Bulletproof aggregated verification and tests

Also constrains bulletproofs to simple rct, for simplicity

21 files changed, 840 insertions, 170 deletions

diff --git a/src/cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_boost_serialization.h b/src/cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_boost_serialization.h
index 143133163..0725a2bb8 100644
--- a/src/cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_boost_serialization.h
+++ b/src/cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_boost_serialization.h
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ namespace boost
     a & x.type;
     if (x.type == rct::RCTTypeNull)
       return;
-    if (x.type != rct::RCTTypeFull && x.type != rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimple && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
+    if (x.type != rct::RCTTypeFull && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimple && x.type != rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
       throw boost::archive::archive_exception(boost::archive::archive_exception::other_exception, "Unsupported rct type");
     // a & x.message; message is not serialized, as it can be reconstructed from the tx data
     // a & x.mixRing; mixRing is not serialized, as it can be reconstructed from the offsets
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ namespace boost
     a & x.type;
     if (x.type == rct::RCTTypeNull)
       return;
-    if (x.type != rct::RCTTypeFull && x.type != rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimple && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
+    if (x.type != rct::RCTTypeFull && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimple && x.type != rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
       throw boost::archive::archive_exception(boost::archive::archive_exception::other_exception, "Unsupported rct type");
     // a & x.message; message is not serialized, as it can be reconstructed from the tx data
     // a & x.mixRing; mixRing is not serialized, as it can be reconstructed from the offsets
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ namespace boost
     if (x.p.rangeSigs.empty())
       a & x.p.bulletproofs;
     a & x.p.MGs;
-    if (x.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
+    if (x.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
       a & x.p.pseudoOuts;
   }
 }
diff --git a/src/cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_format_utils.cpp b/src/cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_format_utils.cpp
index 428be1c9c..524cbf7ae 100644
--- a/src/cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_format_utils.cpp
+++ b/src/cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_format_utils.cpp
@@ -139,18 +139,26 @@ namespace cryptonote
 
       if (!base_only)
       {
-        const bool bulletproof = rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof;
+        const bool bulletproof = rct::is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
         if (bulletproof)
         {
-          if (rv.p.bulletproofs.size() != tx.vout.size())
+          if (rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs) != tx.vout.size())
           {
             LOG_PRINT_L1("Failed to parse transaction from blob, bad bulletproofs size in tx " << get_transaction_hash(tx));
             return false;
           }
-          for (size_t n = 0; n < rv.outPk.size(); ++n)
+          size_t idx = 0;
+          for (size_t n = 0; n < rv.p.bulletproofs.size(); ++n)
           {
-            rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.resize(1);
-            rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V[0] = rv.outPk[n].mask;
+            //rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.resize(1);
+            //rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V[0] = rv.outPk[n].mask;
+            CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.bulletproofs[n].L.size() >= 6, false, "Bad bulletproofs L size"); // at least 64 bits
+            const size_t n_amounts = rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs[n]);
+            CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(idx + n_amounts <= rv.outPk.size(), false, "Internal error filling out V");
+            rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.resize(n_amounts);
+            rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.clear();
+            for (size_t i = 0; i < n_amounts; ++i)
+              rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V[i] = rv.outPk[idx++].mask;
           }
         }
       }
diff --git a/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp b/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp
index 0800409b5..9beb28fbd 100644
--- a/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp
+++ b/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain.cpp
@@ -2597,7 +2597,7 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_outputs(const transaction& tx, tx_verification_context
 
   // from v8, allow bulletproofs
   if (hf_version < 8) {
-    const bool bulletproof = tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof || tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof;
+    const bool bulletproof = rct::is_rct_bulletproof(tx.rct_signatures.type);
     if (bulletproof || !tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty())
     {
       MERROR("Bulletproofs are not allowed before v8");
@@ -2631,7 +2631,7 @@ bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_pr
   rv.message = rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash);
 
   // mixRing - full and simple store it in opposite ways
-  if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof)
+  if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull)
   {
     CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!pubkeys.empty() && !pubkeys[0].empty(), false, "empty pubkeys");
     rv.mixRing.resize(pubkeys[0].size());
@@ -2646,7 +2646,7 @@ bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_pr
       }
     }
   }
-  else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
+  else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
   {
     CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!pubkeys.empty() && !pubkeys[0].empty(), false, "empty pubkeys");
     rv.mixRing.resize(pubkeys.size());
@@ -2665,14 +2665,14 @@ bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_pr
   }
 
