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-rw-r--r--.gitignore2
-rw-r--r--src/cryptonote_config.h2
-rw-r--r--src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt6
-rw-r--r--src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.cc1135
-rw-r--r--src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.h49
-rw-r--r--src/ringct/rctTypes.h33
-rw-r--r--tests/performance_tests/CMakeLists.txt1
-rw-r--r--tests/performance_tests/bulletproof_plus.h100
-rw-r--r--tests/performance_tests/main.cpp21
-rw-r--r--tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt1
-rw-r--r--tests/unit_tests/bulletproofs_plus.cpp169
11 files changed, 1517 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 049fc2562..cf7da3a04 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -110,3 +110,5 @@ nbproject
/testnet
__pycache__/
+*.pyc
+*.log
diff --git a/src/cryptonote_config.h b/src/cryptonote_config.h
index b738960a3..b2919ac20 100644
--- a/src/cryptonote_config.h
+++ b/src/cryptonote_config.h
@@ -221,6 +221,8 @@ namespace config
// Hash domain separators
const char HASH_KEY_BULLETPROOF_EXPONENT[] = "bulletproof";
+ const char HASH_KEY_BULLETPROOF_PLUS_EXPONENT[] = "bulletproof_plus";
+ const char HASH_KEY_BULLETPROOF_PLUS_TRANSCRIPT[] = "bulletproof_plus_transcript";
const char HASH_KEY_RINGDB[] = "ringdsb";
const char HASH_KEY_SUBADDRESS[] = "SubAddr";
const unsigned char HASH_KEY_ENCRYPTED_PAYMENT_ID = 0x8d;
diff --git a/src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt b/src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt
index 40b2dfd55..32da0f5f5 100644
--- a/src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/src/ringct/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -31,13 +31,15 @@ set(ringct_basic_sources
rctTypes.cpp
rctCryptoOps.c
multiexp.cc
- bulletproofs.cc)
+ bulletproofs.cc
+ bulletproofs_plus.cc)
set(ringct_basic_private_headers
rctOps.h
rctTypes.h
multiexp.h
- bulletproofs.h)
+ bulletproofs.h
+ bulletproofs_plus.h)
monero_private_headers(ringct_basic
${crypto_private_headers})
diff --git a/src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.cc b/src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.cc
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5a286ed90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,1135 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2017-2020, The Monero Project
+//
+// All rights reserved.
+//
+// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
+// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+//
+// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
+// conditions and the following disclaimer.
+//
+// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
+// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
+// materials provided with the distribution.
+//
+// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
+// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
+// prior written permission.
+//
+// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
+// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
+// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+// Implements the Bulletproofs+ prover and verifier algorithms
+//
+// Preprint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/735, version 17 Jun 2020
+//
+// NOTE ON NOTATION:
+// In the signature constructions used in Monero, commitments to zero are treated as
+// public keys against the curve group generator `G`. This means that amount
+// commitments must use another generator `H` for values in order to show balance.
+// The result is that the roles of `g` and `h` in the preprint are effectively swapped
+// in this code, taking on the roles of `H` and `G`, respectively. Read carefully!
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <boost/thread/mutex.hpp>
+#include <boost/thread/lock_guard.hpp>
+#include "misc_log_ex.h"
+#include "span.h"
+#include "cryptonote_config.h"
+extern "C"
+{
+#include "crypto/crypto-ops.h"
+}
+#include "rctOps.h"
+#include "multiexp.h"
+#include "bulletproofs_plus.h"
+
+#undef MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY
+#define MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY "bulletproof_plus"
+
+#define STRAUS_SIZE_LIMIT 232
+#define PIPPENGER_SIZE_LIMIT 0
+
+namespace rct
+{
+ // Vector functions
+ static rct::key vector_exponent(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b);
+ static rct::keyV vector_of_scalar_powers(const rct::key &x, size_t n);
+
+ // Proof bounds
+ static constexpr size_t maxN = 64; // maximum number of bits in range
+ static constexpr size_t maxM = BULLETPROOF_MAX_OUTPUTS; // maximum number of outputs to aggregate into a single proof
+
+ // Cached public generators
+ static rct::key Hi[maxN*maxM], Gi[maxN*maxM];
+ static ge_p3 Hi_p3[maxN*maxM], Gi_p3[maxN*maxM];
+ static std::shared_ptr<straus_cached_data> straus_HiGi_cache;
+ static std::shared_ptr<pippenger_cached_data> pippenger_HiGi_cache;
+
+ // Useful scalar constants
+ static const rct::key ZERO = { {0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 } }; // 0
+ static const rct::key ONE = { {0x01, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 } }; // 1
+ static const rct::key TWO = { {0x02, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 , 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,0x00 } }; // 2
+ static const rct::key MINUS_ONE = { { 0xec, 0xd3, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x1a, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0xa2, 0xde, 0xf9, 0xde, 0x14, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10 } }; // -1
+ static const rct::key MINUS_INV_EIGHT = { { 0x74, 0xa4, 0x19, 0x7a, 0xf0, 0x7d, 0x0b, 0xf7, 0x05, 0xc2, 0xda, 0x25, 0x2b, 0x5c, 0x0b, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a } }; // -(8**(-1))
+ static rct::key TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE; // 2**64 - 1
+
+ static boost::mutex init_mutex;
+
+ // Use the generator caches to compute a multiscalar multiplication
+ static inline rct::key multiexp(const std::vector<MultiexpData> &data, size_t HiGi_size)
+ {
+ if (HiGi_size > 0)
+ {
+ static_assert(232 <= STRAUS_SIZE_LIMIT, "Straus in precalc mode can only be calculated till STRAUS_SIZE_LIMIT");
+ return HiGi_size <= 232 && data.size() == HiGi_size ? straus(data, straus_HiGi_cache, 0) : pippenger(data, pippenger_HiGi_cache, HiGi_size, get_pippenger_c(data.size()));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return data.size() <= 95 ? straus(data, NULL, 0) : pippenger(data, NULL, 0, get_pippenger_c(data.size()));
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Confirm that a scalar is properly reduced
+ static inline bool is_reduced(const rct::key &scalar)
+ {
+ return sc_check(scalar.bytes) == 0;
+ }
+
+ // Use hashed values to produce indexed public generators
+ static rct::key get_exponent(const rct::key &base, size_t idx)
+ {
+ static const std::string domain_separator(config::HASH_KEY_BULLETPROOF_PLUS_EXPONENT);
+ std::string hashed = std::string((const char*)base.bytes, sizeof(base)) + domain_separator + tools::get_varint_data(idx);
+ rct::key generator;
+ ge_p3 generator_p3;
+ rct::hash_to_p3(generator_p3, rct::hash2rct(crypto::cn_fast_hash(hashed.data(), hashed.size())));
+ ge_p3_tobytes(generator.bytes, &generator_p3);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!(generator == rct::identity()), "Exponent is point at infinity");
+ return generator;
+ }
+
+ // Construct public generators
+ static void init_exponents()
+ {
