Repo: remove in-tree VRP, link to single-policy VRP

2 files changed, 5 insertions, 143 deletions

diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 3f9b772d1..e23f29df1 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -11,6 +11,11 @@ Portions Copyright (c) 2012-2013, The Cryptonote developers
 - GitHub: [https://github.com/monero-project/monero](https://github.com/monero-project/monero)
 - IRC: [#monero-dev on Freenode](http://webchat.freenode.net/?randomnick=1&channels=%23monero-dev&prompt=1&uio=d4)
 
+## Vulnerability Response
+
+- Our [Vulnerability Response Process](https://github.com/monero-project/meta/blob/master/VULNERABILITY_RESPONSE_PROCESS.md) encourages responsible disclosure
+- We are also available via [HackerOne](https://hackerone.com/monero)
+
 ## Build
 
 | Operating System      | Processor | Status |
diff --git a/VULNERABILITY_RESPONSE_PROCESS.md b/VULNERABILITY_RESPONSE_PROCESS.md
deleted file mode 100644
index eea3a06e7..000000000
--- a/VULNERABILITY_RESPONSE_PROCESS.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
-# Monero Vulnerability Response Process
-
-## Preamble
-
-Researchers/Hackers: while you research/hack, we ask that you please refrain from committing the following:
-- Denial of Service / Active exploiting against the network
-- Social Engineering of Monero staff or contractors
-- Any physical or electronic attempts against Monero community property and/or data centers
-
-## I. Point of Contacts for Security Issues
-
-```
-ric@getmonero.org
-BDA6 BD70 42B7 21C4 67A9  759D 7455 C5E3 C0CD CEB9
-
-luigi1111@getmonero.org
-8777 AB8F 778E E894 87A2  F8E7 F4AC A018 3641 E010
-
-moneromooo.monero@gmail.com
-48B0 8161 FBDA DFE3 93AD  FC3E 686F 0745 4D6C EFC3
-```
-
-## II. Security Response Team
-
-- fluffypony
-- luigi1111
-- moneromooo
-
-## III. Incident Response
-
-1. Researcher submits report via one or both of two methods:
-    - a. Email
-    - b. [HackerOne](https://hackerone.com/monero)
-
-2. Response Team designates a Response Manager who is in charge of the particular report based on availability and/or knowledge-set
-
-3. In no more than 3 working days, Response Team should gratefully respond to researcher using only encrypted, secure channels
-
-4. Response Manager makes inquiries to satisfy any needed information to confirm if submission is indeed a vulnerability
-    - a. If submission proves to be vulnerable, proceed to next step
-    - b. If not vulnerable:
-      - i. Response Manager responds with reasons why submission is not a vulnerability
-      - ii. Response Manager moves discussion to a new or existing ticket on GitHub if necessary
-
-5. If over email, Response Manager opens a HackerOne issue for new submission
-
-6. Establish severity of vulnerability:
-    - a. HIGH: impacts network as a whole, has potential to break entire network, results in the loss of monero, or is on a scale of great catastrophe
-    - b. MEDIUM: impacts individual nodes, wallets, or must be carefully exploited
-    - c. LOW: is not easily exploitable
-
-7. Respond according to the severity of the vulnerability:
-    - a. HIGH severities must be notified on website and reddit /r/Monero within 3 working days of classification
-      - i. The notification should list appropriate steps for users to take, if any
-      - ii. The notification must not include any details that could suggest an exploitation path
-      - iii. The latter takes precedence over the former
-    - b. MEDIUM and HIGH severities will require a Point Release
-    - c. LOW severities will be addressed in the next Regular Release
-
-8. Response Team applies appropriate patch(es)
-    - a. Response Manager designates a PRIVATE git "hotfix branch" to work in
-    - b. Patches are reviewed with the researcher
-    - c. Any messages associated with PUBLIC commits during the time of review should not make reference to the security nature of the PRIVATE branch or its commits
-    - d. Vulnerability announcement is drafted
-      - i. Include the severity of the vulnerability
-      - ii. Include all vulnerable systems/apps/code
-      - iii. Include solutions (if any) if patch cannot be applied
-    - e. Release date is discussed
-
-9. At release date, Response Team coordinates with developers to finalize update:
