diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp')
-rw-r--r-- | src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp | 335 |
1 files changed, 202 insertions, 133 deletions
diff --git a/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp b/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp index cc966c44b..fe0cd9c57 100644 --- a/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp +++ b/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp @@ -45,30 +45,6 @@ using namespace std; #define CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES_L1(expr, ret, message) {if(!(expr)) {MCERROR("verify", message); return ret;}} namespace rct { - bool is_simple(int type) - { - switch (type) - { - case RCTTypeSimple: - case RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof: - return true; - default: - return false; - } - } - - bool is_bulletproof(int type) - { - switch (type) - { - case RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof: - case RCTTypeFullBulletproof: - return true; - default: - return false; - } - } - Bulletproof proveRangeBulletproof(key &C, key &mask, uint64_t amount) { mask = rct::skGen(); @@ -78,6 +54,15 @@ namespace rct { return proof; } + Bulletproof proveRangeBulletproof(keyV &C, keyV &masks, const std::vector<uint64_t> &amounts) + { + masks = rct::skvGen(amounts.size()); + Bulletproof proof = bulletproof_PROVE(amounts, masks); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(proof.V.size() == amounts.size(), "V does not have the expected size"); + C = proof.V; + return proof; + } + bool verBulletproof(const Bulletproof &proof) { try { return bulletproof_VERIFY(proof); } @@ -85,6 +70,13 @@ namespace rct { catch (...) { return false; } } + bool verBulletproof(const std::vector<const Bulletproof*> &proofs) + { + try { return bulletproof_VERIFY(proofs); } + // we can get deep throws from ge_frombytes_vartime if input isn't valid + catch (...) { return false; } + } + //Borromean (c.f. gmax/andytoshi's paper) boroSig genBorromean(const key64 x, const key64 P1, const key64 P2, const bits indices) { key64 L[2], alpha; @@ -285,6 +277,7 @@ namespace rct { for (j = 0; j < dsRows; j++) { addKeys2(L, rv.ss[i][j], c_old, pk[i][j]); hashToPoint(Hi, pk[i][j]); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(Hi == rct::identity()), false, "Data hashed to point at infinity"); addKeys3(R, rv.ss[i][j], Hi, c_old, Ip[j].k); toHash[3 * j + 1] = pk[i][j]; toHash[3 * j + 2] = L; @@ -389,7 +382,7 @@ namespace rct { std::stringstream ss; binary_archive<true> ba(ss); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!rv.mixRing.empty(), "Empty mixRing"); - const size_t inputs = is_simple(rv.type) ? rv.mixRing.size() : rv.mixRing[0].size(); + const size_t inputs = is_rct_simple(rv.type) ? rv.mixRing.size() : rv.mixRing[0].size(); const size_t outputs = rv.ecdhInfo.size(); key prehash; CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(const_cast<rctSig&>(rv).serialize_rctsig_base(ba, inputs, outputs), @@ -398,7 +391,7 @@ namespace rct { hashes.push_back(hash2rct(h)); keyV kv; - if (rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof) + if (rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof) { kv.reserve((6*2+9) * rv.p.bulletproofs.size()); for (const auto &p: rv.p.bulletproofs) @@ -659,7 +652,7 @@ namespace rct { // must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number // Note: For txn fees, the last index in the amounts vector should contain that // Thus the amounts vector will be "one" longer than the destinations vectort - rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, bool bulletproof, hw::device &hwdev) { + rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, hw::device &hwdev) { CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(amounts.size() == destinations.size() || amounts.size() == destinations.size() + 1, "Different number of amounts/destinations"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(amount_keys.size() == destinations.size(), "Different number of amount_keys/destinations"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(index < mixRing.size(), "Bad index into mixRing"); @@ -669,13 +662,10 @@ namespace rct { CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES((kLRki && msout) || (!kLRki && !msout), "Only one of kLRki/msout is present"); rctSig rv; - rv.type = bulletproof ? RCTTypeFullBulletproof : RCTTypeFull; + rv.type = RCTTypeFull; rv.message = message; rv.outPk.resize(destinations.size()); - if (bulletproof) - rv.p.bulletproofs.resize(destinations.size()); - else - rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size()); + rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size()); rv.ecdhInfo.resize(destinations.size()); size_t i = 0; @@ -685,17 +675,10 @@ namespace rct { //add destination to sig rv.outPk[i].dest = copy(destinations[i]); //compute range proof - if (bulletproof) - rv.p.bulletproofs[i] = proveRangeBulletproof(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, amounts[i]); - else - rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, amounts[i]); + rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, amounts[i]); #ifdef DBG - if (bulletproof) - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs[i]), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof"); - else - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof"); #endif - //mask amount and mask rv.ecdhInfo[i].mask = copy(outSk[i].mask); rv.ecdhInfo[i].amount = d2h(amounts[i]); @@ -725,12 +708,13 @@ namespace rct { ctkeyM mixRing; ctkeyV outSk; tie(mixRing, index) = populateFromBlockchain(inPk, mixin); - return genRct(message, inSk, destinations, amounts, mixRing, amount_keys, kLRki, msout, index, outSk, false, hwdev); + return genRct(message, inSk, destinations, amounts, mixRing, amount_keys, kLRki, msout, index, outSk, hwdev); } //RCT simple //for post-rct only - rctSig genRctSimple(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> &inamounts, const vector<xmr_amount> &outamounts, xmr_amount txnFee, const ctkeyM & mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const std::vector<multisig_kLRki> *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, const std::vector<unsigned int> & index, ctkeyV &outSk, bool bulletproof, hw::device &hwdev) { + rctSig genRctSimple(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> &inamounts, const vector<xmr_amount> &outamounts, xmr_amount txnFee, const ctkeyM & mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const std::vector<multisig_kLRki> *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, const std::vector<unsigned int> & index, ctkeyV &outSk, RangeProofType range_proof_type, hw::device &hwdev) { + const bool bulletproof = range_proof_type != RangeProofBorromean; CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(inamounts.size() > 0, "Empty inamounts"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(inamounts.size() == inSk.size(), "Different number of inamounts/inSk"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(outamounts.size() == destinations.size(), "Different number of amounts/destinations"); @@ -746,35 +730,74 @@ namespace rct { } rctSig rv; - rv.type = bulletproof ? RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof : RCTTypeSimple; + rv.type = bulletproof ? RCTTypeBulletproof : RCTTypeSimple; rv.message = message; rv.outPk.resize(destinations.size()); - if (bulletproof) - rv.p.bulletproofs.resize(destinations.size()); - else + if (!bulletproof) rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size()); rv.ecdhInfo.resize(destinations.size()); size_t i; keyV masks(destinations.size()); //sk mask.. outSk.resize(destinations.size()); - key sumout = zero(); for (i = 0; i < destinations.size(); i++) { //add destination to sig rv.outPk[i].dest = copy(destinations[i]); //compute range proof - if (bulletproof) - rv.p.bulletproofs[i] = proveRangeBulletproof(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, outamounts[i]); - else + if (!bulletproof) rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, outamounts[i]); #ifdef DBG - if (bulletproof) - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs[i]), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof"); - else + if (!bulletproof) CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof"); #endif - + } + + rv.p.bulletproofs.clear(); + if (bulletproof) + { + std::vector<uint64_t> proof_amounts; + size_t n_amounts = outamounts.size(); + size_t amounts_proved = 0; + if (range_proof_type == RangeProofPaddedBulletproof) + { + rct::keyV C, masks; + rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(proveRangeBulletproof(C, masks, outamounts)); + #ifdef DBG + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs.back()), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof"); + #endif + for (i = 0; i < outamounts.size(); ++i) + { + rv.outPk[i].mask = rct::scalarmult8(C[i]); + outSk[i].mask = masks[i]; + } + } + else while (amounts_proved < n_amounts) + { + size_t batch_size = 1; + if (range_proof_type == RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof) + while (batch_size * 2 + amounts_proved <= n_amounts && batch_size * 2 <= BULLETPROOF_MAX_OUTPUTS) + batch_size *= 2; + rct::keyV