+ boost::lock_guard<boost::mutex> lock(init_mutex);
+
+ // Only needs to be done once
+ static bool init_done = false;
+ if (init_done)
+ return;
+
+ std::vector<MultiexpData> data;
+ data.reserve(maxN*maxM*2);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < maxN*maxM; ++i)
+ {
+ Hi[i] = get_exponent(rct::H, i * 2);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(ge_frombytes_vartime(&Hi_p3[i], Hi[i].bytes) == 0, "ge_frombytes_vartime failed");
+ Gi[i] = get_exponent(rct::H, i * 2 + 1);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(ge_frombytes_vartime(&Gi_p3[i], Gi[i].bytes) == 0, "ge_frombytes_vartime failed");
+
+ data.push_back({rct::zero(), Gi_p3[i]});
+ data.push_back({rct::zero(), Hi_p3[i]});
+ }
+
+ straus_HiGi_cache = straus_init_cache(data, STRAUS_SIZE_LIMIT);
+ pippenger_HiGi_cache = pippenger_init_cache(data, 0, PIPPENGER_SIZE_LIMIT);
+
+ // Compute 2**64 - 1 for later use in simplifying verification
+ TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE = TWO;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 6; i++)
+ {
+ sc_mul(TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE.bytes, TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE.bytes, TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE.bytes);
+ }
+ sc_sub(TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE.bytes, TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE.bytes, ONE.bytes);
+
+ init_done = true;
+ }
+
+ // Given two scalar arrays, construct a vector pre-commitment:
+ //
+ // a = (a_0, ..., a_{n-1})
+ // b = (b_0, ..., b_{n-1})
+ //
+ // Outputs a_0*Gi_0 + ... + a_{n-1}*Gi_{n-1} +
+ // b_0*Hi_0 + ... + b_{n-1}*Hi_{n-1}
+ static rct::key vector_exponent(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() <= maxN*maxM, "Incompatible sizes of a and maxN");
+
+ std::vector<MultiexpData> multiexp_data;
+ multiexp_data.reserve(a.size()*2);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(a[i], Gi_p3[i]);
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(b[i], Hi_p3[i]);
+ }
+ return multiexp(multiexp_data, 2 * a.size());
+ }
+
+ // Helper function used to compute the L and R terms used in the inner-product round function
+ static rct::key compute_LR(size_t size, const rct::key &y, const std::vector<ge_p3> &G, size_t G0, const std::vector<ge_p3> &H, size_t H0, const rct::keyV &a, size_t a0, const rct::keyV &b, size_t b0, const rct::key &c, const rct::key &d)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(size + G0 <= G.size(), "Incompatible size for G");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(size + H0 <= H.size(), "Incompatible size for H");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(size + a0 <= a.size(), "Incompatible size for a");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(size + b0 <= b.size(), "Incompatible size for b");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(size <= maxN*maxM, "size is too large");
+
+ std::vector<MultiexpData> multiexp_data;
+ multiexp_data.resize(size*2 + 2);
+ rct::key temp;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < size; ++i)
+ {
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, a[a0+i].bytes, y.bytes);
+ sc_mul(multiexp_data[i*2].scalar.bytes, temp.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ multiexp_data[i*2].point = G[G0+i];
+
+ sc_mul(multiexp_data[i*2+1].scalar.bytes, b[b0+i].bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ multiexp_data[i*2+1].point = H[H0+i];
+ }
+
+ sc_mul(multiexp_data[2*size].scalar.bytes, c.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ ge_p3 H_p3;
+ ge_frombytes_vartime(&H_p3, rct::H.bytes);
+ multiexp_data[2*size].point = H_p3;
+
+ sc_mul(multiexp_data[2*size+1].scalar.bytes, d.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ ge_p3 G_p3;
+ ge_frombytes_vartime(&G_p3, rct::G.bytes);
+ multiexp_data[2*size+1].point = G_p3;
+
+ return multiexp(multiexp_data, 0);
+ }
+
+ // Given a scalar, construct a vector of its powers:
+ //
+ // Output (1,x,x**2,...,x**{n-1})
+ static rct::keyV vector_of_scalar_powers(const rct::key &x, size_t n)
+ {
+ rct::keyV res(n);
+ if (n == 0)
+ return res;
+ res[0] = rct::identity();
+ if (n == 1)
+ return res;
+ res[1] = x;
+ for (size_t i = 2; i < n; ++i)
+ {
+ sc_mul(res[i].bytes, res[i-1].bytes, x.bytes);
+ }
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ // Given a scalar, construct the sum of its powers from 2 to n (where n is a power of 2):
+ //
+ // Output x**2 + x**4 + x**6 + ... + x**n
+ static rct::key sum_of_even_powers(const rct::key &x, size_t n)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES((n & (n - 1)) == 0, "Need n to be a power of 2");
+
+ rct::key x1 = copy(x);
+ sc_mul(x1.bytes, x1.bytes, x1.bytes);
+
+ rct::key res = copy(x1);
+ while (n > 2)
+ {
+ sc_muladd(res.bytes, x1.bytes, res.bytes, res.bytes);
+ sc_mul(x1.bytes, x1.bytes, x1.bytes);
+ n /= 2;
+ }
+
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ // Given a scalar, return the sum of its powers from 1 to n
+ //
+ // Output x**1 + x**2 + x**3 + ... + x**n
+ static rct::key sum_of_scalar_powers(const rct::key &x, size_t n)
+ {
+ rct::key res = ONE;
+ if (n == 1)
+ return res;
+
+ n += 1;
+ rct::key x1 = copy(x);
+
+ const bool is_power_of_2 = (n & (n - 1)) == 0;
+ if (is_power_of_2)
+ {
+ sc_add(res.bytes, res.bytes, x1.bytes);
+ while (n > 2)
+ {
+ sc_mul(x1.bytes, x1.bytes, x1.bytes);
+ sc_muladd(res.bytes, x1.bytes, res.bytes, res.bytes);
+ n /= 2;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ rct::key prev = x1;
+ for (size_t i = 1; i < n; ++i)
+ {
+ if (i > 1)
+ sc_mul(prev.bytes, prev.bytes, x1.bytes);
+ sc_add(res.bytes, res.bytes, prev.bytes);
+ }
+ }
+ sc_sub(res.bytes, res.bytes, ONE.bytes);
+
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ // Given two scalar arrays, construct the weighted inner product against another scalar
+ //
+ // Output a_0*b_0*y**1 + a_1*b_1*y**2 + ... + a_{n-1}*b_{n-1}*y**n
+ static rct::key weighted_inner_product(const epee::span<const rct::key> &a, const epee::span<const rct::key> &b, const rct::key &y)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b");
+ rct::key res = rct::zero();
+ rct::key y_power = ONE;
+ rct::key temp;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, a[i].bytes, b[i].bytes);
+ sc_mul(y_power.bytes, y_power.bytes, y.bytes);
+ sc_muladd(res.bytes, temp.bytes, y_power.bytes, res.bytes);
+ }
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ static rct::key weighted_inner_product(const rct::keyV &a, const epee::span<const rct::key> &b, const rct::key &y)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b");
+ rct::key res = rct::zero();
+ rct::key y_power = ONE;
+ rct::key temp;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, a[i].bytes, b[i].bytes);
+ sc_mul(y_power.bytes, y_power.bytes, y.bytes);
+ sc_muladd(res.bytes, temp.bytes, y_power.bytes, res.bytes);
+ }
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ // Fold inner-product point vectors
+ static void hadamard_fold(std::vector<ge_p3> &v, const rct::key &a, const rct::key &b)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES((v.size() & 1) == 0, "Vector size should be even");
+ const size_t sz = v.size() / 2;
+ for (size_t n = 0; n < sz; ++n)
+ {
+ ge_dsmp c[2];
+ ge_dsm_precomp(c[0], &v[n]);
+ ge_dsm_precomp(c[1], &v[sz + n]);
+ ge_double_scalarmult_precomp_vartime2_p3(&v[n], a.bytes, c[0], b.bytes, c[1]);
+ }
+ v.resize(sz);
+ }
+
+ // Add vectors componentwise
