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-rw-r--r--src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt6
-rw-r--r--src/ringct/bulletproofs.cc24
-rw-r--r--src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.cc1121
-rw-r--r--src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.h49
-rw-r--r--src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp219
-rw-r--r--src/ringct/rctTypes.cpp87
-rw-r--r--src/ringct/rctTypes.h80
7 files changed, 1505 insertions, 81 deletions
diff --git a/src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt b/src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt
index 725705872..1824c189f 100644
--- a/src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -31,13 +31,15 @@ set(ringct_basic_sources
rctTypes.cpp
rctCryptoOps.c
multiexp.cc
- bulletproofs.cc)
+ bulletproofs.cc
+ bulletproofs_plus.cc)
set(ringct_basic_private_headers
rctOps.h
rctTypes.h
multiexp.h
- bulletproofs.h)
+ bulletproofs.h
+ bulletproofs_plus.h)
monero_private_headers(ringct_basic
${crypto_private_headers})
diff --git a/src/ringct/bulletproofs.cc b/src/ringct/bulletproofs.cc
index f4e03c381..ba7ab2c0d 100644
--- a/src/ringct/bulletproofs.cc
+++ b/src/ringct/bulletproofs.cc
@@ -70,13 +70,12 @@ static rct::key inner_product(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b);
static constexpr size_t maxN = 64;
static constexpr size_t maxM = BULLETPROOF_MAX_OUTPUTS;
-static rct::key Hi[maxN*maxM], Gi[maxN*maxM];
static ge_p3 Hi_p3[maxN*maxM], Gi_p3[maxN*maxM];
static std::shared_ptr<straus_cached_data> straus_HiGi_cache;
static std::shared_ptr<pippenger_cached_data> pippenger_HiGi_cache;
-static const rct::key TWO = { {0x02, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 } };
-static const rct::key MINUS_ONE = { { 0xec, 0xd3, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x1a, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0xa2, 0xde, 0xf9, 0xde, 0x14, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10 } };
-static const rct::key MINUS_INV_EIGHT = { { 0x74, 0xa4, 0x19, 0x7a, 0xf0, 0x7d, 0x0b, 0xf7, 0x05, 0xc2, 0xda, 0x25, 0x2b, 0x5c, 0x0b, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a } };
+static const constexpr rct::key TWO = { {0x02, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 } };
+static const constexpr rct::key MINUS_ONE = { { 0xec, 0xd3, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x1a, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0xa2, 0xde, 0xf9, 0xde, 0x14, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10 } };
+static const constexpr rct::key MINUS_INV_EIGHT = { { 0x74, 0xa4, 0x19, 0x7a, 0xf0, 0x7d, 0x0b, 0xf7, 0x05, 0xc2, 0xda, 0x25, 0x2b, 0x5c, 0x0b, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a } };
static const rct::keyV oneN = vector_dup(rct::identity(), maxN);
static const rct::keyV twoN = vector_powers(TWO, maxN);
static const rct::key ip12 = inner_product(oneN, twoN);
@@ -100,8 +99,7 @@ static inline bool is_reduced(const rct::key &scalar)
static rct::key get_exponent(const rct::key &base, size_t idx)
{
- static const std::string domain_separator(config::HASH_KEY_BULLETPROOF_EXPONENT);
- std::string hashed = std::string((const char*)base.bytes, sizeof(base)) + domain_separator + tools::get_varint_data(idx);
+ std::string hashed = std::string((const char*)base.bytes, sizeof(base)) + config::HASH_KEY_BULLETPROOF_EXPONENT + tools::get_varint_data(idx);
rct::key e;
ge_p3 e_p3;
rct::hash_to_p3(e_p3, rct::hash2rct(crypto::cn_fast_hash(hashed.data(), hashed.size())));
@@ -121,10 +119,10 @@ static void init_exponents()
data.reserve(maxN*maxM*2);
for (size_t i = 0; i < maxN*maxM; ++i)
{
- Hi[i] = get_exponent(rct::H, i * 2);
- CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(ge_frombytes_vartime(&Hi_p3[i], Hi[i].bytes) == 0, "ge_frombytes_vartime failed");
- Gi[i] = get_exponent(rct::H, i * 2 + 1);
- CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(ge_frombytes_vartime(&Gi_p3[i], Gi[i].bytes) == 0, "ge_frombytes_vartime failed");
+ const rct::key Hi = get_exponent(rct::H, i * 2);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(ge_frombytes_vartime(&Hi_p3[i], Hi.bytes) == 0, "ge_frombytes_vartime failed");
+ const rct::key Gi = get_exponent(rct::H, i * 2 + 1);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(ge_frombytes_vartime(&Gi_p3[i], Gi.bytes) == 0, "ge_frombytes_vartime failed");
data.push_back({rct::zero(), Gi_p3[i]});
data.push_back({rct::zero(), Hi_p3[i]});
@@ -133,11 +131,10 @@ static void init_exponents()
straus_HiGi_cache = straus_init_cache(data, STRAUS_SIZE_LIMIT);
pippenger_HiGi_cache = pippenger_init_cache(data, 0, PIPPENGER_SIZE_LIMIT);
- MINFO("Hi/Gi cache size: " << (sizeof(Hi)+sizeof(Gi))/1024 << " kB");
MINFO("Hi_p3/Gi_p3 cache size: " << (sizeof(Hi_p3)+sizeof(Gi_p3))/1024 << " kB");
MINFO("Straus cache size: " << straus_get_cache_size(straus_HiGi_cache)/1024 << " kB");
MINFO("Pippenger cache size: " << pippenger_get_cache_size(pippenger_HiGi_cache)/1024 << " kB");
- size_t cache_size = (sizeof(Hi)+sizeof(Hi_p3))*2 + straus_get_cache_size(straus_HiGi_cache) + pippenger_get_cache_size(pippenger_HiGi_cache);
+ size_t cache_size = straus_get_cache_size(straus_HiGi_cache) + pippenger_get_cache_size(pippenger_HiGi_cache);
MINFO("Total cache size: " << cache_size/1024 << "kB");
init_done = true;
}
@@ -895,7 +892,8 @@ bool bulletproof_VERIFY(const std::vector<const Bulletproof*> &proofs)
multiexp_data.resize(2 * maxMN);
PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_24_25_invert);
- const std::vector<rct::key> inverses = invert(to_invert);
+ const std::vector<rct::key> inverses = invert(std::move(to_invert));
+ to_invert.clear();
PERF_TIMER_STOP_BP(VERIFY_line_24_25_invert);
// setup weighted aggregates
diff --git a/src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.cc b/src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.cc
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3d27849c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,1121 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2017-2020, The Monero Project
+//
+// All rights reserved.
+//
+// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
+// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+//
+// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
+// conditions and the following disclaimer.
+//
+// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
+// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
+// materials provided with the distribution.
+//
+// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
+// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
+// prior written permission.
+//
+// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
+// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
+// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+// Implements the Bulletproofs+ prover and verifier algorithms
+//
+// Preprint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/735, version 17 Jun 2020
+//
+// NOTE ON NOTATION:
+// In the signature constructions used in Monero, commitments to zero are treated as
+// public keys against the curve group generator `G`. This means that amount
+// commitments must use another generator `H` for values in order to show balance.
+// The result is that the roles of `g` and `h` in the preprint are effectively swapped
+// in this code, taking on the roles of `H` and `G`, respectively. Read carefully!
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <boost/thread/mutex.hpp>
+#include <boost/thread/lock_guard.hpp>
+#include "misc_log_ex.h"
+#include "span.h"
+#include "cryptonote_config.h"
+extern "C"
+{
+#include "crypto/crypto-ops.h"
+}
+#include "rctOps.h"
+#include "multiexp.h"
+#include "bulletproofs_plus.h"
+
+#undef MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY
+#define MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY "bulletproof_plus"
+
+#define STRAUS_SIZE_LIMIT 232
+#define PIPPENGER_SIZE_LIMIT 0
+
+namespace rct
+{
+ // Vector functions
+ static rct::key vector_exponent(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b);
+ static rct::keyV vector_of_scalar_powers(const rct::key &x, size_t n);
+
+ // Proof bounds
+ static constexpr size_t maxN = 64; // maximum number of bits in range
+ static constexpr size_t maxM = BULLETPROOF_PLUS_MAX_OUTPUTS; // maximum number of outputs to aggregate into a single proof
+
+ // Cached public generators
+ static ge_p3 Hi_p3[maxN*maxM], Gi_p3[maxN*maxM];
+ static std::shared_ptr<straus_cached_data> straus_HiGi_cache;
+ static std::shared_ptr<pippenger_cached_data> pippenger_HiGi_cache;
+
+ // Useful scalar constants
+ static const constexpr rct::key ZERO = { {0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 } }; // 0
+ static const constexpr rct::key ONE = { {0x01, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 } }; // 1
+ static const constexpr rct::key TWO = { {0x02, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 } }; // 2
+ static const constexpr rct::key MINUS_ONE = { { 0xec, 0xd3, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x1a, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0xa2, 0xde, 0xf9, 0xde, 0x14, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10 } }; // -1
+ static const constexpr rct::key MINUS_INV_EIGHT = { { 0x74, 0xa4, 0x19, 0x7a, 0xf0, 0x7d, 0x0b, 0xf7, 0x05, 0xc2, 0xda, 0x25, 0x2b, 0x5c, 0x0b, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a } }; // -(8**(-1))
+ static rct::key TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE; // 2**64 - 1
+
+ // Initial transcript hash
+ static rct::key initial_transcript;
+
+ static boost::mutex init_mutex;
+
+ // Use the generator caches to compute a multiscalar multiplication
+ static inline rct::key multiexp(const std::vector<MultiexpData> &data, size_t HiGi_size)
+ {
+ if (HiGi_size > 0)