-    - a. Response Manager propagates the "hotfix branch" to trunk
-    - b. Response Manager includes vulnerability announcement draft in release notes
-    - c. Proceed with the Point or Regular Release
-
-## IV. Post-release Disclosure Process
-
-1. Response Team has 90 days to fulfill all points within section III
-
-2. If the Incident Response process in section III is successfully completed:
-    - a. Response Manager contacts researcher and asks if researcher wishes for credit
-    - b. Finalize vulnerability announcement draft and include the following:
-      - i. Project name and URL
-      - ii. Versions known to be affected
-      - iii. Versions known to be not affected (for example, the vulnerable code was introduced in a recent version, and older versions are therefore unaffected)
-      - iv. Versions not checked
-      - v. Type of vulnerability and its impact
-      - vi. If already obtained or applicable, a CVE-ID
-      - vii. The planned, coordinated release date
-      - viii. Mitigating factors (for example, the vulnerability is only exposed in uncommon, non-default configurations)
-      - ix. Workarounds (configuration changes users can make to reduce their exposure to the vulnerability)
-      - x. If applicable, credits to the original reporter
-    - c. Release finalized vulnerability announcement on website and reddit /r/Monero
-    - d. For HIGH severities, release finalized vulnerability announcement on well-known mailing lists:
-      - i. oss-security@lists.openwall.com
-      - ii. bugtraq@securityfocus.com
-    - e. If applicable, developers request a CVE-ID
-      - i. The commit that applied the fix is made reference too in a future commit and includes a CVE-ID
-
-3. If the Incident Response process in section III is *not* successfully completed:
-    - a. Response Team and developers organize an IRC meeting to discuss why/what points in section III were not resolved and how the team can resolve them in the future
-    - b. Any developer meetings immediately following the incident should include points made in section V
-    - c. If disputes arise about whether or when to disclose information about a vulnerability, the Response Team will publicly discuss the issue via IRC and attempt to reach consensus
-    - d. If consensus on a timely disclosure is not met (no later than 90 days), the researcher (after 90 days) has every right to expose the vulnerability to the public
-
-## V. Incident Analysis
-
-1. Isolate codebase
-    - a. Response Team and developers should coordinate to work on the following:
-      - i. Problematic implementation of classes/libraries/functions, etc.
-      - ii. Focus on apps/distro packaging, etc.
-      - iii. Operator/config error, etc.
-
-2. Auditing
-    - a. Response Team and developers should coordinate to work on the following:
-      - i. Auditing of problem area(s) as discussed in point 1
-      - ii. Generate internal reports and store for future reference
-      - iii. If results are not sensitive, share with the public via IRC or GitHub
-
-3. Response Team has 45 days following completion of section III to ensure completion of section V
-
-## VI. Resolutions
-
-Any further questions or resolutions regarding the incident(s) between the researcher and response + development team after public disclosure can be addressed via the following:
-
-- [GitHub](https://github.com/monero-project/monero/issues/)
-- [HackerOne](https://hackerone.com/monero)
-- [Reddit /r/Monero](https://reddit.com/r/Monero/)
-- IRC
-- Email
-
-## VII. Continuous Improvement
-
-1. Response Team and developers should hold annual meetings to review the previous year's incidents
-
-2. Response Team or designated person(s) should give a brief presentation, including:
-    - a. Areas of Monero affected by the incidents
-    - b. Any network downtime or monetary cost (if any) of the incidents
-    - c. Ways in which the incidents could have been avoided (if any)
-    - d. How effective this process was in dealing with the incidents
-
-3. After the presentation, Response Team and developers should discuss:
-    - a. Potential changes to development processes to reduce future incidents
-    - b. Potential changes to this process to improve future responses