   // II
-  if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof)
+  if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull)
   {
     rv.p.MGs.resize(1);
     rv.p.MGs[0].II.resize(tx.vin.size());
     for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.vin.size(); ++n)
       rv.p.MGs[0].II[n] = rct::ki2rct(boost::get<txin_to_key>(tx.vin[n]).k_image);
   }
-  else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
+  else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
   {
     CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.MGs.size() == tx.vin.size(), false, "Bad MGs size");
     for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.vin.size(); ++n)
@@ -2938,7 +2938,7 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc,
       return false;
     }
     case rct::RCTTypeSimple:
-    case rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof:
+    case rct::RCTTypeBulletproof:
     {
       // check all this, either reconstructed (so should really pass), or not
       {
@@ -2996,7 +2996,6 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc,
       break;
     }
     case rct::RCTTypeFull:
-    case rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof:
     {
       // check all this, either reconstructed (so should really pass), or not
       {
@@ -3061,7 +3060,7 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc,
     }
 
     // for bulletproofs, check they're only multi-output after v8
-    if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
+    if (rct::is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type))
     {
       if (hf_version < 8)
       {
diff --git a/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp b/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp
index 4928bb528..f1a666814 100644
--- a/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp
+++ b/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.cpp
@@ -692,26 +692,142 @@ namespace cryptonote
       return false;
     }
 
+    // resolve outPk references in rct txes
+    // outPk aren't the only thing that need resolving for a fully resolved tx,
+    // but outPk (1) are needed now to check range proof semantics, and
+    // (2) do not need access to the blockchain to find data
+    if (tx.version >= 2)
+    {
+      rct::rctSig &rv = tx.rct_signatures;
+      if (rv.outPk.size() != tx.vout.size())
+      {
+        LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Bad outPk size in tx " << tx_hash << ", rejected");
+        tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
+        return false;
+      }
+      for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.rct_signatures.outPk.size(); ++n)
+        rv.outPk[n].dest = rct::pk2rct(boost::get<txout_to_key>(tx.vout[n].target).key);
+
+      const bool bulletproof = rct::is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
+      if (bulletproof)
+      {
+        if (rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs) != tx.vout.size())
+        {
+          LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Bad bulletproofs size in tx " << tx_hash << ", rejected");
+          tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
+          return false;
+        }
+        size_t idx = 0;
+        for (size_t n = 0; n < rv.p.bulletproofs.size(); ++n)
+        {
+          CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.bulletproofs[n].L.size() >= 6, false, "Bad bulletproofs L size"); // at least 64 bits
+          const size_t n_amounts = rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs[n]);
+          CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(idx + n_amounts <= rv.outPk.size(), false, "Internal error filling out V");
+          rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.clear();
+          for (size_t i = 0; i < n_amounts; ++i)
+            rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.push_back(rv.outPk[idx++].mask);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    return true;
+  }
+  //-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  void core::set_semantics_failed(const crypto::hash &tx_hash)
+  {
+    LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Failed to check tx " << tx_hash << " semantic, rejected");
+    bad_semantics_txes_lock.lock();
+    bad_semantics_txes[0].insert(tx_hash);
+    if (bad_semantics_txes[0].size() >= BAD_SEMANTICS_TXES_MAX_SIZE)
+    {
+      std::swap(bad_semantics_txes[0], bad_semantics_txes[1]);
+      bad_semantics_txes[0].clear();
+    }
+    bad_semantics_txes_lock.unlock();
+  }
+  //-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  bool core::handle_incoming_tx_accumulated_batch(std::vector<tx_verification_batch_info> &tx_info, bool keeped_by_block)
+  {
+    bool ret = true;
     if (keeped_by_block && get_blockchain_storage().is_within_compiled_block_hash_area())
     {
       MTRACE("Skipping semantics check for tx kept by block in embedded hash area");
+      return true;
     }
-    else if(!check_tx_semantic(tx, keeped_by_block))
+
+    std::vector<const rct::rctSig*> rvv;
+    for (size_t n = 0; n < tx_info.size(); ++n)
     {
-      LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Failed to check tx " << tx_hash << " semantic, rejected");
-      tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
-      bad_semantics_txes_lock.lock();
-      bad_semantics_txes[0].insert(tx_hash);
-      if (bad_semantics_txes[0].size() >= BAD_SEMANTICS_TXES_MAX_SIZE)
+      if (!check_tx_semantic(*tx_info[n].tx, keeped_by_block))
       {
-        std::swap(bad_semantics_txes[0], bad_semantics_txes[1]);
-        bad_semantics_txes[0].clear();
+        set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
+        tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
+        tx_info[n].result = false;
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      if (tx_info[n].tx->version < 2)
+        continue;
+      const rct::rctSig &rv = tx_info[n].tx->rct_signatures;
+      switch (rv.type) {
+        case rct::RCTTypeNull:
+          // coinbase should not come here, so we reject for all other types
+          MERROR_VER("Unexpected Null rctSig type");
+          set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
+          tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
+          tx_info[n].result = false;
+          break;
+        case rct::RCTTypeSimple:
+          if (!rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rv))
+          {
+            MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed");
+            set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
+            tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
+            tx_info[n].result = false;
+            break;
+          }
+          break;
+        case rct::RCTTypeFull:
+          if (!rct::verRct(rv, true))
+          {
+            MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed");
+            set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
+            tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
+            tx_info[n].result = false;
+            break;
+          }
+          break;
+        case rct::RCTTypeBulletproof:
+          rvv.push_back(&rv); // delayed batch verification
+          break;
+        default:
+          MERROR_VER("Unknown rct type: " << rv.type);
+          set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
+          tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
+          tx_info[n].result = false;
+          break;
+      }
+    }
+    if (!rvv.empty() && !rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rvv))
+    {
+      LOG_PRINT_L1("One transaction among this group has bad semantics, verifying one at a time");
+      ret = false;
+      const bool assumed_bad = rvv.size() == 1; // if there's only one tx, it must be the bad one
+      for (size_t n = 0; n < tx_info.size(); ++n)
+      {
+        if (!tx_info[n].result)
+          continue;
+        if (tx_info[n].tx->rct_signatures.type != rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
+          continue;
+        if (assumed_bad || !rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(tx_info[n].tx->rct_signatures))
+        {
+          set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
+          tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
+          tx_info[n].result = false;
+        }
       }
-      bad_semantics_txes_lock.unlock();
-      return false;
     }
 