+ {
+ static_assert(232 <= STRAUS_SIZE_LIMIT, "Straus in precalc mode can only be calculated till STRAUS_SIZE_LIMIT");
+ return HiGi_size <= 232 && data.size() == HiGi_size ? straus(data, straus_HiGi_cache, 0) : pippenger(data, pippenger_HiGi_cache, HiGi_size, get_pippenger_c(data.size()));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return data.size() <= 95 ? straus(data, NULL, 0) : pippenger(data, NULL, 0, get_pippenger_c(data.size()));
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Confirm that a scalar is properly reduced
+ static inline bool is_reduced(const rct::key &scalar)
+ {
+ return sc_check(scalar.bytes) == 0;
+ }
+
+ // Use hashed values to produce indexed public generators
+ static ge_p3 get_exponent(const rct::key &base, size_t idx)
+ {
+ std::string hashed = std::string((const char*)base.bytes, sizeof(base)) + config::HASH_KEY_BULLETPROOF_PLUS_EXPONENT + tools::get_varint_data(idx);
+ rct::key generator;
+ ge_p3 generator_p3;
+ rct::hash_to_p3(generator_p3, rct::hash2rct(crypto::cn_fast_hash(hashed.data(), hashed.size())));
+ ge_p3_tobytes(generator.bytes, &generator_p3);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!(generator == rct::identity()), "Exponent is point at infinity");
+ return generator_p3;
+ }
+
+ // Construct public generators
+ static void init_exponents()
+ {
+ boost::lock_guard<boost::mutex> lock(init_mutex);
+
+ // Only needs to be done once
+ static bool init_done = false;
+ if (init_done)
+ return;
+
+ std::vector<MultiexpData> data;
+ data.reserve(maxN*maxM*2);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < maxN*maxM; ++i)
+ {
+ Hi_p3[i] = get_exponent(rct::H, i * 2);
+ Gi_p3[i] = get_exponent(rct::H, i * 2 + 1);
+
+ data.push_back({rct::zero(), Gi_p3[i]});
+ data.push_back({rct::zero(), Hi_p3[i]});
+ }
+
+ straus_HiGi_cache = straus_init_cache(data, STRAUS_SIZE_LIMIT);
+ pippenger_HiGi_cache = pippenger_init_cache(data, 0, PIPPENGER_SIZE_LIMIT);
+
+ // Compute 2**64 - 1 for later use in simplifying verification
+ TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE = TWO;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 6; i++)
+ {
+ sc_mul(TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE.bytes, TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE.bytes, TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE.bytes);
+ }
+ sc_sub(TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE.bytes, TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE.bytes, ONE.bytes);
+
+ // Generate the initial Fiat-Shamir transcript hash, which is constant across all proofs
+ const std::string domain_separator(config::HASH_KEY_BULLETPROOF_PLUS_TRANSCRIPT);
+ ge_p3 initial_transcript_p3;
+ rct::hash_to_p3(initial_transcript_p3, rct::hash2rct(crypto::cn_fast_hash(domain_separator.data(), domain_separator.size())));
+ ge_p3_tobytes(initial_transcript.bytes, &initial_transcript_p3);
+
+ init_done = true;
+ }
+
+ // Given two scalar arrays, construct a vector pre-commitment:
+ //
+ // a = (a_0, ..., a_{n-1})
+ // b = (b_0, ..., b_{n-1})
+ //
+ // Outputs a_0*Gi_0 + ... + a_{n-1}*Gi_{n-1} +
+ // b_0*Hi_0 + ... + b_{n-1}*Hi_{n-1}
+ static rct::key vector_exponent(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() <= maxN*maxM, "Incompatible sizes of a and maxN");
+
+ std::vector<MultiexpData> multiexp_data;
+ multiexp_data.reserve(a.size()*2);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(a[i], Gi_p3[i]);
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(b[i], Hi_p3[i]);
+ }
+ return multiexp(multiexp_data, 2 * a.size());
+ }
+
+ // Helper function used to compute the L and R terms used in the inner-product round function
+ static rct::key compute_LR(size_t size, const rct::key &y, const std::vector<ge_p3> &G, size_t G0, const std::vector<ge_p3> &H, size_t H0, const rct::keyV &a, size_t a0, const rct::keyV &b, size_t b0, const rct::key &c, const rct::key &d)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(size + G0 <= G.size(), "Incompatible size for G");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(size + H0 <= H.size(), "Incompatible size for H");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(size + a0 <= a.size(), "Incompatible size for a");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(size + b0 <= b.size(), "Incompatible size for b");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(size <= maxN*maxM, "size is too large");
+
+ std::vector<MultiexpData> multiexp_data;
+ multiexp_data.resize(size*2 + 2);
+ rct::key temp;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i)
+ {
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, a[a0+i].bytes, y.bytes);
+ sc_mul(multiexp_data[i*2].scalar.bytes, temp.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ multiexp_data[i*2].point = G[G0+i];
+
+ sc_mul(multiexp_data[i*2+1].scalar.bytes, b[b0+i].bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ multiexp_data[i*2+1].point = H[H0+i];
+ }
+
+ sc_mul(multiexp_data[2*size].scalar.bytes, c.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ ge_p3 H_p3;
+ ge_frombytes_vartime(&H_p3, rct::H.bytes);
+ multiexp_data[2*size].point = H_p3;
+
+ sc_mul(multiexp_data[2*size+1].scalar.bytes, d.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ ge_p3 G_p3;
+ ge_frombytes_vartime(&G_p3, rct::G.bytes);
+ multiexp_data[2*size+1].point = G_p3;
+
+ return multiexp(multiexp_data, 0);
+ }
+
+ // Given a scalar, construct a vector of its powers:
+ //
+ // Output (1,x,x**2,...,x**{n-1})
+ static rct::keyV vector_of_scalar_powers(const rct::key &x, size_t n)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(n != 0, "Need n > 0");
+
+ rct::keyV res(n);
+ res[0] = rct::identity();
+ if (n == 1)
+ return res;
+ res[1] = x;
+ for (size_t i = 2; i < n; ++i)
+ {
+ sc_mul(res[i].bytes, res[i-1].bytes, x.bytes);
+ }
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ // Given a scalar, construct the sum of its powers from 2 to n (where n is a power of 2):
+ //
+ // Output x**2 + x**4 + x**6 + ... + x**n
+ static rct::key sum_of_even_powers(const rct::key &x, size_t n)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES((n & (n - 1)) == 0, "Need n to be a power of 2");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(n != 0, "Need n > 0");
+
+ rct::key x1 = copy(x);
+ sc_mul(x1.bytes, x1.bytes, x1.bytes);
+
+ rct::key res = copy(x1);
+ while (n > 2)
+ {
+ sc_muladd(res.bytes, x1.bytes, res.bytes, res.bytes);
+ sc_mul(x1.bytes, x1.bytes, x1.bytes);
+ n /= 2;
+ }
+
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ // Given a scalar, return the sum of its powers from 1 to n
+ //
+ // Output x**1 + x**2 + x**3 + ... + x**n
+ static rct::key sum_of_scalar_powers(const rct::key &x, size_t n)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(n != 0, "Need n > 0");
+
+ rct::key res = ONE;
+ if (n == 1)
+ return x;
+
+ n += 1;
+ rct::key x1 = copy(x);
+
+ const bool is_power_of_2 = (n & (n - 1)) == 0;
+ if (is_power_of_2)
+ {
+ sc_add(res.bytes, res.bytes, x1.bytes);
+ while (n > 2)
+ {
+ sc_mul(x1.bytes, x1.bytes, x1.bytes);
+ sc_muladd(res.bytes, x1.bytes, res.bytes, res.bytes);
+ n /= 2;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ rct::key prev = x1;
+ for (size_t i = 1; i < n; ++i)
+ {
+ if (i > 1)
+ sc_mul(prev.bytes, prev.bytes, x1.bytes);
+ sc_add(res.bytes, res.bytes, prev.bytes);
+ }
+ }
+ sc_sub(res.bytes, res.bytes, ONE.bytes);
+
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ // Given two scalar arrays, construct the weighted inner product against another scalar
+ //
+ // Output a_0*b_0*y**1 + a_1*b_1*y**2 + ... + a_{n-1}*b_{n-1}*y**n
+ static rct::key weighted_inner_product(const epee::span<const rct::key> &a, const epee::span<const rct::key> &b, const rct::key &y)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b");
+ rct::key res = rct::zero();
+ rct::key y_power = ONE;
+ rct::key temp;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, a[i].bytes, b[i].bytes);
+ sc_mul(y_power.bytes, y_power.bytes, y.bytes);
+ sc_muladd(res.bytes, temp.bytes, y_power.bytes, res.bytes);
+ }
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ static rct::key weighted_inner_product(const rct::keyV &a, const epee::span<const rct::key> &b, const rct::key &y)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b");
+ return weighted_inner_product(epee::to_span(a), b, y);
+ }
+
+ // Fold inner-product point vectors
+ static void hadamard_fold(std::vector<ge_p3> &v, const rct::key &a, const rct::key &b)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES((v.size() & 1) == 0, "Vector size should be even");
+ const size_t sz = v.size() / 2;
+ for (size_t n = 0; n < sz; ++n)
+ {
+ ge_dsmp c[2];
+ ge_dsm_precomp(c[0], &v[n]);
+ ge_dsm_precomp(c[1], &v[sz + n]);
+ ge_double_scalarmult_precomp_vartime2_p3(&v[n], a.bytes, c[0], b.bytes, c[1]);
+ }
+ v.resize(sz);
+ }
+
+ // Add vectors componentwise
+ static rct::keyV vector_add(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b");
+ rct::keyV res(a.size());
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ sc_add(res[i].bytes, a[i].bytes, b[i].bytes);
+ }
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ // Add a scalar to all elements of a vector
+ static rct::keyV vector_add(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::key &b)
+ {
+ rct::keyV res(a.size());
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ sc_add(res[i].bytes, a[i].bytes, b.bytes);
+ }
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ // Subtract a scalar from all elements of a vector
+ static rct::keyV vector_subtract(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::key &b)
+ {
+ rct::keyV res(a.size());
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ sc_sub(res[i].bytes, a[i].bytes, b.bytes);
+ }
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ // Multiply a scalar by all elements of a vector