C, masks; + std::vector<uint64_t> batch_amounts(batch_size); + for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i) + batch_amounts[i] = outamounts[i + amounts_proved]; + rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(proveRangeBulletproof(C, masks, batch_amounts)); + #ifdef DBG + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs.back()), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof"); + #endif + for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i) + { + rv.outPk[i + amounts_proved].mask = rct::scalarmult8(C[i]); + outSk[i + amounts_proved].mask = masks[i]; + } + amounts_proved += batch_size; + } + } + + key sumout = zero(); + for (i = 0; i < outSk.size(); ++i) + { sc_add(sumout.bytes, outSk[i].mask.bytes, sumout.bytes); //mask amount and mask @@ -822,7 +845,7 @@ namespace rct { mixRing[i].resize(mixin+1); index[i] = populateFromBlockchainSimple(mixRing[i], inPk[i], mixin); } - return genRctSimple(message, inSk, destinations, inamounts, outamounts, txnFee, mixRing, amount_keys, kLRki, msout, index, outSk, false, hwdev); + return genRctSimple(message, inSk, destinations, inamounts, outamounts, txnFee, mixRing, amount_keys, kLRki, msout, index, outSk, RangeProofBorromean, hwdev); } //RingCT protocol @@ -837,13 +860,10 @@ namespace rct { // must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number bool verRct(const rctSig & rv, bool semantics) { PERF_TIMER(verRct); - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof, false, "verRct called on non-full rctSig"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull, false, "verRct called on non-full rctSig"); if (semantics) { - if (rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof) - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.bulletproofs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.bulletproofs"); - else - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.rangeSigs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.rangeSigs"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.rangeSigs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.rangeSigs"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.ecdhInfo"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.MGs.size() == 1, false, "full rctSig has not one MG"); } @@ -860,19 +880,13 @@ namespace rct { tools::threadpool::waiter waiter; std::deque<bool> results(rv.outPk.size(), false); DP("range proofs verified?"); - for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++) { - tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { - if (rv.p.rangeSigs.empty()) - results[i] = verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs[i]); - else - results[i] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); - }, true); - } + for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++) + tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { results[i] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); }); waiter.wait(&tpool); - for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); ++i) { + for (size_t i = 0; i < results.size(); ++i) { if (!results[i]) { - LOG_PRINT_L1("Range proof verified failed for output " << i); + LOG_PRINT_L1("Range proof verified failed for proof " << i); return false; } } @@ -906,17 +920,26 @@ namespace rct { //ver RingCT simple //assumes only post-rct style inputs (at least for max anonymity) - bool verRctSimple(const rctSig & rv, bool semantics) { + bool verRctSemanticsSimple(const std::vector<const rctSig*> & rvv) { try { - PERF_TIMER(verRctSimple); + PERF_TIMER(verRctSemanticsSimple); - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "verRctSimple called on non simple rctSig"); - if (semantics) + tools::threadpool& tpool = tools::threadpool::getInstance(); + tools::threadpool::waiter waiter; + std::deque<bool> results; + std::vector<const Bulletproof*> proofs; + size_t max_non_bp_proofs = 0, offset = 0; + + for (const rctSig *rvp: rvv) { - if (rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rvp, false, "rctSig pointer is NULL"); + const rctSig &rv = *rvp; + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof, false, "verRctSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig"); + const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type); + if (bulletproof) { - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.bulletproofs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.bulletproofs"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and bulletproofs"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.pseudoOuts.size() == rv.p.MGs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of rv.p.pseudoOuts and rv.p.MGs"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.pseudoOuts.empty(), false, "rv.pseudoOuts is not empty"); } @@ -927,28 +950,22 @@ namespace rct { CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.pseudoOuts.empty(), false, "rv.p.pseudoOuts is not empty"); } CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.ecdhInfo"); - } - else - { - // semantics check is early, and mixRing/MGs aren't resolved yet - if (rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.pseudoOuts.size() == rv.mixRing.