bulletproofs: add aggregated verification

Ported from sarang's java code

4 files changed, 336 insertions, 229 deletions

diff --git a/src/ringct/bulletproofs.cc b/src/ringct/bulletproofs.cc
index 6ba984b03..e2540fb22 100644
--- a/src/ringct/bulletproofs.cc
+++ b/src/ringct/bulletproofs.cc
@@ -889,219 +889,248 @@ Bulletproof bulletproof_PROVE(const std::vector<uint64_t> &v, const rct::keyV &g
 }
 
 /* Given a range proof, determine if it is valid */
-bool bulletproof_VERIFY(const Bulletproof &proof)
+bool bulletproof_VERIFY(const std::vector<const Bulletproof*> &proofs)
 {
   init_exponents();
 
-  CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.V.size() >= 1, false, "V does not have at least one element");
-  CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() == proof.R.size(), false, "Mismatched L and R sizes");
-  CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() > 0, false, "Empty proof");
-
-  const size_t logN = 6;
-  const size_t N = 1 << logN;
-  rct::key tmp, tmp2;
-
-  size_t M, logM;
-  for (logM = 0; (M = 1<<logM) <= maxM && M < proof.V.size(); ++logM);
-  CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() == 6+logM, false, "Proof is not the expected size");
-  const size_t MN = M*N;
-
-  // Reconstruct the challenges
   PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY);
-  PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_start);
-  rct::key hash_cache = rct::hash_to_scalar(proof.V);
-  rct::key y = hash_cache_mash(hash_cache, proof.A, proof.S);
-  rct::key z = hash_cache = rct::hash_to_scalar(y);
-  rct::key x = hash_cache_mash(hash_cache, z, proof.T1, proof.T2);
-  PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_start);
-
-  PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_60);
-  // Reconstruct the challenges
-  rct::key x_ip = hash_cache_mash(hash_cache, x, proof.taux, proof.mu, proof.t);
-  PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_60);
 
-  PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_61);
-  // PAPER LINE 61
-  rct::key L61Left, L61Right;
-  rct::addKeys2(L61Left, proof.taux, proof.t, rct::H);
-
-  const rct::keyV zpow = vector_powers(z, M+3);
-
-  rct::key k;
-  const rct::key ip1y = vector_power_sum(y, MN);
-  sc_mulsub(k.bytes, zpow[2].bytes, ip1y.bytes, rct::zero().bytes);
-  for (size_t j = 1; j <= M; ++j)
+  // sanity and figure out which proof is longest
+  size_t max_length = 0;
+  for (const Bulletproof *p: proofs)
   {
-    CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(j+2 < zpow.size(), false, "invalid zpow index");
-    sc_mulsub(k.bytes, zpow[j+2].bytes, ip12.bytes, k.bytes);
+    const Bulletproof &proof = *p;
+    CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.V.size() >= 1, false, "V does not have at least one element");
+    CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() == proof.R.size(), false, "Mismatched L and R sizes");
+    CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() > 0, false, "Empty proof");
+
+    max_length = std::max(max_length, proof.L.size());
   }
-  PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_61);
+  CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(max_length < 32, false, "At least one proof is too large");
+  size_t maxMN = 1u << max_length;
 
