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| author | anonimal <anonimal@getmonero.org> | 2019-03-09 09:11:44 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | moneromooo-monero <moneromooo-monero@users.noreply.github.com> | 2019-06-14 08:47:05 +0000 |
| commit | 8f66b7053a8e4521fdd68c1d74718e73345fb158 (patch) | |
| tree | b669995624bedf1c4377c32d1183dede4545434d /src/cryptonote_protocol/cryptonote_protocol_handler.h | |
| parent | epee: basic sanity check on allocation size from untrusted source (diff) | |
| download | monero-8f66b7053a8e4521fdd68c1d74718e73345fb158.tar.xz | |
cryptonote_protocol_handler: prevent potential DoS
Essentially, one can send such a large amount of IDs that core exhausts
all free memory. This issue can theoretically be exploited using very
large CN blockchains, such as Monero.
This is a partial fix. Thanks and credit given to CryptoNote author
'cryptozoidberg' for collaboration and the fix. Also thanks to
'moneromooo'. Referencing HackerOne report #506595.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/cryptonote_protocol/cryptonote_protocol_handler.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/cryptonote_protocol/cryptonote_protocol_handler.h | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/cryptonote_protocol/cryptonote_protocol_handler.h b/src/cryptonote_protocol/cryptonote_protocol_handler.h index 0927b5d7f..f1fd69960 100644 --- a/src/cryptonote_protocol/cryptonote_protocol_handler.h +++ b/src/cryptonote_protocol/cryptonote_protocol_handler.h @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ PUSH_WARNINGS DISABLE_VS_WARNINGS(4355) #define LOCALHOST_INT 2130706433 +#define CURRENCY_PROTOCOL_MAX_BLOCKS_REQUEST_COUNT 500 namespace cryptonote { |