+ static rct::keyV vector_scalar(const epee::span<const rct::key> &a, const rct::key &x)
+ {
+ rct::keyV res(a.size());
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ sc_mul(res[i].bytes, a[i].bytes, x.bytes);
+ }
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ // Inversion helper function
+ static rct::key sm(rct::key y, int n, const rct::key &x)
+ {
+ while (n--)
+ sc_mul(y.bytes, y.bytes, y.bytes);
+ sc_mul(y.bytes, y.bytes, x.bytes);
+ return y;
+ }
+
+ // Compute the inverse of a nonzero
+ static rct::key invert(const rct::key &x)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!(x == ZERO), "Cannot invert zero!");
+ rct::key _1, _10, _100, _11, _101, _111, _1001, _1011, _1111;
+
+ _1 = x;
+ sc_mul(_10.bytes, _1.bytes, _1.bytes);
+ sc_mul(_100.bytes, _10.bytes, _10.bytes);
+ sc_mul(_11.bytes, _10.bytes, _1.bytes);
+ sc_mul(_101.bytes, _10.bytes, _11.bytes);
+ sc_mul(_111.bytes, _10.bytes, _101.bytes);
+ sc_mul(_1001.bytes, _10.bytes, _111.bytes);
+ sc_mul(_1011.bytes, _10.bytes, _1001.bytes);
+ sc_mul(_1111.bytes, _100.bytes, _1011.bytes);
+
+ rct::key inv;
+ sc_mul(inv.bytes, _1111.bytes, _1.bytes);
+
+ inv = sm(inv, 123 + 3, _101);
+ inv = sm(inv, 2 + 2, _11);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1111);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1111);
+ inv = sm(inv, 4, _1001);
+ inv = sm(inv, 2, _11);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1111);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 3, _101);
+ inv = sm(inv, 3 + 3, _101);
+ inv = sm(inv, 3, _111);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1111);
+ inv = sm(inv, 2 + 3, _111);
+ inv = sm(inv, 2 + 2, _11);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1011);
+ inv = sm(inv, 2 + 4, _1011);
+ inv = sm(inv, 6 + 4, _1001);
+ inv = sm(inv, 2 + 2, _11);
+ inv = sm(inv, 3 + 2, _11);
+ inv = sm(inv, 3 + 2, _11);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1001);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 3, _111);
+ inv = sm(inv, 2 + 4, _1111);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1011);
+ inv = sm(inv, 3, _101);
+ inv = sm(inv, 2 + 4, _1111);
+ inv = sm(inv, 3, _101);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 2, _11);
+
+ return inv;
+ }
+
+ // Invert a batch of scalars, all of which _must_ be nonzero
+ static rct::keyV invert(rct::keyV x)
+ {
+ rct::keyV scratch;
+ scratch.reserve(x.size());
+
+ rct::key acc = rct::identity();
+ for (size_t n = 0; n < x.size(); ++n)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!(x[n] == ZERO), "Cannot invert zero!");
+ scratch.push_back(acc);
+ if (n == 0)
+ acc = x[0];
+ else
+ sc_mul(acc.bytes, acc.bytes, x[n].bytes);
+ }
+
+ acc = invert(acc);
+
+ rct::key tmp;
+ for (int i = x.size(); i-- > 0; )
+ {
+ sc_mul(tmp.bytes, acc.bytes, x[i].bytes);
+ sc_mul(x[i].bytes, acc.bytes, scratch[i].bytes);
+ acc = tmp;
+ }
+
+ return x;
+ }
+
+ // Compute the slice of a vector
+ static epee::span<const rct::key> slice(const rct::keyV &a, size_t start, size_t stop)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(start < a.size(), "Invalid start index");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(stop <= a.size(), "Invalid stop index");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(start < stop, "Invalid start/stop indices");
+ return epee::span<const rct::key>(&a[start], stop - start);
+ }
+
+ // Update the transcript
+ static rct::key transcript_update(rct::key &transcript, const rct::key &update_0)
+ {
+ rct::key data[2];
+ data[0] = transcript;
+ data[1] = update_0;
+ rct::hash_to_scalar(transcript, data, sizeof(data));
+ return transcript;
+ }
+
+ static rct::key transcript_update(rct::key &transcript, const rct::key &update_0, const rct::key &update_1)
+ {
+ rct::key data[3];
+ data[0] = transcript;
+ data[1] = update_0;
+ data[2] = update_1;
+ rct::hash_to_scalar(transcript, data, sizeof(data));
+ return transcript;
+ }
+
+ // Given a value v [0..2**N) and a mask gamma, construct a range proof
+ BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(const rct::key &sv, const rct::key &gamma)
+ {
+ return bulletproof_plus_PROVE(rct::keyV(1, sv), rct::keyV(1, gamma));
+ }
+
+ BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(uint64_t v, const rct::key &gamma)
+ {
+ return bulletproof_plus_PROVE(std::vector<uint64_t>(1, v), rct::keyV(1, gamma));
+ }
+
+ // Given a set of values v [0..2**N) and masks gamma, construct a range proof
+ BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(const rct::keyV &sv, const rct::keyV &gamma)
+ {
+ // Sanity check on inputs
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(sv.size() == gamma.size(), "Incompatible sizes of sv and gamma");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!sv.empty(), "sv is empty");
+ for (const rct::key &sve: sv)
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(is_reduced(sve), "Invalid sv input");
+ for (const rct::key &g: gamma)
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(is_reduced(g), "Invalid gamma input");
+
+ init_exponents();
+
+ // Useful proof bounds
+ //
+ // N: number of bits in each range (here, 64)
+ // logN: base-2 logarithm
+ // M: first power of 2 greater than or equal to the number of range proofs to aggregate
+ // logM: base-2 logarithm
+ constexpr size_t logN = 6; // log2(64)
+ constexpr size_t N = 1<<logN;
+ size_t M, logM;
+ for (logM = 0; (M = 1<<logM) <= maxM && M < sv.size(); ++logM);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(M <= maxM, "sv/gamma are too large");
+ const size_t logMN = logM + logN;
+ const size_t MN = M * N;
+
+ rct::keyV V(sv.size());
+ rct::keyV aL(MN), aR(MN);
+ rct::keyV aL8(MN), aR8(MN);
+ rct::key temp;
+ rct::key temp2;
+
+ // Prepare output commitments and offset by a factor of 8**(-1)
+ //
+ // This offset is applied to other group elements as well;
+ // it allows us to apply a multiply-by-8 operation in the verifier efficiently
+ // to ensure that the resulting group elements are in the prime-order point subgroup
+ // and avoid much more constly multiply-by-group-order operations.
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sv.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ rct::key gamma8, sv8;
+ sc_mul(gamma8.bytes, gamma[i].bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ sc_mul(sv8.bytes, sv[i].bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ rct::addKeys2(V[i], gamma8, sv8, rct::H);
+ }
+
+ // Decompose values
+ //
+ // Note that this effectively pads the set to a power of 2, which is required for the inner-product argument later.
+ for (size_t j = 0; j < M; ++j)
+ {
+ for (size_t i = N; i-- > 0; )
+ {
+ if (j < sv.size() && (sv[j][i/8] & (((uint64_t)1)<<(i%8))))
+ {
+ aL[j*N+i] = rct::identity();
+ aL8[j*N+i] = INV_EIGHT;
+ aR[j*N+i] = aR8[j*N+i] = rct::zero();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ aL[j*N+i] = aL8[j*N+i] = rct::zero();
+ aR[j*N+i] = MINUS_ONE;
+ aR8[j*N+i] = MINUS_INV_EIGHT;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+try_again:
+ // This is a Fiat-Shamir transcript
+ rct::key transcript = copy(initial_transcript);
+ transcript = transcript_update(transcript, rct::hash_to_scalar(V));
+
+ // A
+ rct::key alpha = rct::skGen();
+ rct::key pre_A = vector_exponent(aL8, aR8);
+ rct::key A;
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, alpha.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ rct::addKeys(A, pre_A, rct::scalarmultBase(temp));
+
+ // Challenges
+ rct::key y = transcript_update(transcript, A);
+ if (y == rct::zero())
+ {
+ MINFO("y is 0, trying again");
+ goto try_again;
+ }
+ rct::key z = transcript = rct::hash_to_scalar(y);
+ if (z == rct::zero())
+ {
+ MINFO("z is 0, trying again");
+ goto try_again;
+ }
+ rct::key z_squared;
+ sc_mul(z_squared.bytes, z.bytes, z.bytes);
+
+ // Windowed vector
+ // d[j*N+i] = z**(2*(j+1)) * 2**i
+ //
+ // We compute this iteratively in order to reduce scalar operations.
+ rct::keyV d(MN, rct::zero());
+ d[0] = z_squared;
+ for (size_t i = 1; i < N; i++)
+ {
+ sc_mul(d[i].bytes, d[i-1].bytes, TWO.bytes);
+ }
+
+ for (size_t j = 1; j < M; j++)
+ {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < N; i++)
+ {
+ sc_mul(d[j*N+i].bytes, d[(j-1)*N+i].bytes, z_squared.bytes);
+ }
+ }
+
+ rct::keyV y_powers = vector_of_scalar_powers(y, MN+2);
+
+ // Prepare inner product terms
+ rct::keyV aL1 = vector_subtract(aL, z);
+
+ rct::keyV aR1 = vector_add(aR, z);
+ rct::keyV d_y(MN);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < MN; i++)
+ {
+ sc_mul(d_y[i].bytes, d[i].bytes, y_powers[MN-i].bytes);
+ }
+ aR1 = vector_add(aR1, d_y);
+
+ rct::key alpha1 = alpha;
+ temp = ONE;
+ for (size_t j = 0; j < sv.size(); j++)
+ {
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, z_squared.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp2.bytes, y_powers[MN+1].bytes, temp.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp2.bytes, temp2.bytes, gamma[j].bytes);
+ sc_add(alpha1.bytes, alpha1.bytes, temp2.bytes);
+ }
+
+ // These are used in the inner product rounds
+ size_t nprime = MN;
+ std::vector<ge_p3> Gprime(MN);
+ std::vector<ge_p3> Hprime(MN);
+ rct::keyV aprime(MN);
+ rct::keyV bprime(MN);
+
+ const rct::key yinv = invert(y);
+ rct::keyV yinvpow(MN);
+ yinvpow[0] = ONE;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < MN; ++i)
+ {
+ Gprime[i] = Gi_p3[i];
+ Hprime[i] = Hi_p3[i];
+ if (i > 0)
+ {
+ sc_mul(yinvpow[i].bytes, yinvpow[i-1].bytes, yinv.bytes);
+ }
+ aprime[i] = aL1[i];
+ bprime[i] = aR1[i];
+ }
+ rct::keyV L(logMN);
+ rct::keyV R(logMN);
+ int round = 0;
+
+ // Inner-product rounds
+ while (nprime > 1)
+ {
+ nprime /= 2;
+
+ rct::key cL = weighted_inner_product(slice(aprime, 0, nprime), slice(bprime, nprime, bprime.size()), y);
+ rct::key cR = weighted_inner_product(vector_scalar(slice(aprime, nprime, aprime.size()), y_powers[nprime]), slice(bprime, 0, nprime), y);