-  // bos coster is slower for small numbers of calcs, straus seems not
-  if (1)
+  const size_t logN = 6;
+  const size_t N = 1 << logN;
+  rct::key tmp;
+
+  // setup weighted aggregates
+  rct::key Z0 = rct::identity();
+  rct::key z1 = rct::zero();
+  rct::key Z2 = rct::identity();
+  rct::key z3 = rct::zero();
+  rct::keyV z4(maxMN, rct::zero()), z5(maxMN, rct::zero());
+  for (const Bulletproof *p: proofs)
   {
-    PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_61rl_new);
-    sc_muladd(tmp.bytes, z.bytes, ip1y.bytes, k.bytes);
-    std::vector<MultiexpData> multiexp_data;
-    multiexp_data.reserve(3+proof.V.size());
-    multiexp_data.emplace_back(tmp, rct::H);
-    for (size_t j = 0; j < proof.V.size(); j++)
+    const Bulletproof &proof = *p;
+
+    size_t M, logM;
+    for (logM = 0; (M = 1<<logM) <= maxM && M < proof.V.size(); ++logM);
+    CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() == 6+logM, false, "Proof is not the expected size");
+    const size_t MN = M*N;
+    rct::key weight = rct::skGen();
+
+    // Reconstruct the challenges
+    PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_start);
+    rct::key hash_cache = rct::hash_to_scalar(proof.V);
+    rct::key y = hash_cache_mash(hash_cache, proof.A, proof.S);
+    rct::key z = hash_cache = rct::hash_to_scalar(y);
+    rct::key x = hash_cache_mash(hash_cache, z, proof.T1, proof.T2);
+    rct::key x_ip = hash_cache_mash(hash_cache, x, proof.taux, proof.mu, proof.t);
+    PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_start);
+
+    PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_61);
+    // PAPER LINE 61
+    rct::key L61Left, L61Right;
+    rct::addKeys2(L61Left, proof.taux, proof.t, rct::H);
+
+    const rct::keyV zpow = vector_powers(z, M+3);
+
+    rct::key k;
+    const rct::key ip1y = vector_power_sum(y, MN);
+    sc_mulsub(k.bytes, zpow[2].bytes, ip1y.bytes, rct::zero().bytes);
+    for (size_t j = 1; j <= M; ++j)
     {
-      multiexp_data.emplace_back(zpow[j+2], proof.V[j]);
+      CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(j+2 < zpow.size(), false, "invalid zpow index");
+      sc_mulsub(k.bytes, zpow[j+2].bytes, ip12.bytes, k.bytes);
     }
-    multiexp_data.emplace_back(x, proof.T1);
-    rct::key xsq;
-    sc_mul(xsq.bytes, x.bytes, x.bytes);
-    multiexp_data.emplace_back(xsq, proof.T2);
-    L61Right = multiexp(multiexp_data, false);
-    PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_61rl_new);
-  }
-  else
-  {
-    PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_61rl_old);
-    sc_muladd(tmp.bytes, z.bytes, ip1y.bytes, k.bytes);
-    L61Right = rct::scalarmultKey(rct::H, tmp);
-    ge_p3 L61Right_p3;
-    CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(ge_frombytes_vartime(&L61Right_p3, L61Right.bytes) == 0, "ge_frombytes_vartime failed");
-    for (size_t j = 0; j+1 < proof.V.size(); j += 2)
+    PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_61);
+
+    // bos coster is slower for small numbers of calcs, straus seems not
+    if (1)
     {
-      CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(j+2+1 < zpow.size(), false, "invalid zpow index");
-      ge_dsmp precomp0, precomp1;
-      rct::precomp(precomp0, j < proof.V.size() ? proof.V[j] : rct::identity());
-      rct::precomp(precomp1, j+1 < proof.V.size() ? proof.V[j+1] : rct::identity());
-      rct::addKeys3acc_p3(&L61Right_p3, zpow[j+2], precomp0, zpow[j+2+1], precomp1);
+      PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_61rl_new);
+      sc_muladd(tmp.bytes, z.bytes, ip1y.bytes, k.bytes);
+      std::vector<MultiexpData> multiexp_data;
+      multiexp_data.reserve(3+proof.V.size());
+      multiexp_data.emplace_back(tmp, rct::H);
+      for (size_t j = 0; j < proof.V.size(); j++)
+      {
+        multiexp_data.emplace_back(zpow[j+2], proof.V[j]);
+      }
+      multiexp_data.emplace_back(x, proof.T1);
+      rct::key xsq;
+      sc_mul(xsq.bytes, x.bytes, x.bytes);
+      multiexp_data.emplace_back(xsq, proof.T2);
+      L61Right = multiexp(multiexp_data, false);
+      PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_61rl_new);
     }
-    for (size_t j = proof.V.size() & 0xfffffffe; j < M; j++)
+    else
     {
-      CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(j+2 < zpow.size(), false, "invalid zpow index");
-      // faster equivalent to:
-      // tmp = rct::scalarmultKey(j < proof.V.size() ? proof.V[j] : rct::identity(), zpow[j+2]);
-      // rct::addKeys(L61Right, L61Right, tmp);
-      if (j < proof.V.size())
-        addKeys_acc_p3(&L61Right_p3, zpow[j+2], proof.V[j]);
-    }
-
-    addKeys_acc_p3(&L61Right_p3, x, proof.T1);
-
-    rct::key xsq;
-    sc_mul(xsq.bytes, x.bytes, x.bytes);
-    addKeys_acc_p3(&L61Right_p3, xsq, proof.T2);
-    ge_p3_tobytes(L61Right.bytes, &L61Right_p3);
-    PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_61rl_old);
-  }
-
-  if (!(L61Right == L61Left))
-  {
-    MERROR("Verification failure at step 1");
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_62);
-  // PAPER LINE 62
-  rct::key P = rct::addKeys(proof.A, rct::scalarmultKey(proof.S, x));
-  PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_62);
+      PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_61rl_old);
+      sc_muladd(tmp.bytes, z.bytes, ip1y.bytes, k.bytes);
+      L61Right = rct::scalarmultKey(rct::H, tmp);
+      ge_p3 L61Right_p3;
+      CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(ge_frombytes_vartime(&L61Right_p3, L61Right.bytes) == 0, "ge_frombytes_vartime failed");
+      for (size_t j = 0; j+1 < proof.V.size(); j += 2)
+      {
+        CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(j+2+1 < zpow.size(), false, "invalid zpow index");
+        ge_dsmp precomp0, precomp1;
+        rct::precomp(precomp0, j < proof.V.size() ? proof.V[j] : rct::identity());
+        rct::precomp(precomp1, j+1 < proof.V.size() ? proof.V[j+1] : rct::identity());
+        rct::addKeys3acc_p3(&L61Right_p3, zpow[j+2], precomp0, zpow[j+2+1], precomp1);
+      }
+      for (size_t j = proof.V.size() & 0xfffffffe; j < M; j++)
+      {
+        CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(j+2 < zpow.size(), false, "invalid zpow index");
+        // faster equivalent to:
+        // tmp = rct::scalarmultKey(j < proof.V.size() ? proof.V[j] : rct::identity(), zpow[j+2]);
+        // rct::addKeys(L61Right, L61Right, tmp);
+        if (j < proof.V.size())
+          addKeys_acc_p3(&L61Right_p3, zpow[j+2], proof.V[j]);
+      }
 
