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Diffstat (limited to 'external/unbound/validator/validator.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | external/unbound/validator/validator.c | 3079 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 3079 deletions
diff --git a/external/unbound/validator/validator.c b/external/unbound/validator/validator.c deleted file mode 100644 index 81ba5fa17..000000000 --- a/external/unbound/validator/validator.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3079 +0,0 @@ -/* - * validator/validator.c - secure validator DNS query response module - * - * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved. - * - * This software is open source. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, - * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation - * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * - * Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may - * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS - * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT - * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR - * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT - * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED - * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR - * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF - * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING - * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS - * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -/** - * \file - * - * This file contains a module that performs validation of DNS queries. - * According to RFC 4034. - */ -#include "config.h" -#include "validator/validator.h" -#include "validator/val_anchor.h" -#include "validator/val_kcache.h" -#include "validator/val_kentry.h" -#include "validator/val_utils.h" -#include "validator/val_nsec.h" -#include "validator/val_nsec3.h" -#include "validator/val_neg.h" -#include "validator/val_sigcrypt.h" -#include "validator/autotrust.h" -#include "services/cache/dns.h" -#include "util/data/dname.h" -#include "util/module.h" -#include "util/log.h" -#include "util/net_help.h" -#include "util/regional.h" -#include "util/config_file.h" -#include "util/fptr_wlist.h" -#include "sldns/rrdef.h" -#include "sldns/wire2str.h" - -/* forward decl for cache response and normal super inform calls of a DS */ -static void process_ds_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, - struct val_qstate* vq, int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, - struct query_info* qinfo, struct sock_list* origin); - -/** fill up nsec3 key iterations config entry */ -static int -fill_nsec3_iter(struct val_env* ve, char* s, int c) -{ - char* e; - int i; - free(ve->nsec3_keysize); - free(ve->nsec3_maxiter); - ve->nsec3_keysize = (size_t*)calloc(sizeof(size_t), (size_t)c); - ve->nsec3_maxiter = (size_t*)calloc(sizeof(size_t), (size_t)c); - if(!ve->nsec3_keysize || !ve->nsec3_maxiter) { - log_err("out of memory"); - return 0; - } - for(i=0; i<c; i++) { - ve->nsec3_keysize[i] = (size_t)strtol(s, &e, 10); - if(s == e) { - log_err("cannot parse: %s", s); - return 0; - } - s = e; - ve->nsec3_maxiter[i] = (size_t)strtol(s, &e, 10); - if(s == e) { - log_err("cannot parse: %s", s); - return 0; - } - s = e; - if(i>0 && ve->nsec3_keysize[i-1] >= ve->nsec3_keysize[i]) { - log_err("nsec3 key iterations not ascending: %d %d", - (int)ve->nsec3_keysize[i-1], - (int)ve->nsec3_keysize[i]); - return 0; - } - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator nsec3cfg keysz %d mxiter %d", - (int)ve->nsec3_keysize[i], (int)ve->nsec3_maxiter[i]); - } - return 1; -} - -/** apply config settings to validator */ -static int -val_apply_cfg(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* val_env, - struct config_file* cfg) -{ - int c; - val_env->bogus_ttl = (uint32_t)cfg->bogus_ttl; - val_env->clean_additional = cfg->val_clean_additional; - val_env->permissive_mode = cfg->val_permissive_mode; - if(!env->anchors) - env->anchors = anchors_create(); - if(!env->anchors) { - log_err("out of memory"); - return 0; - } - if(!val_env->kcache) - val_env->kcache = key_cache_create(cfg); - if(!val_env->kcache) { - log_err("out of memory"); - return 0; - } - env->key_cache = val_env->kcache; - if(!anchors_apply_cfg(env->anchors, cfg)) { - log_err("validator: error in trustanchors config"); - return 0; - } - val_env->date_override = cfg->val_date_override; - val_env->skew_min = cfg->val_sig_skew_min; - val_env->skew_max = cfg->val_sig_skew_max; - c = cfg_count_numbers(cfg->val_nsec3_key_iterations); - if(c < 1 || (c&1)) { - log_err("validator: unparseable or odd nsec3 key " - "iterations: %s", cfg->val_nsec3_key_iterations); - return 0; - } - val_env->nsec3_keyiter_count = c/2; - if(!fill_nsec3_iter(val_env, cfg->val_nsec3_key_iterations, c/2)) { - log_err("validator: cannot apply nsec3 key iterations"); - return 0; - } - if(!val_env->neg_cache) - val_env->neg_cache = val_neg_create(cfg, - val_env->nsec3_maxiter[val_env->nsec3_keyiter_count-1]); - if(!val_env->neg_cache) { - log_err("out of memory"); - return 0; - } - env->neg_cache = val_env->neg_cache; - return 1; -} - -#ifdef USE_ECDSA_EVP_WORKAROUND -void ecdsa_evp_workaround_init(void); -#endif -int -val_init(struct module_env* env, int id) -{ - struct val_env* val_env = (struct val_env*)calloc(1, - sizeof(struct val_env)); - if(!val_env) { - log_err("malloc failure"); - return 0; - } - env->modinfo[id] = (void*)val_env; - env->need_to_validate = 1; - val_env->permissive_mode = 0; - lock_basic_init(&val_env->bogus_lock); - lock_protect(&val_env->bogus_lock, &val_env->num_rrset_bogus, - sizeof(val_env->num_rrset_bogus)); -#ifdef USE_ECDSA_EVP_WORKAROUND - ecdsa_evp_workaround_init(); -#endif - if(!val_apply_cfg(env, val_env, env->cfg)) { - log_err("validator: could not apply configuration settings."); - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -void -val_deinit(struct module_env* env, int id) -{ - struct val_env* val_env; - if(!env || !env->modinfo[id]) - return; - val_env = (struct val_env*)env->modinfo[id]; - lock_basic_destroy(&val_env->bogus_lock); - anchors_delete(env->anchors); - env->anchors = NULL; - key_cache_delete(val_env->kcache); - neg_cache_delete(val_env->neg_cache); - free(val_env->nsec3_keysize); - free(val_env->nsec3_maxiter); - free(val_env); - env->modinfo[id] = NULL; -} - -/** fill in message structure */ -static struct val_qstate* -val_new_getmsg(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq) -{ - if(!qstate->return_msg || qstate->return_rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { - /* create a message to verify */ - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "constructing reply for validation"); - vq->orig_msg = (struct dns_msg*)regional_alloc(qstate->region, - sizeof(struct dns_msg)); - if(!vq->orig_msg) - return NULL; - vq->orig_msg->qinfo = qstate->qinfo; - vq->orig_msg->rep = (struct reply_info*)regional_alloc( - qstate->region, sizeof(struct reply_info)); - if(!vq->orig_msg->rep) - return NULL; - memset(vq->orig_msg->rep, 0, sizeof(struct reply_info)); - vq->orig_msg->rep->flags = (uint16_t)(qstate->return_rcode&0xf) - |BIT_QR|BIT_RA|(qstate->query_flags|(BIT_CD|BIT_RD)); - vq->orig_msg->rep->qdcount = 1; - } else { - vq->orig_msg = qstate->return_msg; - } - vq->qchase = qstate->qinfo; - /* chase reply will be an edited (sub)set of the orig msg rrset ptrs */ - vq->chase_reply = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, - vq->orig_msg->rep, - sizeof(struct reply_info) - sizeof(struct rrset_ref)); - if(!vq->chase_reply) - return NULL; - if(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count > RR_COUNT_MAX) - return NULL; /* protect against integer overflow */ - vq->chase_reply->rrsets = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, - vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets, sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*) - * vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count); - if(!vq->chase_reply->rrsets) - return NULL; - vq->rrset_skip = 0; - return vq; -} - -/** allocate new validator query state */ -static struct val_qstate* -val_new(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id) -{ - struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)regional_alloc( - qstate->region, sizeof(*vq)); - log_assert(!qstate->minfo[id]); - if(!vq) - return NULL; - memset(vq, 0, sizeof(*vq)); - qstate->minfo[id] = vq; - vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; - return val_new_getmsg(qstate, vq); -} - -/** - * Exit validation with an error status - * - * @param qstate: query state - * @param id: validator id. - * @return false, for use by caller to return to stop processing. - */ -static int -val_error(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id) -{ - qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; - qstate->return_rcode = LDNS_RCODE_SERVFAIL; - return 0; -} - -/** - * Check to see if a given response needs to go through the validation - * process. Typical reasons for this routine to return false are: CD bit was - * on in the original request, or the response is a kind of message that - * is unvalidatable (i.e., SERVFAIL, REFUSED, etc.) - * - * @param qstate: query state. - * @param ret_rc: rcode for this message (if noerror - examine ret_msg). - * @param ret_msg: return msg, can be NULL; look at rcode instead. - * @return true if the response could use validation (although this does not - * mean we can actually validate this response). - */ -static int -needs_validation(struct module_qstate* qstate, int ret_rc, - struct dns_msg* ret_msg) -{ - int rcode; - - /* If the CD bit is on in the original request, then you could think - * that we don't bother to validate anything. - * But this is signalled internally with the valrec flag. - * User queries are validated with BIT_CD to make our cache clean - * so that bogus messages get retried by the upstream also for - * downstream validators that set BIT_CD. - * For DNS64 bit_cd signals no dns64 processing, but we want to - * provide validation there too */ - /* - if(qstate->query_flags & BIT_CD) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "not validating response due to CD bit"); - return 0; - } - */ - if(qstate->is_valrec) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "not validating response, is valrec" - "(validation recursion lookup)"); - return 0; - } - - if(ret_rc != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR || !ret_msg) - rcode = ret_rc; - else rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(ret_msg->rep->flags); - - if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN) { - if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) { - char rc[16]; - rc[0]=0; - (void)sldns_wire2str_rcode_buf(rcode, rc, sizeof(rc)); - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate non-answer, rcode %s", rc); - } - return 0; - } - - /* cannot validate positive RRSIG response. (negatives can) */ - if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG && - rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && ret_msg && - ret_msg->rep->an_numrrsets > 0) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate RRSIG, no sigs on sigs."); - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -/** - * Check to see if the response has already been validated. - * @param ret_msg: return msg, can be NULL - * @return true if the response has already been validated - */ -static int -already_validated(struct dns_msg* ret_msg) -{ - /* validate unchecked, and re-validate bogus messages */ - if (ret_msg && ret_msg->rep->security > sec_status_bogus) - { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "response has already been validated: %s", - sec_status_to_string(ret_msg->rep->security)); - return 1; - } - return 0; -} - -/** - * Generate a request for DNS data. - * - * @param qstate: query state that is the parent. - * @param id: module id. - * @param name: what name to query for. - * @param namelen: length of name. - * @param qtype: query type. - * @param qclass: query class. - * @param flags: additional flags, such as the CD bit (BIT_CD), or 0. - * @return false on alloc failure. - */ -static int -generate_request(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id, uint8_t* name, - size_t namelen, uint16_t qtype, uint16_t qclass, uint16_t flags) -{ - struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)qstate->minfo[id]; - struct module_qstate* newq; - struct query_info ask; - int valrec; - ask.qname = name; - ask.qname_len = namelen; - ask.qtype = qtype; - ask.qclass = qclass; - ask.local_alias = NULL; - log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "generate request", &ask); - fptr_ok(fptr_whitelist_modenv_attach_sub(qstate->env->attach_sub)); - /* enable valrec flag to avoid recursion to the same validation - * routine, this lookup is simply a lookup. DLVs need validation */ - if(qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV) - valrec = 0; - else valrec = 1; - if(!