diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'external/unbound/validator')
-rw-r--r-- | external/unbound/validator/autotrust.c | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | external/unbound/validator/autotrust.h | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | external/unbound/validator/val_anchor.c | 59 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | external/unbound/validator/val_anchor.h | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | external/unbound/validator/val_neg.c | 32 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | external/unbound/validator/val_neg.h | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | external/unbound/validator/val_nsec.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | external/unbound/validator/val_nsec3.c | 28 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | external/unbound/validator/val_nsec3.h | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | external/unbound/validator/val_secalgo.c | 316 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | external/unbound/validator/val_secalgo.h | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | external/unbound/validator/val_sigcrypt.c | 44 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | external/unbound/validator/val_sigcrypt.h | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | external/unbound/validator/val_utils.c | 64 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | external/unbound/validator/validator.c | 22 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | external/unbound/validator/validator.h | 2 |
16 files changed, 482 insertions, 156 deletions
diff --git a/external/unbound/validator/autotrust.c b/external/unbound/validator/autotrust.c index f8c9c8c63..a533733c7 100644 --- a/external/unbound/validator/autotrust.c +++ b/external/unbound/validator/autotrust.c @@ -430,6 +430,8 @@ find_add_tp(struct val_anchors* anchors, uint8_t* rr, size_t rr_len, } tp = autr_tp_create(anchors, rr, dname_len, sldns_wirerr_get_class(rr, rr_len, dname_len)); + if(!tp) + return NULL; lock_basic_lock(&tp->lock); return tp; } @@ -1062,7 +1064,7 @@ int autr_read_file(struct val_anchors* anchors, const char* nm) /** string for a trustanchor state */ static const char* -trustanchor_state2str(autr_state_t s) +trustanchor_state2str(autr_state_type s) { switch (s) { case AUTR_STATE_START: return " START "; @@ -1201,7 +1203,7 @@ void autr_write_file(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp) if(fsync(fileno(out)) != 0) log_err("could not fsync(%s): %s", fname, strerror(errno)); #else - FlushFileBuffers((HANDLE)_fileno(out)); + FlushFileBuffers((HANDLE)_get_osfhandle(_fileno(out))); #endif if(fclose(out) != 0) { fatal_exit("could not complete write: %s: %s", @@ -1677,7 +1679,7 @@ reset_holddown(struct module_env* env, struct autr_ta* ta, int* changed) /** Set the state for this trust anchor */ static void set_trustanchor_state(struct module_env* env, struct autr_ta* ta, int* changed, - autr_state_t s) + autr_state_type s) { verbose_key(ta, VERB_ALGO, "update: %s to %s", trustanchor_state2str(ta->s), trustanchor_state2str(s)); @@ -1987,7 +1989,7 @@ calc_next_probe(struct module_env* env, time_t wait) static time_t wait_probe_time(struct val_anchors* anchors) { - rbnode_t* t = rbtree_first(&anchors->autr->probe); + rbnode_type* t = rbtree_first(&anchors->autr->probe); if(t != RBTREE_NULL) return ((struct trust_anchor*)t->key)->autr->next_probe_time; return 0; @@ -2326,6 +2328,7 @@ probe_anchor(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp) qinfo.qname_len = tp->namelen; qinfo.qtype = LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY; qinfo.qclass = tp->dclass; + qinfo.local_alias = NULL; log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "autotrust probe", &qinfo); verbose(VERB_ALGO, "retry probe set in %d seconds", (int)tp->autr->next_probe_time - (int)*env->now); @@ -2333,6 +2336,7 @@ probe_anchor(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp) edns.ext_rcode = 0; edns.edns_version = 0; edns.bits = EDNS_DO; + edns.opt_list = NULL; if(sldns_buffer_capacity(buf) < 65535) edns.udp_size = (uint16_t)sldns_buffer_capacity(buf); else edns.udp_size = 65535; @@ -2359,7 +2363,7 @@ static struct trust_anchor* todo_probe(struct module_env* env, time_t* next) { struct trust_anchor* tp; - rbnode_t* el; + rbnode_type* el; /* get first one */ lock_basic_lock(&env->anchors->lock); if( (el=rbtree_first(&env->anchors->autr->probe)) == RBTREE_NULL) { diff --git a/external/unbound/validator/autotrust.h b/external/unbound/validator/autotrust.h index ae61f8a87..dbaf5126a 100644 --- a/external/unbound/validator/autotrust.h +++ b/external/unbound/validator/autotrust.h @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ typedef enum { AUTR_STATE_MISSING = 3, AUTR_STATE_REVOKED = 4, AUTR_STATE_REMOVED = 5 -} autr_state_t; +} autr_state_type; /** * Autotrust metadata for one trust anchor key. @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ struct autr_ta { /** last update of key state (new pending count keeps date the same) */ time_t last_change; /** 5011 state */ - autr_state_t s; + autr_state_type s; /** pending count */ uint8_t pending_count; /** fresh TA was seen */ @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ struct autr_point_data { /** file to store the trust point in. chrootdir already applied. */ char* file; /** rbtree node for probe sort, key is struct trust_anchor */ - rbnode_t pnode; + rbnode_type pnode; /** the keys */ struct autr_ta* keys; @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ struct autr_point_data { struct autr_global_data { /** rbtree of autotrust anchors sorted by next probe time. * When time is equal, sorted by anchor class, name. */ - rbtree_t probe; + rbtree_type probe; }; /** diff --git a/external/unbound/validator/val_anchor.c b/external/unbound/validator/val_anchor.c index 845b54a2e..6c6322447 100644 --- a/external/unbound/validator/val_anchor.c +++ b/external/unbound/validator/val_anchor.c @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ #include "util/log.h" #include "util/net_help.h" #include "util/config_file.h" +#include "util/as112.h" #include "sldns/sbuffer.h" #include "sldns/rrdef.h" #include "sldns/str2wire.h" @@ -112,7 +113,7 @@ assembled_rrset_delete(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* pkey) /** destroy locks in tree and delete autotrust anchors */ static void -anchors_delfunc(rbnode_t* elem, void* ATTR_UNUSED(arg)) +anchors_delfunc(rbnode_type* elem, void* ATTR_UNUSED(arg)) { struct trust_anchor* ta = (struct trust_anchor*)elem; if(!ta) return; @@ -197,7 +198,7 @@ anchor_find(struct val_anchors* anchors, uint8_t* name, int namelabs, size_t namelen, uint16_t dclass) { struct trust_anchor key; - rbnode_t* n; + rbnode_type* n; if(!name) return NULL; key.node.key = &key; key.name = name; @@ -221,7 +222,7 @@ anchor_new_ta(struct val_anchors* anchors, uint8_t* name, int namelabs, size_t namelen, uint16_t dclass, int lockit) { #ifdef UNBOUND_DEBUG - rbnode_t* r; + rbnode_type* r; #endif struct trust_anchor* ta = (struct trust_anchor*)malloc( sizeof(struct trust_anchor)); @@ -989,7 +990,7 @@ anchors_assemble_rrsets(struct val_anchors* anchors) size_t nods, nokey; lock_basic_lock(&anchors->lock); ta=(struct trust_anchor*)rbtree_first(anchors->tree); - while((rbnode_t*)ta != RBTREE_NULL) { + while((rbnode_type*)ta != RBTREE_NULL) { next = (struct trust_anchor*)rbtree_next(&ta->node); lock_basic_lock(&ta->lock); if(ta->autr || (ta->numDS == 0 && ta->numDNSKEY == 0)) { @@ -1029,6 +1030,8 @@ anchors_assemble_rrsets(struct val_anchors* anchors) ")", b); (void)rbtree_delete(anchors->tree, &ta->node); lock_basic_unlock(&ta->lock); + if(anchors->dlv_anchor == ta) + anchors->dlv_anchor = NULL; anchors_delfunc(&ta->node, NULL); ta = next; continue; @@ -1044,8 +1047,18 @@ int anchors_apply_cfg(struct val_anchors* anchors, struct config_file* cfg) { struct config_strlist* f; + const char** zstr; char* nm; sldns_buffer* parsebuf = sldns_buffer_new(65535); + if(cfg->insecure_lan_zones) { + for(zstr = as112_zones; *zstr; zstr++) { + if(!anchor_insert_insecure(anchors, *zstr)) { + log_err("error in insecure-lan-zones: %s", *zstr); + sldns_buffer_free(parsebuf); + return 0; + } + } + } for(f = cfg->domain_insecure; f; f = f->next) { if(!f->str || f->str[0] == 0) /* empty "" */ continue; @@ -1151,7 +1164,7 @@ anchors_lookup(struct val_anchors* anchors, { struct trust_anchor key; struct trust_anchor* result; - rbnode_t* res = NULL; + rbnode_type* res = NULL; key.node.key = &key; key.name = qname; key.namelabs = dname_count_labels(qname); @@ -1260,3 +1273,39 @@ anchors_delete_insecure(struct val_anchors* anchors, uint16_t c, anchors_delfunc(&ta->node, NULL); } +/** compare two keytags, return -1, 0 or 1 */ +static int +keytag_compare(const void* x, const void* y) +{ + if(*(uint16_t*)x == *(uint16_t*)y) + return 0; + if(*(uint16_t*)x > *(uint16_t*)y) + return 1; + return -1; +} + +size_t +anchor_list_keytags(struct trust_anchor* ta, uint16_t* list, size_t num) +{ + size_t i, ret = 0; + if(ta->numDS == 0 && ta->numDNSKEY == 0) + return 0; /* insecure point */ + if(ta->numDS != 0 && ta->ds_rrset) { + struct packed_rrset_data* d=(struct packed_rrset_data*) + ta->ds_rrset->entry.data; + for(i=0; i<d->count; i++) { + if(ret == num) continue; + list[ret++] = ds_get_keytag(ta->ds_rrset, i); + } + } + if(ta->numDNSKEY != 0 && ta->dnskey_rrset) { + struct packed_rrset_data* d=(struct packed_rrset_data*) + ta->dnskey_rrset->entry.data; + for(i=0; i<d->count; i++) { + if(ret == num) continue; + list[ret++] = dnskey_calc_keytag(ta->dnskey_rrset, i); + } + } + qsort(list, ret, sizeof(*list), keytag_compare); + return ret; +} diff --git a/external/unbound/validator/val_anchor.h b/external/unbound/validator/val_anchor.h index 4951b9996..318a2b227 100644 --- a/external/unbound/validator/val_anchor.h +++ b/external/unbound/validator/val_anchor.h @@ -59,14 +59,14 @@ struct sldns_buffer; */ struct val_anchors { /** lock on trees */ - lock_basic_t lock; + lock_basic_type lock; /** * Anchors are store in this tree. Sort order is chosen, so that * dnames are in nsec-like order. A lookup on class, name will return * an exact match of the closest match, with the ancestor needed. * contents of type trust_anchor. */ - rbtree_t* tree; + rbtree_type* tree; /** The DLV trust anchor (if one is configured, else NULL) */ struct trust_anchor* dlv_anchor; /** Autotrust global data, anchors sorted by next probe time */ @@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ struct ta_key { */ struct trust_anchor { /** rbtree node, key is this structure */ - rbnode_t node; + rbnode_type node; /** lock on the entire anchor and its keys; for autotrust changes */ - lock_basic_t lock; + lock_basic_type lock; /** name of this trust anchor */ uint8_t* name; /** length of name */ @@ -216,4 +216,15 @@ int anchors_add_insecure(struct val_anchors* anchors, uint16_t c, uint8_t* nm); void anchors_delete_insecure(struct val_anchors* anchors, uint16_t c, uint8_t* nm); +/** + * Get a list of keytags for the trust anchor. Zero tags for insecure points. + * @param ta: trust anchor (locked by caller). + * @param list: array of uint16_t. + * @param num: length of array. + * @return number of keytags filled into array. If total number of keytags is + * bigger than the array, it is truncated at num. On errors, less keytags + * are filled in. The array is sorted. + */ +size_t anchor_list_keytags(struct trust_anchor* ta, uint16_t* list, size_t num); + #endif /* VALIDATOR_VAL_ANCHOR_H */ diff --git a/external/unbound/validator/val_neg.c b/external/unbound/validator/val_neg.c index ab31f483e..fe57ac2c4 100644 --- a/external/unbound/validator/val_neg.c +++ b/external/unbound/validator/val_neg.c @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ size_t val_neg_get_mem(struct val_neg_cache* neg) /** clear datas on cache deletion */ static void -neg_clear_datas(rbnode_t* n, void* ATTR_UNUSED(arg)) +neg_clear_datas(rbnode_type* n, void* ATTR_UNUSED(arg)) { struct val_neg_data* d = (struct val_neg_data*)n; free(d->name); @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ neg_clear_datas(rbnode_t* n, void* ATTR_UNUSED(arg)) /** clear zones on cache deletion */ static void -neg_clear_zones(rbnode_t* n, void* ATTR_UNUSED(arg)) +neg_clear_zones(rbnode_type* n, void* ATTR_UNUSED(arg)) { struct val_neg_zone* z = (struct val_neg_zone*)n; /* delete all the rrset entries in the tree */ @@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static struct val_neg_zone* neg_closest_zone_parent(struct val_neg_cache* neg, { struct val_neg_zone key; struct val_neg_zone* result; - rbnode_t* res = NULL; + rbnode_type* res = NULL; key.node.key = &key; key.name = nm; key.len = nm_len; @@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ static struct val_neg_data* neg_closest_data_parent( { struct val_neg_data key; struct val_neg_data* result; - rbnode_t* res = NULL; + rbnode_type* res = NULL; key.node.key = &key; key.name = nm; key.len = nm_len; @@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ static void wipeout(struct val_neg_cache* neg, struct val_neg_zone* zone, uint8_t* end; size_t end_len; int end_labs, m; - rbnode_t* walk, *next; + rbnode_type* walk, *next; struct val_neg_data* cur; uint8_t buf[257]; /* get endpoint */ @@ -823,13 +823,22 @@ void neg_insert_data(struct val_neg_cache* neg, (h != zone->nsec3_hash || it != zone->nsec3_iter || slen != zone->nsec3_saltlen || memcmp(zone->nsec3_salt, s, slen) != 0)) { - uint8_t* sa = memdup(s, slen); - if(sa) { + + if(slen > 0) { + uint8_t* sa = memdup(s, slen); + if(sa) { + free(zone->nsec3_salt); + zone->nsec3_salt = sa; + zone->nsec3_saltlen = slen; + zone->nsec3_iter = it; + zone->nsec3_hash = h; + } + } else { free(zone->nsec3_salt); - zone->nsec3_salt = sa; - zone->nsec3_saltlen = slen; - zone->nsec3_hash = h; + zone->nsec3_salt = NULL; + zone->nsec3_saltlen = 0; zone->nsec3_iter = it; + zone->nsec3_hash = h; } } } @@ -902,7 +911,7 @@ static int neg_closest_data(struct val_neg_zone* zone, uint8_t* qname, size_t len, int labs, struct val_neg_data** data) { struct val_neg_data key; - rbnode_t* r; + rbnode_type* r; key.node.key = &key; key.name = qname; key.len = len; @@ -998,6 +1007,7 @@ int val_neg_dlvlookup(struct val_neg_cache* neg, uint8_t* qname, size_t len, qinfo.qname = qname; qinfo.qtype = LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV; qinfo.qclass = qclass; + qinfo.local_alias = NULL; if(!nsec_proves_nodata(nsec, &qinfo, &wc) && !val_nsec_proves_name_error(nsec, qname)) { /* the NSEC is not a denial for the DLV */ diff --git a/external/unbound/validator/val_neg.h b/external/unbound/validator/val_neg.h index bf3a2471c..6ae71306c 