Updates InProofV1, OutProofV1, and ReserveProofV1 to new V2 variants that include all public proof parameters in Schnorr challenges, along with hash function domain separators. Includes new randomized unit tests.

1 files changed, 128 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto.cpp b/src/crypto/crypto.cpp
index 1e4a6d33f..4cfe83d54 100644
--- a/src/crypto/crypto.cpp
+++ b/src/crypto/crypto.cpp
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@
 #include "crypto.h"
 #include "hash.h"
 
+#include "cryptonote_config.h"
+
 namespace {
   static void local_abort(const char *msg)
   {
@@ -261,11 +263,24 @@ namespace crypto {
     ec_point comm;
   };
 
+  // Used in v1 tx proofs
+  struct s_comm_2_v1 {
+    hash msg;
+    ec_point D;
+    ec_point X;
+    ec_point Y;
+  };
+
+  // Used in v1/v2 tx proofs
   struct s_comm_2 {
     hash msg;
     ec_point D;
     ec_point X;
     ec_point Y;
+    hash sep; // domain separation
+    ec_point R;
+    ec_point A;
+    ec_point B;
   };
 
   void crypto_ops::generate_signature(const hash &prefix_hash, const public_key &pub, const secret_key &sec, signature &sig) {
@@ -321,6 +336,86 @@ namespace crypto {
     return sc_isnonzero(&c) == 0;
   }
 
+  // Generate a proof of knowledge of `r` such that (`R = rG` and `D = rA`) or (`R = rB` and `D = rA`) via a Schnorr proof
+  // This handles use cases for both standard addresses and subaddresses
+  //
+  // NOTE: This generates old v1 proofs, and is for TESTING ONLY
+  void crypto_ops::generate_tx_proof_v1(const hash &prefix_hash, const public_key &R, const public_key &A, const boost::optional<public_key> &B, const public_key &D, const secret_key &r, signature &sig) {
+    // sanity check
+    ge_p3 R_p3;
+    ge_p3 A_p3;
+    ge_p3 B_p3;
+    ge_p3 D_p3;
+    if (ge_frombytes_vartime(&R_p3, &R) != 0) throw std::runtime_error("tx pubkey is invalid");
+    if (ge_frombytes_vartime(&A_p3, &A) != 0) throw std::runtime_error("recipient view pubkey is invalid");
+    if (B && ge_frombytes_vartime(&B_p3, &*B) != 0) throw std::runtime_error("recipient spend pubkey is invalid");
+    if (ge_frombytes_vartime(&D_p3, &D) != 0) throw std::runtime_error("key derivation is invalid");
+#if !defined(NDEBUG)
+    {
+      assert(sc_check(&r) == 0);
+      // check R == r*G or R == r*B
+      public_key dbg_R;
+      if (B)
+      {
+        ge_p2 dbg_R_p2;
+        ge_scalarmult(&dbg_R_p2, &r, &B_p3);
+        ge_tobytes(&dbg_R, &dbg_R_p2);
+      }
+      else
+      {
+        ge_p3 dbg_R_p3;
+        ge_scalarmult_base(&dbg_R_p3, &r);
+        ge_p3_tobytes(&dbg_R, &dbg_R_p3);
+      }
+      assert(R == dbg_R);
+      // check D == r*A
+      ge_p2 dbg_D_p2;
+      ge_scalarmult(&dbg_D_p2, &r, &A_p3);
+      public_key dbg_D;
+      ge_tobytes(&dbg_D, &dbg_D_p2);
+      assert(D == dbg_D);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    // pick random k
+    ec_scalar k;
+    random_scalar(k);
+    
+    s_comm_2_v1 buf;
+    buf.msg = prefix_hash;
+    buf.D = D;
+    
+    if (B)
+    {
+      // compute X = k*B
+      ge_p2 X_p2;
+      ge_scalarmult(&X_p2, &k, &B_p3);
+      ge_tobytes(&buf.X, &X_p2);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+      // compute X = k*G
+      ge_p3 X_p3;
+      ge_scalarmult_base(&X_p3, &k);
+      ge_p3_tobytes(&buf.X, &X_p3);
+    }
+    
+    // compute Y = k*A
+    ge_p2 Y_p2;
+    ge_scalarmult(&Y_p2, &k, &A_p3);
+    ge_tobytes(&buf.Y, &Y_p2);
+
+    // sig.c = Hs(Msg || D || X || Y) 
+    hash_to_scalar(&buf, sizeof(buf), sig.c);
+
+    // sig.r = k - sig.c*r
+    sc_mulsub(&sig.r, &sig.c, &unwrap(r), &k);
+  }
+
+  // Generate a proof of knowledge of `r` such that (`R = rG` and `D = rA`) or (`R = rB` and `D = rA`) via a Schnorr proof
+  // This handles use cases for both standard addresses and subaddresses
+  //
+  // Generates only proofs for InProofV2 and OutProofV2
   void crypto_ops::generate_tx_proof(const hash &prefix_hash, const public_key &R, const public_key &A, const boost::optional<public_key> &B, const public_key &D, const secret_key &r, signature &sig) {
     // sanity check
     ge_p3 R_p3;
@@ -362,10 +457,20 @@ namespace crypto {
     ec_scalar k;
     random_scalar(k);
     