-    return true;
+    return ret;
   }
   //-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   bool core::handle_incoming_txs(const std::vector<blobdata>& tx_blobs, std::vector<tx_verification_context>& tvc, bool keeped_by_block, bool relayed, bool do_not_relay)
@@ -769,6 +885,16 @@ namespace cryptonote
     }
     waiter.wait(&tpool);
 
+    std::vector<tx_verification_batch_info> tx_info;
+    tx_info.reserve(tx_blobs.size());
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < tx_blobs.size(); i++) {
+      if (!results[i].res)
+        continue;
+      tx_info.push_back({&results[i].tx, results[i].hash, tvc[i], results[i].res});
+    }
+    if (!tx_info.empty())
+      handle_incoming_tx_accumulated_batch(tx_info, keeped_by_block);
+
     bool ok = true;
     it = tx_blobs.begin();
     for (size_t i = 0; i < tx_blobs.size(); i++, ++it) {
@@ -886,36 +1012,6 @@ namespace cryptonote
       return false;
     }
 
-    if (tx.version >= 2)
-    {
-      const rct::rctSig &rv = tx.rct_signatures;
-      switch (rv.type) {
-        case rct::RCTTypeNull:
-          // coinbase should not come here, so we reject for all other types
-          MERROR_VER("Unexpected Null rctSig type");
-          return false;
-        case rct::RCTTypeSimple:
-        case rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof:
-          if (!rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rv))
-          {
-            MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed");
-            return false;
-          }
-          break;
-        case rct::RCTTypeFull:
-        case rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof:
-          if (!rct::verRct(rv, true))
-          {
-            MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed");
-            return false;
-          }
-          break;
-        default:
-          MERROR_VER("Unknown rct type: " << rv.type);
-          return false;
-      }
-    }
-
     return true;
   }
   //-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.h b/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.h
index 84e1bb918..497b16214 100644
--- a/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.h
+++ b/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_core.h
@@ -864,9 +864,12 @@ namespace cryptonote
       * @return true if all the checks pass, otherwise false
       */
      bool check_tx_semantic(const transaction& tx, bool keeped_by_block) const;
+     void set_semantics_failed(const crypto::hash &tx_hash);
 
      bool handle_incoming_tx_pre(const blobdata& tx_blob, tx_verification_context& tvc, cryptonote::transaction &tx, crypto::hash &tx_hash, crypto::hash &tx_prefixt_hash, bool keeped_by_block, bool relayed, bool do_not_relay);
      bool handle_incoming_tx_post(const blobdata& tx_blob, tx_verification_context& tvc, cryptonote::transaction &tx, crypto::hash &tx_hash, crypto::hash &tx_prefixt_hash, bool keeped_by_block, bool relayed, bool do_not_relay);
+     struct tx_verification_batch_info { const cryptonote::transaction *tx; crypto::hash tx_hash; tx_verification_context &tvc; bool &result; };
+     bool handle_incoming_tx_accumulated_batch(std::vector<tx_verification_batch_info> &tx_info, bool keeped_by_block);
 
      /**
       * @copydoc miner::on_block_chain_update
diff --git a/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_tx_utils.cpp b/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_tx_utils.cpp
index 32031e950..525945079 100644
--- a/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_tx_utils.cpp
+++ b/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_tx_utils.cpp
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ namespace cryptonote
 