-  // Compute the number of rounds for the inner product
-  const size_t rounds = logM+logN;
-  CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rounds > 0, false, "Zero rounds");
+      addKeys_acc_p3(&L61Right_p3, x, proof.T1);
 
-  PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_21_22);
-  // PAPER LINES 21-22
-  // The inner product challenges are computed per round
-  rct::keyV w(rounds);
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < rounds; ++i)
-  {
-    w[i] = hash_cache_mash(hash_cache, proof.L[i], proof.R[i]);
-  }
-  PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_21_22);
+      rct::key xsq;
+      sc_mul(xsq.bytes, x.bytes, x.bytes);
+      addKeys_acc_p3(&L61Right_p3, xsq, proof.T2);
+      ge_p3_tobytes(L61Right.bytes, &L61Right_p3);
+      PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_61rl_old);
+    }
 
-  PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_24_25);
-  // Basically PAPER LINES 24-25
-  // Compute the curvepoints from G[i] and H[i]
-  rct::key yinvpow = rct::identity();
-  rct::key ypow = rct::identity();
+    if (!(L61Right == L61Left))
+    {
+      MERROR("Verification failure at step 1");
+      return false;
+    }
 
-  PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_24_25_invert);
-  const rct::key yinv = invert(y);
-  rct::keyV winv(rounds);
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < rounds; ++i)
-    winv[i] = invert(w[i]);
-  PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_24_25_invert);
+    PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_62);
+    // PAPER LINE 62
+    rct::addKeys(Z0, Z0, rct::scalarmultKey(rct::addKeys(proof.A, rct::scalarmultKey(proof.S, x)), weight));
+    PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_62);
 
