diff options
| author | anonimal <anonimal@getmonero.org> | 2019-03-09 09:11:44 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | moneromooo-monero <moneromooo-monero@users.noreply.github.com> | 2019-06-14 08:48:01 +0000 |
| commit | 3c953d53696d9ccdd195e6a2f02578a154266882 (patch) | |
| tree | ee0004259555955445b28e5c18fe7fe1869a06ca | |
| parent | epee: basic sanity check on allocation size from untrusted source (diff) | |
| download | monero-3c953d53696d9ccdd195e6a2f02578a154266882.tar.xz | |
cryptonote_protocol_handler: prevent potential DoS
Essentially, one can send such a large amount of IDs that core exhausts
all free memory. This issue can theoretically be exploited using very
large CN blockchains, such as Monero.
This is a partial fix. Thanks and credit given to CryptoNote author
'cryptozoidberg' for collaboration and the fix. Also thanks to
'moneromooo'. Referencing HackerOne report #506595.
| -rw-r--r-- | src/cryptonote_protocol/cryptonote_protocol_handler.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/cryptonote_protocol/cryptonote_protocol_handler.inl | 11 |
2 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/cryptonote_protocol/cryptonote_protocol_handler.h b/src/cryptonote_protocol/cryptonote_protocol_handler.h index 0927b5d7f..f1fd69960 100644 --- a/src/cryptonote_protocol/cryptonote_protocol_handler.h +++ b/src/cryptonote_protocol/cryptonote_protocol_handler.h @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ PUSH_WARNINGS DISABLE_VS_WARNINGS(4355) #define LOCALHOST_INT 2130706433 +#define CURRENCY_PROTOCOL_MAX_BLOCKS_REQUEST_COUNT 500 namespace cryptonote { diff --git a/src/cryptonote_protocol/cryptonote_protocol_handler.inl b/src/cryptonote_protocol/cryptonote_protocol_handler.inl index 8958af7c7..0eacc7cd4 100644 --- a/src/cryptonote_protocol/cryptonote_protocol_handler.inl +++ b/src/cryptonote_protocol/cryptonote_protocol_handler.inl @@ -914,6 +914,17 @@ namespace cryptonote int t_cryptonote_protocol_handler<t_core>::handle_request_get_objects(int command, NOTIFY_REQUEST_GET_OBJECTS::request& arg, cryptonote_connection_context& context) { MLOG_P2P_MESSAGE("Received NOTIFY_REQUEST_GET_OBJECTS (" << arg.blocks.size() << " blocks, " << arg.txs.size() << " txes)"); + + if (arg.blocks.size() > CURRENCY_PROTOCOL_MAX_BLOCKS_REQUEST_COUNT) + { + LOG_ERROR_CCONTEXT( + "Requested objects count is too big (" + << arg.blocks.size() << ") expected not more then " + << CURRENCY_PROTOCOL_MAX_BLOCKS_REQUEST_COUNT); + drop_connection(context, false, false); + return 1; + } + NOTIFY_RESPONSE_GET_OBJECTS::request rsp; if(!m_core.handle_get_objects(arg, rsp, context)) { |