+
+ rct::key dL = rct::skGen();
+ rct::key dR = rct::skGen();
+
+ L[round] = compute_LR(nprime, yinvpow[nprime], Gprime, nprime, Hprime, 0, aprime, 0, bprime, nprime, cL, dL);
+ R[round] = compute_LR(nprime, y_powers[nprime], Gprime, 0, Hprime, nprime, aprime, nprime, bprime, 0, cR, dR);
+
+ const rct::key challenge = transcript_update(transcript, L[round], R[round]);
+ if (challenge == rct::zero())
+ {
+ MINFO("challenge is 0, trying again");
+ goto try_again;
+ }
+
+ const rct::key challenge_inv = invert(challenge);
+
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, yinvpow[nprime].bytes, challenge.bytes);
+ hadamard_fold(Gprime, challenge_inv, temp);
+ hadamard_fold(Hprime, challenge, challenge_inv);
+
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, challenge_inv.bytes, y_powers[nprime].bytes);
+ aprime = vector_add(vector_scalar(slice(aprime, 0, nprime), challenge), vector_scalar(slice(aprime, nprime, aprime.size()), temp));
+ bprime = vector_add(vector_scalar(slice(bprime, 0, nprime), challenge_inv), vector_scalar(slice(bprime, nprime, bprime.size()), challenge));
+
+ rct::key challenge_squared;
+ sc_mul(challenge_squared.bytes, challenge.bytes, challenge.bytes);
+ rct::key challenge_squared_inv = invert(challenge_squared);
+ sc_muladd(alpha1.bytes, dL.bytes, challenge_squared.bytes, alpha1.bytes);
+ sc_muladd(alpha1.bytes, dR.bytes, challenge_squared_inv.bytes, alpha1.bytes);
+
+ ++round;
+ }
+
+ // Final round computations
+ rct::key r = rct::skGen();
+ rct::key s = rct::skGen();
+ rct::key d_ = rct::skGen();
+ rct::key eta = rct::skGen();
+
+ std::vector<MultiexpData> A1_data;
+ A1_data.reserve(4);
+ A1_data.resize(4);
+
+ sc_mul(A1_data[0].scalar.bytes, r.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ A1_data[0].point = Gprime[0];
+
+ sc_mul(A1_data[1].scalar.bytes, s.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ A1_data[1].point = Hprime[0];
+
+ sc_mul(A1_data[2].scalar.bytes, d_.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ ge_p3 G_p3;
+ ge_frombytes_vartime(&G_p3, rct::G.bytes);
+ A1_data[2].point = G_p3;
+
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, r.bytes, y.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, bprime[0].bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp2.bytes, s.bytes, y.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp2.bytes, temp2.bytes, aprime[0].bytes);
+ sc_add(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, temp2.bytes);
+ sc_mul(A1_data[3].scalar.bytes, temp.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ ge_p3 H_p3;
+ ge_frombytes_vartime(&H_p3, rct::H.bytes);
+ A1_data[3].point = H_p3;
+
+ rct::key A1 = multiexp(A1_data, 0);
+
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, r.bytes, y.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, s.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp2.bytes, eta.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ rct::key B;
+ rct::addKeys2(B, temp2, temp, rct::H);
+
+ rct::key e = transcript_update(transcript, A1, B);
+ if (e == rct::zero())
+ {
+ MINFO("e is 0, trying again");
+ goto try_again;
+ }
+ rct::key e_squared;
+ sc_mul(e_squared.bytes, e.bytes, e.bytes);
+
+ rct::key r1;
+ sc_muladd(r1.bytes, aprime[0].bytes, e.bytes, r.bytes);
+
+ rct::key s1;
+ sc_muladd(s1.bytes, bprime[0].bytes, e.bytes, s.bytes);
+
+ rct::key d1;
+ sc_muladd(d1.bytes, d_.bytes, e.bytes, eta.bytes);
+ sc_muladd(d1.bytes, alpha1.bytes, e_squared.bytes, d1.bytes);
+
+ return BulletproofPlus(std::move(V), A, A1, B, r1, s1, d1, std::move(L), std::move(R));
+ }
+
+ BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(const std::vector<uint64_t> &v, const rct::keyV &gamma)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(v.size() == gamma.size(), "Incompatible sizes of v and gamma");
+
+ // vG + gammaH
+ rct::keyV sv(v.size());
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < v.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ sv[i] = rct::d2h(v[i]);
+ }
+ return bulletproof_plus_PROVE(sv, gamma);
+ }
+
+ struct bp_plus_proof_data_t
+ {
+ rct::key y, z, e;
+ std::vector<rct::key> challenges;
+ size_t logM, inv_offset;
+ };
+
+ // Given a batch of range proofs, determine if they are all valid
+ bool bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(const std::vector<const BulletproofPlus*> &proofs)
+ {
+ init_exponents();
+
+ const size_t logN = 6;
+ const size_t N = 1 << logN;
+
+ // Set up
+ size_t max_length = 0; // size of each of the longest proof's inner-product vectors
+ size_t nV = 0; // number of output commitments across all proofs
+ size_t inv_offset = 0;
+ size_t max_logM = 0;
+
+ std::vector<bp_plus_proof_data_t> proof_data;
+ proof_data.reserve(proofs.size());
+
+ // We'll perform only a single batch inversion across all proofs in the batch,
+ // since batch inversion requires only one scalar inversion operation.
+ std::vector<rct::key> to_invert;
+ to_invert.reserve(11 * proofs.size()); // maximal size, given the aggregation limit
+
+ for (const BulletproofPlus *p: proofs)
+ {
+ const BulletproofPlus &proof = *p;
+
+ // Sanity checks
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(is_reduced(proof.r1), false, "Input scalar not in range");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(is_reduced(proof.s1), false, "Input scalar not in range");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(is_reduced(proof.d1), false, "Input scalar not in range");
+
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.V.size() >= 1, false, "V does not have at least one element");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() == proof.R.size(), false, "Mismatched L and R sizes");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() > 0, false, "Empty proof");
+
+ max_length = std::max(max_length, proof.L.size());
+ nV += proof.V.size();
+
+ proof_data.push_back({});
+ bp_plus_proof_data_t &pd = proof_data.back();
+
+ // Reconstruct the challenges
+ rct::key transcript = copy(initial_transcript);
+ transcript = transcript_update(transcript, rct::hash_to_scalar(proof.V));
+ pd.y = transcript_update(transcript, proof.A);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(pd.y == rct::zero()), false, "y == 0");
+ pd.z = transcript = rct::hash_to_scalar(pd.y);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(pd.z == rct::zero()), false, "z == 0");
+
+ // Determine the number of inner-product rounds based on proof size
+ size_t M;
+ for (pd.logM = 0; (M = 1<<pd.logM) <= maxM && M < proof.V.size(); ++pd.logM);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() == 6+pd.logM, false, "Proof is not the expected size");
+ max_logM = std::max(pd.logM, max_logM);
+
+ const size_t rounds = pd.logM+logN;
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rounds > 0, false, "Zero rounds");
+
+ // The inner-product challenges are computed per round
+ pd.challenges.resize(rounds);
+ for (size_t j = 0; j < rounds; ++j)
+ {
+ pd.challenges[j] = transcript_update(transcript, proof.L[j], proof.R[j]);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(pd.challenges[j] == rct::zero()), false, "challenges[j] == 0");
+ }
+
+ // Final challenge
+ pd.e = transcript_update(transcript,proof.A1,proof.B);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(pd.e == rct::zero()), false, "e == 0");
+
+ // Batch scalar inversions
+ pd.inv_offset = inv_offset;
+ for (size_t j = 0; j < rounds; ++j)
+ to_invert.push_back(pd.challenges[j]);
+ to_invert.push_back(pd.y);
+ inv_offset += rounds + 1;
+ }
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(max_length < 32, false, "At least one proof is too large");
+ size_t maxMN = 1u << max_length;
+
+ rct::key temp;
+ rct::key temp2;
+
+ // Final batch proof data
+ std::vector<MultiexpData> multiexp_data;
+ multiexp_data.reserve(nV + (2 * (max_logM + logN) + 3) * proofs.size() + 2 * maxMN);
+ multiexp_data.resize(2 * maxMN);
+
+ const std::vector<rct::key> inverses = invert(std::move(to_invert));
+ to_invert.clear();
+
+ // Weights and aggregates
+ //
+ // The idea is to take the single multiscalar multiplication used in the verification
+ // of each proof in the batch and weight it using a random weighting factor, resulting
+ // in just one multiscalar multiplication check to zero for the entire batch.
+ // We can further simplify the verifier complexity by including common group elements
+ // only once in this single multiscalar multiplication.
+ // Common group elements' weighted scalar sums are tracked across proofs for this reason.
+ //
+ // To build a multiscalar multiplication for each proof, we use the method described in
+ // Section 6.1 of the preprint. Note that the result given there does not account for
+ // the construction of the inner-product inputs that are produced in the range proof
+ // verifier algorithm; we have done so here.
+ rct::key G_scalar = rct::zero();
+ rct::key H_scalar = rct::zero();
+ rct::keyV Gi_scalars(maxMN, rct::zero());
+ rct::keyV Hi_scalars(maxMN, rct::zero());
+
+ int proof_data_index = 0;
+ rct::keyV challenges_cache;
+ std::vector<ge_p3> proof8_V, proof8_L, proof8_R;
+
+ // Process each proof and add to the weighted batch
+ for (const BulletproofPlus *p: proofs)
+ {
+ const BulletproofPlus &proof = *p;
+ const bp_plus_proof_data_t &pd = proof_data[proof_data_index++];
+
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() == 6+pd.logM, false, "Proof is not the expected size");
+ const size_t M = 1 << pd.logM;
+ const size_t MN = M*N;
+
+ // Random weighting factor must be nonzero, which is exceptionally unlikely!
+ rct::key weight = ZERO;
+ while (weight == ZERO)
+ {
+ weight = rct::skGen();
+ }
+
+ // Rescale previously offset proof elements
+ //
+ // This ensures that all such group elements are in the prime-order subgroup.
