() {} + Bulletproof(const rct::key &V, const rct::key &A, const rct::key &S, const rct::key &T1, const rct::key &T2, const rct::key &taux, const rct::key &mu, const rct::keyV &L, const rct::keyV &R, const rct::key &a, const rct::key &b, const rct::key &t): + V({V}), A(A), S(S), T1(T1), T2(T2), taux(taux), mu(mu), L(L), R(R), a(a), b(b), t(t) {} + + BEGIN_SERIALIZE_OBJECT() + // Commitments aren't saved, they're restored via outPk + // FIELD(V) + FIELD(A) + FIELD(S) + FIELD(T1) + FIELD(T2) + FIELD(taux) + FIELD(mu) + FIELD(L) + FIELD(R) + FIELD(a) + FIELD(b) + FIELD(t) + + if (L.empty() || L.size() != R.size()) + return false; + END_SERIALIZE() + }; + //A container to hold all signatures necessary for RingCT // rangeSigs holds all the rangeproof data of a transaction // MG holds the MLSAG signature of a transaction @@ -172,6 +205,8 @@ namespace rct { RCTTypeNull = 0, RCTTypeFull = 1, RCTTypeSimple = 2, + RCTTypeFullBulletproof = 3, + RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof = 4, }; struct rctSigBase { uint8_t type; @@ -189,13 +224,13 @@ namespace rct { FIELD(type) if (type == RCTTypeNull) return true; - if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeSimple) + if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeFullBulletproof && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) return false; VARINT_FIELD(txnFee) // inputs/outputs not saved, only here for serialization help // FIELD(message) - not serialized, it can be reconstructed // FIELD(mixRing) - not serialized, it can be reconstructed - if (type == RCTTypeSimple) + if (type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) { ar.tag("pseudoOuts"); ar.begin_array(); @@ -241,6 +276,7 @@ namespace rct { }; struct rctSigPrunable { std::vector<rangeSig> rangeSigs; + std::vector<Bulletproof> bulletproofs; std::vector<mgSig> MGs; // simple rct has N, full has 1 template<bool W, template <bool> class Archive> @@ -248,26 +284,44 @@ namespace rct { { if (type == RCTTypeNull) return true; - if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeSimple) + if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeFullBulletproof && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) return false; - ar.tag("rangeSigs"); - ar.begin_array(); - PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(outputs, rangeSigs); - if (rangeSigs.size() != outputs) - return false; - for (size_t i = 0; i < outputs; ++i) + if (type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof || type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof) { - FIELDS(rangeSigs[i]) - if (outputs - i > 1) - ar.delimit_array(); + ar.tag("bp"); + ar.begin_array(); + PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(outputs, bulletproofs); + if (bulletproofs.size() != outputs) + return false; + for (size_t i = 0; i < outputs; ++i) + { + FIELDS(bulletproofs[i]) + if (outputs - i > 1) + ar.delimit_array(); + } + ar.end_array(); + } + else + { + ar.tag("rangeSigs"); + ar.begin_array(); + PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(outputs, rangeSigs); + if (rangeSigs.size() != outputs) + return false; + for (size_t i = 0; i < outputs; ++i) + { + FIELDS(rangeSigs[i]) + if (outputs - i > 1) + ar.delimit_array(); + } + ar.end_array(); } - ar.end_array(); ar.tag("MGs"); ar.begin_array(); // we keep a byte for size of MGs, because we don't know whether this is // a simple or full rct signature, and it's starting to annoy the hell out of me - size_t mg_elements = type == RCTTypeSimple ? inputs : 1; + size_t mg_elements = (type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) ? inputs : 1; PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(mg_elements, MGs); if (MGs.size() != mg_elements) return false; @@ -285,7 +339,7 @@ namespace rct { for (size_t j = 0; j < mixin + 1; ++j) { ar.begin_array(); - size_t mg_ss2_elements = (type == RCTTypeSimple ? 1 : inputs) + 1; + size_t mg_ss2_elements = ((type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) ? 1 : inputs) + 1; PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(mg_ss2_elements, MGs[i].ss[j]); if (MGs[i].ss[j].size() != mg_ss2_elements) return false; @@ -464,6 +518,7 @@ VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::mgSig, "rct::mgSig"); VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::rangeSig, "rct::rangeSig"); VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::boroSig, "rct::boroSig"); VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::rctSig, "rct::rctSig"); +VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::Bulletproof, "rct::bulletproof"); VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::key, 0x90); VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::key64, 0x91); @@ -477,6 +532,7 @@ VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::mgSig, 0x98); VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::rangeSig, 0x99); VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::boroSig, 0x9a); VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::rctSig, 0x9b); +VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::Bulletproof, 0x9c); VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::key, "rct_key"); VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::key64, "rct_key64"); @@ -490,5 +546,6 @@ VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::mgSig, "rct_mgSig"); VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::rangeSig, "rct_rangeSig"); VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::boroSig, "rct_boroSig"); VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::rctSig, "rct_rctSig"); +VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::Bulletproof, "rct_bulletproof"); #endif /* RCTTYPES_H */ |