-  std::vector<MultiexpData> multiexp_data;
-  multiexp_data.clear();
-  multiexp_data.reserve(MN*2);
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < MN; ++i)
-  {
-    // Convert the index to binary IN REVERSE and construct the scalar exponent
-    rct::key g_scalar = proof.a;
-    rct::key h_scalar;
-    sc_mul(h_scalar.bytes, proof.b.bytes, yinvpow.bytes);
+    // Compute the number of rounds for the inner product
+    const size_t rounds = logM+logN;
+    CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rounds > 0, false, "Zero rounds");
 
-    for (size_t j = rounds; j-- > 0; )
+    PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_21_22);
+    // PAPER LINES 21-22
+    // The inner product challenges are computed per round
+    rct::keyV w(rounds);
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < rounds; ++i)
+    {
+      w[i] = hash_cache_mash(hash_cache, proof.L[i], proof.R[i]);
+    }
+    PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_21_22);
+
+    PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_24_25);
+    // Basically PAPER LINES 24-25
+    // Compute the curvepoints from G[i] and H[i]
+    rct::key yinvpow = rct::identity();
+    rct::key ypow = rct::identity();
+
+    PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_24_25_invert);
+    const rct::key yinv = invert(y);
+    rct::keyV winv(rounds);
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < rounds; ++i)
+      winv[i] = invert(w[i]);
+    PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_24_25_invert);
+
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < MN; ++i)
     {
-      size_t J = w.size() - j - 1;
+      // Convert the index to binary IN REVERSE and construct the scalar exponent
+      rct::key g_scalar = proof.a;
+      rct::key h_scalar;
+      sc_mul(h_scalar.bytes, proof.b.bytes, yinvpow.bytes);
 
-      if ((i & (((size_t)1)<<j)) == 0)
+      for (size_t j = rounds; j-- > 0; )
       {
-        sc_mul(g_scalar.bytes, g_scalar.bytes, winv[J].bytes);
-        sc_mul(h_scalar.bytes, h_scalar.bytes, w[J].bytes);
+        size_t J = w.size() - j - 1;
+
+        if ((i & (((size_t)1)<<j)) == 0)
+        {
+          sc_mul(g_scalar.bytes, g_scalar.bytes, winv[J].bytes);
+          sc_mul(h_scalar.bytes, h_scalar.bytes, w[J].bytes);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+          sc_mul(g_scalar.bytes, g_scalar.bytes, w[J].bytes);
+          sc_mul(h_scalar.bytes, h_scalar.bytes, winv[J].bytes);
+        }
       }
-      else
+
+      // Adjust the scalars using the exponents from PAPER LINE 62
+      sc_add(g_scalar.bytes, g_scalar.bytes, z.bytes);
+      CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(2+i/N < zpow.size(), false, "invalid zpow index");
+      CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(i%N < twoN.size(), false, "invalid twoN index");
+      sc_mul(tmp.bytes, zpow[2+i/N].bytes, twoN[i%N].bytes);
+      sc_muladd(tmp.bytes, z.bytes, ypow.bytes, tmp.bytes);
+      sc_mulsub(h_scalar.bytes, tmp.bytes, yinvpow.bytes, h_scalar.bytes);
+
+      sc_muladd(z4[i].bytes, g_scalar.bytes, weight.bytes, z4[i].bytes);
+      sc_muladd(z5[i].bytes, h_scalar.bytes, weight.bytes, z5[i].bytes);
+
+      if (i != MN-1)
       {
-        sc_mul(g_scalar.bytes, g_scalar.bytes, w[J].bytes);
-        sc_mul(h_scalar.bytes, h_scalar.bytes, winv[J].bytes);
+        sc_mul(yinvpow.bytes, yinvpow.bytes, yinv.bytes);
+        sc_mul(ypow.bytes, ypow.bytes, y.bytes);
       }
     }
 