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of rv.p.pseudoOuts and mixRing"); - else - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.pseudoOuts.size() == rv.mixRing.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of rv.pseudoOuts and mixRing"); - } - const size_t threads = std::max(rv.outPk.size(), rv.mixRing.size()); + if (!bulletproof) + max_non_bp_proofs += rv.p.rangeSigs.size(); + } - std::deque<bool> results(threads); - tools::threadpool& tpool = tools::threadpool::getInstance(); - tools::threadpool::waiter waiter; + results.resize(max_non_bp_proofs); + for (const rctSig *rvp: rvv) + { + const rctSig &rv = *rvp; - const keyV &pseudoOuts = is_bulletproof(rv.type) ? rv.p.pseudoOuts : rv.pseudoOuts; + const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type); + const keyV &pseudoOuts = bulletproof ? rv.p.pseudoOuts : rv.pseudoOuts; - if (semantics) { key sumOutpks = identity(); for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++) { - addKeys(sumOutpks, sumOutpks, rv.outPk[i].mask); + addKeys(sumOutpks, sumOutpks, rv.outPk[i].mask); } DP(sumOutpks); key txnFeeKey = scalarmultH(d2h(rv.txnFee)); @@ -956,52 +973,100 @@ namespace rct { key sumPseudoOuts = identity(); for (size_t i = 0 ; i < pseudoOuts.size() ; i++) { - addKeys(sumPseudoOuts, sumPseudoOuts, pseudoOuts[i]); + addKeys(sumPseudoOuts, sumPseudoOuts, pseudoOuts[i]); } DP(sumPseudoOuts); //check pseudoOuts vs Outs.. if (!equalKeys(sumPseudoOuts, sumOutpks)) { - LOG_PRINT_L1("Sum check failed"); - return false; + LOG_PRINT_L1("Sum check failed"); + return false; } - results.clear(); - results.resize(rv.outPk.size()); - for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++) { - tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { - if (rv.p.rangeSigs.empty()) - results[i] = verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs[i]); - else - results[i] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); - }, true); + if (bulletproof) + { + for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.p.bulletproofs.size(); i++) + proofs.push_back(&rv.p.bulletproofs[i]); } - waiter.wait(&tpool); - - for (size_t i = 0; i < results.size(); ++i) { - if (!results[i]) { - LOG_PRINT_L1("Range proof verified failed for output " << i); - return false; - } + else + { + for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.p.rangeSigs.size(); i++) + tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i, offset] { results[i+offset] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); }); + offset += rv.p.rangeSigs.size(); } } - else { - const key message = get_pre_mlsag_hash(rv, hw::get_device("default")); - - results.clear(); - results.resize(rv.mixRing.size()); - for (size_t i = 0 ; i < rv.mixRing.size() ; i++) { - tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { - results[i] = verRctMGSimple(message, rv.p.MGs[i], rv.mixRing[i], pseudoOuts[i]); - }, true); + if (!proofs.empty() && !verBulletproof(proofs)) + { + LOG_PRINT_L1("Aggregate range proof verified failed"); + return false; + } + + waiter.wait(&tpool); + for (size_t i = 0; i < results.size(); ++i) { + if (!results[i]) { + LOG_PRINT_L1("Range proof verified failed for proof " << i); + return false; } - waiter.wait(&tpool); + } - for (size_t i = 0; i < results.size(); ++i) { - if (!results[i]) { - LOG_PRINT_L1("verRctMGSimple failed for input " << i); - return false; - } + return true; + } + // we can get deep throws from ge_frombytes_vartime if input isn't valid + catch (const std::exception &e) + { + LOG_PRINT_L1("Error in verRctSemanticsSimple: " << e.what()); + return false; + } + catch (...) + { + LOG_PRINT_L1("Error in verRctSemanticsSimple, but not an actual exception"); + return false; + } + } + + bool verRctSemanticsSimple(const rctSig & rv) + { + return verRctSemanticsSimple(std::vector<const rctSig*>(1, &rv)); + } + + //ver RingCT simple + //assumes only post-rct style inputs (at least for max anonymity) + bool verRctNonSemanticsSimple(const rctSig & rv) { + try + { + PERF_TIMER(verRctNonSemanticsSimple); + + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof, false, "verRctNonSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig"); + const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type); + // semantics check is early, and mixRing/MGs aren't resolved yet + if (bulletproof) + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.pseudoOuts.size() == rv.mixRing.