+ proof8_V.resize(proof.V.size()); for (size_t i = 0; i < proof.V.size(); ++i) rct::scalarmult8(proof8_V[i], proof.V[i]);
+ proof8_L.resize(proof.L.size()); for (size_t i = 0; i < proof.L.size(); ++i) rct::scalarmult8(proof8_L[i], proof.L[i]);
+ proof8_R.resize(proof.R.size()); for (size_t i = 0; i < proof.R.size(); ++i) rct::scalarmult8(proof8_R[i], proof.R[i]);
+ ge_p3 proof8_A1;
+ ge_p3 proof8_B;
+ ge_p3 proof8_A;
+ rct::scalarmult8(proof8_A1, proof.A1);
+ rct::scalarmult8(proof8_B, proof.B);
+ rct::scalarmult8(proof8_A, proof.A);
+
+ // Compute necessary powers of the y-challenge
+ rct::key y_MN = copy(pd.y);
+ rct::key y_MN_1;
+ size_t temp_MN = MN;
+ while (temp_MN > 1)
+ {
+ sc_mul(y_MN.bytes, y_MN.bytes, y_MN.bytes);
+ temp_MN /= 2;
+ }
+ sc_mul(y_MN_1.bytes, y_MN.bytes, pd.y.bytes);
+
+ // V_j: -e**2 * z**(2*j+1) * y**(MN+1) * weight
+ rct::key e_squared;
+ sc_mul(e_squared.bytes, pd.e.bytes, pd.e.bytes);
+
+ rct::key z_squared;
+ sc_mul(z_squared.bytes, pd.z.bytes, pd.z.bytes);
+
+ sc_sub(temp.bytes, ZERO.bytes, e_squared.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, y_MN_1.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, weight.bytes);
+ for (size_t j = 0; j < proof8_V.size(); j++)
+ {
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, z_squared.bytes);
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(temp, proof8_V[j]);
+ }
+
+ // B: -weight
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, MINUS_ONE.bytes, weight.bytes);
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(temp, proof8_B);
+
+ // A1: -weight*e
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, pd.e.bytes);
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(temp, proof8_A1);
+
+ // A: -weight*e*e
+ rct::key minus_weight_e_squared;
+ sc_mul(minus_weight_e_squared.bytes, temp.bytes, pd.e.bytes);
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(minus_weight_e_squared, proof8_A);
+
+ // G: weight*d1
+ sc_muladd(G_scalar.bytes, weight.bytes, proof.d1.bytes, G_scalar.bytes);
+
+ // Windowed vector
+ // d[j*N+i] = z**(2*(j+1)) * 2**i
+ rct::keyV d(MN, rct::zero());
+ d[0] = z_squared;
+ for (size_t i = 1; i < N; i++)
+ {
+ sc_add(d[i].bytes, d[i-1].bytes, d[i-1].bytes);
+ }
+
+ for (size_t j = 1; j < M; j++)
+ {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < N; i++)
+ {
+ sc_mul(d[j*N+i].bytes, d[(j-1)*N+i].bytes, z_squared.bytes);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // More efficient computation of sum(d)
+ rct::key sum_d;
+ sc_mul(sum_d.bytes, TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE.bytes, sum_of_even_powers(pd.z, 2*M).bytes);
+
+ // H: weight*( r1*y*s1 + e**2*( y**(MN+1)*z*sum(d) + (z**2-z)*sum(y) ) )
+ rct::key sum_y = sum_of_scalar_powers(pd.y, MN);
+ sc_sub(temp.bytes, z_squared.bytes, pd.z.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, sum_y.bytes);
+
+ sc_mul(temp2.bytes, y_MN_1.bytes, pd.z.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp2.bytes, temp2.bytes, sum_d.bytes);
+ sc_add(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, temp2.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, e_squared.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp2.bytes, proof.r1.bytes, pd.y.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp2.bytes, temp2.bytes, proof.s1.bytes);
+ sc_add(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, temp2.bytes);
+ sc_muladd(H_scalar.bytes, temp.bytes, weight.bytes, H_scalar.bytes);
+
+ // Compute the number of rounds for the inner-product argument
+ const size_t rounds = pd.logM+logN;
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rounds > 0, false, "Zero rounds");
+
+ const rct::key *challenges_inv = &inverses[pd.inv_offset];
+ const rct::key yinv = inverses[pd.inv_offset + rounds];
+
+ // Compute challenge products
+ challenges_cache.resize(1<<rounds);
+ challenges_cache[0] = challenges_inv[0];
+ challenges_cache[1] = pd.challenges[0];
+ for (size_t j = 1; j < rounds; ++j)
+ {
+ const size_t slots = 1<<(j+1);
+ for (size_t s = slots; s-- > 0; --s)
+ {
+ sc_mul(challenges_cache[s].bytes, challenges_cache[s/2].bytes, pd.challenges[j].bytes);
+ sc_mul(challenges_cache[s-1].bytes, challenges_cache[s/2].bytes, challenges_inv[j].bytes);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Gi and Hi
+ rct::key e_r1_w_y;
+ sc_mul(e_r1_w_y.bytes, pd.e.bytes, proof.r1.bytes);
+ sc_mul(e_r1_w_y.bytes, e_r1_w_y.bytes, weight.bytes);
+ rct::key e_s1_w;
+ sc_mul(e_s1_w.bytes, pd.e.bytes, proof.s1.bytes);
+ sc_mul(e_s1_w.bytes, e_s1_w.bytes, weight.bytes);
+ rct::key e_squared_z_w;
+ sc_mul(e_squared_z_w.bytes, e_squared.bytes, pd.z.bytes);
+ sc_mul(e_squared_z_w.bytes, e_squared_z_w.bytes, weight.bytes);
+ rct::key minus_e_squared_z_w;
+ sc_sub(minus_e_squared_z_w.bytes, ZERO.bytes, e_squared_z_w.bytes);
+ rct::key minus_e_squared_w_y;
+ sc_sub(minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, ZERO.bytes, e_squared.bytes);
+ sc_mul(minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, weight.bytes);
+ sc_mul(minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, y_MN.bytes);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < MN; ++i)
+ {
+ rct::key g_scalar = copy(e_r1_w_y);
+ rct::key h_scalar;
+
+ // Use the binary decomposition of the index
+ sc_muladd(g_scalar.bytes, g_scalar.bytes, challenges_cache[i].bytes, e_squared_z_w.bytes);
+ sc_muladd(h_scalar.bytes, e_s1_w.bytes, challenges_cache[(~i) & (MN-1)].bytes, minus_e_squared_z_w.bytes);
+
+ // Complete the scalar derivation
+ sc_add(Gi_scalars[i].bytes, Gi_scalars[i].bytes, g_scalar.bytes);
+ sc_muladd(h_scalar.bytes, minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, d[i].bytes, h_scalar.bytes);
+ sc_add(Hi_scalars[i].bytes, Hi_scalars[i].bytes, h_scalar.bytes);
+
+ // Update iterated values
+ sc_mul(e_r1_w_y.bytes, e_r1_w_y.bytes, yinv.bytes);
+ sc_mul(minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, yinv.bytes);
+ }
+
+ // L_j: -weight*e*e*challenges[j]**2
+ // R_j: -weight*e*e*challenges[j]**(-2)
+ for (size_t j = 0; j < rounds; ++j)
+ {
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, pd.challenges[j].bytes, pd.challenges[j].bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, minus_weight_e_squared.bytes);
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(temp, proof8_L[j]);
+
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, challenges_inv[j].bytes, challenges_inv[j].bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, minus_weight_e_squared.bytes);
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(temp, proof8_R[j]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Verify all proofs in the weighted batch
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(G_scalar, rct::G);
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(H_scalar, rct::H);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < maxMN; ++i)
+ {
+ multiexp_data[i * 2] = {Gi_scalars[i], Gi_p3[i]};
+ multiexp_data[i * 2 + 1] = {Hi_scalars[i], Hi_p3[i]};
+ }
+ if (!(multiexp(multiexp_data, 2 * maxMN) == rct::identity()))
+ {
+ MERROR("Verification failure");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ bool bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(const std::vector<BulletproofPlus> &proofs)
+ {
+ std::vector<const BulletproofPlus*> proof_pointers;
+ proof_pointers.reserve(proofs.size());
+ for (const BulletproofPlus &proof: proofs)
+ proof_pointers.push_back(&proof);
+ return bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof_pointers);
+ }
+
+ bool bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(const BulletproofPlus &proof)
+ {
+ std::vector<const BulletproofPlus*> proofs;
+ proofs.push_back(&proof);
+ return bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proofs);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.h b/src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d9084075a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2017-2020, The Monero Project
+//
+// All rights reserved.
+//
+// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
+// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+//
+// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
+// conditions and the following disclaimer.
+//
+// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
+// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
+// materials provided with the distribution.
+//
+// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
+// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
+// prior written permission.
+//
+// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
+// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
+// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+#pragma once
+
+#ifndef BULLETPROOFS_PLUS_H
+#define BULLETPROOFS_PLUS_H
+
+#include "rctTypes.h"
+
+namespace rct
+{
+
+BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(const rct::key &v, const rct::key &gamma);
+BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(uint64_t v, const rct::key &gamma);
+BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(const rct::keyV &v, const rct::keyV &gamma);
+BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(const std::vector<uint64_t> &v, const rct::keyV &gamma);
+bool bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(const BulletproofPlus &proof);
+bool bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(const std::vector<const BulletproofPlus*> &proofs);
+bool bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(const std::vector<BulletproofPlus> &proofs);
+
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp b/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp
index f5950c53c..d7883baac 100644
--- a/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp
+++ b/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include "common/util.h"
#include "rctSigs.h"
#include "bulletproofs.h"
+#include "bulletproofs_plus.h"
#include "cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_format_utils.h"