(*qstate->env->attach_sub)(qstate, &ask, - (uint16_t)(BIT_RD|flags), 0, valrec, &newq)){ - log_err("Could not generate request: out of memory"); - return 0; - } - /* newq; validator does not need state created for that - * query, and its a 'normal' for iterator as well */ - if(newq) { - /* add our blacklist to the query blacklist */ - sock_list_merge(&newq->blacklist, newq->region, - vq->chain_blacklist); - } - qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_subquery; - return 1; -} - -/** - * Prime trust anchor for use. - * Generate and dispatch a priming query for the given trust anchor. - * The trust anchor can be DNSKEY or DS and does not have to be signed. - * - * @param qstate: query state. - * @param vq: validator query state. - * @param id: module id. - * @param toprime: what to prime. - * @return false on a processing error. - */ -static int -prime_trust_anchor(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, - int id, struct trust_anchor* toprime) -{ - int ret = generate_request(qstate, id, toprime->name, toprime->namelen, - LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, toprime->dclass, BIT_CD); - if(!ret) { - log_err("Could not prime trust anchor: out of memory"); - return 0; - } - /* ignore newq; validator does not need state created for that - * query, and its a 'normal' for iterator as well */ - vq->wait_prime_ta = 1; /* to elicit PRIME_RESP_STATE processing - from the validator inform_super() routine */ - /* store trust anchor name for later lookup when prime returns */ - vq->trust_anchor_name = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, - toprime->name, toprime->namelen); - vq->trust_anchor_len = toprime->namelen; - vq->trust_anchor_labs = toprime->namelabs; - if(!vq->trust_anchor_name) { - log_err("Could not prime trust anchor: out of memory"); - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -/** - * Validate if the ANSWER and AUTHORITY sections contain valid rrsets. - * They must be validly signed with the given key. - * Tries to validate ADDITIONAL rrsets as well, but only to check them. - * Allows unsigned CNAME after a DNAME that expands the DNAME. - * - * Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the - * trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been - * completed. - * - * @param qstate: query state. - * @param env: module env for verify. - * @param ve: validator env for verify. - * @param qchase: query that was made. - * @param chase_reply: answer to validate. - * @param key_entry: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches - * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). - * @return false if any of the rrsets in the an or ns sections of the message - * fail to verify. The message is then set to bogus. - */ -static int -validate_msg_signatures(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct module_env* env, - struct val_env* ve, struct query_info* qchase, - struct reply_info* chase_reply, struct key_entry_key* key_entry) -{ - uint8_t* sname; - size_t i, slen; - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; - enum sec_status sec; - int dname_seen = 0; - char* reason = NULL; - - /* validate the ANSWER section */ - for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) { - s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; - /* Skip the CNAME following a (validated) DNAME. - * Because of the normalization routines in the iterator, - * there will always be an unsigned CNAME following a DNAME - * (unless qtype=DNAME). */ - if(dname_seen && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) { - dname_seen = 0; - /* CNAME was synthesized by our own iterator */ - /* since the DNAME verified, mark the CNAME as secure */ - ((struct packed_rrset_data*)s->entry.data)->security = - sec_status_secure; - ((struct packed_rrset_data*)s->entry.data)->trust = - rrset_trust_validated; - continue; - } - - /* Verify the answer rrset */ - sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason); - /* If the (answer) rrset failed to validate, then this - * message is BAD. */ - if(sec != sec_status_secure) { - log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "validator: response " - "has failed ANSWER rrset:", s->rk.dname, - ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); - errinf(qstate, reason); - if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) - errinf(qstate, "for CNAME"); - else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) - errinf(qstate, "for DNAME"); - errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - return 0; - } - - /* Notice a DNAME that should be followed by an unsigned - * CNAME. */ - if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME && - ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) { - dname_seen = 1; - } - } - - /* validate the AUTHORITY section */ - for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ - chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { - s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; - sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason); - /* If anything in the authority section fails to be secure, - * we have a bad message. */ - if(sec != sec_status_secure) { - log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "validator: response " - "has failed AUTHORITY rrset:", s->rk.dname, - ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); - errinf(qstate, reason); - errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); - errinf_rrset(qstate, s); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - return 0; - } - } - - /* attempt to validate the ADDITIONAL section rrsets */ - if(!ve->clean_additional) - return 1; - for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; - i<chase_reply->rrset_count; i++) { - s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; - /* only validate rrs that have signatures with the key */ - /* leave others unchecked, those get removed later on too */ - val_find_rrset_signer(s, &sname, &slen); - if(sname && query_dname_compare(sname, key_entry->name)==0) - (void)val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, - &reason); - /* the additional section can fail to be secure, - * it is optional, check signature in case we need - * to clean the additional section later. */ - } - - return 1; -} - -/** - * Detect wrong truncated response (say from BIND 9.6.1 that is forwarding - * and saw the NS record without signatures from a referral). - * The positive response has a mangled authority section. - * Remove that authority section and the additional section. - * @param rep: reply - * @return true if a wrongly truncated response. - */ -static int -detect_wrongly_truncated(struct reply_info* rep) -{ - size_t i; - /* only NS in authority, and it is bogus */ - if(rep->ns_numrrsets != 1 || rep->an_numrrsets == 0) - return 0; - if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[ rep->an_numrrsets ]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) - return 0; - if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[ rep->an_numrrsets ] - ->entry.data)->security == sec_status_secure) - return 0; - /* answer section is present and secure */ - for(i=0; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) { - if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[ i ] - ->entry.data)->security != sec_status_secure) - return 0; - } - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "truncating to minimal response"); - return 1; -} - -/** - * For messages that are not referrals, if the chase reply contains an - * unsigned NS record in the authority section it could have been - * inserted by a (BIND) forwarder that thinks the zone is insecure, and - * that has an NS record without signatures in cache. Remove the NS - * record since the reply does not hinge on that record (in the authority - * section), but do not remove it if it removes the last record from the - * answer+authority sections. - * @param chase_reply: the chased reply, we have a key for this contents, - * so we should have signatures for these rrsets and not having - * signatures means it will be bogus. - * @param orig_reply: original reply, remove NS from there as well because - * we cannot mark the NS record as DNSSEC valid because it is not - * validated by signatures. - */ -static void -remove_spurious_authority(struct reply_info* chase_reply, - struct reply_info* orig_reply) -{ - size_t i, found = 0; - int remove = 0; - /* if no answer and only 1 auth RRset, do not remove that one */ - if(chase_reply->an_numrrsets == 0 && chase_reply->ns_numrrsets == 1) - return; - /* search authority section for unsigned NS records */ - for(i = chase_reply->an_numrrsets; - i < chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { - struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*) - chase_reply->rrsets[i]->entry.data; - if(ntohs(chase_reply->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS - && d->rrsig_count == 0) { - found = i; - remove = 1; - break; - } - } - /* see if we found the entry */ - if(!remove) return; - log_rrset_key(VERB_ALGO, "Removing spurious unsigned NS record " - "(likely inserted by forwarder)", chase_reply->rrsets[found]); - - /* find rrset in orig_reply */ - for(i = orig_reply->an_numrrsets; - i < orig_reply->an_numrrsets+orig_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { - if(ntohs(orig_reply->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS - && query_dname_compare(orig_reply->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, - chase_reply->rrsets[found]->rk.dname) == 0) { - /* remove from orig_msg */ - val_reply_remove_auth(orig_reply, i); - break; - } - } - /* remove rrset from chase_reply */ - val_reply_remove_auth(chase_reply, found); -} - -/** - * Given a "positive" response -- a response that contains an answer to the - * question, and no CNAME chain, validate this response. - * - * The answer and authority RRsets must already be verified as secure. - * - * @param env: module env for verify. - * @param ve: validator env for verify. - * @param qchase: query that was made. - * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. - * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches - * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). - */ -static void -validate_positive_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, - struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, - struct key_entry_key* kkey) -{ - uint8_t* wc = NULL; - int wc_NSEC_ok = 0; - int nsec3s_seen = 0; - size_t i; - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; - - /* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the answer itself */ - for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) { - s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; - - /* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard - * expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be - * made in the authority section. */ - if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc)) { - log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Positive response has " - "inconsistent wildcard sigs:", s->rk.dname, - ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - return; - } - } - - /* validate the AUTHORITY section as well - this will generally be - * the NS rrset (which could be missing, no problem) */ - for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ - chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { - s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; - - /* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a - * (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove - * that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard - * was used. */ - if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { - if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) { - wc_NSEC_ok = 1; - } - /* if not, continue looking for proof */ - } - - /* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and - * we have NSEC3 records */ - if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { - nsec3s_seen = 1; - } - } - - /* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already - * proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3 - * records. */ - if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen) { - enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve, - chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets, - chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, wc); - if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Positive wildcard response is " - "insecure"); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; - return; - } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) - wc_NSEC_ok = 1; - } - - /* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard - * response, fail. */ - if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) { - verbose(VERB_QUERY, "positive response was wildcard " - "expansion and did not prove original data " - "did not exist"); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - return; - } - - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated positive response"); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; -} - -/** - * Validate a NOERROR/NODATA signed response -- a response that has a - * NOERROR Rcode but no ANSWER section RRsets. This consists of making - * certain that the authority section NSEC/NSEC3s proves that the qname - * does exist and the qtype doesn't. - * - * The answer and authority RRsets must already be verified as secure. - * - * @param env: module env for verify. - * @param ve: validator env for verify. - * @param qchase: query that was made. - * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. - * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches - * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). - */ -static void -validate_nodata_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, - struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, - struct key_entry_key* kkey) -{ - /* Since we are here, there must be nothing in the ANSWER section to - * validate. */ - /* (Note: CNAME/DNAME responses will not directly get here -- - * instead, they are chased down into individual CNAME validations, - * and at the end of the cname chain a POSITIVE, or CNAME_NOANSWER - * validation.) */ - - /* validate the AUTHORITY section */ - int has_valid_nsec = 0; /* If true, then the NODATA has been proven.