+    // if B is not present
+    static const ec_point zero = {{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }};
+
     s_comm_2 buf;
     buf.msg = prefix_hash;
     buf.D = D;
-
+    buf.R = R;
+    buf.A = A;
+    if (B)
+        buf.B = *B;
+    else
+        buf.B = zero;
+    cn_fast_hash(config::HASH_KEY_TXPROOF_V2, sizeof(config::HASH_KEY_TXPROOF_V2)-1, buf.sep);
+    
     if (B)
     {
       // compute X = k*B
@@ -386,7 +491,7 @@ namespace crypto {
     ge_scalarmult(&Y_p2, &k, &A_p3);
     ge_tobytes(&buf.Y, &Y_p2);
 
-    // sig.c = Hs(Msg || D || X || Y)
+    // sig.c = Hs(Msg || D || X || Y || sep || R || A || B) 
     hash_to_scalar(&buf, sizeof(buf), sig.c);
 
     // sig.r = k - sig.c*r
@@ -395,7 +500,8 @@ namespace crypto {
     memwipe(&k, sizeof(k));
   }
 
-  bool crypto_ops::check_tx_proof(const hash &prefix_hash, const public_key &R, const public_key &A, const boost::optional<public_key> &B, const public_key &D, const signature &sig) {
+  // Verify a proof: either v1 (version == 1) or v2 (version == 2)
+  bool crypto_ops::check_tx_proof(const hash &prefix_hash, const public_key &R, const public_key &A, const boost::optional<public_key> &B, const public_key &D, const signature &sig, const int version) {
     // sanity check
     ge_p3 R_p3;
     ge_p3 A_p3;
@@ -467,14 +573,31 @@ namespace crypto {
     ge_p2 Y_p2;
     ge_p1p1_to_p2(&Y_p2, &Y_p1p1);
 
-    // compute c2 = Hs(Msg || D || X || Y)
+    // Compute hash challenge
+    // for v1, c2 = Hs(Msg || D || X || Y)
+    // for v2, c2 = Hs(Msg || D || X || Y || sep || R || A || B)
+
+    // if B is not present
+    static const ec_point zero = {{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }};
+
     s_comm_2 buf;
     buf.msg = prefix_hash;
     buf.D = D;
+    buf.R = R;
+    buf.A = A;
+    if (B)
+        buf.B = *B;
+    else
+        buf.B = zero;
+    cn_fast_hash(config::HASH_KEY_TXPROOF_V2, sizeof(config::HASH_KEY_TXPROOF_V2)-1, buf.sep);
     ge_tobytes(&buf.X, &X_p2);
     ge_tobytes(&buf.Y, &Y_p2);
     ec_scalar c2;
-    hash_to_scalar(&buf, sizeof(s_comm_2), c2);
+
+    // Hash depends on version
+    if (version == 1) hash_to_scalar(&buf, sizeof(s_comm_2) - 3*sizeof(ec_point) - sizeof(hash), c2);
+    else if (version == 2) hash_to_scalar(&buf, sizeof(s_comm_2), c2);
+    else return false;
 
     // test if c2 == sig.c
     sc_sub(&c2, &c2, &sig.c);