100644 --- a/external/unbound/validator/val_neg.h +++ b/external/unbound/validator/val_neg.h @@ -67,9 +67,9 @@ struct ub_packed_rrset_key; struct val_neg_cache { /** the big lock on the negative cache. Because we use a rbtree * for the data (quick lookup), we need a big lock */ - lock_basic_t lock; + lock_basic_type lock; /** The zone rbtree. contents sorted canonical, type val_neg_zone */ - rbtree_t tree; + rbtree_type tree; /** the first in linked list of LRU of val_neg_data */ struct val_neg_data* first; /** last in lru (least recently used element) */ @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ struct val_neg_cache { */ struct val_neg_zone { /** rbtree node element, key is this struct: the name, class */ - rbnode_t node; + rbnode_type node; /** name; the key */ uint8_t* name; /** length of name */ @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ struct val_neg_zone { /** tree of NSEC data for this zone, sorted canonical * by NSEC owner name */ - rbtree_t tree; + rbtree_type tree; /** class of node; host order */ uint16_t dclass; @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ struct val_neg_zone { */ struct val_neg_data { /** rbtree node element, key is this struct: the name */ - rbnode_t node; + rbnode_type node; /** name; the key */ uint8_t* name; /** length of name */ diff --git a/external/unbound/validator/val_nsec.c b/external/unbound/validator/val_nsec.c index f104a347c..1e4f440ff 100644 --- a/external/unbound/validator/val_nsec.c +++ b/external/unbound/validator/val_nsec.c @@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ int nsec_proves_nodata(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, } else { /* See if the next owner name covers a wildcard * empty non-terminal. */ - while (dname_strict_subdomain_c(nm, nsec->rk.dname)) { + while (dname_canonical_compare(nsec->rk.dname, nm) < 0) { /* wildcard does not apply if qname below * the name that exists under the '*' */ if (dname_subdomain_c(qinfo->qname, nm)) diff --git a/external/unbound/validator/val_nsec3.c b/external/unbound/validator/val_nsec3.c index 22867d170..4d978372a 100644 --- a/external/unbound/validator/val_nsec3.c +++ b/external/unbound/validator/val_nsec3.c @@ -623,14 +623,14 @@ nsec3_calc_b32(struct regional* region, sldns_buffer* buf, } int -nsec3_hash_name(rbtree_t* table, struct regional* region, sldns_buffer* buf, +nsec3_hash_name(rbtree_type* table, struct regional* region, sldns_buffer* buf, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec3, int rr, uint8_t* dname, size_t dname_len, struct nsec3_cached_hash** hash) { struct nsec3_cached_hash* c; struct nsec3_cached_hash looki; #ifdef UNBOUND_DEBUG - rbnode_t* n; + rbnode_type* n; #endif int r; looki.node.key = &looki; @@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ nsec3_hash_matches_owner(struct nsec3_filter* flt, */ static int find_matching_nsec3(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt, - rbtree_t* ct, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen, + rbtree_type* ct, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen, struct ub_packed_rrset_key** rrset, int* rr) { size_t i_rs; @@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ nsec3_covers(uint8_t* zone, struct nsec3_cached_hash* hash, */ static int find_covering_nsec3(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt, - rbtree_t* ct, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen, + rbtree_type* ct, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen, struct ub_packed_rrset_key** rrset, int* rr) { size_t i_rs; @@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ find_covering_nsec3(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt, */ static int nsec3_find_closest_encloser(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt, - rbtree_t* ct, struct query_info* qinfo, struct ce_response* ce) + rbtree_type* ct, struct query_info* qinfo, struct ce_response* ce) { uint8_t* nm = qinfo->qname; size_t nmlen = qinfo->qname_len; @@ -936,7 +936,7 @@ next_closer(uint8_t* qname, size_t qnamelen, uint8_t* ce, */ static enum sec_status nsec3_prove_closest_encloser(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt, - rbtree_t* ct, struct query_info* qinfo, int prove_does_not_exist, + rbtree_type* ct, struct query_info* qinfo, int prove_does_not_exist, struct ce_response* ce) { uint8_t* nc; @@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ nsec3_ce_wildcard(struct regional* region, uint8_t* ce, size_t celen, /** Do the name error proof */ static enum sec_status nsec3_do_prove_nameerror(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt, - rbtree_t* ct, struct query_info* qinfo) + rbtree_type* ct, struct query_info* qinfo) { struct ce_response ce; uint8_t* wc; @@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@ nsec3_prove_nameerror(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num, struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey) { - rbtree_t ct; + rbtree_type ct; struct nsec3_filter flt; if(!list || num == 0 || !kkey || !key_entry_isgood(kkey)) @@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@ nsec3_prove_nameerror(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, /** Do the nodata proof */ static enum sec_status nsec3_do_prove_nodata(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt, - rbtree_t* ct, struct query_info* qinfo) + rbtree_type* ct, struct query_info* qinfo) { struct ce_response ce; uint8_t* wc; @@ -1180,7 +1180,7 @@ nsec3_do_prove_nodata(struct module_env* env, struct nsec3_filter* flt, nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) && !nsec3_has_type(rrset, rr, LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA)) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec3 nodata proof: matching " - "wilcard is a delegation, bogus"); + "wildcard is a delegation, bogus"); return sec_status_bogus; } /* everything is peachy keen, except for optout spans */ @@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ nsec3_prove_nodata(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num, struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey) { - rbtree_t ct; + rbtree_type ct; struct nsec3_filter flt; if(!list || num == 0 || !kkey || !key_entry_isgood(kkey)) @@ -1240,7 +1240,7 @@ nsec3_prove_wildcard(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num, struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey, uint8_t* wc) { - rbtree_t ct; + rbtree_type ct; struct nsec3_filter flt; struct ce_response ce; uint8_t* nc; @@ -1314,7 +1314,7 @@ nsec3_prove_nods(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num, struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason) { - rbtree_t ct; + rbtree_type ct; struct nsec3_filter flt; struct ce_response ce; struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset; @@ -1403,7 +1403,7 @@ nsec3_prove_nxornodata(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey, int* nodata) { enum sec_status sec, secnx; - rbtree_t ct; + rbtree_type ct; struct nsec3_filter flt; *nodata = 0; diff --git a/external/unbound/validator/val_nsec3.h b/external/unbound/validator/val_nsec3.h index 69ba78d83..27e9f9eac 100644 --- a/external/unbound/validator/val_nsec3.h +++ b/external/unbound/validator/val_nsec3.h @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ nsec3_prove_nxornodata(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, */ struct nsec3_cached_hash { /** rbtree node, key is this structure */ - rbnode_t node; + rbnode_type node; /** where are the parameters for conversion, in this rrset data */ struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec3; /** where are the parameters for conversion, this RR number in data */ @@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ int nsec3_hash_cmp(const void* c1, const void* c2); * 0 on a malloc failure. * -1 if the NSEC3 rr was badly formatted (i.e. formerr). */ -int nsec3_hash_name(rbtree_t* table, struct regional* region, +int nsec3_hash_name(rbtree_type* table, struct regional* region, struct sldns_buffer* buf, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec3, int rr, uint8_t* dname, size_t dname_len, struct nsec3_cached_hash** hash); diff --git a/external/unbound/validator/val_secalgo.c b/external/unbound/validator/val_secalgo.c index b55d4a62c..be88ff438 100644 --- a/external/unbound/validator/val_secalgo.c +++ b/external/unbound/validator/val_secalgo.c @@ -72,6 +72,11 @@ #include <openssl/engine.h> #endif +/** fake DSA support for unit tests */ +int fake_dsa = 0; +/** fake SHA1 support for unit tests */ +int fake_sha1 = 0; + /* return size of digest if supported, or 0 otherwise */ size_t nsec3_hash_algo_size_supported(int id) @@ -98,6 +103,12 @@ secalgo_nsec3_hash(int algo, unsigned char* buf, size_t len, } } +void +secalgo_hash_sha256(unsigned char* buf, size_t len, unsigned char* res) +{ + (void)SHA256(buf, len, res); +} + /** * Return size of DS digest according to its hash algorithm. * @param algo: DS digest algo. @@ -107,9 +118,12 @@ size_t ds_digest_size_supported(int algo) { switch(algo) { -#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA1 case LDNS_SHA1: +#if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA1) && defined(USE_SHA1) return SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; +#else + if(fake_sha1) return 20; + return 0; #endif #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 case LDNS_SHA256: @@ -117,6 +131,8 @@ ds_digest_size_supported(int algo) #endif #ifdef USE_GOST case LDNS_HASH_GOST: + /* we support GOST if it can be loaded */ + (void)sldns_key_EVP_load_gost_id(); if(EVP_get_digestbyname("md_gost94")) return 32; else return 0; @@ -147,7 +163,7 @@ secalgo_ds_digest(int algo, unsigned char* buf, size_t len, unsigned char* res) { switch(algo) { -#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA1 +#if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA1) && defined(USE_SHA1) case LDNS_SHA1: (void)SHA1(buf, len, res); return 1; @@ -186,8 +202,22 @@ dnskey_algo_id_is_supported(int id) return 0; case LDNS_DSA: case LDNS_DSA_NSEC3: +#if defined(USE_DSA) && defined(USE_SHA1) + return 1; +#else + if(fake_dsa || fake_sha1) return 1; + return 0; +#endif + case LDNS_RSASHA1: case LDNS_RSASHA1_NSEC3: +#ifdef USE_SHA1 + return 1; +#else + if(fake_sha1) return 1; + return 0; +#endif + #if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && defined(USE_SHA2) case LDNS_RSASHA256: #endif @@ -198,7 +228,10 @@ dnskey_algo_id_is_supported(int id) case LDNS_ECDSAP256SHA256: case LDNS_ECDSAP384SHA384: #endif +#if (defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && defined(USE_SHA2)) || (defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA512) && defined(USE_SHA2)) || defined(USE_ECDSA) return 1; +#endif + #ifdef USE_GOST case LDNS_ECC_GOST: /* we support GOST if it can be loaded */ @@ -225,6 +258,7 @@ log_crypto_error(const char* str, unsigned long e) log_err("%s crypto %s", str, buf); } +#ifdef USE_DSA /** * Setup DSA key digest in DER encoding ... * @param sig: input is signature output alloced ptr (unless failure). @@ -253,8 +287,12 @@ setup_dsa_sig(unsigned char** sig, unsigned int* len) dsasig = DSA_SIG_new(); if(!dsasig) return 0; +#ifdef HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0 + if(!DSA_SIG_set0(dsasig, R, S)) return 0; +#else dsasig->r = R; dsasig->s = S; +#endif *sig = NULL; newlen = i2d_DSA_SIG(dsasig, sig); if(newlen < 0) { @@ -266,6 +304,7 @@ setup_dsa_sig(unsigned char** sig, unsigned int* len) DSA_SIG_free(dsasig); return 1; } +#endif /* USE_DSA */ #ifdef USE_ECDSA /** @@ -279,36 +318,82 @@ setup_dsa_sig(unsigned char** sig, unsigned int* len) static int setup_ecdsa_sig(unsigned char** sig, unsigned int* len) { - ECDSA_SIG* ecdsa_sig; - int newlen; + /* convert from two BIGNUMs in the rdata buffer, to ASN notation. + * ASN preable: 30440220 <R 32bytefor256> 0220 <S 32bytefor256> + * the '20' is the length of that field (=bnsize). +i * the '44' is the total remaining length. + * if negative, start with leading zero. + * if starts with 00s, remove them from the number. + */ + uint8_t pre[] = {0x30, 0x44, 0x02, 0x20}; + int pre_len = 4; + uint8_t mid[] = {0x02, 0x20}; + int mid_len = 2; + int raw_sig_len, r_high, s_high, r_rem=0, s_rem=0; int bnsize = (int)((*len)/2); + unsigned char* d = *sig; + uint8_t* p; /* if too short or not even length, fails */ if(*len < 16 || bnsize*2 != (int)*len) return 0; - /* use the raw data to parse two evenly long BIGNUMs, "r | s". */ - ecdsa_sig = ECDSA_SIG_new(); - if(!ecdsa_sig) return 0; - ecdsa_sig->r = BN_bin2bn(*sig, bnsize, ecdsa_sig->r); - ecdsa_sig->s = BN_bin2bn(*sig+bnsize, bnsize, ecdsa_sig->s); - if(!ecdsa_sig->r || !ecdsa_sig->s) { - ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig); - return 0; - } - /* spool it into ASN format */ - *sig = NULL; - newlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, sig); - if(newlen <= 0) { - ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig); - free(*sig); + /* strip leading zeroes from r (but not last one) */ + while(r_rem < bnsize-1 && d[r_rem] == 0) + r_rem++; + /* strip leading zeroes from s (but not last one) */ + while(s_rem < bnsize-1 && d[bnsize+s_rem] == 0) + s_rem++; + + r_high = ((d[0+r_rem]&0x80)?1:0); + s_high = ((d[bnsize+s_rem]&0x80)?1:0); + raw_sig_len = pre_len + r_high + bnsize - r_rem + mid_len + + s_high + bnsize - s_rem; + *sig = (unsigned char*)malloc((size_t)raw_sig_len); + if(!*sig) return 0; + p = (uint8_t*)*sig; + p[0] = pre[0]; + p[1] = (uint8_t)(raw_sig_len-2); + p[2] = pre[2]; + p[3] = (uint8_t)(bnsize + r_high - r_rem); + p += 4; + if(r_high) { + *p = 0; + p += 1; } - *len = (unsigned int)newlen; - ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig); + memmove(p, d+r_rem, (size_t)bnsize-r_rem); + p += bnsize-r_rem; + memmove(p, mid, (size_t)mid_len-1); + p += mid_len-1; + *p = (uint8_t)(bnsize + s_high - s_rem); + p += 1; + if(s_high) { + *p = 0; + p += 1; + } + memmove(p, d+bnsize+s_rem, (size_t)bnsize-s_rem); + *len = (unsigned int)raw_sig_len; return 1; } #endif /* USE_ECDSA */ +#ifdef USE_ECDSA_EVP_WORKAROUND +static EVP_MD ecdsa_evp_256_md; +static EVP_MD ecdsa_evp_384_md; +void ecdsa_evp_workaround_init(void) +{ + /* openssl before 1.0.0 fixes RSA with the SHA256 + * hash in EVP. We create one for ecdsa_sha256 */ + ecdsa_evp_256_md = *EVP_sha256(); + ecdsa_evp_256_md.required_pkey_type[0] = EVP_PKEY_EC; + ecdsa_evp_256_md.verify = (void*)ECDSA_verify; + + ecdsa_evp_384_md = *EVP_sha384(); + ecdsa_evp_384_md.required_pkey_type[0] = EVP_PKEY_EC; + ecdsa_evp_384_md.verify = (void*)ECDSA_verify; +} +#endif /* USE_ECDSA_EVP_WORKAROUND */ + /** * Setup key and digest for verification. Adjust sig if necessary. * @@ -323,10 +408,13 @@ static int setup_key_digest(int