#include "cryptonote_config.h"
@@ -78,6 +79,36 @@ namespace
return rct::Bulletproof{rct::keyV(n_outs, I), I, I, I, I, I, I, rct::keyV(nrl, I), rct::keyV(nrl, I), I, I, I};
}
+ rct::BulletproofPlus make_dummy_bulletproof_plus(const std::vector<uint64_t> &outamounts, rct::keyV &C, rct::keyV &masks)
+ {
+ const size_t n_outs = outamounts.size();
+ const rct::key I = rct::identity();
+ size_t nrl = 0;
+ while ((1u << nrl) < n_outs)
+ ++nrl;
+ nrl += 6;
+
+ C.resize(n_outs);
+ masks.resize(n_outs);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < n_outs; ++i)
+ {
+ masks[i] = I;
+ rct::key sv8, sv;
+ sv = rct::zero();
+ sv.bytes[0] = outamounts[i] & 255;
+ sv.bytes[1] = (outamounts[i] >> 8) & 255;
+ sv.bytes[2] = (outamounts[i] >> 16) & 255;
+ sv.bytes[3] = (outamounts[i] >> 24) & 255;
+ sv.bytes[4] = (outamounts[i] >> 32) & 255;
+ sv.bytes[5] = (outamounts[i] >> 40) & 255;
+ sv.bytes[6] = (outamounts[i] >> 48) & 255;
+ sv.bytes[7] = (outamounts[i] >> 56) & 255;
+ sc_mul(sv8.bytes, sv.bytes, rct::INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ rct::addKeys2(C[i], rct::INV_EIGHT, sv8, rct::H);
+ }
+
+ return rct::BulletproofPlus{rct::keyV(n_outs, I), I, I, I, I, I, I, rct::keyV(nrl, I), rct::keyV(nrl, I)};
+ }
}
namespace rct {
@@ -107,6 +138,32 @@ namespace rct {
catch (...) { return false; }
}
+ BulletproofPlus proveRangeBulletproofPlus(keyV &C, keyV &masks, const std::vector<uint64_t> &amounts, epee::span<const key> sk, hw::device &hwdev)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(amounts.size() == sk.size(), "Invalid amounts/sk sizes");
+ masks.resize(amounts.size());
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < masks.size(); ++i)
+ masks[i] = hwdev.genCommitmentMask(sk[i]);
+ BulletproofPlus proof = bulletproof_plus_PROVE(amounts, masks);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(proof.V.size() == amounts.size(), "V does not have the expected size");
+ C = proof.V;
+ return proof;
+ }
+
+ bool verBulletproofPlus(const BulletproofPlus &proof)
+ {
+ try { return bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof); }
+ // we can get deep throws from ge_frombytes_vartime if input isn't valid
+ catch (...) { return false; }
+ }
+
+ bool verBulletproofPlus(const std::vector<const BulletproofPlus*> &proofs)
+ {
+ try { return bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proofs); }
+ // we can get deep throws from ge_frombytes_vartime if input isn't valid
+ catch (...) { return false; }
+ }
+
//Borromean (c.f. gmax/andytoshi's paper)
boroSig genBorromean(const key64 x, const key64 P1, const key64 P2, const bits indices) {
key64 L[2], alpha;
@@ -611,6 +668,25 @@ namespace rct {
kv.push_back(p.t);
}
}
+ else if (rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproofPlus)
+ {
+ kv.reserve((6*2+6) * rv.p.bulletproofs_plus.size());
+ for (const auto &p: rv.p.bulletproofs_plus)
+ {
+ // V are not hashed as they're expanded from outPk.mask
+ // (and thus hashed as part of rctSigBase above)
+ kv.push_back(p.A);
+ kv.push_back(p.A1);
+ kv.push_back(p.B);
+ kv.push_back(p.r1);
+ kv.push_back(p.s1);
+ kv.push_back(p.d1);
+ for (size_t n = 0; n < p.L.size(); ++n)
+ kv.push_back(p.L[n]);
+ for (size_t n = 0; n < p.R.size(); ++n)
+ kv.push_back(p.R[n]);
+ }
+ }
else
{
kv.reserve((64*3+1) * rv.p.rangeSigs.size());
@@ -1031,7 +1107,7 @@ namespace rct {
//mask amount and mask
rv.ecdhInfo[i].mask = copy(outSk[i].mask);
rv.ecdhInfo[i].amount = d2h(amounts[i]);
- hwdev.ecdhEncode(rv.ecdhInfo[i], amount_keys[i], rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG);
+ hwdev.ecdhEncode(rv.ecdhInfo[i], amount_keys[i], rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproofPlus);
}
//set txn fee
@@ -1063,7 +1139,7 @@ namespace rct {
//RCT simple
//for post-rct only
rctSig genRctSimple(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> &inamounts, const vector<xmr_amount> &outamounts, xmr_amount txnFee, const ctkeyM & mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const std::vector<multisig_kLRki> *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, const std::vector<unsigned int> & index, ctkeyV &outSk, const RCTConfig &rct_config, hw::device &hwdev) {
- const bool bulletproof = rct_config.range_proof_type != RangeProofBorromean;
+ const bool bulletproof_or_plus = rct_config.range_proof_type > RangeProofBorromean;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(inamounts.size() > 0, "Empty inamounts");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(inamounts.size() == inSk.size(), "Different number of inamounts/inSk");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(outamounts.size() == destinations.size(), "Different number of amounts/destinations");
@@ -1079,11 +1155,14 @@ namespace rct {
}
rctSig rv;
- if (bulletproof)
+ if (bulletproof_or_plus)
{
switch (rct_config.bp_version)
{
case 0:
+ case 4:
+ rv.type = RCTTypeBulletproofPlus;
+ break;
case 3:
rv.type = RCTTypeCLSAG;
break;
@@ -1102,7 +1181,7 @@ namespace rct {
rv.message = message;
rv.outPk.resize(destinations.size());
- if (!bulletproof)
+ if (!bulletproof_or_plus)
rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size());
rv.ecdhInfo.resize(destinations.size());
@@ -1114,17 +1193,19 @@ namespace rct {
//add destination to sig
rv.outPk[i].dest = copy(destinations[i]);
//compute range proof
- if (!bulletproof)
+ if (!bulletproof_or_plus)
rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, outamounts[i]);
#ifdef DBG
- if (!bulletproof)
+ if (!bulletproof_or_plus)
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof");
#endif
}
rv.p.bulletproofs.clear();
- if (bulletproof)
+ rv.p.bulletproofs_plus.clear();
+ if (bulletproof_or_plus)
{
+ const bool plus = is_rct_bulletproof_plus(rv.type);
size_t n_amounts = outamounts.size();
size_t amounts_proved = 0;
if (rct_config.range_proof_type == RangeProofPaddedBulletproof)
@@ -1133,19 +1214,31 @@ namespace rct {
if (hwdev.get_mode() == hw::device::TRANSACTION_CREATE_FAKE)
{
// use a fake bulletproof for speed
- rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(make_dummy_bulletproof(outamounts, C, masks));
+ if (plus)
+ rv.p.bulletproofs_plus.push_back(make_dummy_bulletproof_plus(outamounts, C, masks));
+ else
+ rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(make_dummy_bulletproof(outamounts, C, masks));
}
else
{
const epee::span<const key> keys{&amount_keys[0], amount_keys.size()};
- rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(proveRangeBulletproof(C, masks, outamounts, keys, hwdev));
+ if (plus)
+ rv.p.bulletproofs_plus.push_back(proveRangeBulletproofPlus(C, masks, outamounts, keys, hwdev));
+ else
+ rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(proveRangeBulletproof(C, masks, outamounts, keys, hwdev));
#ifdef DBG
- CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs.back()), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof");
+ if (plus)
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproofPlus(rv.p.bulletproofs_plus.back()), "verBulletproofPlus failed on newly created proof");
+ else
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs.back()), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof");
#endif
}
for (i = 0; i < outamounts.size(); ++i)
{
- rv.outPk[i].mask = rct::scalarmult8(C[i]);
+ if (plus)
+ rv.outPk[i].mask = C[i];
+ else
+ rv.outPk[i].mask = rct::scalarmult8(C[i]);
outSk[i].mask = masks[i];
}
}
@@ -1153,7 +1246,7 @@ namespace rct {
{
size_t batch_size = 1;
if (rct_config.range_proof_type == RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof)
- while (batch_size * 2 + amounts_proved <= n_amounts && batch_size * 2 <= BULLETPROOF_MAX_OUTPUTS)
+ while (batch_size * 2 + amounts_proved <= n_amounts && batch_size * 2 <= (plus ? BULLETPROOF_PLUS_MAX_OUTPUTS : BULLETPROOF_MAX_OUTPUTS))
batch_size *= 2;
rct::keyV C, masks;
std::vector<uint64_t> batch_amounts(batch_size);
@@ -1162,19 +1255,31 @@ namespace rct {
if (hwdev.get_mode() == hw::device::TRANSACTION_CREATE_FAKE)
{
// use a fake bulletproof for speed
- rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(make_dummy_bulletproof(batch_amounts, C, masks));
+ if (plus)
+ rv.p.bulletproofs_plus.push_back(make_dummy_bulletproof_plus(batch_amounts, C, masks));
+ else
+ rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(make_dummy_bulletproof(batch_amounts, C, masks));
}
else
{
const epee::span<const key> keys{&amount_keys[amounts_proved], batch_size};
- rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(proveRangeBulletproof(C, masks, batch_amounts, keys, hwdev));
+ if (plus)
+ rv.p.bulletproofs_plus.push_back(proveRangeBulletproofPlus(C, masks, batch_amounts, keys, hwdev));
+ else
+ rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(proveRangeBulletproof(C, masks, batch_amounts, keys, hwdev));
#ifdef DBG
- CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs.back()), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof");
+ if (plus)
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproofPlus(rv.p.bulletproofs_plus.back()), "verBulletproofPlus failed on newly created proof");
+ else
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs.back()), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof");
#endif
}
for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i)
{
- rv.outPk[i + amounts_proved].mask = rct::scalarmult8(C[i]);
+ if (plus)
+ rv.outPk[i + amounts_proved].mask = C[i];
+ else
+ rv.outPk[i + amounts_proved].mask = rct::scalarmult8(C[i]);
outSk[i + amounts_proved].mask = masks[i];
}
amounts_proved += batch_size;
@@ -1189,7 +1294,7 @@ namespace rct {
//mask amount and mask
rv.ecdhInfo[i].mask = copy(outSk[i].mask);
rv.ecdhInfo[i].amount = d2h(outamounts[i]);
- hwdev.ecdhEncode(rv.ecdhInfo[i], amount_keys[i], rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG);
+ hwdev.ecdhEncode(rv.ecdhInfo[i], amount_keys[i], rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproofPlus);
}
//set txn fee
@@ -1197,9 +1302,9 @@ namespace rct {
// TODO: unused ??