*/ - uint8_t* ce = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. This is the - proven closest encloser. */ - uint8_t* wc = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. wildcard nsec */ - int nsec3s_seen = 0; /* nsec3s seen */ - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; - size_t i; - - for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ - chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { - s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; - /* If we encounter an NSEC record, try to use it to prove - * NODATA. - * This needs to handle the ENT NODATA case. */ - if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { - if(nsec_proves_nodata(s, qchase, &wc)) { - has_valid_nsec = 1; - /* sets wc-encloser if wildcard applicable */ - } - if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname)) { - ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s); - } - if(val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(s, qchase)) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "delegation is insecure"); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; - return; - } - } else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { - nsec3s_seen = 1; - } - } - - /* check to see if we have a wildcard NODATA proof. */ - - /* The wildcard NODATA is 1 NSEC proving that qname does not exist - * (and also proving what the closest encloser is), and 1 NSEC - * showing the matching wildcard, which must be *.closest_encloser. */ - if(wc && !ce) - has_valid_nsec = 0; - else if(wc && ce) { - if(query_dname_compare(wc, ce) != 0) { - has_valid_nsec = 0; - } - } - - if(!has_valid_nsec && nsec3s_seen) { - enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_nodata(env, ve, - chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets, - chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey); - if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NODATA response is insecure"); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; - return; - } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) - has_valid_nsec = 1; - } - - if(!has_valid_nsec) { - verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NODATA response failed to prove NODATA " - "status with NSEC/NSEC3"); - if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) - log_dns_msg("Failed NODATA", qchase, chase_reply); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - return; - } - - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated NODATA response."); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; -} - -/** - * Validate a NAMEERROR signed response -- a response that has a NXDOMAIN - * Rcode. - * This consists of making certain that the authority section NSEC proves - * that the qname doesn't exist and the covering wildcard also doesn't exist.. - * - * The answer and authority RRsets must have already been verified as secure. - * - * @param env: module env for verify. - * @param ve: validator env for verify. - * @param qchase: query that was made. - * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. - * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches - * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). - * @param rcode: adjusted RCODE, in case of RCODE/proof mismatch leniency. - */ -static void -validate_nameerror_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, - struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, - struct key_entry_key* kkey, int* rcode) -{ - int has_valid_nsec = 0; - int has_valid_wnsec = 0; - int nsec3s_seen = 0; - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; - size_t i; - - for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ - chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { - s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; - if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { - if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname)) - has_valid_nsec = 1; - if(val_nsec_proves_no_wc(s, qchase->qname, - qchase->qname_len)) - has_valid_wnsec = 1; - if(val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(s, qchase)) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "delegation is insecure"); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; - return; - } - } else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) - nsec3s_seen = 1; - } - - if((!has_valid_nsec || !has_valid_wnsec) && nsec3s_seen) { - /* use NSEC3 proof, both answer and auth rrsets, in case - * NSEC3s end up in the answer (due to qtype=NSEC3 or so) */ - chase_reply->security = nsec3_prove_nameerror(env, ve, - chase_reply->rrsets, chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ - chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey); - if(chase_reply->security != sec_status_secure) { - verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NameError response failed nsec, " - "nsec3 proof was %s", sec_status_to_string( - chase_reply->security)); - return; - } - has_valid_nsec = 1; - has_valid_wnsec = 1; - } - - /* If the message fails to prove either condition, it is bogus. */ - if(!has_valid_nsec) { - verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NameError response has failed to prove: " - "qname does not exist"); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - /* Be lenient with RCODE in NSEC NameError responses */ - validate_nodata_response(env, ve, qchase, chase_reply, kkey); - if (chase_reply->security == sec_status_secure) - *rcode = LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR; - return; - } - - if(!has_valid_wnsec) { - verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NameError response has failed to prove: " - "covering wildcard does not exist"); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - /* Be lenient with RCODE in NSEC NameError responses */ - validate_nodata_response(env, ve, qchase, chase_reply, kkey); - if (chase_reply->security == sec_status_secure) - *rcode = LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR; - return; - } - - /* Otherwise, we consider the message secure. */ - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated NAME ERROR response."); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; -} - -/** - * Given a referral response, validate rrsets and take least trusted rrset - * as the current validation status. - * - * Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the - * trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been - * completed. - * - * @param chase_reply: answer to validate. - */ -static void -validate_referral_response(struct reply_info* chase_reply) -{ - size_t i; - enum sec_status s; - /* message security equals lowest rrset security */ - chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; - for(i=0; i<chase_reply->rrset_count; i++) { - s = ((struct packed_rrset_data*)chase_reply->rrsets[i] - ->entry.data)->security; - if(s < chase_reply->security) - chase_reply->security = s; - } - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validated part of referral response as %s", - sec_status_to_string(chase_reply->security)); -} - -/** - * Given an "ANY" response -- a response that contains an answer to a - * qtype==ANY question, with answers. This does no checking that all - * types are present. - * - * NOTE: it may be possible to get parent-side delegation point records - * here, which won't all be signed. Right now, this routine relies on the - * upstream iterative resolver to not return these responses -- instead - * treating them as referrals. - * - * NOTE: RFC 4035 is silent on this issue, so this may change upon - * clarification. Clarification draft -05 says to not check all types are - * present. - * - * Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the - * trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been - * completed. - * - * @param env: module env for verify. - * @param ve: validator env for verify. - * @param qchase: query that was made. - * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. - * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches - * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). - */ -static void -validate_any_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, - struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, - struct key_entry_key* kkey) -{ - /* all answer and auth rrsets already verified */ - /* but check if a wildcard response is given, then check NSEC/NSEC3 - * for qname denial to see if wildcard is applicable */ - uint8_t* wc = NULL; - int wc_NSEC_ok = 0; - int nsec3s_seen = 0; - size_t i; - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; - - if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_ANY) { - log_err("internal error: ANY validation called for non-ANY"); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - return; - } - - /* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the answer itself */ - for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) { - s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; - - /* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard - * expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be - * made in the authority section. */ - if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc)) { - log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Positive ANY response" - " has inconsistent wildcard sigs:", - s->rk.dname, ntohs(s->rk.type), - ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - return; - } - } - - /* if it was a wildcard, check for NSEC/NSEC3s in both answer - * and authority sections (NSEC may be moved to the ANSWER section) */ - if(wc != NULL) - for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; - i++) { - s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; - - /* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a - * (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove - * that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard - * was used. */ - if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { - if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) { - wc_NSEC_ok = 1; - } - /* if not, continue looking for proof */ - } - - /* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and - * we have NSEC3 records */ - if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { - nsec3s_seen = 1; - } - } - - /* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already - * proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3 - * records. */ - if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen) { - /* look both in answer and auth section for NSEC3s */ - enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve, - chase_reply->rrsets, - chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, - qchase, kkey, wc); - if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Positive ANY wildcard response is " - "insecure"); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; - return; - } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) - wc_NSEC_ok = 1; - } - - /* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard - * response, fail. */ - if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) { - verbose(VERB_QUERY, "positive ANY response was wildcard " - "expansion and did not prove original data " - "did not exist"); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - return; - } - - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated positive ANY response"); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; -} - -/** - * Validate CNAME response, or DNAME+CNAME. - * This is just like a positive proof, except that this is about a - * DNAME+CNAME. Possible wildcard proof. - * Difference with positive proof is that this routine refuses - * wildcarded DNAMEs. - * - * The answer and authority rrsets must already be verified as secure. - * - * @param env: module env for verify. - * @param ve: validator env for verify. - * @param qchase: query that was made. - * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. - * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches - * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). - */ -static void -validate_cname_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, - struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, - struct key_entry_key* kkey) -{ - uint8_t* wc = NULL; - int wc_NSEC_ok = 0; - int nsec3s_seen = 0; - size_t i; - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; - - /* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the CNAME (+DNAME) */ - for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) { - s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; - - /* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard - * expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be - * made in the authority section. */ - if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc)) { - log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Cname response has " - "inconsistent wildcard sigs:", s->rk.dname, - ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - return; - } - - /* Refuse wildcarded DNAMEs rfc 4597. - * Do not follow a wildcarded DNAME because - * its synthesized CNAME expansion is underdefined */ - if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME && - ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME && wc) { - log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "cannot validate a " - "wildcarded DNAME:", s->rk.dname, - ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class)); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - return; - } - - /* If we have found a CNAME, stop looking for one. - * The iterator has placed the CNAME chain in correct - * order. */ - if (ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) { - break; - } - } - - /* AUTHORITY section */ - for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ - chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { - s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; - - /* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a - * (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove - * that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard - * was used. */ - if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { - if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) { - wc_NSEC_ok = 1; - } - /* if not, continue looking for proof */ - } - - /* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and - * we have NSEC3 records */ - if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { - nsec3s_seen = 1; - } - } - - /* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already - * proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3 - * records. */ - if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen) { - enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve, - chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets, - chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, wc); - if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "wildcard CNAME response is " - "insecure"); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; - return; - } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) - wc_NSEC_ok = 1; - } - - /* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard - * response, fail. */ - if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) { - verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAME response was wildcard " - "expansion and did not prove original data " - "did not exist"); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - return; - } - - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated CNAME response"); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; -} - -/** - * Validate CNAME NOANSWER response, no more data after a CNAME chain. - * This can be a NODATA or a NAME ERROR case, but not both at the same time. - * We don't know because the rcode has been set to NOERROR by the CNAME. - * - * The answer and authority rrsets must already be verified as secure. - * - * @param env: module env for verify. - * @param ve: validator env for verify. - * @param qchase: query that was made. - * @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate. - * @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches - * the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood(). - */ -static void -validate_cname_noanswer_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, - struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply, - struct key_entry_key* kkey) -{ - int nodata_valid_nsec = 0; /* If true, then NODATA has been proven.