+ static rct::keyV vector_add(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::keyV &b)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(a.size() == b.size(), "Incompatible sizes of a and b");
+ rct::keyV res(a.size());
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ sc_add(res[i].bytes, a[i].bytes, b[i].bytes);
+ }
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ // Add a scalar to all elements of a vector
+ static rct::keyV vector_add(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::key &b)
+ {
+ rct::keyV res(a.size());
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ sc_add(res[i].bytes, a[i].bytes, b.bytes);
+ }
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ // Subtract a scalar from all elements of a vector
+ static rct::keyV vector_subtract(const rct::keyV &a, const rct::key &b)
+ {
+ rct::keyV res(a.size());
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ sc_sub(res[i].bytes, a[i].bytes, b.bytes);
+ }
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ // Multiply a scalar by all elements of a vector
+ static rct::keyV vector_scalar(const epee::span<const rct::key> &a, const rct::key &x)
+ {
+ rct::keyV res(a.size());
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < a.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ sc_mul(res[i].bytes, a[i].bytes, x.bytes);
+ }
+ return res;
+ }
+
+ // Inversion helper function
+ static rct::key sm(rct::key y, int n, const rct::key &x)
+ {
+ while (n--)
+ sc_mul(y.bytes, y.bytes, y.bytes);
+ sc_mul(y.bytes, y.bytes, x.bytes);
+ return y;
+ }
+
+ // Compute the inverse of a nonzero
+ static rct::key invert(const rct::key &x)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!(x == ZERO), "Cannot invert zero!");
+ rct::key _1, _10, _100, _11, _101, _111, _1001, _1011, _1111;
+
+ _1 = x;
+ sc_mul(_10.bytes, _1.bytes, _1.bytes);
+ sc_mul(_100.bytes, _10.bytes, _10.bytes);
+ sc_mul(_11.bytes, _10.bytes, _1.bytes);
+ sc_mul(_101.bytes, _10.bytes, _11.bytes);
+ sc_mul(_111.bytes, _10.bytes, _101.bytes);
+ sc_mul(_1001.bytes, _10.bytes, _111.bytes);
+ sc_mul(_1011.bytes, _10.bytes, _1001.bytes);
+ sc_mul(_1111.bytes, _100.bytes, _1011.bytes);
+
+ rct::key inv;
+ sc_mul(inv.bytes, _1111.bytes, _1.bytes);
+
+ inv = sm(inv, 123 + 3, _101);
+ inv = sm(inv, 2 + 2, _11);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1111);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1111);
+ inv = sm(inv, 4, _1001);
+ inv = sm(inv, 2, _11);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1111);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 3, _101);
+ inv = sm(inv, 3 + 3, _101);
+ inv = sm(inv, 3, _111);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1111);
+ inv = sm(inv, 2 + 3, _111);
+ inv = sm(inv, 2 + 2, _11);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1011);
+ inv = sm(inv, 2 + 4, _1011);
+ inv = sm(inv, 6 + 4, _1001);
+ inv = sm(inv, 2 + 2, _11);
+ inv = sm(inv, 3 + 2, _11);
+ inv = sm(inv, 3 + 2, _11);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1001);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 3, _111);
+ inv = sm(inv, 2 + 4, _1111);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 4, _1011);
+ inv = sm(inv, 3, _101);
+ inv = sm(inv, 2 + 4, _1111);
+ inv = sm(inv, 3, _101);
+ inv = sm(inv, 1 + 2, _11);
+
+ return inv;
+ }
+
+ // Invert a batch of scalars, all of which _must_ be nonzero
+ static rct::keyV invert(rct::keyV x)
+ {
+ rct::keyV scratch;
+ scratch.reserve(x.size());
+
+ rct::key acc = rct::identity();
+ for (size_t n = 0; n < x.size(); ++n)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!(x[n] == ZERO), "Cannot invert zero!");
+ scratch.push_back(acc);
+ if (n == 0)
+ acc = x[0];
+ else
+ sc_mul(acc.bytes, acc.bytes, x[n].bytes);
+ }
+
+ acc = invert(acc);
+
+ rct::key tmp;
+ for (int i = x.size(); i-- > 0; )
+ {
+ sc_mul(tmp.bytes, acc.bytes, x[i].bytes);
+ sc_mul(x[i].bytes, acc.bytes, scratch[i].bytes);
+ acc = tmp;
+ }
+
+ return x;
+ }
+
+ // Compute the slice of a vector
+ static epee::span<const rct::key> slice(const rct::keyV &a, size_t start, size_t stop)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(start < a.size(), "Invalid start index");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(stop <= a.size(), "Invalid stop index");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(start < stop, "Invalid start/stop indices");
+ return epee::span<const rct::key>(&a[start], stop - start);
+ }
+
+ // Initialize the Fiat-Shamir transcript
+ static rct::key transcript_initialize()
+ {
+ static const std::string domain_separator(config::HASH_KEY_BULLETPROOF_PLUS_TRANSCRIPT);
+ rct::key transcript;
+ ge_p3 transcript_p3;
+ rct::hash_to_p3(transcript_p3, rct::hash2rct(crypto::cn_fast_hash(domain_separator.data(), domain_separator.size())));
+ ge_p3_tobytes(transcript.bytes, &transcript_p3);
+ return transcript;
+ }
+
+ // Update the transcript
+ static rct::key transcript_update(rct::key &transcript, const rct::key &update_0)
+ {
+ rct::key data[2];
+ data[0] = transcript;
+ data[1] = update_0;
+ rct::hash_to_scalar(transcript, data, sizeof(data));
+ return transcript;
+ }
+
+ static rct::key transcript_update(rct::key &transcript, const rct::key &update_0, const rct::key &update_1)
+ {
+ rct::key data[3];
+ data[0] = transcript;
+ data[1] = update_0;
+ data[2] = update_1;
+ rct::hash_to_scalar(transcript, data, sizeof(data));
+ return transcript;
+ }
+
+ // Given a value v [0..2**N) and a mask gamma, construct a range proof
+ BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(const rct::key &sv, const rct::key &gamma)
+ {
+ return bulletproof_plus_PROVE(rct::keyV(1, sv), rct::keyV(1, gamma));
+ }
+
+ BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(uint64_t v, const rct::key &gamma)
+ {
+ return bulletproof_plus_PROVE(std::vector<uint64_t>(1, v), rct::keyV(1, gamma));
+ }
+
+ // Given a set of values v [0..2**N) and masks gamma, construct a range proof
+ BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(const rct::keyV &sv, const rct::keyV &gamma)
+ {
+ // Sanity check on inputs
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(sv.size() == gamma.size(), "Incompatible sizes of sv and gamma");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!sv.empty(), "sv is empty");
+ for (const rct::key &sve: sv)
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(is_reduced(sve), "Invalid sv input");
+ for (const rct::key &g: gamma)
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(is_reduced(g), "Invalid gamma input");
+
+ init_exponents();
+
+ // Useful proof bounds
+ //
+ // N: number of bits in each range (here, 64)
+ // logN: base-2 logarithm
+ // M: first power of 2 greater than or equal to the number of range proofs to aggregate
+ // logM: base-2 logarithm
+ constexpr size_t logN = 6; // log2(64)
+ constexpr size_t N = 1<<logN;
+ size_t M, logM;
+ for (logM = 0; (M = 1<<logM) <= maxM && M < sv.size(); ++logM);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(M <= maxM, "sv/gamma are too large");
+ const size_t logMN = logM + logN;
+ const size_t MN = M * N;
+
+ rct::keyV V(sv.size());
+ rct::keyV aL(MN), aR(MN);
+ rct::keyV aL8(MN), aR8(MN);
+ rct::key temp;
+ rct::key temp2;
+
+ // Prepare output commitments and offset by a factor of 8**(-1)
+ //
+ // This offset is applied to other group elements as well;
+ // it allows us to apply a multiply-by-8 operation in the verifier efficiently
+ // to ensure that the resulting group elements are in the prime-order point subgroup
+ // and avoid much more constly multiply-by-group-order operations.