       // the non-simple version is slightly smaller, but assumes all real inputs
       // are on the same index, so can only be used if there just one ring.
-      bool use_simple_rct = sources.size() > 1;
+      bool use_simple_rct = sources.size() > 1 || range_proof_type == rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof || range_proof_type == rct::RangeProofBulletproof;
 
       if (!use_simple_rct)
       {
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ namespace cryptonote
       if (use_simple_rct)
         tx.rct_signatures = rct::genRctSimple(rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash), inSk, destinations, inamounts, outamounts, amount_in - amount_out, mixRing, amount_keys, msout ? &kLRki : NULL, msout, index, outSk, range_proof_type, hwdev);
       else
-        tx.rct_signatures = rct::genRct(rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash), inSk, destinations, outamounts, mixRing, amount_keys, msout ? &kLRki[0] : NULL, msout, sources[0].real_output, outSk, range_proof_type, hwdev); // same index assumption
+        tx.rct_signatures = rct::genRct(rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash), inSk, destinations, outamounts, mixRing, amount_keys, msout ? &kLRki[0] : NULL, msout, sources[0].real_output, outSk, hwdev); // same index assumption
       memwipe(inSk.data(), inSk.size() * sizeof(rct::ctkey));
 
       CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(tx.vout.size() == outSk.size(), false, "outSk size does not match vout");
diff --git a/src/device/device_ledger.cpp b/src/device/device_ledger.cpp
index c4e9e40b7..658b379e4 100644
--- a/src/device/device_ledger.cpp
+++ b/src/device/device_ledger.cpp
@@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ namespace hw {
         this->exchange();
 
         //pseudoOuts
-        if ((type == rct::RCTTypeSimple) || (type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)) {
+        if ((type == rct::RCTTypeSimple) || (type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)) {
           for ( i = 0; i < inputs_size; i++) {
             offset = set_command_header(INS_VALIDATE, 0x01, i+2);
             //options
diff --git a/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp b/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp
index 2e2b07fcc..2175d1659 100644
--- a/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp
+++ b/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ namespace rct {
       hashes.push_back(hash2rct(h));
 
       keyV kv;
-      if (rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof)
+      if (rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof)
       {
         kv.reserve((6*2+9) * rv.p.bulletproofs.size());
         for (const auto &p: rv.p.bulletproofs)
@@ -651,8 +651,7 @@ namespace rct {
     //   must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number
     //   Note: For txn fees, the last index in the amounts vector should contain that
     //   Thus the amounts vector will be "one" longer than the destinations vectort
-    rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, RangeProofType range_proof_type, hw::device &hwdev) {
-        const bool bulletproof = range_proof_type != RangeProofBorromean;
+    rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, hw::device &hwdev) {
         CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(amounts.size() == destinations.size() || amounts.size() == destinations.size() + 1, "Different number of amounts/destinations");
         CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(amount_keys.size() == destinations.size(), "Different number of amount_keys/destinations");
         CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(index < mixRing.size(), "Bad index into mixRing");
@@ -662,11 +661,10 @@ namespace rct {
         CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES((kLRki && msout) || (!kLRki && !msout), "Only one of kLRki/msout is present");
 
         rctSig rv;
-        rv.type = bulletproof ? RCTTypeFullBulletproof : RCTTypeFull;
+        rv.type = RCTTypeFull;
         rv.message = message;
         rv.outPk.resize(destinations.size());
-        if (!bulletproof)
-          rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size());
+        rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size());
         rv.ecdhInfo.resize(destinations.size());
 
         size_t i = 0;
@@ -675,46 +673,11 @@ namespace rct {
         for (i = 0; i < destinations.size(); i++) {
             //add destination to sig
             rv.outPk[i].dest = copy(destinations[i]);
-            //compute range proof (bulletproofs are done later)
-            if (!bulletproof)
-            {
-                rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, amounts[i]);
-            #ifdef DBG
-                CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof");
-            #endif
-            }
-        }
-
-        rv.p.bulletproofs.clear();
-        if (bulletproof)
-        {
-            std::vector<uint64_t> proof_amounts;
-            size_t amounts_proved = 0;
-            while (amounts_proved < amounts.size())
-            {
-                size_t batch_size = 1;
-                if (range_proof_type == RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof)
-                  while (batch_size * 2 + amounts_proved <= amounts.size())
-                    batch_size *= 2;
-                rct::keyV C, masks;
-                std::vector<uint64_t> batch_amounts(batch_size);
-                for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i)
-                  batch_amounts[i] = amounts[i + amounts_proved];
-                rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(proveRangeBulletproof(C, masks, batch_amounts));
+            //compute range proof
+            rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, amounts[i]);
             #ifdef DBG
-                CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs.back()), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof");
+            CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof");
             #endif
-                for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i)
-                {
-                  rv.outPk[i + amounts_proved].mask = C[i];
-                  outSk[i + amounts_proved].mask = masks[i];
-                }
-                amounts_proved += batch_size;
-            }
-        }
-
-        for (i = 0; i < outSk.size(); ++i)
-        {
             //mask amount and mask
             rv.ecdhInfo[i].mask = copy(outSk[i].mask);
             rv.ecdhInfo[i].amount = d2h(amounts[i]);
@@ -744,7 +707,7 @@ namespace rct {
         ctkeyM mixRing;
         ctkeyV outSk;
         tie(mixRing, index) = populateFromBlockchain(inPk, mixin);
-        return genRct(message, inSk, destinations, amounts, mixRing, amount_keys, kLRki, msout, index, outSk, RangeProofBorromean, hwdev);
+        return genRct(message, inSk, destinations, amounts, mixRing, amount_keys, kLRki, msout, index, outSk, hwdev);
     }
     