// key txnFeeKey = scalarmultH(d2h(rv.txnFee));
rv.mixRing = mixRing;
- keyV &pseudoOuts = bulletproof ? rv.p.pseudoOuts : rv.pseudoOuts;
+ keyV &pseudoOuts = bulletproof_or_plus ? rv.p.pseudoOuts : rv.pseudoOuts;
pseudoOuts.resize(inamounts.size());
- if (rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG)
+ if (is_rct_clsag(rv.type))
rv.p.CLSAGs.resize(inamounts.size());
else
rv.p.MGs.resize(inamounts.size());
@@ -1218,11 +1323,11 @@ namespace rct {
if (msout)
{
msout->c.resize(inamounts.size());
- msout->mu_p.resize(rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG ? inamounts.size() : 0);
+ msout->mu_p.resize(is_rct_clsag(rv.type) ? inamounts.size() : 0);
}
for (i = 0 ; i < inamounts.size(); i++)
{
- if (rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG)
+ if (is_rct_clsag(rv.type))
{
rv.p.CLSAGs[i] = proveRctCLSAGSimple(full_message, rv.mixRing[i], inSk[i], a[i], pseudoOuts[i], kLRki ? &(*kLRki)[i]: NULL, msout ? &msout->c[i] : NULL, msout ? &msout->mu_p[i] : NULL, index[i], hwdev);
}
@@ -1328,20 +1433,25 @@ namespace rct {
tools::threadpool& tpool = tools::threadpool::getInstance();
tools::threadpool::waiter waiter(tpool);
std::deque<bool> results;
- std::vector<const Bulletproof*> proofs;
+ std::vector<const Bulletproof*> bp_proofs;
+ std::vector<const BulletproofPlus*> bpp_proofs;
size_t max_non_bp_proofs = 0, offset = 0;
for (const rctSig *rvp: rvv)
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rvp, false, "rctSig pointer is NULL");
const rctSig &rv = *rvp;
- CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG,
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproofPlus,
false, "verRctSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig");
const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
- if (bulletproof)
+ const bool bulletproof_plus = is_rct_bulletproof_plus(rv.type);
+ if (bulletproof || bulletproof_plus)
{
- CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and bulletproofs");
- if (rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG)
+ if (bulletproof_plus)
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == n_bulletproof_plus_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs_plus), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and bulletproofs_plus");
+ else
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and bulletproofs");
+ if (is_rct_clsag(rv.type))
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.MGs.empty(), false, "MGs are not empty for CLSAG");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.pseudoOuts.size() == rv.p.CLSAGs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of rv.p.pseudoOuts and rv.p.CLSAGs");
@@ -1361,7 +1471,7 @@ namespace rct {
}
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.ecdhInfo");
- if (!bulletproof)
+ if (!bulletproof && !bulletproof_plus)
max_non_bp_proofs += rv.p.rangeSigs.size();
}
@@ -1371,11 +1481,15 @@ namespace rct {
const rctSig &rv = *rvp;
const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
- const keyV &pseudoOuts = bulletproof ? rv.p.pseudoOuts : rv.pseudoOuts;
+ const bool bulletproof_plus = is_rct_bulletproof_plus(rv.type);
+ const keyV &pseudoOuts = bulletproof || bulletproof_plus ? rv.p.pseudoOuts : rv.pseudoOuts;
rct::keyV masks(rv.outPk.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++) {
- masks[i] = rv.outPk[i].mask;
+ if (bulletproof_plus)
+ masks[i] = rct::scalarmult8(rv.outPk[i].mask);
+ else
+ masks[i] = rv.outPk[i].mask;
}
key sumOutpks = addKeys(masks);
DP(sumOutpks);
@@ -1391,10 +1505,15 @@ namespace rct {
return false;
}
- if (bulletproof)
+ if (bulletproof_plus)
+ {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.p.bulletproofs_plus.size(); i++)
+ bpp_proofs.push_back(&rv.p.bulletproofs_plus[i]);
+ }
+ else if (bulletproof)
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.p.bulletproofs.size(); i++)
- proofs.push_back(&rv.p.bulletproofs[i]);
+ bp_proofs.push_back(&rv.p.bulletproofs[i]);
}
else
{
@@ -1403,9 +1522,18 @@ namespace rct {
offset += rv.p.rangeSigs.size();
}
}
- if (!proofs.empty() && !verBulletproof(proofs))
+ if (!bpp_proofs.empty() && !verBulletproofPlus(bpp_proofs))
+ {
+ LOG_PRINT_L1("Aggregate range proof verified failed");
+ if (!waiter.wait())
+ return false;
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (!bp_proofs.empty() && !verBulletproof(bp_proofs))
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("Aggregate range proof verified failed");
+ if (!waiter.wait())
+ return false;
return false;
}
@@ -1445,11 +1573,12 @@ namespace rct {
{
PERF_TIMER(verRctNonSemanticsSimple);
- CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG,
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproofPlus,
false, "verRctNonSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig");
const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
+ const bool bulletproof_plus = is_rct_bulletproof_plus(rv.type);
// semantics check is early, and mixRing/MGs aren't resolved yet
- if (bulletproof)
+ if (bulletproof || bulletproof_plus)
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.pseudoOuts.size() == rv.mixRing.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of rv.p.pseudoOuts and mixRing");
else
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.pseudoOuts.size() == rv.mixRing.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of rv.pseudoOuts and mixRing");
@@ -1460,7 +1589,7 @@ namespace rct {
tools::threadpool& tpool = tools::threadpool::getInstance();
tools::threadpool::waiter waiter(tpool);
- const keyV &pseudoOuts = bulletproof ? rv.p.pseudoOuts : rv.pseudoOuts;
+ const keyV &pseudoOuts = bulletproof || bulletproof_plus ? rv.p.pseudoOuts : rv.pseudoOuts;
const key message = get_pre_mlsag_hash(rv, hw::get_device("default"));
@@ -1468,10 +1597,8 @@ namespace rct {
results.resize(rv.mixRing.size());
for (size_t i = 0 ; i < rv.mixRing.size() ; i++) {
tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] {
- if (rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG)
- {
+ if (is_rct_clsag(rv.type))
results[i] = verRctCLSAGSimple(message, rv.p.CLSAGs[i], rv.mixRing[i], pseudoOuts[i]);
- }
else
results[i] = verRctMGSimple(message, rv.p.MGs[i], rv.mixRing[i], pseudoOuts[i]);
});
@@ -1518,10 +1645,12 @@ namespace rct {
//mask amount and mask
ecdhTuple ecdh_info = rv.ecdhInfo[i];
- hwdev.ecdhDecode(ecdh_info, sk, rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG);
+ hwdev.ecdhDecode(ecdh_info, sk, rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproofPlus);
mask = ecdh_info.mask;
key amount = ecdh_info.amount;
key C = rv.outPk[i].mask;
+ if (is_rct_bulletproof_plus(rv.type))
+ C = scalarmult8(C);
DP("C");
DP(C);
key Ctmp;
@@ -1542,16 +1671,19 @@ namespace rct {
}
xmr_amount decodeRctSimple(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key &mask, hw::device &hwdev) {
- CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG, false, "decodeRct called on non simple rctSig");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproofPlus,
+ false, "decodeRct called on non simple rctSig");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(i < rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Bad index");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.outPk and rv.ecdhInfo");
//mask amount and mask
ecdhTuple ecdh_info = rv.ecdhInfo[i];
- hwdev.ecdhDecode(ecdh_info, sk, rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG);
+ hwdev.ecdhDecode(ecdh_info, sk, rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproofPlus);
mask = ecdh_info.mask;
key amount = ecdh_info.amount;
key C = rv.outPk[i].mask;
+ if (is_rct_bulletproof_plus(rv.type))
+ C = scalarmult8(C);
DP("C");
DP(C);
key Ctmp;
@@ -1574,6 +1706,7 @@ namespace rct {
bool signMultisigMLSAG(rctSig &rv, const std::vector<unsigned int> &indices, const keyV &k, const multisig_out &msout, const key &secret_key) {
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof2,
false, "unsupported rct type");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!is_rct_clsag(rv.type), false, "CLSAG signature type in MLSAG signature function");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(indices.size() == k.size(), false, "Mismatched k/indices sizes");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(k.size() == rv.p.MGs.size(), false, "Mismatched k/MGs size");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(k.size() == msout.c.size(), false, "Mismatched k/msout.c size");
@@ -1598,7 +1731,7 @@ namespace rct {
}
bool signMultisigCLSAG(rctSig &rv, const std::vector<unsigned int> &indices, const keyV &k, const multisig_out &msout, const key &secret_key) {
- CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG, false, "unsupported rct type");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(is_rct_clsag(rv.type), false, "unsupported rct type");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(indices.size() == k.size(), false, "Mismatched k/indices sizes");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(k.size() == rv.p.CLSAGs.size(), false, "Mismatched k/CLSAGs size");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(k.size() == msout.c.size(), false, "Mismatched k/msout.c size");
@@ -1620,7 +1753,7 @@ namespace rct {
}
bool signMultisig(rctSig &rv, const std::vector<unsigned int> &indices, const keyV &k, const multisig_out &msout, const key &secret_key) {
- if (rv.type == RCTTypeCLSAG)
+ if (is_rct_clsag(rv.type))
return signMultisigCLSAG(rv, indices, k, msout, secret_key);
else
return signMultisigMLSAG(rv, indices, k, msout, secret_key);
diff --git a/src/ringct/rctTypes.cpp b/src/ringct/rctTypes.cpp
index 1f674056d..c22b0524f 100644
--- a/src/ringct/rctTypes.cpp
+++ b/src/ringct/rctTypes.cpp
@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ namespace rct {
case RCTTypeBulletproof:
case RCTTypeBulletproof2:
case RCTTypeCLSAG:
+ case RCTTypeBulletproofPlus:
return true;
default:
return false;
@@ -215,6 +216,17 @@ namespace rct {
}
}
+ bool is_rct_bulletproof_plus(int type)
+ {
+ switch (type)
+ {
+ case RCTTypeBulletproofPlus:
+ return true;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
bool is_rct_borromean(int type)
{
switch (type)
@@ -227,19 +239,34 @@ namespace rct {
}
}
- size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof)
+ bool is_rct_clsag(int type)
{
- CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() >= 6, 0, "Invalid bulletproof L size");
- CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() == proof.R.size(), 0, "Mismatched bulletproof L/R size");
+ switch (type)
+ {
+ case RCTTypeCLSAG:
+ case RCTTypeBulletproofPlus:
+ return true;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ static size_t n_bulletproof_amounts_base(const size_t L_size, const size_t R_size, const size_t V_size, const size_t max_outputs)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(L_size >= 6, 0, "Invalid bulletproof L size");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(L_size == R_size, 0, "Mismatched bulletproof L/R size");
static const size_t extra_bits = 4;
- static_assert((1 << extra_bits) == BULLETPROOF_MAX_OUTPUTS, "log2(BULLETPROOF_MAX_OUTPUTS) is out of date");
- CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() <= 6 + extra_bits, 0, "Invalid bulletproof L size");
- CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.V.size() <= (1u<<(proof.L.size()-6)), 0, "Invalid bulletproof V/L");
- CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.V.size() * 2 > (1u<<(proof.L.size()-6)), 0, "Invalid bulletproof V/L");
- CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.V.size() > 0, 0, "Empty bulletproof");
- return proof.V.size();
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES((1 << extra_bits) == max_outputs, 0, "log2(max_outputs) is out of date");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(L_size <= 6 + extra_bits, 0, "Invalid bulletproof L size");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(V_size <= (1u<<(L_size-6)), 0, "Invalid bulletproof V/L");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(V_size * 2 > (1u<<(L_size-6)), 0, "Invalid bulletproof V/L");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(V_size > 0, 0, "Empty bulletproof");
