Fake outs set is now decided by the wallet

This plugs a privacy leak from the wallet to the daemon,
as the daemon could previously see what input is included
as a transaction input, which the daemon hadn't previously
supplied. Now, the wallet requests a particular set of
outputs, including the real one.

This can result in transactions that can't be accepted if
the wallet happens to select too many outputs with non standard
unlock times. The daemon could know this and select another
output, but the wallet is blind to it. It's currently very
unlikely since I don't think anything uses non default
unlock times. The wallet requests more outputs than necessary
so it can use spares if any of the returns outputs are still
locked. If there are not enough spares to reach the desired
mixin, the transaction will fail.

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/src/wallet/api/wallet.cpp b/src/wallet/api/wallet.cpp
index 67d2ebecb..4b97e2f1d 100644
--- a/src/wallet/api/wallet.cpp
+++ b/src/wallet/api/wallet.cpp
@@ -527,8 +527,8 @@ PendingTransaction *WalletImpl::createTransaction(const string &dst_addr, const
         } catch (const tools::error::not_enough_outs_to_mix& e) {
             std::ostringstream writer;
             writer << tr("not enough outputs for specified mixin_count") << " = " << e.mixin_count() << ":";
-            for (const cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_RANDOM_OUTPUTS_FOR_AMOUNTS::outs_for_amount& outs_for_amount : e.scanty_outs()) {
-                writer << "\n" << tr("output amount") << " = " << print_money(outs_for_amount.amount) << ", " << tr("found outputs to mix") << " = " << outs_for_amount.outs.size();
+            for (const std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t> outs_for_amount : e.scanty_outs()) {
+                writer << "\n" << tr("output amount") << " = " << print_money(outs_for_amount.first) << ", " << tr("found outputs to mix") << " = " << outs_for_amount.second;
             }
             m_errorString = writer.str();
             m_status = Status_Error;