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sv.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ rct::key gamma8, sv8;
+ sc_mul(gamma8.bytes, gamma[i].bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ sc_mul(sv8.bytes, sv[i].bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ rct::addKeys2(V[i], gamma8, sv8, rct::H);
+ }
+
+ // Decompose values
+ //
+ // Note that this effectively pads the set to a power of 2, which is required for the inner-product argument later.
+ for (size_t j = 0; j < M; ++j)
+ {
+ for (size_t i = N; i-- > 0; )
+ {
+ if (j < sv.size() && (sv[j][i/8] & (((uint64_t)1)<<(i%8))))
+ {
+ aL[j*N+i] = rct::identity();
+ aL8[j*N+i] = INV_EIGHT;
+ aR[j*N+i] = aR8[j*N+i] = rct::zero();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ aL[j*N+i] = aL8[j*N+i] = rct::zero();
+ aR[j*N+i] = MINUS_ONE;
+ aR8[j*N+i] = MINUS_INV_EIGHT;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+try_again:
+ // This is a Fiat-Shamir transcript
+ rct::key transcript = transcript_initialize();
+ transcript = transcript_update(transcript, rct::hash_to_scalar(V));
+
+ // A
+ rct::key alpha = rct::skGen();
+ rct::key pre_A = vector_exponent(aL8, aR8);
+ rct::key A;
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, alpha.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ rct::addKeys(A, pre_A, rct::scalarmultBase(temp));
+
+ // Challenges
+ rct::key y = transcript_update(transcript, A);
+ if (y == rct::zero())
+ {
+ MINFO("y is 0, trying again");
+ goto try_again;
+ }
+ rct::key z = transcript = rct::hash_to_scalar(y);
+ if (z == rct::zero())
+ {
+ MINFO("z is 0, trying again");
+ goto try_again;
+ }
+ rct::key z_squared;
+ sc_mul(z_squared.bytes, z.bytes, z.bytes);
+
+ // Windowed vector
+ // d[j*N+i] = z**(2*(j+1)) * 2**i
+ //
+ // We compute this iteratively in order to reduce scalar operations.
+ rct::keyV d(MN, rct::zero());
+ d[0] = z_squared;
+ for (size_t i = 1; i < N; i++)
+ {
+ sc_mul(d[i].bytes, d[i-1].bytes, TWO.bytes);
+ }
+
+ for (size_t j = 1; j < M; j++)
+ {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < N; i++)
+ {
+ sc_mul(d[j*N+i].bytes, d[(j-1)*N+i].bytes, z_squared.bytes);
+ }
+ }
+
+ rct::keyV y_powers = vector_of_scalar_powers(y, MN+2);
+
+ // Prepare inner product terms
+ rct::keyV aL1 = vector_subtract(aL, z);
+
+ rct::keyV aR1 = vector_add(aR, z);
+ rct::keyV d_y(MN);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < MN; i++)
+ {
+ sc_mul(d_y[i].bytes, d[i].bytes, y_powers[MN-i].bytes);
+ }
+ aR1 = vector_add(aR1, d_y);
+
+ rct::key alpha1 = alpha;
+ temp = ONE;
+ for (size_t j = 0; j < sv.size(); j++)
+ {
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, z_squared.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp2.bytes, y_powers[MN+1].bytes, temp.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp2.bytes, temp2.bytes, gamma[j].bytes);
+ sc_add(alpha1.bytes, alpha1.bytes, temp2.bytes);
+ }
+
+ // These are used in the inner product rounds
+ size_t nprime = MN;
+ std::vector<ge_p3> Gprime(MN);
+ std::vector<ge_p3> Hprime(MN);
+ rct::keyV aprime(MN);
+ rct::keyV bprime(MN);
+
+ const rct::key yinv = invert(y);
+ rct::keyV yinvpow(MN);
+ yinvpow[0] = ONE;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < MN; ++i)
+ {
+ Gprime[i] = Gi_p3[i];
+ Hprime[i] = Hi_p3[i];
+ if (i > 0)
+ {
+ sc_mul(yinvpow[i].bytes, yinvpow[i-1].bytes, yinv.bytes);
+ }
+ aprime[i] = aL1[i];
+ bprime[i] = aR1[i];
+ }
+ rct::keyV L(logMN);
+ rct::keyV R(logMN);
+ int round = 0;
+
+ // Inner-product rounds
+ while (nprime > 1)
+ {
+ nprime /= 2;
+
+ rct::key cL = weighted_inner_product(slice(aprime, 0, nprime), slice(bprime, nprime, bprime.size()), y);
+ rct::key cR = weighted_inner_product(vector_scalar(slice(aprime, nprime, aprime.size()), y_powers[nprime]), slice(bprime, 0, nprime), y);
+
+ rct::key dL = rct::skGen();
+ rct::key dR = rct::skGen();
+
+ L[round] = compute_LR(nprime, yinvpow[nprime], Gprime, nprime, Hprime, 0, aprime, 0, bprime, nprime, cL, dL);
+ R[round] = compute_LR(nprime, y_powers[nprime], Gprime, 0, Hprime, nprime, aprime, nprime, bprime, 0, cR, dR);
+
+ const rct::key challenge = transcript_update(transcript, L[round], R[round]);
+ if (challenge == rct::zero())
+ {
+ MINFO("challenge is 0, trying again");
+ goto try_again;
+ }
+
+ const rct::key challenge_inv = invert(challenge);
+
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, yinvpow[nprime].bytes, challenge.bytes);
+ hadamard_fold(Gprime, challenge_inv, temp);
+ hadamard_fold(Hprime, challenge, challenge_inv);
+
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, challenge_inv.bytes, y_powers[nprime].bytes);
+ aprime = vector_add(vector_scalar(slice(aprime, 0, nprime), challenge), vector_scalar(slice(aprime, nprime, aprime.size()), temp));
+ bprime = vector_add(vector_scalar(slice(bprime, 0, nprime), challenge_inv), vector_scalar(slice(bprime, nprime, bprime.size()), challenge));
+
+ rct::key challenge_squared;
+ sc_mul(challenge_squared.bytes, challenge.bytes, challenge.bytes);
+ rct::key challenge_squared_inv = invert(challenge_squared);
+ sc_muladd(alpha1.bytes, dL.bytes, challenge_squared.bytes, alpha1.bytes);
+ sc_muladd(alpha1.bytes, dR.bytes, challenge_squared_inv.bytes, alpha1.bytes);
+
+ ++round;
+ }
+
+ // Final round computations
+ rct::key r = rct::skGen();
+ rct::key s = rct::skGen();
+ rct::key d_ = rct::skGen();
+ rct::key eta = rct::skGen();
+
+ std::vector<MultiexpData> A1_data;
+ A1_data.reserve(4);
+ A1_data.resize(4);
+
+ sc_mul(A1_data[0].scalar.bytes, r.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ A1_data[0].point = Gprime[0];
+
+ sc_mul(A1_data[1].scalar.bytes, s.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ A1_data[1].point = Hprime[0];
+
+ sc_mul(A1_data[2].scalar.bytes, d_.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ ge_p3 G_p3;
+ ge_frombytes_vartime(&G_p3, rct::G.bytes);
+ A1_data[2].point = G_p3;
+
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, r.bytes, y.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, bprime[0].bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp2.bytes, s.bytes, y.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp2.bytes, temp2.bytes, aprime[0].bytes);
+ sc_add(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, temp2.bytes);
+ sc_mul(A1_data[3].scalar.bytes, temp.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ ge_p3 H_p3;
+ ge_frombytes_vartime(&H_p3, rct::H.bytes);
+ A1_data[3].point = H_p3;
+
+ rct::key A1 = multiexp(A1_data, 0);
+
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, r.bytes, y.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, s.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp2.bytes, eta.bytes, INV_EIGHT.bytes);
+ rct::key B;