+ return V_size;
}
+ size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof) { return n_bulletproof_amounts_base(proof.L.size(), proof.R.size(), proof.V.size(), BULLETPROOF_MAX_OUTPUTS); }
+ size_t n_bulletproof_plus_amounts(const BulletproofPlus &proof) { return n_bulletproof_amounts_base(proof.L.size(), proof.R.size(), proof.V.size(), BULLETPROOF_PLUS_MAX_OUTPUTS); }
+
size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const std::vector<Bulletproof> &proofs)
{
size_t n = 0;
@@ -254,15 +281,31 @@ namespace rct {
return n;
}
- size_t n_bulletproof_max_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof)
+ size_t n_bulletproof_plus_amounts(const std::vector<BulletproofPlus> &proofs)
+ {
+ size_t n = 0;
+ for (const BulletproofPlus &proof: proofs)
+ {
+ size_t n2 = n_bulletproof_plus_amounts(proof);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(n2 < std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max() - n, 0, "Invalid number of bulletproofs");
+ if (n2 == 0)
+ return 0;
+ n += n2;
+ }
+ return n;
+ }
+
+ static size_t n_bulletproof_max_amounts_base(size_t L_size, size_t R_size, size_t max_outputs)
{
- CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() >= 6, 0, "Invalid bulletproof L size");
- CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() == proof.R.size(), 0, "Mismatched bulletproof L/R size");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(L_size >= 6, 0, "Invalid bulletproof L size");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(L_size == R_size, 0, "Mismatched bulletproof L/R size");
static const size_t extra_bits = 4;
- static_assert((1 << extra_bits) == BULLETPROOF_MAX_OUTPUTS, "log2(BULLETPROOF_MAX_OUTPUTS) is out of date");
- CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() <= 6 + extra_bits, 0, "Invalid bulletproof L size");
- return 1 << (proof.L.size() - 6);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES((1 << extra_bits) == max_outputs, 0, "log2(max_outputs) is out of date");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(L_size <= 6 + extra_bits, 0, "Invalid bulletproof L size");
+ return 1 << (L_size - 6);
}
+ size_t n_bulletproof_max_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof) { return n_bulletproof_max_amounts_base(proof.L.size(), proof.R.size(), BULLETPROOF_MAX_OUTPUTS); }
+ size_t n_bulletproof_plus_max_amounts(const BulletproofPlus &proof) { return n_bulletproof_max_amounts_base(proof.L.size(), proof.R.size(), BULLETPROOF_PLUS_MAX_OUTPUTS); }
size_t n_bulletproof_max_amounts(const std::vector<Bulletproof> &proofs)
{
@@ -278,4 +321,18 @@ namespace rct {
return n;
}
+ size_t n_bulletproof_plus_max_amounts(const std::vector<BulletproofPlus> &proofs)
+ {
+ size_t n = 0;
+ for (const BulletproofPlus &proof: proofs)
+ {
+ size_t n2 = n_bulletproof_plus_max_amounts(proof);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(n2 < std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max() - n, 0, "Invalid number of bulletproofs");
+ if (n2 == 0)
+ return 0;
+ n += n2;
+ }
+ return n;
+ }
+
}
diff --git a/src/ringct/rctTypes.h b/src/ringct/rctTypes.h
index 278ff4164..59ed4d6a6 100644
--- a/src/ringct/rctTypes.h
+++ b/src/ringct/rctTypes.h
@@ -238,11 +238,48 @@ namespace rct {
END_SERIALIZE()
};
+ struct BulletproofPlus
+ {
+ rct::keyV V;
+ rct::key A, A1, B;
+ rct::key r1, s1, d1;
+ rct::keyV L, R;
+
+ BulletproofPlus() {}
+ BulletproofPlus(const rct::key &V, const rct::key &A, const rct::key &A1, const rct::key &B, const rct::key &r1, const rct::key &s1, const rct::key &d1, const rct::keyV &L, const rct::keyV &R):
+ V({V}), A(A), A1(A1), B(B), r1(r1), s1(s1), d1(d1), L(L), R(R) {}
+ BulletproofPlus(const rct::keyV &V, const rct::key &A, const rct::key &A1, const rct::key &B, const rct::key &r1, const rct::key &s1, const rct::key &d1, const rct::keyV &L, const rct::keyV &R):
+ V(V), A(A), A1(A1), B(B), r1(r1), s1(s1), d1(d1), L(L), R(R) {}
+
+ bool operator==(const BulletproofPlus &other) const { return V == other.V && A == other.A && A1 == other.A1 && B == other.B && r1 == other.r1 && s1 == other.s1 && d1 == other.d1 && L == other.L && R == other.R; }
+
+ BEGIN_SERIALIZE_OBJECT()
+ // Commitments aren't saved, they're restored via outPk
+ // FIELD(V)
+ FIELD(A)
+ FIELD(A1)
+ FIELD(B)
+ FIELD(r1)
+ FIELD(s1)
+ FIELD(d1)
+ FIELD(L)
+ FIELD(R)
+
+ if (L.empty() || L.size() != R.size())
+ return false;
+ END_SERIALIZE()
+ };
+
size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof);
size_t n_bulletproof_max_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof);
size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const std::vector<Bulletproof> &proofs);
size_t n_bulletproof_max_amounts(const std::vector<Bulletproof> &proofs);
+ size_t n_bulletproof_plus_amounts(const BulletproofPlus &proof);
+ size_t n_bulletproof_plus_max_amounts(const BulletproofPlus &proof);
+ size_t n_bulletproof_plus_amounts(const std::vector<BulletproofPlus> &proofs);
+ size_t n_bulletproof_plus_max_amounts(const std::vector<BulletproofPlus> &proofs);
+
//A container to hold all signatures necessary for RingCT
// rangeSigs holds all the rangeproof data of a transaction
// MG holds the MLSAG signature of a transaction
@@ -257,6 +294,7 @@ namespace rct {
RCTTypeBulletproof = 3,
RCTTypeBulletproof2 = 4,
RCTTypeCLSAG = 5,
+ RCTTypeBulletproofPlus = 6,
};
enum RangeProofType { RangeProofBorromean, RangeProofBulletproof, RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof, RangeProofPaddedBulletproof };
struct RCTConfig {
@@ -285,7 +323,7 @@ namespace rct {
FIELD(type)
if (type == RCTTypeNull)
return ar.good();
- if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeBulletproof && type != RCTTypeBulletproof2 && type != RCTTypeCLSAG)
+ if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeBulletproof && type != RCTTypeBulletproof2 && type != RCTTypeCLSAG && type != RCTTypeBulletproofPlus)
return false;
VARINT_FIELD(txnFee)
// inputs/outputs not saved, only here for serialization help
@@ -314,7 +352,7 @@ namespace rct {
return false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < outputs; ++i)
{
- if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || type == RCTTypeCLSAG)
+ if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || type == RCTTypeCLSAG || type == RCTTypeBulletproofPlus)
{
ar.begin_object();
if (!typename Archive<W>::is_saving())
@@ -360,6 +398,7 @@ namespace rct {
struct rctSigPrunable {
std::vector<rangeSig> rangeSigs;
std::vector<Bulletproof> bulletproofs;
+ std::vector<BulletproofPlus> bulletproofs_plus;
std::vector<mgSig> MGs; // simple rct has N, full has 1
std::vector<clsag> CLSAGs;
keyV pseudoOuts; //C - for simple rct
@@ -376,9 +415,28 @@ namespace rct {
return false;
if (type == RCTTypeNull)
return ar.good();
- if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeBulletproof && type != RCTTypeBulletproof2 && type != RCTTypeCLSAG)
+ if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeBulletproof && type != RCTTypeBulletproof2 && type != RCTTypeCLSAG && type != RCTTypeBulletproofPlus)
return false;
- if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof || type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || type == RCTTypeCLSAG)
+ if (type == RCTTypeBulletproofPlus)
+ {
+ uint32_t nbp = bulletproofs_plus.size();
+ VARINT_FIELD(nbp)
+ ar.tag("bpp");
+ ar.begin_array();
+ if (nbp > outputs)
+ return false;
+ PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(nbp, bulletproofs_plus);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < nbp; ++i)
+ {
+ FIELDS(bulletproofs_plus[i])
+ if (nbp - i > 1)
+ ar.delimit_array();
+ }
+ if (n_bulletproof_plus_max_amounts(bulletproofs_plus) < outputs)
+ return false;
+ ar.end_array();
+ }
+ else if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof || type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || type == RCTTypeCLSAG)
{
uint32_t nbp = bulletproofs.size();
if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || type == RCTTypeCLSAG)
@@ -416,7 +474,7 @@ namespace rct {
ar.end_array();
}
- if (type == RCTTypeCLSAG)
+ if (type == RCTTypeCLSAG || type == RCTTypeBulletproofPlus)
{
ar.tag("CLSAGs");
ar.begin_array();
@@ -507,7 +565,7 @@ namespace rct {
}
ar.end_array();
}
- if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof || type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || type == RCTTypeCLSAG)
+ if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof || type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || type == RCTTypeCLSAG || type == RCTTypeBulletproofPlus)
{
ar.tag("pseudoOuts");
ar.begin_array();
@@ -528,6 +586,7 @@ namespace rct {
BEGIN_SERIALIZE_OBJECT()
FIELD(rangeSigs)
FIELD(bulletproofs)
+ FIELD(bulletproofs_plus)
FIELD(MGs)
FIELD(CLSAGs)
FIELD(pseudoOuts)
@@ -538,12 +597,12 @@ namespace rct {
keyV& get_pseudo_outs()
{
- return type == RCTTypeBulletproof || type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || type == RCTTypeCLSAG ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts;
+ return type == RCTTypeBulletproof || type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || type == RCTTypeCLSAG || type == RCTTypeBulletproofPlus ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts;
}
keyV const& get_pseudo_outs() const
{
- return type == RCTTypeBulletproof || type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || type == RCTTypeCLSAG ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts;
+ return type == RCTTypeBulletproof || type == RCTTypeBulletproof2 || type == RCTTypeCLSAG || type == RCTTypeBulletproofPlus ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts;
}
BEGIN_SERIALIZE_OBJECT()
@@ -655,7 +714,9 @@ namespace rct {
bool is_rct_simple(int type);
bool is_rct_bulletproof(int type);
+ bool is_rct_bulletproof_plus(int type);
bool is_rct_borromean(int type);
+ bool is_rct_clsag(int type);
static inline const rct::key &pk2rct(const crypto::public_key &pk) { return (const rct::key&)pk; }
static inline const rct::key &sk2rct(const crypto::secret_key &sk) { return (const rct::key&)sk; }
@@ -711,6 +772,7 @@ VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::Bulletproof, "rct::bulletproof");
VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::multisig_kLRki, "rct::multisig_kLRki");
VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::multisig_out, "rct::multisig_out");
VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::clsag, "rct::clsag");
+VARIANT_TAG(debug_archive, rct::BulletproofPlus, "rct::bulletproof_plus");
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::key, 0x90);
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::key64, 0x91);
@@ -728,6 +790,7 @@ VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::Bulletproof, 0x9c);
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::multisig_kLRki, 0x9d);
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::multisig_out, 0x9e);
VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::clsag, 0x9f);
+VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, rct::BulletproofPlus, 0xa0);
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::key, "rct_key");
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::key64, "rct_key64");
@@ -745,5 +808,6 @@ VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::Bulletproof, "rct_bulletproof");
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::multisig_kLRki, "rct_multisig_kLR");
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::multisig_out, "rct_multisig_out");
VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::clsag, "rct_clsag");
+VARIANT_TAG(json_archive, rct::BulletproofPlus, "rct_bulletproof_plus");
#endif /* RCTTYPES_H */
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-12-26 08:12:08 +0000