algo, EVP_PKEY** evp_key, const EVP_MD** digest_type, unsigned char* key, size_t keylen) { +#if defined(USE_DSA) && defined(USE_SHA1) DSA* dsa; +#endif RSA* rsa; switch(algo) { +#if defined(USE_DSA) && defined(USE_SHA1) case LDNS_DSA: case LDNS_DSA_NSEC3: *evp_key = EVP_PKEY_new(); @@ -352,8 +440,13 @@ setup_key_digest(int algo, EVP_PKEY** evp_key, const EVP_MD** digest_type, #endif break; +#endif /* USE_DSA && USE_SHA1 */ + +#if defined(USE_SHA1) || (defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && defined(USE_SHA2)) || (defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA512) && defined(USE_SHA2)) +#ifdef USE_SHA1 case LDNS_RSASHA1: case LDNS_RSASHA1_NSEC3: +#endif #if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && defined(USE_SHA2) case LDNS_RSASHA256: #endif @@ -388,9 +481,14 @@ setup_key_digest(int algo, EVP_PKEY** evp_key, const EVP_MD** digest_type, *digest_type = EVP_sha512(); else #endif +#ifdef USE_SHA1 *digest_type = EVP_sha1(); - +#else + { verbose(VERB_QUERY, "no digest available"); return 0; } +#endif break; +#endif /* defined(USE_SHA1) || (defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && defined(USE_SHA2)) || (defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA512) && defined(USE_SHA2)) */ + case LDNS_RSAMD5: *evp_key = EVP_PKEY_new(); if(!*evp_key) { @@ -437,20 +535,7 @@ setup_key_digest(int algo, EVP_PKEY** evp_key, const EVP_MD** digest_type, return 0; } #ifdef USE_ECDSA_EVP_WORKAROUND - /* openssl before 1.0.0 fixes RSA with the SHA256 - * hash in EVP. We create one for ecdsa_sha256 */ - { - static int md_ecdsa_256_done = 0; - static EVP_MD md; - if(!md_ecdsa_256_done) { - EVP_MD m = *EVP_sha256(); - md_ecdsa_256_done = 1; - m.required_pkey_type[0] = (*evp_key)->type; - m.verify = (void*)ECDSA_verify; - md = m; - } - *digest_type = &md; - } + *digest_type = &ecdsa_evp_256_md; #else *digest_type = EVP_sha256(); #endif @@ -464,20 +549,7 @@ setup_key_digest(int algo, EVP_PKEY** evp_key, const EVP_MD** digest_type, return 0; } #ifdef USE_ECDSA_EVP_WORKAROUND - /* openssl before 1.0.0 fixes RSA with the SHA384 - * hash in EVP. We create one for ecdsa_sha384 */ - { - static int md_ecdsa_384_done = 0; - static EVP_MD md; - if(!md_ecdsa_384_done) { - EVP_MD m = *EVP_sha384(); - md_ecdsa_384_done = 1; - m.required_pkey_type[0] = (*evp_key)->type; - m.verify = (void*)ECDSA_verify; - md = m; - } - *digest_type = &md; - } + *digest_type = &ecdsa_evp_384_md; #else *digest_type = EVP_sha384(); #endif @@ -510,9 +582,18 @@ verify_canonrrset(sldns_buffer* buf, int algo, unsigned char* sigblock, char** reason) { const EVP_MD *digest_type; - EVP_MD_CTX ctx; - int res, dofree = 0; + EVP_MD_CTX* ctx; + int res, dofree = 0, docrypto_free = 0; EVP_PKEY *evp_key = NULL; + +#ifndef USE_DSA + if((algo == LDNS_DSA || algo == LDNS_DSA_NSEC3) &&(fake_dsa||fake_sha1)) + return sec_status_secure; +#endif +#ifndef USE_SHA1 + if(fake_sha1 && (algo == LDNS_DSA || algo == LDNS_DSA_NSEC3 || algo == LDNS_RSASHA1 || algo == LDNS_RSASHA1_NSEC3)) + return sec_status_secure; +#endif if(!setup_key_digest(algo, &evp_key, &digest_type, key, keylen)) { verbose(VERB_QUERY, "verify: failed to setup key"); @@ -520,6 +601,7 @@ verify_canonrrset(sldns_buffer* buf, int algo, unsigned char* sigblock, EVP_PKEY_free(evp_key); return sec_status_bogus; } +#ifdef USE_DSA /* if it is a DSA signature in bind format, convert to DER format */ if((algo == LDNS_DSA || algo == LDNS_DSA_NSEC3) && sigblock_len == 1+2*SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) { @@ -529,10 +611,14 @@ verify_canonrrset(sldns_buffer* buf, int algo, unsigned char* sigblock, EVP_PKEY_free(evp_key); return sec_status_bogus; } - dofree = 1; + docrypto_free = 1; } +#endif +#if defined(USE_ECDSA) && defined(USE_DSA) + else +#endif #ifdef USE_ECDSA - else if(algo == LDNS_ECDSAP256SHA256 || algo == LDNS_ECDSAP384SHA384) { + if(algo == LDNS_ECDSAP256SHA256 || algo == LDNS_ECDSAP384SHA384) { /* EVP uses ASN prefix on sig, which is not in the wire data */ if(!setup_ecdsa_sig(&sigblock, &sigblock_len)) { verbose(VERB_QUERY, "verify: failed to setup ECDSA sig"); @@ -545,32 +631,48 @@ verify_canonrrset(sldns_buffer* buf, int algo, unsigned char* sigblock, #endif /* USE_ECDSA */ /* do the signature cryptography work */ - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); - if(EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, digest_type) == 0) { - verbose(VERB_QUERY, "verify: EVP_DigestInit failed"); +#ifdef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); +#else + ctx = (EVP_MD_CTX*)malloc(sizeof(*ctx)); + if(ctx) EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx); +#endif + if(!ctx) { + log_err("EVP_MD_CTX_new: malloc failure"); EVP_PKEY_free(evp_key); if(dofree) free(sigblock); + else if(docrypto_free) OPENSSL_free(sigblock); return sec_status_unchecked; } - if(EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char*)sldns_buffer_begin(buf), - (unsigned int)sldns_buffer_limit(buf)) == 0) { - verbose(VERB_QUERY, "verify: EVP_DigestUpdate failed"); + if(EVP_VerifyInit(ctx, digest_type) == 0) { + verbose(VERB_QUERY, "verify: EVP_VerifyInit failed"); + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx); EVP_PKEY_free(evp_key); if(dofree) free(sigblock); + else if(docrypto_free) OPENSSL_free(sigblock); return sec_status_unchecked; } - - res = EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx, sigblock, sigblock_len, evp_key); - if(EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx) == 0) { - verbose(VERB_QUERY, "verify: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup failed"); + if(EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char*)sldns_buffer_begin(buf), + (unsigned int)sldns_buffer_limit(buf)) == 0) { + verbose(VERB_QUERY, "verify: EVP_VerifyUpdate failed"); + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx); EVP_PKEY_free(evp_key); if(dofree) free(sigblock); + else if(docrypto_free) OPENSSL_free(sigblock); return sec_status_unchecked; } + + res = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigblock, sigblock_len, evp_key); +#ifdef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx); +#else + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx); + free(ctx); +#endif EVP_PKEY_free(evp_key); - if(dofree) - free(sigblock); + if(dofree) free(sigblock); + else if(docrypto_free) OPENSSL_free(sigblock); if(res == 1) { return sec_status_secure; @@ -622,13 +724,21 @@ secalgo_nsec3_hash(int algo, unsigned char* buf, size_t len, } } +void +secalgo_hash_sha256(unsigned char* buf, size_t len, unsigned char* res) +{ + (void)HASH_HashBuf(HASH_AlgSHA256, res, buf, (unsigned long)len); +} + size_t ds_digest_size_supported(int algo) { /* uses libNSS */ switch(algo) { +#ifdef USE_SHA1 case LDNS_SHA1: return SHA1_LENGTH; +#endif #ifdef USE_SHA2 case LDNS_SHA256: return SHA256_LENGTH; @@ -650,9 +760,11 @@ secalgo_ds_digest(int algo, unsigned char* buf, size_t len, { /* uses libNSS */ switch(algo) { +#ifdef USE_SHA1 case LDNS_SHA1: return HASH_HashBuf(HASH_AlgSHA1, res, buf, len) == SECSuccess; +#endif #if defined(USE_SHA2) case LDNS_SHA256: return HASH_HashBuf(HASH_AlgSHA256, res, buf, len) @@ -680,10 +792,15 @@ dnskey_algo_id_is_supported(int id) case LDNS_RSAMD5: /* RFC 6725 deprecates RSAMD5 */ return 0; +#if defined(USE_SHA1) || defined(USE_SHA2) +#if defined(USE_DSA) && defined(USE_SHA1) case LDNS_DSA: case