-    // Adjust the scalars using the exponents from PAPER LINE 62
-    sc_add(g_scalar.bytes, g_scalar.bytes, z.bytes);
-    CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(2+i/N < zpow.size(), false, "invalid zpow index");
-    CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(i%N < twoN.size(), false, "invalid twoN index");
-    sc_mul(tmp.bytes, zpow[2+i/N].bytes, twoN[i%N].bytes);
-    sc_muladd(tmp.bytes, z.bytes, ypow.bytes, tmp.bytes);
-    sc_mulsub(h_scalar.bytes, tmp.bytes, yinvpow.bytes, h_scalar.bytes);
+    PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_24_25);
 
-    multiexp_data.emplace_back(g_scalar, Gi_p3[i]);
-    multiexp_data.emplace_back(h_scalar, Hi_p3[i]);
+    // PAPER LINE 26
+    PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_26_new);
+    std::vector<MultiexpData> multiexp_data;
+    multiexp_data.reserve(2*rounds);
 
-    if (i != MN-1)
+    sc_muladd(z1.bytes, proof.mu.bytes, weight.bytes, z1.bytes);
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < rounds; ++i)
     {
-      sc_mul(yinvpow.bytes, yinvpow.bytes, yinv.bytes);
-      sc_mul(ypow.bytes, ypow.bytes, y.bytes);
+      sc_mul(tmp.bytes, w[i].bytes, w[i].bytes);
+      multiexp_data.emplace_back(tmp, proof.L[i]);
+      sc_mul(tmp.bytes, winv[i].bytes, winv[i].bytes);
+      multiexp_data.emplace_back(tmp, proof.R[i]);
     }
+    rct::key acc = multiexp(multiexp_data, false);
+    rct::addKeys(Z2, Z2, rct::scalarmultKey(acc, weight));
+    sc_mulsub(tmp.bytes, proof.a.bytes, proof.b.bytes, proof.t.bytes);
+    sc_mul(tmp.bytes, tmp.bytes, x_ip.bytes);
+    sc_muladd(z3.bytes, tmp.bytes, weight.bytes, z3.bytes);
+    PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_26_new);
   }
 
-  rct::key inner_prod = multiexp(multiexp_data, true);
-  PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_24_25);
-
-  // PAPER LINE 26
-  rct::key pprime;
-  PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_line_26_new);
-  multiexp_data.clear();
-  multiexp_data.reserve(1+2*rounds);
+  // now check all proofs at once
+  PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_step2_check);
+  rct::key Y = Z0;
+  sc_sub(tmp.bytes, rct::zero().bytes, z1.bytes);
+  rct::addKeys(Y, Y, rct::scalarmultBase(tmp));
+  rct::addKeys(Y, Y, Z2);
+  rct::addKeys(Y, Y, rct::scalarmultKey(rct::H, z3));
 
-  sc_sub(tmp.bytes, rct::zero().bytes, proof.mu.bytes);
-  rct::addKeys(pprime, P, rct::scalarmultBase(tmp));
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < rounds; ++i)
+  std::vector<MultiexpData> multiexp_data;
+  multiexp_data.reserve(2 * maxMN);
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < maxMN; ++i)
   {
-    sc_mul(tmp.bytes, w[i].bytes, w[i].bytes);
-    sc_mul(tmp2.bytes, winv[i].bytes, winv[i].bytes);
-    multiexp_data.emplace_back(tmp, proof.L[i]);
-    multiexp_data.emplace_back(tmp2, proof.R[i]);
+    sc_sub(tmp.bytes, rct::zero().bytes, z4[i].bytes);
+    multiexp_data.emplace_back(tmp, Gi_p3[i]);
+    sc_sub(tmp.bytes, rct::zero().bytes, z5[i].bytes);
+    multiexp_data.emplace_back(tmp, Hi_p3[i]);
   }
-  sc_mul(tmp.bytes, proof.t.bytes, x_ip.bytes);
-  multiexp_data.emplace_back(tmp, rct::H);
-  addKeys(pprime, pprime, multiexp(multiexp_data, false));
-  PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_line_26_new);
-
-  PERF_TIMER_START_BP(VERIFY_step2_check);
-  sc_mul(tmp.bytes, proof.a.bytes, proof.b.bytes);
-  sc_mul(tmp.bytes, tmp.bytes, x_ip.bytes);
-  tmp = rct::scalarmultKey(rct::H, tmp);
-  rct::addKeys(tmp, tmp, inner_prod);
+  rct::addKeys(Y, Y, multiexp(multiexp_data, true));
   PERF_TIMER_STOP(VERIFY_step2_check);
-  if (!(pprime == tmp))
+
+  if (!(Y == rct::identity()))
   {
     MERROR("Verification failure at step 2");
     return false;
@@ -1111,4 +1140,19 @@ bool bulletproof_VERIFY(const Bulletproof &proof)
   return true;
 }
 