+ rct::addKeys2(B, temp2, temp, rct::H);
+
+ rct::key e = transcript_update(transcript, A1, B);
+ rct::key e_squared;
+ sc_mul(e_squared.bytes, e.bytes, e.bytes);
+
+ rct::key r1;
+ sc_muladd(r1.bytes, aprime[0].bytes, e.bytes, r.bytes);
+
+ rct::key s1;
+ sc_muladd(s1.bytes, bprime[0].bytes, e.bytes, s.bytes);
+
+ rct::key d1;
+ sc_muladd(d1.bytes, d_.bytes, e.bytes, eta.bytes);
+ sc_muladd(d1.bytes, alpha1.bytes, e_squared.bytes, d1.bytes);
+
+ return BulletproofPlus(std::move(V), A, A1, B, r1, s1, d1, std::move(L), std::move(R));
+ }
+
+ BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(const std::vector<uint64_t> &v, const rct::keyV &gamma)
+ {
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(v.size() == gamma.size(), "Incompatible sizes of v and gamma");
+
+ // vG + gammaH
+ rct::keyV sv(v.size());
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < v.size(); ++i)
+ {
+ sv[i] = rct::zero();
+ sv[i].bytes[0] = v[i] & 255;
+ sv[i].bytes[1] = (v[i] >> 8) & 255;
+ sv[i].bytes[2] = (v[i] >> 16) & 255;
+ sv[i].bytes[3] = (v[i] >> 24) & 255;
+ sv[i].bytes[4] = (v[i] >> 32) & 255;
+ sv[i].bytes[5] = (v[i] >> 40) & 255;
+ sv[i].bytes[6] = (v[i] >> 48) & 255;
+ sv[i].bytes[7] = (v[i] >> 56) & 255;
+ }
+ return bulletproof_plus_PROVE(sv, gamma);
+ }
+
+ struct bp_plus_proof_data_t
+ {
+ rct::key y, z, e;
+ std::vector<rct::key> challenges;
+ size_t logM, inv_offset;
+ };
+
+ // Given a batch of range proofs, determine if they are all valid
+ bool bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(const std::vector<const BulletproofPlus*> &proofs)
+ {
+ init_exponents();
+
+ const size_t logN = 6;
+ const size_t N = 1 << logN;
+
+ // Set up
+ size_t max_length = 0; // size of each of the longest proof's inner-product vectors
+ size_t nV = 0; // number of output commitments across all proofs
+ size_t inv_offset = 0;
+ size_t max_logM = 0;
+
+ std::vector<bp_plus_proof_data_t> proof_data;
+ proof_data.reserve(proofs.size());
+
+ // We'll perform only a single batch inversion across all proofs in the batch,
+ // since batch inversion requires only one scalar inversion operation.
+ std::vector<rct::key> to_invert;
+ to_invert.reserve(11 * sizeof(proofs)); // maximal size, given the aggregation limit
+
+ for (const BulletproofPlus *p: proofs)
+ {
+ const BulletproofPlus &proof = *p;
+
+ // Sanity checks
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(is_reduced(proof.r1), false, "Input scalar not in range");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(is_reduced(proof.s1), false, "Input scalar not in range");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(is_reduced(proof.d1), false, "Input scalar not in range");
+
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.V.size() >= 1, false, "V does not have at least one element");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() == proof.R.size(), false, "Mismatched L and R sizes");
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() > 0, false, "Empty proof");
+
+ max_length = std::max(max_length, proof.L.size());
+ nV += proof.V.size();
+
+ bp_plus_proof_data_t pd;
+
+ // Reconstruct the challenges
+ rct::key transcript = transcript_initialize();
+ transcript = transcript_update(transcript, rct::hash_to_scalar(proof.V));
+ pd.y = transcript_update(transcript, proof.A);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(pd.y == rct::zero()), false, "y == 0");
+ pd.z = transcript = rct::hash_to_scalar(pd.y);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(pd.z == rct::zero()), false, "z == 0");
+
+ // Determine the number of inner-product rounds based on proof size
+ size_t M;
+ for (pd.logM = 0; (M = 1<<pd.logM) <= maxM && M < proof.V.size(); ++pd.logM);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() == 6+pd.logM, false, "Proof is not the expected size");
+ max_logM = std::max(pd.logM, max_logM);
+
+ const size_t rounds = pd.logM+logN;
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rounds > 0, false, "Zero rounds");
+
+ // The inner-product challenges are computed per round
+ pd.challenges.resize(rounds);
+ for (size_t j = 0; j < rounds; ++j)
+ {
+ pd.challenges[j] = transcript_update(transcript, proof.L[j], proof.R[j]);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(pd.challenges[j] == rct::zero()), false, "challenges[j] == 0");
+ }
+
+ // Final challenge
+ pd.e = transcript_update(transcript,proof.A1,proof.B);
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(pd.e == rct::zero()), false, "e == 0");
+
+ // Batch scalar inversions
+ pd.inv_offset = inv_offset;
+ for (size_t j = 0; j < rounds; ++j)
+ to_invert.push_back(pd.challenges[j]);
+ to_invert.push_back(pd.y);
+ inv_offset += rounds + 1;
+ proof_data.push_back(pd);
+ }
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(max_length < 32, false, "At least one proof is too large");
+ size_t maxMN = 1u << max_length;
+
+ rct::key temp;
+ rct::key temp2;
+
+ // Final batch proof data
+ std::vector<MultiexpData> multiexp_data;
+ multiexp_data.reserve(nV + (2 * (max_logM + logN) + 3) * proofs.size() + 2 * maxMN);
+ multiexp_data.resize(2 * maxMN);
+
+ const std::vector<rct::key> inverses = invert(to_invert);
+
+ // Weights and aggregates
+ //
+ // The idea is to take the single multiscalar multiplication used in the verification
+ // of each proof in the batch and weight it using a random weighting factor, resulting
+ // in just one multiscalar multiplication check to zero for the entire batch.
+ // We can further simplify the verifier complexity by including common group elements
+ // only once in this single multiscalar multiplication.
+ // Common group elements' weighted scalar sums are tracked across proofs for this reason.
+ //
+ // To build a multiscalar multiplication for each proof, we use the method described in
+ // Section 6.1 of the preprint. Note that the result given there does not account for
+ // the construction of the inner-product inputs that are produced in the range proof
+ // verifier algorithm; we have done so here.
+ rct::key G_scalar = rct::zero();
+ rct::key H_scalar = rct::zero();
+ rct::keyV Gi_scalars(maxMN, rct::zero());
+ rct::keyV Hi_scalars(maxMN, rct::zero());
+
+ int proof_data_index = 0;
+ rct::keyV challenges_cache;
+ std::vector<ge_p3> proof8_V, proof8_L, proof8_R;
+
+ // Process each proof and add to the weighted batch
+ for (const BulletproofPlus *p: proofs)
+ {
+ const BulletproofPlus &proof = *p;
+ const bp_plus_proof_data_t &pd = proof_data[proof_data_index++];
+
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() == 6+pd.logM, false, "Proof is not the expected size");
+ const size_t M = 1 << pd.logM;
+ const size_t MN = M*N;
+
+ // Random weighting factor must be nonzero, which is exceptionally unlikely!