*/ - uint8_t* ce = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. This is the - proven closest encloser. */ - uint8_t* wc = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. wildcard nsec */ - int nxdomain_valid_nsec = 0; /* if true, namerror has been proven */ - int nxdomain_valid_wnsec = 0; - int nsec3s_seen = 0; /* nsec3s seen */ - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s; - size_t i; - - /* the AUTHORITY section */ - for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+ - chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) { - s = chase_reply->rrsets[i]; - - /* If we encounter an NSEC record, try to use it to prove - * NODATA. This needs to handle the ENT NODATA case. - * Also try to prove NAMEERROR, and absence of a wildcard */ - if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) { - if(nsec_proves_nodata(s, qchase, &wc)) { - nodata_valid_nsec = 1; - /* set wc encloser if wildcard applicable */ - } - if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname)) { - ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s); - nxdomain_valid_nsec = 1; - } - if(val_nsec_proves_no_wc(s, qchase->qname, - qchase->qname_len)) - nxdomain_valid_wnsec = 1; - if(val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(s, qchase)) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "delegation is insecure"); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; - return; - } - } else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { - nsec3s_seen = 1; - } - } - - /* check to see if we have a wildcard NODATA proof. */ - - /* The wildcard NODATA is 1 NSEC proving that qname does not exists - * (and also proving what the closest encloser is), and 1 NSEC - * showing the matching wildcard, which must be *.closest_encloser. */ - if(wc && !ce) - nodata_valid_nsec = 0; - else if(wc && ce) { - if(query_dname_compare(wc, ce) != 0) { - nodata_valid_nsec = 0; - } - } - if(nxdomain_valid_nsec && !nxdomain_valid_wnsec) { - /* name error is missing wildcard denial proof */ - nxdomain_valid_nsec = 0; - } - - if(nodata_valid_nsec && nxdomain_valid_nsec) { - verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAMEchain to noanswer proves that name " - "exists and not exists, bogus"); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - return; - } - if(!nodata_valid_nsec && !nxdomain_valid_nsec && nsec3s_seen) { - int nodata; - enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_nxornodata(env, ve, - chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets, - chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, &nodata); - if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "CNAMEchain to noanswer response " - "is insecure"); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; - return; - } else if(sec == sec_status_secure) { - if(nodata) - nodata_valid_nsec = 1; - else nxdomain_valid_nsec = 1; - } - } - - if(!nodata_valid_nsec && !nxdomain_valid_nsec) { - verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAMEchain to noanswer response failed " - "to prove status with NSEC/NSEC3"); - if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) - log_dns_msg("Failed CNAMEnoanswer", qchase, chase_reply); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - return; - } - - if(nodata_valid_nsec) - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated CNAME chain to a " - "NODATA response."); - else verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated CNAME chain to a " - "NAMEERROR response."); - chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure; -} - -/** - * Process init state for validator. - * Process the INIT state. First tier responses start in the INIT state. - * This is where they are vetted for validation suitability, and the initial - * key search is done. - * - * Currently, events the come through this routine will be either promoted - * to FINISHED/CNAME_RESP (no validation needed), FINDKEY (next step to - * validation), or will be (temporarily) retired and a new priming request - * event will be generated. - * - * @param qstate: query state. - * @param vq: validator query state. - * @param ve: validator shared global environment. - * @param id: module id. - * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if - * not. - */ -static int -processInit(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, - struct val_env* ve, int id) -{ - uint8_t* lookup_name; - size_t lookup_len; - struct trust_anchor* anchor; - enum val_classification subtype = val_classify_response( - qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo, &vq->qchase, - vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip); - if(vq->restart_count > VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "restart count exceeded"); - return val_error(qstate, id); - } - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator classification %s", - val_classification_to_string(subtype)); - if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL && - vq->rrset_skip < vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count) { - /* referral uses the rrset name as qchase, to find keys for - * that rrset */ - vq->qchase.qname = vq->orig_msg->rep-> - rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.dname; - vq->qchase.qname_len = vq->orig_msg->rep-> - rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.dname_len; - vq->qchase.qtype = ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep-> - rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.type); - vq->qchase.qclass = ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep-> - rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.rrset_class); - } - lookup_name = vq->qchase.qname; - lookup_len = vq->qchase.qname_len; - /* for type DS look at the parent side for keys/trustanchor */ - /* also for NSEC not at apex */ - if(vq->qchase.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS || - (vq->qchase.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC && - vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count > vq->rrset_skip && - ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.type) == - LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC && - !(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]-> - rk.flags&PACKED_RRSET_NSEC_AT_APEX))) { - dname_remove_label(&lookup_name, &lookup_len); - } - - val_mark_indeterminate(vq->chase_reply, qstate->env->anchors, - qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env); - vq->key_entry = NULL; - vq->empty_DS_name = NULL; - vq->ds_rrset = 0; - anchor = anchors_lookup(qstate->env->anchors, - lookup_name, lookup_len, vq->qchase.qclass); - - /* Determine the signer/lookup name */ - val_find_signer(subtype, &vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, - vq->rrset_skip, &vq->signer_name, &vq->signer_len); - if(vq->signer_name != NULL && - !dname_subdomain_c(lookup_name, vq->signer_name)) { - log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "this signer name is not a parent " - "of lookupname, omitted", vq->signer_name, 0, 0); - vq->signer_name = NULL; - } - if(vq->signer_name == NULL) { - log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "no signer, using", lookup_name, - 0, 0); - } else { - lookup_name = vq->signer_name; - lookup_len = vq->signer_len; - log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "signer is", lookup_name, 0, 0); - } - - /* for NXDOMAIN it could be signed by a parent of the trust anchor */ - if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR && vq->signer_name && - anchor && dname_strict_subdomain_c(anchor->name, lookup_name)){ - lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); - anchor = anchors_lookup(qstate->env->anchors, - lookup_name, lookup_len, vq->qchase.qclass); - if(!anchor) { /* unsigned parent denies anchor*/ - verbose(VERB_QUERY, "unsigned parent zone denies" - " trust anchor, indeterminate"); - vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_indeterminate; - vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; - return 1; - } - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "trust anchor NXDOMAIN by signed parent"); - } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE && - qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY && - query_dname_compare(lookup_name, qstate->qinfo.qname) == 0) { - /* is a DNSKEY so lookup a bit higher since we want to - * get it from a parent or from trustanchor */ - dname_remove_label(&lookup_name, &lookup_len); - } - - if(vq->rrset_skip > 0 || subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME || - subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) { - /* extract this part of orig_msg into chase_reply for - * the eventual VALIDATE stage */ - val_fill_reply(vq->chase_reply, vq->orig_msg->rep, - vq->rrset_skip, lookup_name, lookup_len, - vq->signer_name); - if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) - log_dns_msg("chased extract", &vq->qchase, - vq->chase_reply); - } - - vq->key_entry = key_cache_obtain(ve->kcache, lookup_name, lookup_len, - vq->qchase.qclass, qstate->region, *qstate->env->now); - - /* there is no key(from DLV) and no trust anchor */ - if(vq->key_entry == NULL && anchor == NULL) { - /*response isn't under a trust anchor, so we cannot validate.*/ - vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_indeterminate; - /* go to finished state to cache this result */ - vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; - return 1; - } - /* if not key, or if keyentry is *above* the trustanchor, i.e. - * the keyentry is based on another (higher) trustanchor */ - else if(vq->key_entry == NULL || (anchor && - dname_strict_subdomain_c(anchor->name, vq->key_entry->name))) { - /* trust anchor is an 'unsigned' trust anchor */ - if(anchor && anchor->numDS == 0 && anchor->numDNSKEY == 0) { - vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; - val_mark_insecure(vq->chase_reply, anchor->name, - qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env); - lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); - vq->dlv_checked=1; /* skip DLV check */ - /* go to finished state to cache this result */ - vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; - return 1; - } - /* fire off a trust anchor priming query. */ - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "prime trust anchor"); - if(!prime_trust_anchor(qstate, vq, id, anchor)) { - lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); - return val_error(qstate, id); - } - lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); - /* and otherwise, don't continue processing this event. - * (it will be reactivated when the priming query returns). */ - vq->state = VAL_FINDKEY_STATE; - return 0; - } - if(anchor) { - lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock); - } - - if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) { - /* response is under a null key, so we cannot validate - * However, we do set the status to INSECURE, since it is - * essentially proven insecure. */ - vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; - val_mark_insecure(vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry->name, - qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env); - /* go to finished state to cache this result */ - vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; - return 1; - } else if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) { - /* key is bad, chain is bad, reply is bogus */ - errinf_dname(qstate, "key for validation", vq->key_entry->name); - errinf(qstate, "is marked as invalid"); - if(key_entry_get_reason(vq->key_entry)) { - errinf(qstate, "because of a previous"); - errinf(qstate, key_entry_get_reason(vq->key_entry)); - } - /* no retries, stop bothering the authority until timeout */ - vq->restart_count = VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT; - vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; - return 1; - } - - /* otherwise, we have our "closest" cached key -- continue - * processing in the next state. */ - vq->state = VAL_FINDKEY_STATE; - return 1; -} - -/** - * Process the FINDKEY state. Generally this just calculates the next name - * to query and either issues a DS or a DNSKEY query. It will check to see - * if the correct key has already been reached, in which case it will - * advance the event to the next state. - * - * @param qstate: query state. - * @param vq: validator query state. - * @param id: module id. - * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if - * not. - */ -static int -processFindKey(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, int id) -{ - uint8_t* target_key_name, *current_key_name; - size_t target_key_len; - int strip_lab; - - log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: FindKey", &vq->qchase); - /* We know that state.key_entry is not 0 or bad key -- if it were, - * then previous processing should have directed this event to - * a different state. - * It could be an isnull key, which signals that a DLV was just - * done and the DNSKEY after the DLV failed with dnssec-retry state - * and the DNSKEY has to be performed again. */ - log_assert(vq->key_entry && !key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)); - if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) { - if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, - vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, - vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD)) { - log_err("mem error generating DNSKEY request"); - return val_error(qstate, id); - } - return 0; - } - - target_key_name = vq->signer_name; - target_key_len = vq->signer_len; - if(!target_key_name) { - target_key_name = vq->qchase.qname; - target_key_len = vq->qchase.qname_len; - } - - current_key_name = vq->key_entry->name; - - /* If our current key entry matches our target, then we are done. */ - if(query_dname_compare(target_key_name, current_key_name) == 0) { - vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; - return 1; - } - - if(vq->empty_DS_name) { - /* if