LDNS_DSA_NSEC3: +#endif +#ifdef USE_SHA1 case LDNS_RSASHA1: case LDNS_RSASHA1_NSEC3: +#endif #ifdef USE_SHA2 case LDNS_RSASHA256: #endif @@ -691,6 +808,8 @@ dnskey_algo_id_is_supported(int id) case LDNS_RSASHA512: #endif return 1; +#endif /* SHA1 or SHA2 */ + #ifdef USE_ECDSA case LDNS_ECDSAP256SHA256: case LDNS_ECDSAP384SHA384: @@ -922,6 +1041,9 @@ nss_setup_key_digest(int algo, SECKEYPublicKey** pubkey, HASH_HashType* htype, */ switch(algo) { + +#if defined(USE_SHA1) || defined(USE_SHA2) +#if defined(USE_DSA) && defined(USE_SHA1) case LDNS_DSA: case LDNS_DSA_NSEC3: *pubkey = nss_buf2dsa(key, keylen); @@ -932,8 +1054,11 @@ nss_setup_key_digest(int algo, SECKEYPublicKey** pubkey, HASH_HashType* htype, *htype = HASH_AlgSHA1; /* no prefix for DSA verification */ break; +#endif +#ifdef USE_SHA1 case LDNS_RSASHA1: case LDNS_RSASHA1_NSEC3: +#endif #ifdef USE_SHA2 case LDNS_RSASHA256: #endif @@ -960,13 +1085,22 @@ nss_setup_key_digest(int algo, SECKEYPublicKey** pubkey, HASH_HashType* htype, *prefixlen = sizeof(p_sha512); } else #endif +#ifdef USE_SHA1 { *htype = HASH_AlgSHA1; *prefix = p_sha1; *prefixlen = sizeof(p_sha1); } +#else + { + verbose(VERB_QUERY, "verify: no digest algo"); + return 0; + } +#endif break; +#endif /* SHA1 or SHA2 */ + case LDNS_RSAMD5: *pubkey = nss_buf2rsa(key, keylen); if(!*pubkey) { @@ -1048,6 +1182,7 @@ verify_canonrrset(sldns_buffer* buf, int algo, unsigned char* sigblock, return sec_status_bogus; } +#if defined(USE_DSA) && defined(USE_SHA1) /* need to convert DSA, ECDSA signatures? */ if((algo == LDNS_DSA || algo == LDNS_DSA_NSEC3)) { if(sigblock_len == 1+2*SHA1_LENGTH) { @@ -1070,6 +1205,7 @@ verify_canonrrset(sldns_buffer* buf, int algo, unsigned char* sigblock, SECITEM_FreeItem(p, PR_TRUE); } } +#endif /* USE_DSA */ /* do the signature cryptography work */ /* hash the data */ @@ -1133,6 +1269,9 @@ verify_canonrrset(sldns_buffer* buf, int algo, unsigned char* sigblock, #include "macros.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "dsa.h" +#ifdef HAVE_NETTLE_DSA_COMPAT_H +#include "dsa-compat.h" +#endif #include "asn1.h" #ifdef USE_ECDSA #include "ecdsa.h" @@ -1208,6 +1347,12 @@ secalgo_nsec3_hash(int algo, unsigned char* buf, size_t len, } } +void +secalgo_hash_sha256(unsigned char* buf, size_t len, unsigned char* res) +{ + _digest_nettle(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, (uint8_t*)buf, len, res); +} + /** * Return size of DS digest according to its hash algorithm. * @param algo: DS digest algo. @@ -1218,7 +1363,12 @@ ds_digest_size_supported(int algo) { switch(algo) { case LDNS_SHA1: +#ifdef USE_SHA1 return SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; +#else + if(fake_sha1) return 20; + return 0; +#endif #ifdef USE_SHA2 case LDNS_SHA256: return SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; @@ -1240,8 +1390,10 @@ secalgo_ds_digest(int algo, unsigned char* buf, size_t len, unsigned char* res) { switch(algo) { +#ifdef USE_SHA1 case LDNS_SHA1: return _digest_nettle(SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, buf, len, res); +#endif #if defined(USE_SHA2) case LDNS_SHA256: return _digest_nettle(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, buf, len, res); @@ -1265,10 +1417,14 @@ dnskey_algo_id_is_supported(int id) { /* uses libnettle */ switch(id) { +#if defined(USE_DSA) && defined(USE_SHA1) case LDNS_DSA: case LDNS_DSA_NSEC3: +#endif +#ifdef USE_SHA1 case LDNS_RSASHA1: case LDNS_RSASHA1_NSEC3: +#endif #ifdef USE_SHA2 case LDNS_RSASHA256: case LDNS_RSASHA512: @@ -1285,12 +1441,13 @@ dnskey_algo_id_is_supported(int id) } } +#if defined(USE_DSA) && defined(USE_SHA1) static char * _verify_nettle_dsa(sldns_buffer* buf, unsigned char* sigblock, unsigned int sigblock_len, unsigned char* key, unsigned int keylen) { uint8_t digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - uint8_t key_t; + uint8_t key_t_value; int res = 0; size_t offset; struct dsa_public_key pubkey; @@ -1329,8 +1486,8 @@ _verify_nettle_dsa(sldns_buffer* buf, unsigned char* sigblock, } /* Validate T values constraints - RFC 2536 sec. 2 & sec. 3 */ - key_t = key[0]; - if (key_t > 8) { + key_t_value = key[0]; + if (key_t_value > 8) { return "invalid T value in DSA pubkey"; } @@ -1341,9 +1498,9 @@ _verify_nettle_dsa(sldns_buffer* buf, unsigned char* sigblock, expected_len = 1 + /* T */ 20 + /* Q */ - (64 + key_t*8) + /* P */ - (64 + key_t*8) + /* G */ - (64 + key_t*8); /* Y */ + (64 + key_t_value*8) + /* P */ + (64 + key_t_value*8) + /* G */ + (64 + key_t_value*8); /* Y */ if (keylen != expected_len ) { return "invalid DSA pubkey length"; } @@ -1353,11 +1510,11 @@ _verify_nettle_dsa(sldns_buffer* buf, unsigned char* sigblock, offset = 1; nettle_mpz_set_str_256_u(pubkey.q, 20, key+offset); offset += 20; - nettle_mpz_set_str_256_u(pubkey.p, (64 + key_t*8), key+offset); - offset += (64 + key_t*8); - nettle_mpz_set_str_256_u(pubkey.g, (64 + key_t*8), key+offset); - offset += (64 + key_t*8); - nettle_mpz_set_str_256_u(pubkey.y, (64 + key_t*8), key+offset); + nettle_mpz_set_str_256_u(pubkey.p, (64 + key_t_value*8), key+offset); + offset += (64 + key_t_value*8); + nettle_mpz_set_str_256_u(pubkey.g, (64 + key_t_value*8), key+offset); + offset += (64 + key_t_value*8); + nettle_mpz_set_str_256_u(pubkey.y, (64 + key_t_value*8), key+offset); /* Digest content of "buf" and verify its DSA signature in "sigblock"*/ res = _digest_nettle(SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, (unsigned char*)sldns_buffer_begin(buf), @@ -1372,6 +1529,7 @@ _verify_nettle_dsa(sldns_buffer* buf, unsigned char* sigblock, else return NULL; } +#endif /* USE_DSA */ static char * _verify_nettle_rsa(sldns_buffer* buf, unsigned int digest_size, char* sigblock, @@ -1543,6 +1701,7 @@ verify_canonrrset(sldns_buffer* buf, int algo, unsigned char* sigblock, } switch(algo) { +#if defined(USE_DSA) && defined(USE_SHA1) case LDNS_DSA: case LDNS_DSA_NSEC3: *reason = _verify_nettle_dsa(buf, sigblock, sigblock_len, key, keylen); @@ -1550,10 +1709,13 @@ verify_canonrrset(sldns_buffer* buf, int algo, unsigned char* sigblock, return sec_status_bogus; else return sec_status_secure; +#endif /* USE_DSA */ +#ifdef USE_SHA1 case LDNS_RSASHA1: case LDNS_RSASHA1_NSEC3: digest_size = (digest_size ? digest_size : SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); +#endif #ifdef USE_SHA2 case LDNS_RSASHA256: digest_size = (digest_size ? digest_size : SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); diff --git a/external/unbound/validator/val_secalgo.h b/external/unbound/validator/val_secalgo.h index 589f1f11d..52aaeb9f6 100644 --- a/external/unbound/validator/val_secalgo.h +++ b/external/unbound/validator/val_secalgo.h @@ -60,6 +60,14 @@ int secalgo_nsec3_hash(int algo, unsigned char* buf, size_t len, unsigned char* res); /** + * Calculate the sha256 hash for the data buffer into the result. + * @param buf: buffer to digest. + * @param len: length of the buffer to digest. + * @param res: result is stored here (space 256/8 bytes). + */ +void secalgo_hash_sha256(unsigned char* buf, size_t len, unsigned char* res); + +/** * Return size of DS digest according to its hash algorithm. * @param algo: DS digest algo. * @return size in bytes of digest, or 0 if not supported. diff --git a/external/unbound/validator/val_sigcrypt.c b/external/unbound/validator/val_sigcrypt.c index 1dd07b420..25278a8f3 100644 --- a/external/unbound/validator/val_sigcrypt.c +++ b/external/unbound/validator/val_sigcrypt.c @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ #include "util/module.h" #include "util/net_help.h" #include "util/regional.h" +#include "util/config_file.h" #include "sldns/keyraw.h" #include "sldns/sbuffer.h" #include "sldns/parseutil.h" @@ -318,12 +319,17 @@ int ds_digest_match_dnskey(struct module_env* env, size_t dslen; uint8_t* digest; /* generated digest */ size_t digestlen = ds_digest_size_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx); - + if(digestlen == 0) { verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DS fail: not supported, or DS RR " "format error"); return 0; /* not supported, or DS RR format error */ } +#ifndef USE_SHA1 + if(fake_sha1 && ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx)==LDNS_SHA1) + return 1; +#endif + /* check digest length in DS with length from hash function */ ds_get_sigdata(ds_rrset, ds_idx, &ds, &dslen); if(!ds || dslen != digestlen) { @@ -483,7 +489,7 @@ dnskeyset_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, { enum sec_status sec; size_t i, num; - rbtree_t* sortree = NULL; + rbtree_type* sortree = NULL; /* make sure that for all DNSKEY algorithms there are valid sigs */ struct algo_needs needs; int alg; @@ -551,7 +557,7 @@ dnskey_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, { enum sec_status sec; size_t i, num, numchecked = 0; - rbtree_t* sortree = NULL; + rbtree_type* sortree = NULL; int buf_canon = 0; uint16_t tag = dnskey_calc_keytag(dnskey, dnskey_idx); int algo = dnskey_get_algo(dnskey, dnskey_idx); @@ -585,7 +591,7 @@ enum sec_status dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, time_t now, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, size_t sig_idx, - struct rbtree_t** sortree, char** reason) + struct rbtree_type** sortree, char** reason) { /* find matching keys and check them */ enum sec_status sec = sec_status_bogus; @@ -627,7 +633,7 @@ dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, */ struct canon_rr { /** rbtree node, key is this structure */ - rbnode_t node; + rbnode_type node; /** rrset the RR is in */ struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset; /** which RR in the rrset */ @@ -885,7 +891,7 @@ canonical_tree_compare(const void* k1, const void* k2) */ static void canonical_sort(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct packed_rrset_data* d, - rbtree_t* sortree, struct canon_rr* rrs) + rbtree_type* sortree, struct canon_rr* rrs) { size_t i; /* insert into rbtree to sort and detect duplicates */ @@ -1043,7 +1049,7 @@ canonicalize_rdata(sldns_buffer* buf, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, int rrset_canonical_equal(struct regional* region, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* k1, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* k2) { - struct rbtree_t sortree1, sortree2; + struct rbtree_type sortree1, sortree2; struct canon_rr *rrs1, *rrs2, *p1, *p2; struct packed_rrset_data* d1=(struct packed_rrset_data*)k1->entry.data; struct packed_rrset_data* d2=(struct packed_rrset_data*)k2->entry.data; @@ -1120,7 +1126,7 @@ int rrset_canonical_equal(struct regional* region, static int rrset_canonical(struct regional* region, sldns_buffer* buf, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* k, uint8_t* sig, size_t siglen, - struct rbtree_t** sortree) + struct rbtree_type** sortree) { struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)k->entry.data; uint8_t* can_owner = NULL; @@ -1129,8 +1135,8 @@ rrset_canonical(struct regional* region, sldns_buffer* buf, struct canon_rr* rrs; if(!*sortree) { - *sortree = (struct rbtree_t*)regional_alloc(region, - sizeof(rbtree_t)); + *sortree = (struct rbtree_type*)regional_alloc(region, + sizeof(rbtree_type)); if(!*sortree) return 0; if(d->count > RR_COUNT_MAX) @@ -1283,15 +1289,23 @@ adjust_ttl(struct val_env* ve, uint32_t unow, /* so now: * d->ttl: rrset ttl read from message or cache. May be reduced * origttl: original TTL from signature, authoritative TTL max. + * MIN_TTL: minimum TTL from config. * expittl: TTL until the signature expires. * - * Use the smallest of these. + * Use the smallest of these, but don't let origttl set the TTL + * below the minimum. */ - if(d->ttl > (time_t)origttl) { - verbose(VERB_QUERY, "rrset TTL larger than original TTL," - " adjusting TTL downwards"); + if(MIN_TTL > (time_t)origttl && d->ttl > MIN_TTL) { + verbose(VERB_QUERY, "rrset TTL larger than original and minimum" + " TTL, adjusting TTL downwards to minimum ttl"); + d->ttl = MIN_TTL; + } + else if(MIN_TTL <= origttl && d->ttl > (time_t)origttl) { + verbose(VERB_QUERY, "rrset TTL larger than original TTL, " + "adjusting TTL downwards to original ttl"); d->ttl = origttl; } + if(expittl > 0 && d->ttl > (time_t)expittl) { verbose(VERB_ALGO, "rrset TTL larger than sig expiration ttl," " adjusting TTL downwards"); @@ -1304,7 +1318,7 @@ dnskey_verify_rrset_sig(struct regional* region, sldns_buffer* buf, struct val_env* ve, time_t now, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, size_t dnskey_idx, size_t sig_idx, - struct rbtree_t** sortree, int* buf_canon, char** reason) + struct rbtree_type** sortree, int* buf_canon, char** reason) { enum sec_status sec; uint8_t* sig; /* RRSIG rdata */ diff --git a/external/unbound/validator/val_sigcrypt.h b/external/unbound/validator/val_sigcrypt.h index 68aa9a445..5a975acff 100644 --- a/external/unbound/validator/val_sigcrypt.h +++ b/external/unbound/validator/val_sigcrypt.h @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ struct val_env; struct module_env; struct ub_packed_rrset_key; -struct rbtree_t; +struct rbtree_type; struct regional; struct sldns_buffer; @@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ enum sec_status dnskey_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, enum sec_status dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, time_t now, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, size_t sig_idx, - struct rbtree_t** sortree, char** reason); + struct rbtree_type** sortree, char** reason); /** * verify rrset, with specific dnskey(from set), for a specific rrsig @@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ enum sec_status dnskey_verify_rrset_sig(struct regional* region, struct sldns_buffer* buf, struct val_env* ve, time_t now, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, size_t dnskey_idx, size_t sig_idx, - struct rbtree_t** sortree, int* buf_canon, char** reason); + struct rbtree_type** sortree, int* buf_canon, char** reason); /** * canonical compare for two tree entries diff --git a/external/unbound/validator/val_utils.c b/external/unbound/validator/val_utils.c index 475b0c905..e3677e1d9 100644 --- a/external/unbound/validator/val_utils.c +++ b/external/unbound/validator/val_utils.c @@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ #include "util/net_help.h" #include "util/module.h" #include "util/regional.h" +#include "sldns/wire2str.h" +#include "sldns/parseutil.h" enum val_classification val_classify_response(uint16_t query_flags, struct query_info* origqinf, @@ -217,7 +219,7 @@ val_find_signer(enum val_classification subtype, struct query_info* qinf, { size_t i; - if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE || subtype == VAL_CLASS_ANY) { + if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE) { /* check