     //RCT simple    
@@ -766,35 +729,61 @@ namespace rct {
         }
 
         rctSig rv;
-        rv.type = bulletproof ? RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof : RCTTypeSimple;
+        rv.type = bulletproof ? RCTTypeBulletproof : RCTTypeSimple;
         rv.message = message;
         rv.outPk.resize(destinations.size());
-        if (bulletproof)
-          rv.p.bulletproofs.resize(destinations.size());
-        else
+        if (!bulletproof)
           rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size());
         rv.ecdhInfo.resize(destinations.size());
 
         size_t i;
         keyV masks(destinations.size()); //sk mask..
         outSk.resize(destinations.size());
-        key sumout = zero();
         for (i = 0; i < destinations.size(); i++) {
 
             //add destination to sig
             rv.outPk[i].dest = copy(destinations[i]);
             //compute range proof
-            if (bulletproof)
-              rv.p.bulletproofs[i] = proveRangeBulletproof(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, outamounts[i]);
-            else
+            if (!bulletproof)
               rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, outamounts[i]);
             #ifdef DBG
-            if (bulletproof)
-                CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs[i]), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof");
-            else
+            if (!bulletproof)
                 CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof");
             #endif
-         
+        }
+
+        rv.p.bulletproofs.clear();
+        if (bulletproof)
+        {
+            std::vector<uint64_t> proof_amounts;
+            size_t n_amounts = outamounts.size();
+            size_t amounts_proved = 0;
+            while (amounts_proved < n_amounts)
+            {
+                size_t batch_size = 1;
+                if (range_proof_type == RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof)
+                  while (batch_size * 2 + amounts_proved <= n_amounts && batch_size * 2 <= 16)
+                    batch_size *= 2;
+                rct::keyV C, masks;
+                std::vector<uint64_t> batch_amounts(batch_size);
+                for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i)
+                  batch_amounts[i] = outamounts[i + amounts_proved];
+                rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(proveRangeBulletproof(C, masks, batch_amounts));
+            #ifdef DBG
+                CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs.back()), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof");
+            #endif
+                for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i)
+                {
+                  rv.outPk[i + amounts_proved].mask = C[i];
+                  outSk[i + amounts_proved].mask = masks[i];
+                }
+                amounts_proved += batch_size;
+            }
+        }
+
+        key sumout = zero();
+        for (i = 0; i < outSk.size(); ++i)
+        {
             sc_add(sumout.bytes, outSk[i].mask.bytes, sumout.bytes);
 
             //mask amount and mask
@@ -857,14 +846,10 @@ namespace rct {
     //   must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number    
     bool verRct(const rctSig & rv, bool semantics) {
         PERF_TIMER(verRct);
-        CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof, false, "verRct called on non-full rctSig");
-        const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
+        CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull, false, "verRct called on non-full rctSig");
         if (semantics)
         {
-          if (bulletproof)
-            CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and bulletproofs");
-          else
-            CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.rangeSigs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.rangeSigs");
+          CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.rangeSigs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.rangeSigs");
           CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.ecdhInfo");
           CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.MGs.size() == 1, false, "full rctSig has not one MG");
         }
@@ -879,14 +864,10 @@ namespace rct {
           if (semantics) {
             tools::threadpool& tpool = tools::threadpool::getInstance();
             tools::threadpool::waiter waiter;
-            std::deque<bool> results(bulletproof ? rv.p.bulletproofs.size() : rv.outPk.size(), false);
+            std::deque<bool> results(rv.outPk.size(), false);
             DP("range proofs verified?");
-            if (bulletproof)
-              for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.p.bulletproofs.size(); i++)
-                tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { results[i] = verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs[i]); });
-            else
-              for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++)
-                tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { results[i] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); });
+            for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++)
+              tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { results[i] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); });
             waiter.wait(&tpool);
 
             for (size_t i = 0; i < results.size(); ++i) {
@@ -940,7 +921,7 @@ namespace rct {
         {
           CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rvp, false, "rctSig pointer is NULL");
           const rctSig &rv = *rvp;
-          CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "verRctSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig");
+          CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof, false, "verRctSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig");
           const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
           if (bulletproof)
           {
@@ -1041,7 +1022,7 @@ namespace rct {
       {
         PERF_TIMER(verRctNonSemanticsSimple);
 