the last empty nonterminal/emptyDS name we detected is - * below the current key, use that name to make progress - * along the chain of trust */ - if(query_dname_compare(target_key_name, - vq->empty_DS_name) == 0) { - /* do not query for empty_DS_name again */ - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Cannot retrieve DS for signature"); - errinf(qstate, "no signatures"); - errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); - vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; - return 1; - } - current_key_name = vq->empty_DS_name; - } - - log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "current keyname", current_key_name, - LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN); - log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "target keyname", target_key_name, - LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN); - /* assert we are walking down the DNS tree */ - if(!dname_subdomain_c(target_key_name, current_key_name)) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "bad signer name"); - vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; - return 1; - } - /* so this value is >= -1 */ - strip_lab = dname_count_labels(target_key_name) - - dname_count_labels(current_key_name) - 1; - log_assert(strip_lab >= -1); - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "striplab %d", strip_lab); - if(strip_lab > 0) { - dname_remove_labels(&target_key_name, &target_key_len, - strip_lab); - } - log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "next keyname", target_key_name, - LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN); - - /* The next step is either to query for the next DS, or to query - * for the next DNSKEY. */ - if(vq->ds_rrset) - log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "DS RRset", vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN); - else verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No DS RRset"); - - if(vq->ds_rrset && query_dname_compare(vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, - vq->key_entry->name) != 0) { - if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, - vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, - vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD)) { - log_err("mem error generating DNSKEY request"); - return val_error(qstate, id); - } - return 0; - } - - if(!vq->ds_rrset || query_dname_compare(vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, - target_key_name) != 0) { - /* check if there is a cache entry : pick up an NSEC if - * there is no DS, check if that NSEC has DS-bit unset, and - * thus can disprove the secure delegation we seek. - * We can then use that NSEC even in the absence of a SOA - * record that would be required by the iterator to supply - * a completely protocol-correct response. - * Uses negative cache for NSEC3 lookup of DS responses. */ - /* only if cache not blacklisted, of course */ - struct dns_msg* msg; - if(!qstate->blacklist && !vq->chain_blacklist && - (msg=val_find_DS(qstate->env, target_key_name, - target_key_len, vq->qchase.qclass, qstate->region, - vq->key_entry->name)) ) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Process cached DS response"); - process_ds_response(qstate, vq, id, LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR, - msg, &msg->qinfo, NULL); - return 1; /* continue processing ds-response results */ - } - if(!generate_request(qstate, id, target_key_name, - target_key_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, vq->qchase.qclass, - BIT_CD)) { - log_err("mem error generating DS request"); - return val_error(qstate, id); - } - return 0; - } - - /* Otherwise, it is time to query for the DNSKEY */ - if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, - vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, - vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD)) { - log_err("mem error generating DNSKEY request"); - return val_error(qstate, id); - } - - return 0; -} - -/** - * Process the VALIDATE stage, the init and findkey stages are finished, - * and the right keys are available to validate the response. - * Or, there are no keys available, in order to invalidate the response. - * - * After validation, the status is recorded in the message and rrsets, - * and finished state is started. - * - * @param qstate: query state. - * @param vq: validator query state. - * @param ve: validator shared global environment. - * @param id: module id. - * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if - * not. - */ -static int -processValidate(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, - struct val_env* ve, int id) -{ - enum val_classification subtype; - int rcode; - - if(!vq->key_entry) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate: no key entry, failed"); - return val_error(qstate, id); - } - - /* This is the default next state. */ - vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; - - /* Unsigned responses must be underneath a "null" key entry.*/ - if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) { - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Verified that %sresponse is INSECURE", - vq->signer_name?"":"unsigned "); - vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure; - val_mark_insecure(vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry->name, - qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env); - key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry, qstate); - return 1; - } - - if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) { - log_nametypeclass(VERB_DETAIL, "Could not establish a chain " - "of trust to keys for", vq->key_entry->name, - LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, vq->key_entry->key_class); - vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - errinf(qstate, "while building chain of trust"); - if(vq->restart_count >= VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) - key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry, qstate); - return 1; - } - - /* signerName being null is the indicator that this response was - * unsigned */ - if(vq->signer_name == NULL) { - log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "processValidate: state has no " - "signer name", &vq->qchase); - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Could not establish validation of " - "INSECURE status of unsigned response."); - errinf(qstate, "no signatures"); - errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); - vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus; - return 1; - } - subtype = val_classify_response(qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo, - &vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip); - if(subtype != VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) - remove_spurious_authority(vq->chase_reply, vq->orig_msg->rep); - - /* check signatures in the message; - * answer and authority must be valid, additional is only checked. */ - if(!validate_msg_signatures(qstate, qstate->env, ve, &vq->qchase, - vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry)) { - /* workaround bad recursor out there that truncates (even - * with EDNS4k) to 512 by removing RRSIG from auth section - * for positive replies*/ - if((subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE || subtype == VAL_CLASS_ANY - || subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) && - detect_wrongly_truncated(vq->orig_msg->rep)) { - /* truncate the message some more */ - vq->orig_msg->rep->ns_numrrsets = 0; - vq->orig_msg->rep->ar_numrrsets = 0; - vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count = - vq->orig_msg->rep->an_numrrsets; - vq->chase_reply->ns_numrrsets = 0; - vq->chase_reply->ar_numrrsets = 0; - vq->chase_reply->rrset_count = - vq->chase_reply->an_numrrsets; - qstate->errinf = NULL; - } - else { - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Validate: message contains " - "bad rrsets"); - return 1; - } - } - - switch(subtype) { - case VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE: - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a positive response"); - validate_positive_response(qstate->env, ve, - &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry); - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(positive): %s", - sec_status_to_string( - vq->chase_reply->security)); - break; - - case VAL_CLASS_NODATA: - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a nodata response"); - validate_nodata_response(qstate->env, ve, - &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry); - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(nodata): %s", - sec_status_to_string( - vq->chase_reply->security)); - break; - - case VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR: - rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(vq->orig_msg->rep->flags); - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a nxdomain response"); - validate_nameerror_response(qstate->env, ve, - &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry, &rcode); - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(nxdomain): %s", - sec_status_to_string( - vq->chase_reply->security)); - FLAGS_SET_RCODE(vq->orig_msg->rep->flags, rcode); - FLAGS_SET_RCODE(vq->chase_reply->flags, rcode); - break; - - case VAL_CLASS_CNAME: - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a cname response"); - validate_cname_response(qstate->env, ve, - &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry); - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(cname): %s", - sec_status_to_string( - vq->chase_reply->security)); - break; - - case VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER: - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a cname noanswer " - "response"); - validate_cname_noanswer_response(qstate->env, ve, - &vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry); - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(cname_noanswer): %s", - sec_status_to_string( - vq->chase_reply->security)); - break; - - case VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL: - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a referral response"); - validate_referral_response(vq->chase_reply); - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(referral): %s", - sec_status_to_string( - vq->chase_reply->security)); - break; - - case VAL_CLASS_ANY: - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a positive ANY " - "response"); - validate_any_response(qstate->env, ve, &vq->qchase, - vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry); - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(positive_any): %s", - sec_status_to_string( - vq->chase_reply->security)); - break; - - default: - log_err("validate: unhandled response subtype: %d", - subtype); - } - if(vq->chase_reply->security == sec_status_bogus) { - if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE) - errinf(qstate, "wildcard"); - else errinf(qstate, val_classification_to_string(subtype)); - errinf(qstate, "proof failed"); - errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin); - } - - return 1; -} - -/** - * Init DLV check. - * DLV is going to be decommissioned, but the code is still here for some time. - * - * Called when a query is determined by other trust anchors to be insecure - * (or indeterminate). Then we look if there is a key in the DLV. - * Performs aggressive negative cache check to see if there is no key. - * Otherwise, spawns a DLV query, and changes to the DLV wait state. - * - * @param qstate: query state. - * @param vq: validator query state. - * @param ve: validator shared global environment. - * @param id: module id. - * @return true if there is no DLV. - * false: processing is finished for the validator operate(). - * This function may exit in three ways: - * o no DLV (aggressive cache), so insecure. (true) - * o error - stop processing (false) - * o DLV lookup was started, stop processing (false) - */ -static int -val_dlv_init(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, - struct val_env* ve, int id) -{ - uint8_t* nm; - size_t nm_len; - /* there must be a DLV configured */ - log_assert(qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor); - /* this bool is true to avoid looping in the DLV checks */ - log_assert(vq->dlv_checked); - - /* init the DLV lookup variables */ - vq->dlv_lookup_name = NULL; - vq->dlv_lookup_name_len = 0; - vq->dlv_insecure_at = NULL; - vq->dlv_insecure_at_len = 0; - - /* Determine the name for which we want to lookup DLV. - * This name is for the current message, or - * for the current RRset for CNAME, referral subtypes. - * If there is a signer, use that, otherwise the domain name */ - if(vq->signer_name) { - nm = vq->signer_name; - nm_len = vq->signer_len; - } else { - /* use qchase */ - nm = vq->qchase.qname; - nm_len = vq->qchase.qname_len; - if(vq->qchase.