for the answer rrset */ for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) { if(query_dname_compare(qinf->qname, @@ -269,6 +271,29 @@ val_find_signer(enum val_classification subtype, struct query_info* qinf, signer_name, signer_len, &matchcount); } } + } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_ANY) { + /* check for one of the answer rrset that has signatures, + * or potentially a DNAME is in use with a different qname */ + for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) { + if(query_dname_compare(qinf->qname, + rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) { + val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], + signer_name, signer_len); + if(*signer_name) + return; + } + } + /* no answer RRSIGs with qname, try a DNAME */ + if(skip < rep->an_numrrsets && + ntohs(rep->rrsets[skip]->rk.type) == + LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) { + val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[skip], + signer_name, signer_len); + if(*signer_name) + return; + } + *signer_name = NULL; + *signer_len = 0; } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) { /* find keys for the item at skip */ if(skip < rep->rrset_count) { @@ -470,16 +495,21 @@ val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, return sec_status_bogus; } - digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ds_rrset); - if(sigalg) + if(sigalg) { + /* harden against algo downgrade is enabled */ + digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ds_rrset); algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ds_rrset, digest_algo, sigalg); + } else { + /* accept any key algo, any digest algo */ + digest_algo = -1; + } num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset); for(i=0; i<num; i++) { /* Check to see if we can understand this DS. * And check it is the strongest digest */ if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) || !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) || - ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i) != digest_algo) { + (sigalg && (ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i) != digest_algo))) { continue; } @@ -691,6 +721,31 @@ val_dsset_isusable(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset) ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i)) return 1; } + if(verbosity < VERB_ALGO) + return 0; + if(rrset_get_count(ds_rrset) == 0) + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS is not usable"); + else { + /* report usability for the first DS RR */ + sldns_lookup_table *lt; + char herr[64], aerr[64]; + lt = sldns_lookup_by_id(sldns_hashes, + (int)ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i)); + if(lt) snprintf(herr, sizeof(herr), "%s", lt->name); + else snprintf(herr, sizeof(herr), "%d", + (int)ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i)); + lt = sldns_lookup_by_id(sldns_algorithms, + (int)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i)); + if(lt) snprintf(aerr, sizeof(aerr), "%s", lt->name); + else snprintf(aerr, sizeof(aerr), "%d", + (int)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i)); + verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS unsupported, hash %s %s, " + "key algorithm %s %s", herr, + (ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, 0)? + "(supported)":"(unsupported)"), aerr, + (ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, 0)? + "(supported)":"(unsupported)")); + } return 0; } @@ -1088,6 +1143,7 @@ val_find_DS(struct module_env* env, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen, uint16_t c, qinfo.qname_len = nmlen; qinfo.qtype = LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS; qinfo.qclass = c; + qinfo.local_alias = NULL; /* do not add SOA to reply message, it is going to be used internal */ msg = val_neg_getmsg(env->neg_cache, &qinfo, region, env->rrset_cache, env->scratch_buffer, *env->now, 0, topname); diff --git a/external/unbound/validator/validator.c b/external/unbound/validator/validator.c index db4383bed..81ba5fa17 100644 --- a/external/unbound/validator/validator.c +++ b/external/unbound/validator/validator.c @@ -156,6 +156,9 @@ val_apply_cfg(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* val_env, return 1; } +#ifdef USE_ECDSA_EVP_WORKAROUND +void ecdsa_evp_workaround_init(void); +#endif int val_init(struct module_env* env, int id) { @@ -171,10 +174,14 @@ val_init(struct module_env* env, int id) lock_basic_init(&val_env->bogus_lock); lock_protect(&val_env->bogus_lock, &val_env->num_rrset_bogus, sizeof(val_env->num_rrset_bogus)); +#ifdef USE_ECDSA_EVP_WORKAROUND + ecdsa_evp_workaround_init(); +#endif if(!val_apply_cfg(env, val_env, env->cfg)) { log_err("validator: could not apply configuration settings."); return 0; } + return 1; } @@ -371,6 +378,7 @@ generate_request(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id, uint8_t* name, ask.qname_len = namelen; ask.qtype = qtype; ask.qclass = qclass; + ask.local_alias = NULL; log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "generate request", &ask); fptr_ok(fptr_whitelist_modenv_attach_sub(qstate->env->attach_sub)); /* enable valrec flag to avoid recursion to the same validation @@ -2084,15 +2092,17 @@ processFinished(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, if(qstate->query_flags&BIT_RD) { /* if secure, this will override cache anyway, no need * to check if from parentNS */ - if(!dns_cache_store(qstate->env, &vq->orig_msg->qinfo, - vq->orig_msg->rep, 0, qstate->prefetch_leeway, 0, NULL, - qstate->query_flags)) { - log_err("out of memory caching validator results"); + if(!qstate->no_cache_store) { + if(!dns_cache_store(qstate->env, &vq->orig_msg->qinfo, + vq->orig_msg->rep, 0, qstate->prefetch_leeway, 0, NULL, + qstate->query_flags)) { + log_err("out of memory caching validator results"); + } } } else { /* for a referral, store the verified RRsets */ /* and this does not get prefetched, so no leeway */ - if(!dns_cache_store(qstate->env, &vq->orig_msg->qinfo, + if(!dns_cache_store(qstate->env, &vq->orig_msg->qinfo, vq->orig_msg->rep, 1, 0, 0, NULL, qstate->query_flags)) { log_err("out of memory caching validator results"); @@ -2274,6 +2284,7 @@ val_operate(struct module_qstate* qstate, enum module_ev event, int id, (void)outbound; if(event == module_event_new || (event == module_event_pass && vq == NULL)) { + /* pass request to next module, to get it */ verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: pass to next module"); qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_module; @@ -2282,6 +2293,7 @@ val_operate(struct module_qstate* qstate, enum module_ev event, int id, if(event == module_event_moddone) { /* check if validation is needed */ verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: nextmodule returned"); + if(!needs_validation(qstate, qstate->return_rcode, qstate->return_msg)) { /* no need to validate this */ diff --git a/external/unbound/validator/validator.h b/external/unbound/validator/validator.h index 20f806ada..23d307242 100644 --- a/external/unbound/validator/validator.h +++ b/external/unbound/validator/validator.h @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ struct val_env { size_t* nsec3_maxiter; /** lock on bogus counter */ - lock_basic_t bogus_lock; + lock_basic_type bogus_lock; /** number of times rrsets marked bogus */ size_t num_rrset_bogus; }; |