-        CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "verRctNonSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig");
+        CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof, false, "verRctNonSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig");
         const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
         // semantics check is early, and mixRing/MGs aren't resolved yet
         if (bulletproof)
@@ -1101,7 +1082,7 @@ namespace rct {
     //   uses the attached ecdh info to find the amounts represented by each output commitment 
     //   must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number    
     xmr_amount decodeRct(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key & mask, hw::device &hwdev) {
-        CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof, false, "decodeRct called on non-full rctSig");
+        CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull, false, "decodeRct called on non-full rctSig");
         CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(i < rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Bad index");
         CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.outPk and rv.ecdhInfo");
 
@@ -1129,7 +1110,7 @@ namespace rct {
     }
 
     xmr_amount decodeRctSimple(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key &mask, hw::device &hwdev) {
-        CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "decodeRct called on non simple rctSig");
+        CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof, false, "decodeRct called on non simple rctSig");
         CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(i < rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Bad index");
         CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.outPk and rv.ecdhInfo");
 
@@ -1157,12 +1138,12 @@ namespace rct {
     }
 
     bool signMultisig(rctSig &rv, const std::vector<unsigned int> &indices, const keyV &k, const multisig_out &msout, const key &secret_key) {
-        CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof,
+        CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof,
             false, "unsupported rct type");
         CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(indices.size() == k.size(), false, "Mismatched k/indices sizes");
         CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(k.size() == rv.p.MGs.size(), false, "Mismatched k/MGs size");
         CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(k.size() == msout.c.size(), false, "Mismatched k/msout.c size");
-        if (rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof)
+        if (rv.type == RCTTypeFull)
         {
           CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.MGs.size() == 1, false, "MGs not a single element");
         }
diff --git a/src/ringct/rctSigs.h b/src/ringct/rctSigs.h
index d1090ca77..ae8bb91d7 100644
--- a/src/ringct/rctSigs.h
+++ b/src/ringct/rctSigs.h
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ namespace rct {
     //decodeRct: (c.f. https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 5.1.1)
     //   uses the attached ecdh info to find the amounts represented by each output commitment
     //   must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number
-    rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, RangeProofType range_proof_type, hw::device &hwdev);
+    rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, hw::device &hwdev);
     rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const ctkeyV  & inPk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, const int mixin, hw::device &hwdev);
     rctSig genRctSimple(const key & message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const ctkeyV & inPk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & inamounts, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & outamounts, const keyV &amount_keys, const std::vector<multisig_kLRki> *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, xmr_amount txnFee, unsigned int mixin, hw::device &hwdev);
     rctSig genRctSimple(const key & message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & inamounts, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & outamounts, xmr_amount txnFee, const ctkeyM & mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const std::vector<multisig_kLRki> *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, const std::vector<unsigned int> & index, ctkeyV &outSk, RangeProofType range_proof_type, hw::device &hwdev);
diff --git a/src/ringct/rctTypes.cpp b/src/ringct/rctTypes.cpp
index 72ef75780..e67637af6 100644
--- a/src/ringct/rctTypes.cpp
+++ b/src/ringct/rctTypes.cpp
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 // STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
 // THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 
+#include "misc_log_ex.h"
 #include "rctTypes.h"
 using namespace crypto;
 using namespace std;
@@ -214,7 +215,7 @@ namespace rct {
         switch (type)
         {
             case RCTTypeSimple:
-            case RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof:
+            case RCTTypeBulletproof:
                 return true;
             default:
                 return false;
@@ -225,19 +226,29 @@ namespace rct {
     {
         switch (type)
         {
-            case RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof:
-            case RCTTypeFullBulletproof:
+            case RCTTypeBulletproof:
                 return true;
             default:
                 return false;
         }
     }
 
+    size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof)
+    {
+        CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() >= 6, 0, "Invalid bulletproof L size");
+        return 1 << (proof.L.size() - 6);
+    }
+
     size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const std::vector<Bulletproof> &proofs)
     {
         size_t n = 0;
         for (const Bulletproof &proof: proofs)
-            n += proof.V.size();
+        {
+            size_t n2 = n_bulletproof_amounts(proof);
+            if (n2 == 0)
+                return 0;
+            n += n2;
+        }
         return n;
     }
 
diff --git a/src/ringct/rctTypes.h b/src/ringct/rctTypes.h
index 5574c7784..894f747b8 100644
--- a/src/ringct/rctTypes.h
+++ b/src/ringct/rctTypes.h
@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ namespace rct {
       END_SERIALIZE()
     };
 
+    size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof);
     size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const std::vector<Bulletproof> &proofs);
 