+ rct::key weight = ZERO;
+ while (weight == ZERO)
+ {
+ weight = rct::skGen();
+ }
+
+ // Rescale previously offset proof elements
+ //
+ // This ensures that all such group elements are in the prime-order subgroup.
+ proof8_V.resize(proof.V.size()); for (size_t i = 0; i < proof.V.size(); ++i) rct::scalarmult8(proof8_V[i], proof.V[i]);
+ proof8_L.resize(proof.L.size()); for (size_t i = 0; i < proof.L.size(); ++i) rct::scalarmult8(proof8_L[i], proof.L[i]);
+ proof8_R.resize(proof.R.size()); for (size_t i = 0; i < proof.R.size(); ++i) rct::scalarmult8(proof8_R[i], proof.R[i]);
+ ge_p3 proof8_A1;
+ ge_p3 proof8_B;
+ ge_p3 proof8_A;
+ rct::scalarmult8(proof8_A1, proof.A1);
+ rct::scalarmult8(proof8_B, proof.B);
+ rct::scalarmult8(proof8_A, proof.A);
+
+ // Compute necessary powers of the y-challenge
+ rct::key y_MN = copy(pd.y);
+ rct::key y_MN_1;
+ size_t temp_MN = MN;
+ while (temp_MN > 1)
+ {
+ sc_mul(y_MN.bytes, y_MN.bytes, y_MN.bytes);
+ temp_MN /= 2;
+ }
+ sc_mul(y_MN_1.bytes, y_MN.bytes, pd.y.bytes);
+
+ // V_j: -e**2 * z**(2*j+1) * y**(MN+1) * weight
+ rct::key e_squared;
+ sc_mul(e_squared.bytes, pd.e.bytes, pd.e.bytes);
+
+ rct::key z_squared;
+ sc_mul(z_squared.bytes, pd.z.bytes, pd.z.bytes);
+
+ sc_sub(temp.bytes, ZERO.bytes, e_squared.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, y_MN_1.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, weight.bytes);
+ for (size_t j = 0; j < proof8_V.size(); j++)
+ {
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, z_squared.bytes);
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(temp, proof8_V[j]);
+ }
+
+ // B: -weight
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, MINUS_ONE.bytes, weight.bytes);
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(temp, proof8_B);
+
+ // A1: -weight*e
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, pd.e.bytes);
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(temp, proof8_A1);
+
+ // A: -weight*e*e
+ rct::key minus_weight_e_squared;
+ sc_mul(minus_weight_e_squared.bytes, temp.bytes, pd.e.bytes);
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(minus_weight_e_squared, proof8_A);
+
+ // G: weight*d1
+ sc_muladd(G_scalar.bytes, weight.bytes, proof.d1.bytes, G_scalar.bytes);
+
+ // Windowed vector
+ // d[j*N+i] = z**(2*(j+1)) * 2**i
+ rct::keyV d(MN, rct::zero());
+ d[0] = z_squared;
+ for (size_t i = 1; i < N; i++)
+ {
+ sc_add(d[i].bytes, d[i-1].bytes, d[i-1].bytes);
+ }
+
+ for (size_t j = 1; j < M; j++)
+ {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < N; i++)
+ {
+ sc_mul(d[j*N+i].bytes, d[(j-1)*N+i].bytes, z_squared.bytes);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // More efficient computation of sum(d)
+ rct::key sum_d;
+ sc_mul(sum_d.bytes, TWO_SIXTY_FOUR_MINUS_ONE.bytes, sum_of_even_powers(pd.z, 2*M).bytes);
+
+ // H: weight*( r1*y*s1 + e**2*( y**(MN+1)*z*sum(d) + (z**2-z)*sum(y) ) )
+ rct::key sum_y = sum_of_scalar_powers(pd.y, MN);
+ sc_sub(temp.bytes, z_squared.bytes, pd.z.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, sum_y.bytes);
+
+ sc_mul(temp2.bytes, y_MN_1.bytes, pd.z.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp2.bytes, temp2.bytes, sum_d.bytes);
+ sc_add(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, temp2.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, e_squared.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp2.bytes, proof.r1.bytes, pd.y.bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp2.bytes, temp2.bytes, proof.s1.bytes);
+ sc_add(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, temp2.bytes);
+ sc_muladd(H_scalar.bytes, temp.bytes, weight.bytes, H_scalar.bytes);
+
+ // Compute the number of rounds for the inner-product argument
+ const size_t rounds = pd.logM+logN;
+ CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rounds > 0, false, "Zero rounds");
+
+ const rct::key *challenges_inv = &inverses[pd.inv_offset];
+ const rct::key yinv = inverses[pd.inv_offset + rounds];
+
+ // Compute challenge products
+ challenges_cache.resize(1<<rounds);
+ challenges_cache[0] = challenges_inv[0];
+ challenges_cache[1] = pd.challenges[0];
+ for (size_t j = 1; j < rounds; ++j)
+ {
+ const size_t slots = 1<<(j+1);
+ for (size_t s = slots; s-- > 0; --s)
+ {
+ sc_mul(challenges_cache[s].bytes, challenges_cache[s/2].bytes, pd.challenges[j].bytes);
+ sc_mul(challenges_cache[s-1].bytes, challenges_cache[s/2].bytes, challenges_inv[j].bytes);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Gi and Hi
+ rct::key e_r1_w_y;
+ sc_mul(e_r1_w_y.bytes, pd.e.bytes, proof.r1.bytes);
+ sc_mul(e_r1_w_y.bytes, e_r1_w_y.bytes, weight.bytes);
+ rct::key e_s1_w;
+ sc_mul(e_s1_w.bytes, pd.e.bytes, proof.s1.bytes);
+ sc_mul(e_s1_w.bytes, e_s1_w.bytes, weight.bytes);
+ rct::key e_squared_z_w;
+ sc_mul(e_squared_z_w.bytes, e_squared.bytes, pd.z.bytes);
+ sc_mul(e_squared_z_w.bytes, e_squared_z_w.bytes, weight.bytes);
+ rct::key minus_e_squared_z_w;
+ sc_sub(minus_e_squared_z_w.bytes, ZERO.bytes, e_squared_z_w.bytes);
+ rct::key minus_e_squared_w_y;
+ sc_sub(minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, ZERO.bytes, e_squared.bytes);
+ sc_mul(minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, weight.bytes);
+ sc_mul(minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, y_MN.bytes);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < MN; ++i)
+ {
+ rct::key g_scalar = copy(e_r1_w_y);
+ rct::key h_scalar;
+
+ // Use the binary decomposition of the index
+ sc_muladd(g_scalar.bytes, g_scalar.bytes, challenges_cache[i].bytes, e_squared_z_w.bytes);
+ sc_muladd(h_scalar.bytes, e_s1_w.bytes, challenges_cache[(~i) & (MN-1)].bytes, minus_e_squared_z_w.bytes);
+
+ // Complete the scalar derivation
+ sc_add(Gi_scalars[i].bytes, Gi_scalars[i].bytes, g_scalar.bytes);
+ sc_muladd(h_scalar.bytes, minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, d[i].bytes, h_scalar.bytes);
+ sc_add(Hi_scalars[i].bytes, Hi_scalars[i].bytes, h_scalar.bytes);
+
+ // Update iterated values
+ sc_mul(e_r1_w_y.bytes, e_r1_w_y.bytes, yinv.bytes);
+ sc_mul(minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, minus_e_squared_w_y.bytes, yinv.bytes);
+ }
+
+ // L_j: -weight*e*e*challenges[j]**2
+ // R_j: -weight*e*e*challenges[j]**(-2)
+ for (size_t j = 0; j < rounds; ++j)
+ {
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, pd.challenges[j].bytes, pd.challenges[j].bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, minus_weight_e_squared.bytes);
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(temp, proof8_L[j]);
+
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, challenges_inv[j].bytes, challenges_inv[j].bytes);
+ sc_mul(temp.bytes, temp.bytes, minus_weight_e_squared.bytes);
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(temp, proof8_R[j]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Verify all proofs in the weighted batch
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(G_scalar, rct::G);
+ multiexp_data.emplace_back(H_scalar, rct::H);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < maxMN; ++i)
+ {
+ multiexp_data[i * 2] = {Gi_scalars[i], Gi_p3[i]};
+ multiexp_data[i * 2 + 1] = {Hi_scalars[i], Hi_p3[i]};
+ }
+ if (!(multiexp(multiexp_data, 2 * maxMN) == rct::identity()))
+ {
+ MERROR("Verification failure");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ bool bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(const std::vector<BulletproofPlus> &proofs)
+ {
+ std::vector<const BulletproofPlus*> proof_pointers;
+ proof_pointers.reserve(proofs.size());
+ for (const BulletproofPlus &proof: proofs)
+ proof_pointers.push_back(&proof);
+ return bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof_pointers);
+ }
+
+ bool bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(const BulletproofPlus &proof)
+ {
+ std::vector<const BulletproofPlus*> proofs;
+ proofs.push_back(&proof);
+ return bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proofs);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.h b/src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d9084075a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/ringct/bulletproofs_plus.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2017-2020, The Monero Project
+//
+// All rights reserved.