+bool bulletproof_VERIFY(const std::vector<Bulletproof> &proofs)
+{
+  std::vector<const Bulletproof*> proof_pointers;
+  for (const Bulletproof &proof: proofs)
+    proof_pointers.push_back(&proof);
+  return bulletproof_VERIFY(proof_pointers);
+}
+
+bool bulletproof_VERIFY(const Bulletproof &proof)
+{
+  std::vector<const Bulletproof*> proofs;
+  proofs.push_back(&proof);
+  return bulletproof_VERIFY(proofs);
+}
+
 }
diff --git a/src/ringct/bulletproofs.h b/src/ringct/bulletproofs.h
index 3dfa38b12..b86202ccc 100644
--- a/src/ringct/bulletproofs.h
+++ b/src/ringct/bulletproofs.h
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ Bulletproof bulletproof_PROVE(uint64_t v, const rct::key &gamma);
 Bulletproof bulletproof_PROVE(const rct::keyV &v, const rct::keyV &gamma);
 Bulletproof bulletproof_PROVE(const std::vector<uint64_t> &v, const rct::keyV &gamma);
 bool bulletproof_VERIFY(const Bulletproof &proof);
+bool bulletproof_VERIFY(const std::vector<const Bulletproof*> &proofs);
+bool bulletproof_VERIFY(const std::vector<Bulletproof> &proofs);
 
 }
 
diff --git a/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp b/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp
index 6dcb203bf..2e2b07fcc 100644
--- a/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp
+++ b/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp
@@ -70,6 +70,13 @@ namespace rct {
       catch (...) { return false; }
     }
 
+    bool verBulletproof(const std::vector<const Bulletproof*> &proofs)
+    {
+      try { return bulletproof_VERIFY(proofs); }
+      // we can get deep throws from ge_frombytes_vartime if input isn't valid
+      catch (...) { return false; }
+    }
+
     //Borromean (c.f. gmax/andytoshi's paper)
     boroSig genBorromean(const key64 x, const key64 P1, const key64 P2, const bits indices) {
         key64 L[2], alpha;
@@ -918,15 +925,23 @@ namespace rct {
 
     //ver RingCT simple
     //assumes only post-rct style inputs (at least for max anonymity)
-    bool verRctSimple(const rctSig & rv, bool semantics) {
+    bool verRctSemanticsSimple(const std::vector<const rctSig*> & rvv) {
       try
       {
-        PERF_TIMER(verRctSimple);
+        PERF_TIMER(verRctSemanticsSimple);
 
-        CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "verRctSimple called on non simple rctSig");
-        const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
-        if (semantics)
+        tools::threadpool& tpool = tools::threadpool::getInstance();
+        tools::threadpool::waiter waiter;
+        std::deque<bool> results;
+        std::vector<const Bulletproof*> proofs;
+        size_t max_non_bp_proofs = 0, offset = 0;
+
+        for (const rctSig *rvp: rvv)
         {
+          CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rvp, false, "rctSig pointer is NULL");
+          const rctSig &rv = *rvp;
+          CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "verRctSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig");
+          const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
           if (bulletproof)
           {
             CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and bulletproofs");
@@ -940,28 +955,22 @@ namespace rct {
             CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.pseudoOuts.empty(), false, "rv.p.pseudoOuts is not empty");
           }
           CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.ecdhInfo");
-        }
-        else
-        {
-          // semantics check is early, and mixRing/MGs aren't resolved yet
-          if (bulletproof)
-            CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.pseudoOuts.size() == rv.mixRing.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of rv.p.pseudoOuts and mixRing");
-          else
-            CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.pseudoOuts.size() == rv.mixRing.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of rv.pseudoOuts and mixRing");
-        }
 