     //A container to hold all signatures necessary for RingCT
@@ -226,8 +227,7 @@ namespace rct {
       RCTTypeNull = 0,
       RCTTypeFull = 1,
       RCTTypeSimple = 2,
-      RCTTypeFullBulletproof = 3,
-      RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof = 4,
+      RCTTypeBulletproof = 3,
     };
     enum RangeProofType { RangeProofBorromean, RangeProofBulletproof, RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof };
     struct rctSigBase {
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ namespace rct {
           FIELD(type)
           if (type == RCTTypeNull)
             return true;
-          if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeFullBulletproof && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
+          if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeBulletproof)
             return false;
           VARINT_FIELD(txnFee)
           // inputs/outputs not saved, only here for serialization help
@@ -307,9 +307,9 @@ namespace rct {
         {
           if (type == RCTTypeNull)
             return true;
-          if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeFullBulletproof && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
+          if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeBulletproof)
             return false;
-          if (type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof || type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof)
+          if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof)
           {
             ar.tag("bp");
             ar.begin_array();
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ namespace rct {
           ar.begin_array();
           // we keep a byte for size of MGs, because we don't know whether this is
           // a simple or full rct signature, and it's starting to annoy the hell out of me
-          size_t mg_elements = (type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) ? inputs : 1;
+          size_t mg_elements = (type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeBulletproof) ? inputs : 1;
           PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(mg_elements, MGs);
           if (MGs.size() != mg_elements)
             return false;
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ namespace rct {
             for (size_t j = 0; j < mixin + 1; ++j)
             {
               ar.begin_array();
-              size_t mg_ss2_elements = ((type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) ? 1 : inputs) + 1;
+              size_t mg_ss2_elements = ((type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeBulletproof) ? 1 : inputs) + 1;
               PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(mg_ss2_elements, MGs[i].ss[j]);
               if (MGs[i].ss[j].size() != mg_ss2_elements)
                 return false;
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ namespace rct {
                ar.delimit_array();
           }
           ar.end_array();
-          if (type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
+          if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof)
           {
             ar.tag("pseudoOuts");
             ar.begin_array();
@@ -416,12 +416,12 @@ namespace rct {
 
         keyV& get_pseudo_outs()
         {
-          return type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts;
+          return type == RCTTypeBulletproof ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts;
         }
 
         keyV const& get_pseudo_outs() const
         {
-          return type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts;
+          return type == RCTTypeBulletproof ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts;
         }
     };
 
diff --git a/src/wallet/wallet2.cpp b/src/wallet/wallet2.cpp
index fdba6d84a..37340e22b 100644
--- a/src/wallet/wallet2.cpp
+++ b/src/wallet/wallet2.cpp
@@ -1142,10 +1142,9 @@ static uint64_t decodeRct(const rct::rctSig & rv, const crypto::key_derivation &
     switch (rv.type)
     {
     case rct::RCTTypeSimple:
-    case rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof:
+    case rct::RCTTypeBulletproof:
       return rct::decodeRctSimple(rv, rct::sk2rct(scalar1), i, mask, hwdev);
     case rct::RCTTypeFull:
-    case rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof:
       return rct::decodeRct(rv, rct::sk2rct(scalar1), i, mask, hwdev);
     default:
       LOG_ERROR("Unsupported rct type: " << rv.type);
diff --git a/tests/core_tests/CMakeLists.txt b/tests/core_tests/CMakeLists.txt
index c8ee7d9db..1ac0e7864 100644
--- a/tests/core_tests/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/tests/core_tests/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ set(core_tests_sources
   transaction_tests.cpp
   tx_validation.cpp
   v2_tests.cpp
-  rct.cpp)
+  rct.cpp
+  bulletproofs.cpp)
 
 set(core_tests_headers
   block_reward.h
@@ -58,7 +59,8 @@ set(core_tests_headers
   transaction_tests.h
   tx_validation.h
   v2_tests.h
-  rct.h)
+  rct.h
+  bulletproofs.h)
 