+//
+// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
+// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+//
+// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
+// conditions and the following disclaimer.
+//
+// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
+// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
+// materials provided with the distribution.
+//
+// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
+// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
+// prior written permission.
+//
+// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
+// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
+// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+#pragma once
+
+#ifndef BULLETPROOFS_PLUS_H
+#define BULLETPROOFS_PLUS_H
+
+#include "rctTypes.h"
+
+namespace rct
+{
+
+BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(const rct::key &v, const rct::key &gamma);
+BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(uint64_t v, const rct::key &gamma);
+BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(const rct::keyV &v, const rct::keyV &gamma);
+BulletproofPlus bulletproof_plus_PROVE(const std::vector<uint64_t> &v, const rct::keyV &gamma);
+bool bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(const BulletproofPlus &proof);
+bool bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(const std::vector<const BulletproofPlus*> &proofs);
+bool bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(const std::vector<BulletproofPlus> &proofs);
+
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/ringct/rctTypes.h b/src/ringct/rctTypes.h
index 278ff4164..dc69990f0 100644
--- a/src/ringct/rctTypes.h
+++ b/src/ringct/rctTypes.h
@@ -238,6 +238,39 @@ namespace rct {
END_SERIALIZE()
};
+ struct BulletproofPlus
+ {
+ rct::keyV V;
+ rct::key A, A1, B;
+ rct::key r1, s1, d1;
+ rct::keyV L, R;
+
+ BulletproofPlus():
+ A({}), A1({}), B({}), r1({}), s1({}), d1({}) {}
+ BulletproofPlus(const rct::key &V, const rct::key &A, const rct::key &A1, const rct::key &B, const rct::key &r1, const rct::key &s1, const rct::key &d1, const rct::keyV &L, const rct::keyV &R):
+ V({V}), A(A), A1(A1), B(B), r1(r1), s1(s1), d1(d1), L(L), R(R) {}
+ BulletproofPlus(const rct::keyV &V, const rct::key &A, const rct::key &A1, const rct::key &B, const rct::key &r1, const rct::key &s1, const rct::key &d1, const rct::keyV &L, const rct::keyV &R):
+ V(V), A(A), A1(A1), B(B), r1(r1), s1(s1), d1(d1), L(L), R(R) {}
+
+ bool operator==(const BulletproofPlus &other) const { return V == other.V && A == other.A && A1 == other.A1 && B == other.B && r1 == other.r1 && s1 == other.s1 && d1 == other.d1 && L == other.L && R == other.R; }
+
+ BEGIN_SERIALIZE_OBJECT()
+ // Commitments aren't saved, they're restored via outPk
+ // FIELD(V)
+ FIELD(A)
+ FIELD(A1)
+ FIELD(B)
+ FIELD(r1)
+ FIELD(s1)
+ FIELD(d1)
+ FIELD(L)
+ FIELD(R)
+
+ if (L.empty() || L.size() != R.size())
+ return false;
+ END_SERIALIZE()
+ };
+
size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof);
size_t n_bulletproof_max_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof);
size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const std::vector<Bulletproof> &proofs);
diff --git a/tests/performance_tests/CMakeLists.txt b/tests/performance_tests/CMakeLists.txt
index 542d204e0..e8810ff85 100644
--- a/tests/performance_tests/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/tests/performance_tests/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ set(performance_tests_headers
subaddress_expand.h
range_proof.h
bulletproof.h
+ bulletproof_plus.h
crypto_ops.h
sc_reduce32.h
sc_check.h
diff --git a/tests/performance_tests/bulletproof_plus.h b/tests/performance_tests/bulletproof_plus.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b436e5e12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/performance_tests/bulletproof_plus.h
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2014-2020, The Monero Project
+//
+// All rights reserved.
+//
+// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
+// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+//
+// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
+// conditions and the following disclaimer.
+//
+// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
+// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
+// materials provided with the distribution.
+//
+// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
+// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
+// prior written permission.
