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authoranonimal <anonimal@i2pmail.org>2017-04-21 19:59:13 +0000
committeranonimal <anonimal@i2pmail.org>2017-04-24 20:11:09 +0000
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+# Monero Vulnerability Response Process
+
+## Preamble
+
+Researchers/Hackers: while you research/hack, we ask that you please refrain from committing the following:
+- Denial of Service / Active exploiting against the network
+- Social Engineering of Monero staff or contractors
+- Any physical or electronic attempts against Monero community property and/or data centers
+
+## I. Point of Contacts for Security Issues
+
+```
+ric@getmonero.org
+BDA6 BD70 42B7 21C4 67A9 759D 7455 C5E3 C0CD CEB9
+
+luigi1111@getmonero.org
+8777 AB8F 778E E894 87A2 F8E7 F4AC A018 3641 E010
+
+moneromooo.monero@gmail.com
+48B0 8161 FBDA DFE3 93AD FC3E 686F 0745 4D6C EFC3
+```
+
+## II. Security Response Team
+
+- fluffypony
+- luigi1111
+- moneromooo
+
+## III. Incident Response
+
+1. Researcher submits report via one or both of two methods:
+ - a. Email
+ - b. [HackerOne](https://hackerone.com/monero)
+
+2. Response Team designates a Response Manager who is in charge of the particular report based on availability and/or knowledge-set
+
+3. In no more than 3 working days, Response Team should gratefully respond to researcher using only encrypted, secure channels
+
+4. Response Manager makes inquiries to satisfy any needed information to confirm if submission is indeed a vulnerability
+ - a. If submission proves to be vulnerable, proceed to next step
+ - b. If not vulnerable:
+ - i. Response Manager responds with reasons why submission is not a vulnerability
+ - ii. Response Manager moves discussion to a new or existing ticket on GitHub if necessary
+
+5. If over email, Response Manager opens a HackerOne issue for new submission
+
+6. Establish severity of vulnerability:
+ - a. HIGH: impacts network as a whole, has potential to break entire network, results in the loss of monero, or is on a scale of great catastrophe
+ - b. MEDIUM: impacts individual nodes, wallets, or must be carefully exploited
+ - c. LOW: is not easily exploitable
+
+7. Respond according to the severity of the vulnerability:
+ - a. HIGH severities must be notified on website and reddit /r/Monero within 3 working days of classification
+ - i. The notification should list appropriate steps for users to take, if any
+ - ii. The notification must not include any details that could suggest an exploitation path
+ - iii. The latter takes precedence over the former
+ - b. MEDIUM and HIGH severities will require a Point Release
+ - c. LOW severities will be addressed in the next Regular Release
+
+8. Response Team applies appropriate patch(es)
+ - a. Response Manager designates a PRIVATE git "hotfix branch" to work in
+ - b. Patches are reviewed with the researcher
+ - c. Any messages associated with PUBLIC commits during the time of review should not make reference to the security nature of the PRIVATE branch or its commits
+ - d. Vulnerability announcement is drafted
+ - i. Include the severity of the vulnerability
+ - ii. Include all vulnerable systems/apps/code
+ - iii. Include solutions (if any) if patch cannot be applied
+ - e. Release date is discussed
+
+9. At release date, Response Team coordinates with developers to finalize update:
+ - a. Response Manager propagates the "hotfix branch" to trunk
+ - b. Response Manager includes vulnerability announcement draft in release notes
+ - c. Proceed with the Point or Regular Release
+
+## IV. Post-release Disclosure Process
+
+1. Response Team has 90 days to fulfill all points within section III
+
+2. If the Incident Response process in section III is successfully completed:
+ - a. Response Manager contacts researcher and asks if researcher wishes for credit
+ - b. Finalize vulnerability announcement draft and include the following:
+ - i. Project name and URL
+ - ii. Versions known to be affected
+ - iii. Versions known to be not affected (for example, the vulnerable code was introduced in a recent version, and older versions are therefore unaffected)
+ - iv. Versions not checked
+ - v. Type of vulnerability and its impact
+ - vi. If already obtained or applicable, a CVE-ID
+ - vii. The planned, coordinated release date
+ - viii. Mitigating factors (for example, the vulnerability is only exposed in uncommon, non-default configurations)
+ - ix. Workarounds (configuration changes users can make to reduce their exposure to the vulnerability)
+ - x. If applicable, credits to the original reporter
+ - c. Release finalized vulnerability announcement on website and reddit /r/Monero
+ - d. For HIGH severities, release finalized vulnerability announcement on well-known mailing lists:
+ - i. oss-security@lists.openwall.com
+ - ii. bugtraq@securityfocus.com
+ - e. If applicable, developers request a CVE-ID
+ - i. The commit that applied the fix is made reference too in a future commit and includes a CVE-ID
+
+3. If the Incident Response process in section III is *not* successfully completed:
+ - a. Response Team and developers organize an IRC meeting to discuss why/what points in section III were not resolved and how the team can resolve them in the future
+ - b. Any developer meetings immediately following the incident should include points made in section V
+ - c. If disputes arise about whether or when to disclose information about a vulnerability, the Response Team will publicly discuss the issue via IRC and attempt to reach consensus
+ - d. If consensus on a timely disclosure is not met (no later than 90 days), the researcher (after 90 days) has every right to expose the vulnerability to the public
+
+## V. Incident Analysis
+
+1. Isolate codebase
+ - a. Response Team and developers should coordinate to work on the following:
+ - i. Problematic implementation of classes/libraries/functions, etc.
+ - ii. Focus on apps/distro packaging, etc.
+ - iii. Operator/config error, etc.
+
+2. Auditing
+ - a. Response Team and developers should coordinate to work on the following:
+ - i. Auditing of problem area(s) as discussed in point 1
+ - ii. Generate internal reports and store for future reference
+ - iii. If results are not sensitive, share with the public via IRC or GitHub
+
+3. Response Team has 45 days following completion of section III to ensure completion of section V
+
+## VI. Resolutions
+
+Any further questions or resolutions regarding the incident(s) between the researcher and response + development team after public disclosure can be addressed via the following:
+
+- [GitHub](https://github.com/monero-project/monero/issues/)
+- [HackerOne](https://hackerone.com/monero)
+- [Reddit /r/Monero](https://reddit.com/r/Monero/)
+- IRC
+- Email
+
+## VII. Continuous Improvement
+
+1. Response Team and developers should hold annual meetings to review the previous year's incidents
+
+2. Response Team or designated person(s) should give a brief presentation, including:
+ - a. Areas of Monero affected by the incidents
+ - b. Any network downtime or monetary cost (if any) of the incidents
+ - c. Ways in which the incidents could have been avoided (if any)
+ - d. How effective this process was in dealing with the incidents
+
+3. After the presentation, Response Team and developers should discuss:
+ - a. Potential changes to development processes to reduce future incidents
+ - b. Potential changes to this process to improve future responses