-        const size_t threads = std::max(rv.outPk.size(), rv.mixRing.size());
+          if (!bulletproof)
+            max_non_bp_proofs += rv.p.rangeSigs.size();
+        }
 
-        std::deque<bool> results(threads);
-        tools::threadpool& tpool = tools::threadpool::getInstance();
-        tools::threadpool::waiter waiter;
+        results.resize(max_non_bp_proofs);
+        for (const rctSig *rvp: rvv)
+        {
+          const rctSig &rv = *rvp;
 
-        const keyV &pseudoOuts = bulletproof ? rv.p.pseudoOuts : rv.pseudoOuts;
+          const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
+          const keyV &pseudoOuts = bulletproof ? rv.p.pseudoOuts : rv.pseudoOuts;
 
-        if (semantics) {
           key sumOutpks = identity();
           for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++) {
-              addKeys(sumOutpks, sumOutpks, rv.outPk[i].mask);
+            addKeys(sumOutpks, sumOutpks, rv.outPk[i].mask);
           }
           DP(sumOutpks);
           key txnFeeKey = scalarmultH(d2h(rv.txnFee));
@@ -969,50 +978,100 @@ namespace rct {
 
           key sumPseudoOuts = identity();
           for (size_t i = 0 ; i < pseudoOuts.size() ; i++) {
-              addKeys(sumPseudoOuts, sumPseudoOuts, pseudoOuts[i]);
+            addKeys(sumPseudoOuts, sumPseudoOuts, pseudoOuts[i]);
           }
           DP(sumPseudoOuts);
 
           //check pseudoOuts vs Outs..
           if (!equalKeys(sumPseudoOuts, sumOutpks)) {
-              LOG_PRINT_L1("Sum check failed");
-              return false;
+            LOG_PRINT_L1("Sum check failed");
+            return false;
           }
 
-          results.clear();
-          results.resize(bulletproof ? rv.p.bulletproofs.size() : rv.outPk.size());
           if (bulletproof)
+          {
             for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.p.bulletproofs.size(); i++)
-              tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { results[i] = verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs[i]); });
+              proofs.push_back(&rv.p.bulletproofs[i]);
+          }
           else
+          {
             for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.p.rangeSigs.size(); i++)
-              tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { results[i] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); });
-          waiter.wait(&tpool);
-
-          for (size_t i = 0; i < results.size(); ++i) {
-            if (!results[i]) {
-              LOG_PRINT_L1("Range proof verified failed for proof " << i);
-              return false;
-            }
+              tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i, offset] { results[i+offset] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); });
+            offset += rv.p.rangeSigs.size();
           }
         }
-        else {
-          const key message = get_pre_mlsag_hash(rv, hw::get_device("default"));
-
-          results.clear();
-          results.resize(rv.mixRing.size());
-          for (size_t i = 0 ; i < rv.mixRing.size() ; i++) {
-            tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] {
-                results[i] = verRctMGSimple(message, rv.p.MGs[i], rv.mixRing[i], pseudoOuts[i]);
-            }, true);
+        if (!proofs.empty() && !verBulletproof(proofs))
+        {
+          LOG_PRINT_L1("Aggregate range proof verified failed");
+          return false;
+        }
+
+        waiter.wait(&tpool);
+        for (size_t i = 0; i < results.size(); ++i) {
+          if (!results[i]) {
+            LOG_PRINT_L1("Range proof verified failed for proof " << i);
+            return false;
           }
-          waiter.wait(&tpool);
+        }
 
