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| -rw-r--r-- | ANONYMITY_NETWORKS.md | 46 |
1 files changed, 29 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/ANONYMITY_NETWORKS.md b/ANONYMITY_NETWORKS.md index cb0e378c3..3337b5fc3 100644 --- a/ANONYMITY_NETWORKS.md +++ b/ANONYMITY_NETWORKS.md @@ -46,8 +46,10 @@ Connecting to an anonymous address requires the command line option `--tx-proxy` which tells `monerod` the ip/port of a socks proxy provided by a separate process. On most systems the configuration will look like: -> `--tx-proxy tor,127.0.0.1:9050,10` -> `--tx-proxy i2p,127.0.0.1:9000` +``` +--tx-proxy tor,127.0.0.1:9050,10 +--tx-proxy i2p,127.0.0.1:9000 +``` which tells `monerod` that ".onion" p2p addresses can be forwarded to a socks proxy at IP 127.0.0.1 port 9050 with a max of 10 outgoing connections and @@ -55,12 +57,14 @@ proxy at IP 127.0.0.1 port 9050 with a max of 10 outgoing connections and 9000 with the default max outgoing connections. Since there are no seed nodes for anonymity connections, peers must be manually specified: -> `--add-exclusive-node rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion:28083` -> `--add-peer rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion:28083` +``` +--add-exclusive-node rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion:28083 +--add-peer rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion:28083 +``` Either option can be listed multiple times, and can specify any mix of Tor, I2P, and IPv4 addresses. Using `--add-exclusive-node` will prevent the usage of -seed nodes on ALL networks, which will typically be undesireable. +seed nodes on ALL networks, which will typically be undesirable. ### Inbound Connections @@ -68,8 +72,10 @@ Receiving anonymity connections is done through the option `--anonymous-inbound`. This option tells `monerod` the inbound address, network type, and max connections: -> `--anonymous-inbound rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion:28083,127.0.0.1:28083,25` -> `--anonymous-inbound cmeua5767mz2q5jsaelk2rxhf67agrwuetaso5dzbenyzwlbkg2q.b32.i2p:5000,127.0.0.1:30000` +``` +--anonymous-inbound rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion:28083,127.0.0.1:28083,25 +--anonymous-inbound cmeua5767mz2q5jsaelk2rxhf67agrwuetaso5dzbenyzwlbkg2q.b32.i2p:5000,127.0.0.1:30000 +``` which tells `monerod` that a max of 25 inbound Tor connections are being received at address "rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion:28083" and forwarded to `monerod` @@ -87,12 +93,16 @@ P2P anonymity connections. The anonymity network (Tor/i2p) is [configured in the same manner](#configuration), except the localhost port must be the RPC port (typically 18081 for mainnet) instead of the p2p port: -> HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/data/monero -> HiddenServicePort 18081 127.0.0.1:18081 +``` +HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/data/monero +HiddenServicePort 18081 127.0.0.1:18081 +``` Then the wallet will be configured to use a Tor/i2p address: -> `--proxy 127.0.0.1:9050` -> `--daemon-address rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion` +``` +--proxy 127.0.0.1:9050 +--daemon-address rveahdfho7wo4b2m.onion +``` The proxy must match the address type - a Tor proxy will not work properly with i2p addresses, etc. @@ -125,8 +135,10 @@ can distribute the address to its other peers. Tor must be configured for hidden services. An example configuration ("torrc") might look like: -> HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/data/monero -> HiddenServicePort 28083 127.0.0.1:28083 +``` +HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/data/monero +HiddenServicePort 28083 127.0.0.1:28083 +``` This will store key information in `/var/lib/tor/data/monero` and will forward "Tor port" 28083 to port 28083 of ip 127.0.0.1. The file @@ -170,7 +182,7 @@ be used by an ISP to link a user to a transaction. Run `monerod` as often as possible to conceal when transactions are being sent. Future versions will also have peers that first receive a transaction over an anonymity network delay the broadcast to public peers by a randomized amount. -This will not completetely mitigate a user who syncs up sends then quits, in +This will not completely mitigate a user who syncs up sends then quits, in part because this rule is not enforceable, so this mitigation strategy is simply a best effort attempt. @@ -183,9 +195,9 @@ the connections are not circuit based. #### Mitigation -The best mitigiation is to use I2P instead of Tor. However, I2P +The best mitigation is to use I2P instead of Tor. However, I2P has a smaller set of users (less cover traffic) and academic reviews, so there -is a tradeoff in potential isses. Also, anyone attempting this strategy really +is a trade off in potential issues. Also, anyone attempting this strategy really wants to uncover a user, it seems unlikely that this would be performed against every Tor/I2P user. @@ -213,7 +225,7 @@ key identity. @secparam (twitter) recommended changing circuits (Tor) as an additional precaution. This is likely not a good idea - forcibly requesting Tor to change circuits is observable by the ISP. Instead, `monerod` should likely disconnect -from peers ocassionally. Tor will rotate circuits every ~10 minutes, so +from peers occasionally. Tor will rotate circuits every ~10 minutes, so establishing new connections will use a new public key identity and make it more difficult for the hidden service to link information. This process will have to be done carefully because closing/reconnecting connections can also |