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS) - dname_remove_label(&nm, &nm_len); - } - log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "DLV init look", nm, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, - vq->qchase.qclass); - log_assert(nm && nm_len); - /* sanity check: no DLV lookups below the DLV anchor itself. - * Like, an securely insecure delegation there makes no sense. */ - if(dname_subdomain_c(nm, qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name)) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DLV lookup within DLV repository denied"); - return 1; - } - /* concat name (minus root label) + dlv name */ - vq->dlv_lookup_name_len = nm_len - 1 + - qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->namelen; - vq->dlv_lookup_name = regional_alloc(qstate->region, - vq->dlv_lookup_name_len); - if(!vq->dlv_lookup_name) { - log_err("Out of memory preparing DLV lookup"); - return val_error(qstate, id); - } - memmove(vq->dlv_lookup_name, nm, nm_len-1); - memmove(vq->dlv_lookup_name+nm_len-1, - qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name, - qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->namelen); - log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "DLV name", vq->dlv_lookup_name, - LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV, vq->qchase.qclass); - - /* determine where the insecure point was determined, the DLV must - * be equal or below that to continue building the trust chain - * down. May be NULL if no trust chain was built yet */ - nm = NULL; - if(vq->key_entry && key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) { - nm = vq->key_entry->name; - nm_len = vq->key_entry->namelen; - } - if(nm) { - vq->dlv_insecure_at_len = nm_len - 1 + - qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->namelen; - vq->dlv_insecure_at = regional_alloc(qstate->region, - vq->dlv_insecure_at_len); - if(!vq->dlv_insecure_at) { - log_err("Out of memory preparing DLV lookup"); - return val_error(qstate, id); - } - memmove(vq->dlv_insecure_at, nm, nm_len-1); - memmove(vq->dlv_insecure_at+nm_len-1, - qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name, - qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->namelen); - log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "insecure_at", - vq->dlv_insecure_at, 0, vq->qchase.qclass); - } - - /* If we can find the name in the aggressive negative cache, - * give up; insecure is the answer */ - while(val_neg_dlvlookup(ve->neg_cache, vq->dlv_lookup_name, - vq->dlv_lookup_name_len, vq->qchase.qclass, - qstate->env->rrset_cache, *qstate->env->now)) { - /* go up */ - dname_remove_label(&vq->dlv_lookup_name, - &vq->dlv_lookup_name_len); - /* too high? */ - if(!dname_subdomain_c(vq->dlv_lookup_name, - qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name)) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "ask above dlv repo"); - return 1; /* Above the repo is insecure */ - } - /* above chain of trust? */ - if(vq->dlv_insecure_at && !dname_subdomain_c( - vq->dlv_lookup_name, vq->dlv_insecure_at)) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "ask above insecure endpoint"); - return 1; - } - } - - /* perform a lookup for the DLV; with validation */ - vq->state = VAL_DLVLOOKUP_STATE; - if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->dlv_lookup_name, - vq->dlv_lookup_name_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV, - vq->qchase.qclass, 0)) { - return val_error(qstate, id); - } - - /* Find the closest encloser DLV from the repository. - * then that is used to build another chain of trust - * This may first require a query 'too low' that has NSECs in - * the answer, from which we determine the closest encloser DLV. - * When determine the closest encloser, skip empty nonterminals, - * since we want a nonempty node in the DLV repository. */ - - return 0; -} - -/** - * The Finished state. The validation status (good or bad) has been determined. - * - * @param qstate: query state. - * @param vq: validator query state. - * @param ve: validator shared global environment. - * @param id: module id. - * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if - * not. - */ -static int -processFinished(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, - struct val_env* ve, int id) -{ - enum val_classification subtype = val_classify_response( - qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo, &vq->qchase, - vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip); - - /* if the result is insecure or indeterminate and we have not - * checked the DLV yet, check the DLV */ - if((vq->chase_reply->security == sec_status_insecure || - vq->chase_reply->security == sec_status_indeterminate) && - qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor && !vq->dlv_checked) { - vq->dlv_checked = 1; - if(!val_dlv_init(qstate, vq, ve, id)) - return 0; - } - - /* store overall validation result in orig_msg */ - if(vq->rrset_skip == 0) - vq->orig_msg->rep->security = vq->chase_reply->security; - else if(subtype != VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL || - vq->rrset_skip < vq->orig_msg->rep->an_numrrsets + - vq->orig_msg->rep->ns_numrrsets) { - /* ignore sec status of additional section if a referral - * type message skips there and - * use the lowest security status as end result. */ - if(vq->chase_reply->security < vq->orig_msg->rep->security) - vq->orig_msg->rep->security = - vq->chase_reply->security; - } - - if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) { - /* for a referral, move to next unchecked rrset and check it*/ - vq->rrset_skip = val_next_unchecked(vq->orig_msg->rep, - vq->rrset_skip); - if(vq->rrset_skip < vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count) { - /* and restart for this rrset */ - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: go to next rrset"); - vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_unchecked; - vq->dlv_checked = 0; /* can do DLV for this RR */ - vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; - return 1; - } - /* referral chase is done */ - } - if(vq->chase_reply->security != sec_status_bogus && - subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) { - /* chase the CNAME; process next part of the message */ - if(!val_chase_cname(&vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, - &vq->rrset_skip)) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: failed to chase CNAME"); - vq->orig_msg->rep->security = sec_status_bogus; - } else { - /* restart process for new qchase at rrset_skip */ - log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: chased to", - &vq->qchase); - vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_unchecked; - vq->dlv_checked = 0; /* can do DLV for this RR */ - vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; - return 1; - } - } - - if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_secure) { - /* If the message is secure, check that all rrsets are - * secure (i.e. some inserted RRset for CNAME chain with - * a different signer name). And drop additional rrsets - * that are not secure (if clean-additional option is set) */ - /* this may cause the msg to be marked bogus */ - val_check_nonsecure(ve, vq->orig_msg->rep); - if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_secure) { - log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validation success", - &qstate->qinfo); - } - } - - /* if the result is bogus - set message ttl to bogus ttl to avoid - * endless bogus revalidation */ - if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_bogus) { - /* see if we can try again to fetch data */ - if(vq->restart_count < VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) { - int restart_count = vq->restart_count+1; - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validation failed, " - "blacklist and retry to fetch data"); - val_blacklist(&qstate->blacklist, qstate->region, - qstate->reply_origin, 0); - qstate->reply_origin = NULL; - qstate->errinf = NULL; - memset(vq, 0, sizeof(*vq)); - vq->restart_count = restart_count; - vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "pass back to next module"); - qstate->ext_state[id] = module_restart_next; - return 0; - } - - vq->orig_msg->rep->ttl = ve->bogus_ttl; - vq->orig_msg->rep->prefetch_ttl = - PREFETCH_TTL_CALC(vq->orig_msg->rep->ttl); - if(qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level >= 1 && - !qstate->env->cfg->val_log_squelch) { - if(qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level < 2) - log_query_info(0, "validation failure", - &qstate->qinfo); - else { - char* err = errinf_to_str(qstate); - if(err) log_info("%s", err); - free(err); - } - } - /* If we are in permissive mode, bogus gets indeterminate */ - if(ve->permissive_mode) - vq->orig_msg->rep->security = sec_status_indeterminate; - } - - /* store results in cache */ - if(qstate->query_flags&BIT_RD) { - /* if secure, this will override cache anyway, no need - * to check if from parentNS */ - if(!qstate->no_cache_store) { - if(!dns_cache_store(qstate->env, &vq->orig_msg->qinfo, - vq->orig_msg->rep, 0, qstate->prefetch_leeway, 0, NULL, - qstate->query_flags)) { - log_err("out of memory caching validator results"); - } - } - } else { - /* for a referral, store the verified RRsets */ - /* and this does not get prefetched, so no leeway */ - if(!dns_cache_store(qstate->env, &vq->orig_msg->qinfo, - vq->orig_msg->rep, 1, 0, 0, NULL, - qstate->query_flags)) { - log_err("out of memory caching validator results"); - } - } - qstate->return_rcode = LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR; - qstate->return_msg = vq->orig_msg; - qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished; - return 0; -} - -/** - * The DLVLookup state. Process DLV lookups. - * - * @param qstate: query state. - * @param vq: validator query state. - * @param ve: validator shared global environment. - * @param id: module id. - * @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if - * not. - */ -static int -processDLVLookup(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, - struct val_env* ve, int id) -{ - /* see if this we are ready to continue normal resolution */ - /* we may need more DLV lookups */ - if(vq->dlv_status==dlv_error) - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DLV woke up with status dlv_error"); - else if(vq->dlv_status==dlv_success) - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DLV woke up with status dlv_success"); - else if(vq->dlv_status==dlv_ask_higher) - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DLV woke up with status dlv_ask_higher"); - else if(vq->dlv_status==dlv_there_is_no_dlv) - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DLV woke up with status dlv_there_is_no_dlv"); - else verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DLV woke up with status unknown"); - - if(vq->dlv_status == dlv_error) { - verbose(VERB_QUERY, "failed DLV lookup"); - return val_error(qstate, id); - } else if(vq->dlv_status == dlv_success) { - uint8_t* nm; - size_t nmlen; - /* chain continues with DNSKEY, continue in FINDKEY */ - vq->state = VAL_FINDKEY_STATE; - - /* strip off the DLV suffix from the name; could result in . */ - log_assert(dname_subdomain_c(vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, - qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name)); - nmlen = vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len - - qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->namelen + 1; - nm = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, - vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, nmlen); - if(!nm) { - log_err("Out of memory in DLVLook"); - return val_error(qstate, id); - } - nm[nmlen-1] = 0; - - vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname = nm; - vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len = nmlen; - - /* create a nullentry for the key so the dnskey lookup - * can be retried after a validation failure for it */ - vq->key_entry = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, - nm, nmlen, vq->qchase.qclass, 0, 0); - if(!vq->key_entry) { - log_err("Out of memory in DLVLook"); - return val_error(qstate, id); - } - - if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, - vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, - vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD)) { - log_err("mem error generating DNSKEY request"); - return val_error(qstate, id); - } - return 0; - } else if(vq->dlv_status == dlv_there_is_no_dlv) { - /* continue with the insecure result we got */ - vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; - return 1; - } - log_assert(vq->dlv_status == dlv_ask_higher); - - /* ask higher, make sure we stay in DLV repo, below dlv_at */ - if(!dname_subdomain_c(vq->dlv_lookup_name, - qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name)) { - /* just like, there is no DLV */ - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "ask above dlv repo"); - vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; - return 1; - } - if(vq->dlv_insecure_at && !dname_subdomain_c(vq->dlv_lookup_name, - vq->dlv_insecure_at)) { - /* already checked a chain lower than dlv_lookup_name */ - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "ask above insecure endpoint"); - log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "enpt", vq->dlv_insecure_at, 0, 0); - vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE; - return 1; - } - - /* check negative cache before making new request */ - if(val_neg_dlvlookup(ve->neg_cache, vq->dlv_lookup_name, - vq->dlv_lookup_name_len, vq->qchase.qclass, - qstate->env->rrset_cache, *qstate->env->now)) { - /* does not exist, go up one (go higher). */ - dname_remove_label(&vq->dlv_lookup_name, - &vq->dlv_lookup_name_len); - /* limit number of labels, limited number of recursion */ - return processDLVLookup(qstate, vq, ve, id); - } - - if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->dlv_lookup_name, - vq->dlv_lookup_name_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV, - vq->qchase.qclass, 0)) { - return val_error(qstate, id); - } - - return 0; -} - -/** - * Handle validator state. - * If a method returns true, the next state is started. If false, then - * processing will stop. - * @param qstate: query state. - * @param vq: validator query state. - * @param ve: validator shared global environment. - * @param id: module id. - */ -static void -val_handle(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, - struct val_env* ve, int id) -{ - int cont = 1; - while(cont) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "val handle processing q with state %s", - val_state_to_string(vq->state)); - switch(vq->state) { - case VAL_INIT_STATE: - cont = processInit(qstate, vq, ve, id); - break; - case VAL_FINDKEY_STATE: - cont = processFindKey(qstate, vq, id); - break; - case VAL_VALIDATE_STATE: - cont = processValidate(qstate, vq, ve, id); - break; - case VAL_FINISHED_STATE: - cont = processFinished(qstate, vq, ve, id); - break; - case VAL_DLVLOOKUP_STATE: - cont = processDLVLookup(qstate, vq, ve, id); - break; - default: - log_warn("validator: invalid state %d", - vq->state); - cont = 0; - break; - } - } -} - -void -val_operate(struct module_qstate* qstate, enum module_ev event, int id, - struct outbound_entry* outbound) -{ - struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; - struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)qstate->minfo[id]; - verbose(VERB_QUERY, "validator[module %d] operate: extstate:%s " - "event:%s", id, strextstate(qstate->ext_state[id]), - strmodulevent(event)); - log_query_info(VERB_QUERY, "validator operate: query", - &qstate->qinfo); - if(vq && qstate->qinfo.qname != vq->qchase.qname) - log_query_info(VERB_QUERY, "validator operate: chased to", - &vq->qchase); - (void)outbound; - if(event == module_event_new || - (event == module_event_pass && vq == NULL)) { - - /* pass request to next module, to get it */ - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: pass to next