-          for (size_t i = 0; i < results.size(); ++i) {
-            if (!results[i]) {
-              LOG_PRINT_L1("verRctMGSimple failed for input " << i);
-              return false;
-            }
+        return true;
+      }
+      // we can get deep throws from ge_frombytes_vartime if input isn't valid
+      catch (const std::exception &e)
+      {
+        LOG_PRINT_L1("Error in verRctSemanticsSimple: " << e.what());
+        return false;
+      }
+      catch (...)
+      {
+        LOG_PRINT_L1("Error in verRctSemanticsSimple, but not an actual exception");
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+
+    bool verRctSemanticsSimple(const rctSig & rv)
+    {
+      return verRctSemanticsSimple(std::vector<const rctSig*>(1, &rv));
+    }
+
+    //ver RingCT simple
+    //assumes only post-rct style inputs (at least for max anonymity)
+    bool verRctNonSemanticsSimple(const rctSig & rv) {
+      try
+      {
+        PERF_TIMER(verRctNonSemanticsSimple);
+
+        CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "verRctNonSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig");
+        const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
+        // semantics check is early, and mixRing/MGs aren't resolved yet
+        if (bulletproof)
+          CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.pseudoOuts.size() == rv.mixRing.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of rv.p.pseudoOuts and mixRing");
+        else
+          CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.pseudoOuts.size() == rv.mixRing.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of rv.pseudoOuts and mixRing");
+
+        const size_t threads = std::max(rv.outPk.size(), rv.mixRing.size());
+
+        std::deque<bool> results(threads);
+        tools::threadpool& tpool = tools::threadpool::getInstance();
+        tools::threadpool::waiter waiter;
+
+        const keyV &pseudoOuts = bulletproof ? rv.p.pseudoOuts : rv.pseudoOuts;
+
+        const key message = get_pre_mlsag_hash(rv, hw::get_device("default"));
+
+        results.clear();
+        results.resize(rv.mixRing.size());
+        for (size_t i = 0 ; i < rv.mixRing.size() ; i++) {
+          tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] {
+              results[i] = verRctMGSimple(message, rv.p.MGs[i], rv.mixRing[i], pseudoOuts[i]);
+          });
+        }
+        waiter.wait(&tpool);
+
+        for (size_t i = 0; i < results.size(); ++i) {
+          if (!results[i]) {
+            LOG_PRINT_L1("verRctMGSimple failed for input " << i);
+            return false;
           }
         }
 
@@ -1021,12 +1080,12 @@ namespace rct {
       // we can get deep throws from ge_frombytes_vartime if input isn't valid
       catch (const std::exception &e)
       {
-        LOG_PRINT_L1("Error in verRct: " << e.what());
+        LOG_PRINT_L1("Error in verRctNonSemanticsSimple: " << e.what());
         return false;
       }
       catch (...)
       {
-        LOG_PRINT_L1("Error in verRct, but not an actual exception");
+        LOG_PRINT_L1("Error in verRctNonSemanticsSimple, but not an actual exception");
         return false;
       }
     }
diff --git a/src/ringct/rctSigs.h b/src/ringct/rctSigs.h
index 9a66310c7..d1090ca77 100644
--- a/src/ringct/rctSigs.h
+++ b/src/ringct/rctSigs.h
@@ -125,8 +125,10 @@ namespace rct {
     rctSig genRctSimple(const key & message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & inamounts, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & outamounts, xmr_amount txnFee, const ctkeyM & mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const std::vector<multisig_kLRki> *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, const std::vector<unsigned int> & index, ctkeyV &outSk, RangeProofType range_proof_type, hw::device &hwdev);
     bool verRct(const rctSig & rv, bool semantics);
     static inline bool verRct(const rctSig & rv) { return verRct(rv, true) && verRct(rv, false); }
-    bool verRctSimple(const rctSig & rv, bool semantics);
-    static inline bool verRctSimple(const rctSig & rv) { return verRctSimple(rv, true) && verRctSimple(rv, false); }
+    bool verRctSemanticsSimple(const rctSig & rv);
+    bool verRctSemanticsSimple(const std::vector<const rctSig*> & rv);
+    bool verRctNonSemanticsSimple(const rctSig & rv);
+    static inline bool verRctSimple(const rctSig & rv) { return verRctSemanticsSimple(rv) && verRctNonSemanticsSimple(rv); }
     xmr_amount decodeRct(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key & mask, hw::device &hwdev);
     xmr_amount decodeRct(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, hw::device &hwdev);
     xmr_amount decodeRctSimple(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key & mask, hw::device &hwdev);