diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp')
-rw-r--r-- | src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp | 35 |
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp b/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp index 3d586a704..836856bae 100644 --- a/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp +++ b/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp @@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ static const struct { { 5, 802660, 0, 1472415036 + 86400*180 }, // add 5 months on testnet to shut the update warning up since there's a large gap to v6 { 6, 971400, 0, 1501709789 }, + { 7, 1057028, 0, 1512211236 }, }; static const uint64_t testnet_hard_fork_version_1_till = 624633; @@ -2387,8 +2388,10 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_outputs(const transaction& tx, tx_verification_context LOG_PRINT_L3("Blockchain::" << __func__); CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(m_blockchain_lock); + const uint8_t hf_version = m_hardfork->get_current_version(); + // from hard fork 2, we forbid dust and compound outputs - if (m_hardfork->get_current_version() >= 2) { + if (hf_version >= 2) { for (auto &o: tx.vout) { if (tx.version == 1) { @@ -2401,7 +2404,7 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_outputs(const transaction& tx, tx_verification_context } // in a v2 tx, all outputs must have 0 amount - if (m_hardfork->get_current_version() >= 3) { + if (hf_version >= 3) { if (tx.version >= 2) { for (auto &o: tx.vout) { if (o.amount != 0) { @@ -2413,7 +2416,7 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_outputs(const transaction& tx, tx_verification_context } // from v4, forbid invalid pubkeys - if (m_hardfork->get_current_version() >= 4) { + if (hf_version >= 4) { for (const auto &o: tx.vout) { if (o.target.type() == typeid(txout_to_key)) { const txout_to_key& out_to_key = boost::get<txout_to_key>(o.target); @@ -2425,6 +2428,16 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_outputs(const transaction& tx, tx_verification_context } } + // from v7, allow bulletproofs + if (hf_version < 7 || !m_testnet) { + if (!tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty()) + { + MERROR("Bulletproofs are not allowed before v7 or on mainnet"); + tvc.m_invalid_output = true; + return false; + } + } + return true; } //------------------------------------------------------------------ @@ -2450,7 +2463,7 @@ bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_pr rv.message = rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash); // mixRing - full and simple store it in opposite ways - if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull) + if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof) { rv.mixRing.resize(pubkeys[0].size()); for (size_t m = 0; m < pubkeys[0].size(); ++m) @@ -2464,7 +2477,7 @@ bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_pr } } } - else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple) + else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) { rv.mixRing.resize(pubkeys.size()); for (size_t n = 0; n < pubkeys.size(); ++n) @@ -2482,14 +2495,14 @@ bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_pr } // II - if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull) + if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof) { rv.p.MGs.resize(1); rv.p.MGs[0].II.resize(tx.vin.size()); for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.vin.size(); ++n) rv.p.MGs[0].II[n] = rct::ki2rct(boost::get<txin_to_key>(tx.vin[n]).k_image); } - else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple) + else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) { CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.MGs.size() == tx.vin.size(), false, "Bad MGs size"); for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.vin.size(); ++n) @@ -2753,7 +2766,9 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc, MERROR_VER("Null rct signature on non-coinbase tx"); return false; } - case rct::RCTTypeSimple: { + case rct::RCTTypeSimple: + case rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof: + { // check all this, either recontructed (so should really pass), or not { if (pubkeys.size() != rv.mixRing.size()) @@ -2809,7 +2824,9 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc, } break; } - case rct::RCTTypeFull: { + case rct::RCTTypeFull: + case rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof: + { // check all this, either recontructed (so should really pass), or not { bool size_matches = true; |