module"); - qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_module; - return; - } - if(event == module_event_moddone) { - /* check if validation is needed */ - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: nextmodule returned"); - - if(!needs_validation(qstate, qstate->return_rcode, - qstate->return_msg)) { - /* no need to validate this */ - if(qstate->return_msg) - qstate->return_msg->rep->security = - sec_status_indeterminate; - qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished; - return; - } - if(already_validated(qstate->return_msg)) { - qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished; - return; - } - /* qclass ANY should have validation result from spawned - * queries. If we get here, it is bogus or an internal error */ - if(qstate->qinfo.qclass == LDNS_RR_CLASS_ANY) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate classANY: bogus"); - if(qstate->return_msg) - qstate->return_msg->rep->security = - sec_status_bogus; - qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished; - return; - } - /* create state to start validation */ - qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; /* override this */ - if(!vq) { - vq = val_new(qstate, id); - if(!vq) { - log_err("validator: malloc failure"); - qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; - return; - } - } else if(!vq->orig_msg) { - if(!val_new_getmsg(qstate, vq)) { - log_err("validator: malloc failure"); - qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; - return; - } - } - val_handle(qstate, vq, ve, id); - return; - } - if(event == module_event_pass) { - qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; /* override this */ - /* continue processing, since val_env exists */ - val_handle(qstate, vq, ve, id); - return; - } - log_err("validator: bad event %s", strmodulevent(event)); - qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; - return; -} - -/** - * Evaluate the response to a priming request. - * - * @param dnskey_rrset: DNSKEY rrset (can be NULL if none) in prime reply. - * (this rrset is allocated in the wrong region, not the qstate). - * @param ta: trust anchor. - * @param qstate: qstate that needs key. - * @param id: module id. - * @return new key entry or NULL on allocation failure. - * The key entry will either contain a validated DNSKEY rrset, or - * represent a Null key (query failed, but validation did not), or a - * Bad key (validation failed). - */ -static struct key_entry_key* -primeResponseToKE(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, - struct trust_anchor* ta, struct module_qstate* qstate, int id) -{ - struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; - struct key_entry_key* kkey = NULL; - enum sec_status sec = sec_status_unchecked; - char* reason = NULL; - int downprot = qstate->env->cfg->harden_algo_downgrade; - - if(!dnskey_rrset) { - log_nametypeclass(VERB_OPS, "failed to prime trust anchor -- " - "could not fetch DNSKEY rrset", - ta->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass); - if(qstate->env->cfg->harden_dnssec_stripped) { - errinf(qstate, "no DNSKEY rrset"); - kkey = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, ta->name, - ta->namelen, ta->dclass, BOGUS_KEY_TTL, - *qstate->env->now); - } else kkey = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, ta->name, - ta->namelen, ta->dclass, NULL_KEY_TTL, - *qstate->env->now); - if(!kkey) { - log_err("out of memory: allocate fail prime key"); - return NULL; - } - return kkey; - } - /* attempt to verify with trust anchor DS and DNSKEY */ - kkey = val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(qstate->region, qstate->env, ve, - dnskey_rrset, ta->ds_rrset, ta->dnskey_rrset, downprot, - &reason); - if(!kkey) { - log_err("out of memory: verifying prime TA"); - return NULL; - } - if(key_entry_isgood(kkey)) - sec = sec_status_secure; - else - sec = sec_status_bogus; - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate keys with anchor(DS): %s", - sec_status_to_string(sec)); - - if(sec != sec_status_secure) { - log_nametypeclass(VERB_OPS, "failed to prime trust anchor -- " - "DNSKEY rrset is not secure", - ta->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass); - /* NOTE: in this case, we should probably reject the trust - * anchor for longer, perhaps forever. */ - if(qstate->env->cfg->harden_dnssec_stripped) { - errinf(qstate, reason); - kkey = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, ta->name, - ta->namelen, ta->dclass, BOGUS_KEY_TTL, - *qstate->env->now); - } else kkey = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, ta->name, - ta->namelen, ta->dclass, NULL_KEY_TTL, - *qstate->env->now); - if(!kkey) { - log_err("out of memory: allocate null prime key"); - return NULL; - } - return kkey; - } - - log_nametypeclass(VERB_DETAIL, "Successfully primed trust anchor", - ta->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass); - return kkey; -} - -/** - * In inform supers, with the resulting message and rcode and the current - * keyset in the super state, validate the DS response, returning a KeyEntry. - * - * @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DS. - * @param vq: validator query state - * @param id: module id. - * @param rcode: rcode result value. - * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). - * @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info. - * @param ke: the key entry to return. It returns - * is_bad if the DS response fails to validate, is_null if the - * DS response indicated an end to secure space, is_good if the DS - * validated. It returns ke=NULL if the DS response indicated that the - * request wasn't a delegation point. - * @return 0 on servfail error (malloc failure). - */ -static int -ds_response_to_ke(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, - int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo, - struct key_entry_key** ke) -{ - struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; - char* reason = NULL; - enum val_classification subtype; - if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { - char rc[16]; - rc[0]=0; - (void)sldns_wire2str_rcode_buf(rcode, rc, sizeof(rc)); - /* errors here pretty much break validation */ - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS response was error, thus bogus"); - errinf(qstate, rc); - errinf(qstate, "no DS"); - goto return_bogus; - } - - subtype = val_classify_response(BIT_RD, qinfo, qinfo, msg->rep, 0); - if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE) { - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds; - enum sec_status sec; - ds = reply_find_answer_rrset(qinfo, msg->rep); - /* If there was no DS rrset, then we have mis-classified - * this message. */ - if(!ds) { - log_warn("internal error: POSITIVE DS response was " - "missing DS."); - errinf(qstate, "no DS record"); - goto return_bogus; - } - /* Verify only returns BOGUS or SECURE. If the rrset is - * bogus, then we are done. */ - sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(qstate->env, ve, ds, - vq->key_entry, &reason); - if(sec != sec_status_secure) { - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS rrset in DS response did " - "not verify"); - errinf(qstate, reason); - goto return_bogus; - } - - /* If the DS rrset validates, we still have to make sure - * that they are usable. */ - if(!val_dsset_isusable(ds)) { - /* If they aren't usable, then we treat it like - * there was no DS. */ - *ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, - qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, - ub_packed_rrset_ttl(ds), *qstate->env->now); - return (*ke) != NULL; - } - - /* Otherwise, we return the positive response. */ - log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validated DS", qinfo); - *ke = key_entry_create_rrset(qstate->region, - qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, ds, - NULL, *qstate->env->now); - return (*ke) != NULL; - } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NODATA || - subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR) { - /* NODATA means that the qname exists, but that there was - * no DS. This is a pretty normal case. */ - time_t proof_ttl = 0; - enum sec_status sec; - - /* make sure there are NSECs or NSEC3s with signatures */ - if(!val_has_signed_nsecs(msg->rep, &reason)) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "no NSECs: %s", reason); - errinf(qstate, reason); - goto return_bogus; - } - - /* For subtype Name Error. - * attempt ANS 2.8.1.0 compatibility where it sets rcode - * to nxdomain, but really this is an Nodata/Noerror response. - * Find and prove the empty nonterminal in that case */ - - /* Try to prove absence of the DS with NSEC */ - sec = val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply( - qstate->env, ve, qinfo, msg->rep, vq->key_entry, - &proof_ttl, &reason); - switch(sec) { - case sec_status_secure: - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the " - "referral proved no DS."); - *ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, - qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, - qinfo->qclass, proof_ttl, - *qstate->env->now); - return (*ke) != NULL; - case sec_status_insecure: - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the " - "referral proved not a delegation point"); - *ke = NULL; - return 1; - case sec_status_bogus: - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the " - "referral did not prove no DS."); - errinf(qstate, reason); - goto return_bogus; - case sec_status_unchecked: - default: - /* NSEC proof did not work, try next */ - break; - } - - sec = nsec3_prove_nods(qstate->env, ve, - msg->rep->rrsets + msg->rep->an_numrrsets, - msg->rep->ns_numrrsets, qinfo, vq->key_entry, &reason); - switch(sec) { - case sec_status_insecure: - /* case insecure also continues to unsigned - * space. If nsec3-iter-count too high or - * optout, then treat below as unsigned */ - case sec_status_secure: - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC3s for the " - "referral proved no DS."); - *ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, - qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, - qinfo->qclass, proof_ttl, - *qstate->env->now); - return (*ke) != NULL; - case sec_status_indeterminate: - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC3s for the " - "referral proved no delegation"); - *ke = NULL; - return 1; - case sec_status_bogus: - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC3s for the " - "referral did not prove no DS."); - errinf(qstate, reason); - goto return_bogus; - case sec_status_unchecked: - default: - /* NSEC3 proof did not work */ - break; - } - - /* Apparently, no available NSEC/NSEC3 proved NODATA, so - * this is BOGUS. */ - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS %s ran out of options, so return " - "bogus", val_classification_to_string(subtype)); - errinf(qstate, "no DS but also no proof of that"); - goto return_bogus; - } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME || - subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER) { - /* if the CNAME matches the exact name we want and is signed - * properly, then also, we are sure that no DS exists there, - * much like a NODATA proof */ - enum sec_status sec; - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* cname; - cname = reply_find_rrset_section_an(msg->rep, qinfo->qname, - qinfo->qname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME, qinfo->qclass); - if(!cname) { - errinf(qstate, "validator classified CNAME but no " - "CNAME of the queried name for DS"); - goto return_bogus; - } - if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)cname->entry.data)->rrsig_count - == 0) { - if(msg->rep->an_numrrsets != 0 && ntohs(msg->rep-> - rrsets[0]->rk.type)==LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) { - errinf(qstate, "DS got DNAME answer"); - } else { - errinf(qstate, "DS got unsigned CNAME answer"); - } - goto return_bogus; - } - sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(qstate->env, ve, cname, - vq->key_entry, &reason); - if(sec == sec_status_secure) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "CNAME validated, " - "proof that DS does not exist"); - /* and that it is not a referral point */ - *ke = NULL; - return 1; - } - errinf(qstate, "CNAME in DS response was not secure."); - errinf(qstate, reason); - goto return_bogus; - } else { - verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Encountered an unhandled type of " - "DS response, thus bogus."); - errinf(qstate, "no DS and"); - if(FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->rep->flags) != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { - char rc[16]; - rc[0]=0; - (void)sldns_wire2str_rcode_buf((int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE( - msg->rep->flags), rc, sizeof(rc)); - errinf(qstate, rc); - } else errinf(qstate, val_classification_to_string(subtype)); - errinf(qstate, "message fails to prove that"); - goto return_bogus; - } -return_bogus: - *ke = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, qinfo->qname, - qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, - BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *qstate->env->now); - return (*ke) != NULL; -} - -/** - * Process DS response. Called from inform_supers. - * Because it is in inform_supers, the mesh itself is busy doing callbacks - * for a state that is to be deleted soon; don't touch the mesh; instead - * set a state in the super, as the super will be reactivated soon. - * Perform processing to determine what state to set in the super. - * - * @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DS. - * @param vq: validator query state - * @param id: module id. - * @param rcode: rcode result value. - * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). - * @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info. - * @param origin: the origin of msg. - */ -static void -process_ds_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, - int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo, - struct sock_list* origin) -{ - struct key_entry_key* dske = NULL; - uint8_t* olds = vq->empty_DS_name; - vq->empty_DS_name = NULL; - if(!ds_response_to_ke(qstate, vq, id, rcode, msg, qinfo, &dske)) { - log_err("malloc failure in process_ds_response"); - vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */ - vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; - return; - } - if(dske == NULL) { - vq->empty_DS_name = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, - qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len); - if(!vq->empty_DS_name) { - log_err("malloc failure in empty_DS_name"); - vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */ - vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; - return; - } - vq->empty_DS_len = qinfo->qname_len; - vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; - /* ds response indicated that we aren't on a delegation point. - * Keep the forState.state on FINDKEY. */ - } else if(key_entry_isgood(dske)) { - vq->ds_rrset = key_entry_get_rrset(dske, qstate->region); - if(!vq->ds_rrset) { - log_err("malloc failure in process DS"); - vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */ - vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; - return; - } - vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; /* fresh blacklist for next part*/ - /* Keep the forState.state on FINDKEY. */ - } else if(key_entry_isbad(dske) - && vq->restart_count < VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) { - vq->empty_DS_name = olds; - val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region, origin, 1); - qstate->errinf = NULL; - vq->restart_count++; - } else { - if(key_entry_isbad(dske)) { - errinf_origin(qstate, origin); - errinf_dname(qstate, "for DS", qinfo->qname); - } - /* NOTE: the reason for the DS to be not good (that is, - * either bad or null) should have been logged by - * dsResponseToKE. */ - vq->key_entry = dske; - /* The FINDKEY phase has ended, so move on. */ - vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; - } -} - -/** - * Process DNSKEY response. Called from inform_supers. - * Sets the key entry in the state. - * Because it is in inform_supers, the mesh itself is busy doing callbacks - * for a state that is to be deleted soon; don't touch the mesh; instead - * set a state in the super, as the super will be reactivated soon. - * Perform processing to determine what state to set in the super. - * - * @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DNSKEY. - * @param vq: validator query state - * @param id: module id. - * @param rcode: rcode result value. - * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). - * @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info. - * @param origin: the origin of msg. - */ -static void -process_dnskey_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, - int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo, - struct sock_list* origin) -{ - struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; - struct key_entry_key* old = vq->key_entry; - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey = NULL; - int downprot; - char* reason = NULL; - - if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) - dnskey = reply_find_answer_rrset(qinfo, msg->rep); - - if(dnskey == NULL) { - /* bad response */ - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Missing DNSKEY RRset in response to " - "DNSKEY query."); - if(vq->restart_count < VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) { - val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region, - origin, 1); - qstate->errinf = NULL; - vq->restart_count++; - return; - } - vq->key_entry = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, - qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, - BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *qstate->env->now); - if(!vq->key_entry) { - log_err("alloc failure in missing dnskey response"); - /* key_entry is NULL for failure in Validate */ - } - errinf(qstate, "No DNSKEY record"); - errinf_origin(qstate, origin); - errinf_dname(qstate, "for key", qinfo->qname); - vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; - return; - } - if(!vq->ds_rrset) { - log_err("internal error: no DS rrset for new DNSKEY response"); - vq->key_entry = NULL; - vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; - return; - } - downprot = qstate->env->cfg->harden_algo_downgrade; - vq->key_entry = val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(qstate->region, qstate->env, - ve, dnskey, vq->ds_rrset, downprot, &reason); - - if(!vq->key_entry) { - log_err("out of memory in verify new DNSKEYs"); - vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; - return; - } - /* If the key entry isBad or isNull, then we can move on to the next - * state. */ - if(!key_entry_isgood(vq->key_entry)) { - if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) { - if(vq->restart_count < VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) { - val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, - qstate->region, origin, 1); - qstate->errinf = NULL; - vq->restart_count++; - vq->key_entry = old; - return; - } - verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Did not match a DS to a DNSKEY, " - "thus bogus."); - errinf(qstate, reason); - errinf_origin(qstate, origin); - errinf_dname(qstate, "for key", qinfo->qname); - } - vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; - vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; - return; - } - vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; - qstate->errinf = NULL; - - /* The DNSKEY validated, so cache it as a trusted key rrset. */ - key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry, qstate); - - /* If good, we stay in the FINDKEY state. */ - log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validated DNSKEY", qinfo); -} - -/** - * Process prime response - * Sets the key entry in the state. - * - * @param qstate: query state that is validating and primed a trust anchor. - * @param vq: validator query state - * @param id: module id. - * @param rcode: rcode result value. - * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). - * @param origin: the origin of msg. - */ -static void -process_prime_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, - int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct sock_list* origin) -{ - struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; - struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset = NULL; - struct trust_anchor* ta = anchor_find(qstate->env->anchors, - vq->trust_anchor_name, vq->trust_anchor_labs, - vq->trust_anchor_len, vq->qchase.qclass); - if(!ta) { - /* trust anchor revoked, restart with less anchors */ - vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; - if(!vq->trust_anchor_name) - vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; /* break a loop */ - vq->trust_anchor_name = NULL; - return; - } - /* Fetch and validate the keyEntry that corresponds to the - * current trust anchor. */ - if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { - dnskey_rrset = reply_find_rrset_section_an(msg->rep, - ta->name, ta->namelen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, - ta->dclass); - } - if(ta->autr) { - if(!autr_process_prime(qstate->env, ve, ta, dnskey_rrset)) { - /* trust anchor revoked, restart with less anchors */ - vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; - vq->trust_anchor_name = NULL; - return; - } - } - vq->key_entry = primeResponseToKE(dnskey_rrset, ta, qstate, id); - lock_basic_unlock(&ta->lock); - if(vq->key_entry) { - if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry) - && vq->restart_count < VAL_MAX_RESTART_COUNT) { - val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region, - origin, 1); - qstate->errinf = NULL; - vq->restart_count++; - vq->key_entry = NULL; - vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE; - return; - } - vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; - errinf_origin(qstate, origin); - errinf_dname(qstate, "for trust anchor", ta->name); - /* store the freshly primed entry in the cache */ - key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry, qstate); - } - - /* If the result of the prime is a null key, skip the FINDKEY state.*/ - if(!vq->key_entry || key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry) || - key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) { - vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; - } - /* the qstate will be reactivated after inform_super is done */ -} - -/** - * Process DLV response. Called from inform_supers. - * Because it is in inform_supers, the mesh itself is busy doing callbacks - * for a state that is to be deleted soon; don't touch the mesh; instead - * set a state in the super, as the super will be reactivated soon. - * Perform processing to determine what state to set in the super. - * - * @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DLV. - * @param vq: validator query state - * @param id: module id. - * @param rcode: rcode result value. - * @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK). - * @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info. - */ -static void -process_dlv_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, - int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo) -{ - struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id]; - - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "process dlv response to super"); - if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { - /* lookup failed, set in vq to give up */ - vq->dlv_status = dlv_error; - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "response is error"); - return; - } - if(msg->rep->security != sec_status_secure) { - vq->dlv_status = dlv_error; - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "response is not secure, %s", - sec_status_to_string(msg->rep->security)); - return; - } - /* was the lookup a success? validated DLV? */ - if(FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->rep->flags) == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && - msg->rep->an_numrrsets == 1 && - msg->rep->security == sec_status_secure && - ntohs(msg->rep->rrsets[0]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV && - ntohs(msg->rep->rrsets[0]->rk.rrset_class) == qinfo->qclass && - query_dname_compare(msg->rep->rrsets[0]->rk.dname, - vq->dlv_lookup_name) == 0) { - /* yay! it is just like a DS */ - vq->ds_rrset = (struct ub_packed_rrset_key*) - regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, - msg->rep->rrsets[0], sizeof(*vq->ds_rrset)); - if(!vq->ds_rrset) { - log_err("out of memory in process_dlv"); - return; - } - vq->ds_rrset->entry.key = vq->ds_rrset; - vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname = (uint8_t*)regional_alloc_init( - qstate->region, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, - vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len); - if(!vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname) { - log_err("out of memory in process_dlv"); - vq->dlv_status = dlv_error; - return; - } - vq->ds_rrset->entry.data = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, - vq->ds_rrset->entry.data, - packed_rrset_sizeof(vq->ds_rrset->entry.data)); - if(!vq->ds_rrset->entry.data) { - log_err("out of memory in process_dlv"); - vq->dlv_status = dlv_error; - return; - } - packed_rrset_ptr_fixup(vq->ds_rrset->entry.data); - /* make vq do a DNSKEY query next up */ - vq->dlv_status = dlv_success; - return; - } - /* store NSECs into negative cache */ - val_neg_addreply(ve->neg_cache, msg->rep); - - /* was the lookup a failure? - * if we have to go up into the DLV for a higher DLV anchor - * then set this in the vq, so it can make queries when activated. - * See if the NSECs indicate that we should look for higher DLV - * or, that there is no DLV securely */ - if(!val_nsec_check_dlv(qinfo, msg->rep, &vq->dlv_lookup_name, - &vq->dlv_lookup_name_len)) { - vq->dlv_status = dlv_error; - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "nsec error"); - return; - } - if(!dname_subdomain_c(vq->dlv_lookup_name, - qstate->env->anchors->dlv_anchor->name)) { - vq->dlv_status = dlv_there_is_no_dlv; - return; - } - vq->dlv_status = dlv_ask_higher; -} - -/* - * inform validator super. - * - * @param qstate: query state that finished. - * @param id: module id. - * @param super: the qstate to inform. - */ -void -val_inform_super(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id, - struct module_qstate* super) -{ - struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)super->minfo[id]; - log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: inform_super, sub is", - &qstate->qinfo); - log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "super is", &super->qinfo); - if(!vq) { - verbose(VERB_ALGO, "super: has no validator state"); - return; - } - if(vq->wait_prime_ta) { - vq->wait_prime_ta = 0; - process_prime_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode, - qstate->return_msg, qstate->reply_origin); - return; - } - if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS) { - process_ds_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode, - qstate->return_msg, &qstate->qinfo, - qstate->reply_origin); - return; - } else if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY) { - process_dnskey_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode, - qstate->return_msg, &qstate->qinfo, - qstate->reply_origin); - return; - } else if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DLV) { - process_dlv_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode, - qstate->return_msg, &qstate->qinfo); - return; - } - log_err("internal error in validator: no inform_supers possible"); -} - -void -val_clear(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id) -{ - if(!qstate) - return; - /* everything is allocated in the region, so assign NULL */ - qstate->minfo[id] = NULL; -} - -size_t -val_get_mem(struct module_env* env, int id) -{ - struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)env->modinfo[id]; - if(!ve) - return 0; - return sizeof(*ve) + key_cache_get_mem(ve->kcache) + - val_neg_get_mem(ve->neg_cache) + - sizeof(size_t)*2*ve->nsec3_keyiter_count; -} - -/** - * The validator function block - */ -static struct module_func_block val_block = { - "validator", - &val_init, &val_deinit, &val_operate, &val_inform_super, &val_clear, - &val_get_mem -}; - -struct module_func_block* -val_get_funcblock(void) -{ - return &val_block; -} - -const char* -val_state_to_string(enum val_state state) -{ - switch(state) { - case VAL_INIT_STATE: return "VAL_INIT_STATE"; - case VAL_FINDKEY_STATE: return "VAL_FINDKEY_STATE"; - case VAL_VALIDATE_STATE: return "VAL_VALIDATE_STATE"; - case VAL_FINISHED_STATE: return "VAL_FINISHED_STATE"; - case VAL_DLVLOOKUP_STATE: return "VAL_DLVLOOKUP_STATE"; - } - return "UNKNOWN VALIDATOR STATE"; -} - |