Updates InProofV1, OutProofV1, and ReserveProofV1 to new V2 variants that include all public proof parameters in Schnorr challenges, along with hash function domain separators. Includes new randomized unit tests.

2 files changed, 131 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt b/tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt
index ef0477888..7e6432766 100644
--- a/tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ set(unit_tests_sources
   test_peerlist.cpp
   test_protocol_pack.cpp
   threadpool.cpp
+  tx_proof.cpp
   hardfork.cpp
   unbound.cpp
   uri.cpp
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/tx_proof.cpp b/tests/unit_tests/tx_proof.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c5d06bc68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/tx_proof.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2018, The Monero Project
+// 
+// All rights reserved.
+// 
+// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
+// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+// 
+// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
+//    conditions and the following disclaimer.
+// 
+// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
+//    of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
+//    materials provided with the distribution.
+// 
+// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
+//    used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
+//    prior written permission.
+// 
+// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
+// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
+// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+#include "gtest/gtest.h"
+
+#include "crypto/crypto.h"
+extern "C" {
+#include "crypto/crypto-ops.h"
+}
+#include "crypto/hash.h"
+#include <boost/algorithm/string.hpp>
+
+static inline unsigned char *operator &(crypto::ec_point &point) {
+    return &reinterpret_cast<unsigned char &>(point);
+  }
+
+static inline unsigned char *operator &(crypto::ec_scalar &scalar) {
+    return &reinterpret_cast<unsigned char &>(scalar);
+  }
+
+TEST(tx_proof, prove_verify_v2)
+{
+    crypto::secret_key r;
+    crypto::random32_unbiased(&r);
+
+    // A = aG
+    // B = bG
+    crypto::secret_key a,b;
+    crypto::public_key A,B;
+    crypto::generate_keys(A, a, a, false);
+    crypto::generate_keys(B, b, b, false);
+
+    // R_B = rB
+    crypto::public_key R_B;
+    ge_p3 B_p3;
+    ge_frombytes_vartime(&B_p3,&B);
+    ge_p2 R_B_p2;
+    ge_scalarmult(&R_B_p2, &unwrap(r), &B_p3);
+    ge_tobytes(&R_B, &R_B_p2);
+
+    // R_G = rG
+    crypto::public_key R_G;
+    ge_frombytes_vartime(&B_p3,&B);
+    ge_p3 R_G_p3;
+    ge_scalarmult_base(&R_G_p3, &unwrap(r));
+    ge_p3_tobytes(&R_G, &R_G_p3);
+
+    // D = rA
+    crypto::public_key D;
+    ge_p3 A_p3;
+    ge_frombytes_vartime(&A_p3,&A);
+    ge_p2 D_p2;
+    ge_scalarmult(&D_p2, &unwrap(r), &A_p3);
+    ge_tobytes(&D, &D_p2);
+
+    crypto::signature sig;
+
+    // Message data
+    crypto::hash prefix_hash;
+    char data[] = "hash input";
+    crypto::cn_fast_hash(data,sizeof(data)-1,prefix_hash);
+
+    // Generate/verify valid v1 proof with standard address
+    crypto::generate_tx_proof_v1(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, r, sig);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, sig, 1));
+
+    // Generate/verify valid v1 proof with subaddress
+    crypto::generate_tx_proof_v1(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, r, sig);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, sig, 1));
+
+    // Generate/verify valid v2 proof with standard address
+    crypto::generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, r, sig);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, sig, 2));
+
+    // Generate/verify valid v2 proof with subaddress
+    crypto::generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, r, sig);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, sig, 2));
+
+    // Try to verify valid v2 proofs as v1 proof (bad)
+    crypto::generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, r, sig);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, sig, 1));
+    crypto::generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, r, sig);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, sig, 1));
+
+    // Randomly-distributed test points
+    crypto::secret_key evil_a, evil_b, evil_d, evil_r;
+    crypto::public_key evil_A, evil_B, evil_D, evil_R;
+    crypto::generate_keys(evil_A, evil_a, evil_a, false);
+    crypto::generate_keys(evil_B, evil_b, evil_b, false);
+    crypto::generate_keys(evil_D, evil_d, evil_d, false);
+    crypto::generate_keys(evil_R, evil_r, evil_r, false);
+
+    // Selectively choose bad point in v2 proof (bad)
+    crypto::generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, r, sig);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, evil_R, A, B, D, sig, 2));
+    ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, evil_A, B, D, sig, 2));
+    ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, evil_B, D, sig, 2));
+    ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, evil_D, sig, 2));
+
+    // Try to verify valid v1 proofs as v2 proof (bad)
+    crypto::generate_tx_proof_v1(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, r, sig);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_G, A, boost::none, D, sig, 2));
+    crypto::generate_tx_proof_v1(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, r, sig);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, R_B, A, B, D, sig, 2));
+}