+//
+// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
+// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
+// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+//
+// Parts of this file are originally copyright (c) 2012-2013 The Cryptonote developers
+
+#pragma once
+
+#include "ringct/rctSigs.h"
+#include "ringct/bulletproofs_plus.h"
+
+template<bool a_verify, size_t n_amounts>
+class test_bulletproof_plus
+{
+public:
+ static const size_t approx_loop_count = 100 / n_amounts;
+ static const size_t loop_count = (approx_loop_count >= 10 ? approx_loop_count : 10) / (a_verify ? 1 : 5);
+ static const bool verify = a_verify;
+
+ bool init()
+ {
+ proof = rct::bulletproof_plus_PROVE(std::vector<uint64_t>(n_amounts, 749327532984), rct::skvGen(n_amounts));
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ bool test()
+ {
+ bool ret = true;
+ if (verify)
+ ret = rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof);
+ else
+ rct::bulletproof_plus_PROVE(std::vector<uint64_t>(n_amounts, 749327532984), rct::skvGen(n_amounts));
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+private:
+ rct::BulletproofPlus proof;
+};
+
+template<bool batch, size_t start, size_t repeat, size_t mul, size_t add, size_t N>
+class test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus
+{
+public:
+ static const size_t loop_count = 500 / (N * repeat);
+
+ bool init()
+ {
+ size_t o = start;
+ for (size_t n = 0; n < N; ++n)
+ {
+ //printf("adding %zu times %zu\n", repeat, o);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < repeat; ++i)
+ proofs.push_back(rct::bulletproof_plus_PROVE(std::vector<uint64_t>(o, 749327532984), rct::skvGen(o)));
+ o = o * mul + add;
+ }
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ bool test()
+ {
+ if (batch)
+ {
+ return rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proofs);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ for (const rct::BulletproofPlus &proof: proofs)
+ if (!rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof))
+ return false;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+private:
+ std::vector<rct::BulletproofPlus> proofs;
+};
diff --git a/tests/performance_tests/main.cpp b/tests/performance_tests/main.cpp
index e59bb52fd..a61d84bed 100644
--- a/tests/performance_tests/main.cpp
+++ b/tests/performance_tests/main.cpp
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
#include "equality.h"
#include "range_proof.h"
#include "bulletproof.h"
+#include "bulletproof_plus.h"
#include "crypto_ops.h"
#include "multiexp.h"
#include "sig_mlsag.h"
@@ -241,6 +242,26 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
TEST_PERFORMANCE1(filter, p, test_range_proof, true);
TEST_PERFORMANCE1(filter, p, test_range_proof, false);
+ TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_bulletproof_plus, true, 1); // 1 bulletproof_plus with 1 amount
+ TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_bulletproof_plus, false, 1);
+
+ TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_bulletproof_plus, true, 2); // 1 bulletproof_plus with 2 amounts
+ TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_bulletproof_plus, false, 2);
+
+ TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_bulletproof_plus, true, 15); // 1 bulletproof_plus with 15 amounts
+ TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_bulletproof_plus, false, 15);
+
+ TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, false, 2, 1, 1, 0, 4);
+ TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, true, 2, 1, 1, 0, 4); // 4 proofs, each with 2 amounts
+ TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, false, 8, 1, 1, 0, 4);
+ TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, true, 8, 1, 1, 0, 4); // 4 proofs, each with 8 amounts
+ TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, false, 1, 1, 2, 0, 4);
+ TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, true, 1, 1, 2, 0, 4); // 4 proofs with 1, 2, 4, 8 amounts
+ TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, false, 1, 8, 1, 1, 4);
+ TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, true, 1, 8, 1, 1, 4); // 32 proofs, with 1, 2, 3, 4 amounts, 8 of each
+ TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, false, 2, 1, 1, 0, 64);
+ TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof_plus, true, 2, 1, 1, 0, 64); // 64 proof, each with 2 amounts
+
TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_bulletproof, true, 1); // 1 bulletproof with 1 amount
TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_bulletproof, false, 1);
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt b/tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt
index 556e0ec40..5f6b1e749 100644
--- a/tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ set(unit_tests_sources
block_reward.cpp
bootstrap_node_selector.cpp
bulletproofs.cpp
+ bulletproofs_plus.cpp
canonical_amounts.cpp
chacha.cpp
checkpoints.cpp
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/bulletproofs_plus.cpp b/tests/unit_tests/bulletproofs_plus.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a64320233
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/bulletproofs_plus.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2017-2020, The Monero Project
+//
+// All rights reserved.
+//
+// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
+// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+//
+// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
+// conditions and the following disclaimer.
+//
+// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
+// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
+// materials provided with the distribution.
+//
+// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
+// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
+// prior written permission.
+//
+// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
+// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
+// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+//
+// Parts of this file are originally copyright (c) 2012-2013 The Cryptonote developers
+
+#include "gtest/gtest.h"
+
+#include "string_tools.h"
+#include "ringct/rctOps.h"
+#include "ringct/rctSigs.h"
+#include "ringct/bulletproofs_plus.h"
+#include "cryptonote_basic/blobdatatype.h"
+#include "cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_format_utils.h"
+#include "device/device.hpp"
+#include "misc_log_ex.h"
+
+TEST(bulletproofs_plus, valid_zero)
+{
+ rct::BulletproofPlus proof = bulletproof_plus_PROVE(0, rct::skGen());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof));
+}
+
+TEST(bulletproofs_plus, valid_max)
+{
+ rct::BulletproofPlus proof = bulletproof_plus_PROVE(0xffffffffffffffff, rct::skGen());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof));
+}
+
+TEST(bulletproofs_plus, valid_random)
+{
+ for (int n = 0; n < 8; ++n)
+ {
+ rct::BulletproofPlus proof = bulletproof_plus_PROVE(crypto::rand<uint64_t>(), rct::skGen());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof));
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(bulletproofs_plus, valid_multi_random)
+{
+ for (int n = 0; n < 8; ++n)
+ {
+ size_t outputs = 2 + n;
+ std::vector<uint64_t> amounts;
+ rct::keyV gamma;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < outputs; ++i)
+ {
+ amounts.push_back(crypto::rand<uint64_t>());
+ gamma.push_back(rct::skGen());
+ }
+ rct::BulletproofPlus proof = bulletproof_plus_PROVE(amounts, gamma);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof));
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(bulletproofs_plus, valid_aggregated)
+{
+ static const size_t N_PROOFS = 8;
+ std::vector<rct::BulletproofPlus> proofs(N_PROOFS);
+ for (size_t n = 0; n < N_PROOFS; ++n)
+ {
+ size_t outputs = 2 + n;
+ std::vector<uint64_t> amounts;
+ rct::keyV gamma;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < outputs; ++i)
+ {
+ amounts.push_back(crypto::rand<uint64_t>());
+ gamma.push_back(rct::skGen());
+ }
+ proofs[n] = bulletproof_plus_PROVE(amounts, gamma);
+ }
+ ASSERT_TRUE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proofs));
+}
+
+TEST(bulletproofs_plus, invalid_8)
+{
+ rct::key invalid_amount = rct::zero();
+ invalid_amount[8] = 1;
+ rct::BulletproofPlus proof = bulletproof_plus_PROVE(invalid_amount, rct::skGen());
+ ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof));
+}
+
+TEST(bulletproofs_plus, invalid_31)
+{
+ rct::key invalid_amount = rct::zero();
+ invalid_amount[31] = 1;
+ rct::BulletproofPlus proof = bulletproof_plus_PROVE(invalid_amount, rct::skGen());
+ ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof));
+}
+
+static const char * const torsion_elements[] =
+{
+ "c7176a703d4dd84fba3c0b760d10670f2a2053fa2c39ccc64ec7fd7792ac03fa",
+ "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+ "26e8958fc2b227b045c3f489f2ef98f0d5dfac05d3c63339b13802886d53fc85",
+ "ecffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7f",
+ "26e8958fc2b227b045c3f489f2ef98f0d5dfac05d3c63339b13802886d53fc05",
+ "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000080",
+ "c7176a703d4dd84fba3c0b760d10670f2a2053fa2c39ccc64ec7fd7792ac037a",
+};
+
+TEST(bulletproofs_plus, invalid_torsion)
+{
+ rct::BulletproofPlus proof = bulletproof_plus_PROVE(7329838943733, rct::skGen());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof));
+ for (const auto &xs: torsion_elements)
+ {
+ rct::key x;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(epee::string_tools::hex_to_pod(xs, x));
+ ASSERT_FALSE(rct::isInMainSubgroup(x));
+ for (auto &k: proof.V)
+ {
+ const rct::key org_k = k;
+ rct::addKeys(k, org_k, x);
+ ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof));
+ k = org_k;
+ }
+ for (auto &k: proof.L)
+ {
+ const rct::key org_k = k;
+ rct::addKeys(k, org_k, x);
+ ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof));
+ k = org_k;
+ }
+ for (auto &k: proof.R)
+ {
+ const rct::key org_k = k;
+ rct::addKeys(k, org_k, x);
+ ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof));
+ k = org_k;
+ }
+ const rct::key org_A = proof.A;
+ rct::addKeys(proof.A, org_A, x);
+ ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof));
+ proof.A = org_A;
+ const rct::key org_A1 = proof.A1;
+ rct::addKeys(proof.A1, org_A1, x);
+ ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof));
+ proof.A1 = org_A1;
+ const rct::key org_B = proof.B;
+ rct::addKeys(proof.B, org_B, x);
+ ASSERT_FALSE(rct::bulletproof_plus_VERIFY(proof));
+ proof.B = org_B;
+ }
+}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-17 19:50:31 +0000