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of rv.p.pseudoOuts and mixRing"); + else + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.pseudoOuts.size() == rv.mixRing.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of rv.pseudoOuts and mixRing"); + + const size_t threads = std::max(rv.outPk.size(), rv.mixRing.size()); + + std::deque<bool> results(threads); + tools::threadpool& tpool = tools::threadpool::getInstance(); + tools::threadpool::waiter waiter; + + const keyV &pseudoOuts = bulletproof ? rv.p.pseudoOuts : rv.pseudoOuts; + + const key message = get_pre_mlsag_hash(rv, hw::get_device("default")); + + results.clear(); + results.resize(rv.mixRing.size()); + for (size_t i = 0 ; i < rv.mixRing.size() ; i++) { + tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { + results[i] = verRctMGSimple(message, rv.p.MGs[i], rv.mixRing[i], pseudoOuts[i]); + }); + } + waiter.wait(&tpool); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < results.size(); ++i) { + if (!results[i]) { + LOG_PRINT_L1("verRctMGSimple failed for input " << i); + return false; } } @@ -1010,12 +1075,12 @@ namespace rct { // we can get deep throws from ge_frombytes_vartime if input isn't valid catch (const std::exception &e) { - LOG_PRINT_L1("Error in verRct: " << e.what()); + LOG_PRINT_L1("Error in verRctNonSemanticsSimple: " << e.what()); return false; } catch (...) { - LOG_PRINT_L1("Error in verRct, but not an actual exception"); + LOG_PRINT_L1("Error in verRctNonSemanticsSimple, but not an actual exception"); return false; } } @@ -1031,7 +1096,7 @@ namespace rct { // uses the attached ecdh info to find the amounts represented by each output commitment // must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number xmr_amount decodeRct(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key & mask, hw::device &hwdev) { - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof, false, "decodeRct called on non-full rctSig"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull, false, "decodeRct called on non-full rctSig"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(i < rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Bad index"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.outPk and rv.ecdhInfo"); @@ -1044,6 +1109,8 @@ namespace rct { DP("C"); DP(C); key Ctmp; + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(sc_check(mask.bytes) == 0, "warning, bad ECDH mask"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(sc_check(amount.bytes) == 0, "warning, bad ECDH amount"); addKeys2(Ctmp, mask, amount, H); DP("Ctmp"); DP(Ctmp); @@ -1059,7 +1126,7 @@ namespace rct { } xmr_amount decodeRctSimple(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key &mask, hw::device &hwdev) { - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "decodeRct called on non simple rctSig"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof, false, "decodeRct called on non simple rctSig"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(i < rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Bad index"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.outPk and rv.ecdhInfo"); @@ -1072,6 +1139,8 @@ namespace rct { DP("C"); DP(C); key Ctmp; + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(sc_check(mask.bytes) == 0, "warning, bad ECDH mask"); + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(sc_check(amount.bytes) == 0, "warning, bad ECDH amount"); addKeys2(Ctmp, mask, amount, H); DP("Ctmp"); DP(Ctmp); @@ -1087,12 +1156,12 @@ namespace rct { } bool signMultisig(rctSig &rv, const std::vector<unsigned int> &indices, const keyV &k, const multisig_out &msout, const key &secret_key) { - CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, + CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof, false, "unsupported rct type"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(indices.size() == k.size(), false, "Mismatched k/indices sizes"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(k.size() == rv.p.MGs.size(), false, "Mismatched k/MGs size"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(k.size() == msout.c.size(), false, "Mismatched k/msout.c size"); - if (rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof) + if (rv.type == RCTTypeFull) { CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.MGs.size() == 1, false, "MGs not a single element"); } |