 add_executable(core_tests
   ${core_tests_sources}
@@ -73,6 +75,7 @@ target_link_libraries(core_tests
     device
     ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}
     ${EXTRA_LIBRARIES})
+enable_stack_trace(core_tests)
 set_property(TARGET core_tests
   PROPERTY
     FOLDER "tests")
diff --git a/tests/core_tests/bulletproofs.cpp b/tests/core_tests/bulletproofs.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3f2a2567c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/core_tests/bulletproofs.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2014-2018, The Monero Project
+// 
+// All rights reserved.
+// 
+// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
+// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+// 
+// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
+//    conditions and the following disclaimer.
+// 
+// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
+//    of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
+//    materials provided with the distribution.
+// 
+// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
+//    used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
+//    prior written permission.
+// 
+// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
+// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
+// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+// 
+// Parts of this file are originally copyright (c) 2012-2013 The Cryptonote developers
+
+#include "ringct/rctSigs.h"
+#include "ringct/bulletproofs.h"
+#include "chaingen.h"
+#include "bulletproofs.h"
+#include "device/device.hpp"
+
+using namespace epee;
+using namespace crypto;
+using namespace cryptonote;
+
+//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Tests
+
+bool gen_bp_tx_validation_base::generate_with(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events,
+    const int *out_idx, int mixin, size_t n_txes, const uint64_t *amounts_paid, bool valid, const bool *multi_out,
+    const std::function<bool(std::vector<tx_source_entry> &sources, std::vector<tx_destination_entry> &destinations, size_t tx_idx)> &pre_tx,
+    const std::function<bool(transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx)> &post_tx) const
+{
+  uint64_t ts_start = 1338224400;
+
+  GENERATE_ACCOUNT(miner_account);
+  MAKE_GENESIS_BLOCK(events, blk_0, miner_account, ts_start);
+
+  // create 8 miner accounts, and have them mine the next 8 blocks
+  cryptonote::account_base miner_accounts[8];
+  const cryptonote::block *prev_block = &blk_0;
+  cryptonote::block blocks[8 + CRYPTONOTE_MINED_MONEY_UNLOCK_WINDOW];
+  for (size_t n = 0; n < 8; ++n) {
+    miner_accounts[n].generate();
+    CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(generator.construct_block_manually(blocks[n], *prev_block, miner_accounts[n],
+        test_generator::bf_major_ver | test_generator::bf_minor_ver | test_generator::bf_timestamp | test_generator::bf_hf_version,
+        2, 2, prev_block->timestamp + DIFFICULTY_BLOCKS_ESTIMATE_TIMESPAN * 2, // v2 has blocks twice as long
+          crypto::hash(), 0, transaction(), std::vector<crypto::hash>(), 0, 0, 2),
+        false, "Failed to generate block");
+    events.push_back(blocks[n]);
+    prev_block = blocks + n;
+    LOG_PRINT_L0("Initial miner tx " << n << ": " << obj_to_json_str(blocks[n].miner_tx));
+  }
+
+  // rewind
+  cryptonote::block blk_r, blk_last;
+  {
+    blk_last = blocks[7];
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < CRYPTONOTE_MINED_MONEY_UNLOCK_WINDOW; ++i)
+    {
+      CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(generator.construct_block_manually(blocks[8+i], blk_last, miner_account,
+          test_generator::bf_major_ver | test_generator::bf_minor_ver | test_generator::bf_timestamp | test_generator::bf_hf_version,
+          2, 2, blk_last.timestamp + DIFFICULTY_BLOCKS_ESTIMATE_TIMESPAN * 2, // v2 has blocks twice as long
+          crypto::hash(), 0, transaction(), std::vector<crypto::hash>(), 0, 0, 2),
+          false, "Failed to generate block");
+      events.push_back(blocks[8+i]);
+      blk_last = blocks[8+i];
+    }
+    blk_r = blk_last;
+  }
+
+  // create 4 txes from these miners in another block, to generate some rct outputs
+  std::vector<transaction> rct_txes;
+  cryptonote::block blk_txes;
+  std::vector<crypto::hash> starting_rct_tx_hashes;
+  static const uint64_t input_amounts_available[] = {5000000000000, 30000000000000, 100000000000, 80000000000};
+  for (size_t n = 0; n < n_txes; ++n)
+  {
+    std::vector<tx_source_entry> sources;
+
+    sources.resize(1);
+    tx_source_entry& src = sources.back();
+
+    const uint64_t needed_amount = input_amounts_available[n];
+    src.amount = input_amounts_available[n];
+    size_t real_index_in_tx = 0;
+    for (size_t m = 0; m < 7; ++m) {
+      size_t index_in_tx = 0;
+      for (size_t i = 0; i < blocks[m].miner_tx.vout.size(); ++i)
+        if (blocks[m].miner_tx.vout[i].amount == needed_amount)
+          index_in_tx = i;
+      CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(blocks[m].miner_tx.vout[index_in_tx].amount == needed_amount, false, "Expected amount not found");
+      src.push_output(m, boost::get<txout_to_key>(blocks[m].miner_tx.vout[index_in_tx].target).key, src.amount);
+      if (m == n)
+        real_index_in_tx = index_in_tx;
+    }
+    src.real_out_tx_key = cryptonote::get_tx_pub_key_from_extra(blocks[n].miner_tx);
+    src.real_output = n;
+    src.real_output_in_tx_index = real_index_in_tx;
+    src.mask = rct::identity();
+    src.rct = false;
+
+    //fill outputs entry
+    tx_destination_entry td;
+    td.addr = miner_accounts[n].get_keys().m_account_address;
+    std::vector<tx_destination_entry> destinations;
+    for (int o = 0; amounts_paid[o] != (uint64_t)-1; ++o)
+    {
+      td.amount = amounts_paid[o];
+      destinations.push_back(td);
+    }
+
+    if (pre_tx && !pre_tx(sources, destinations, n))
+    {
+      MDEBUG("pre_tx returned failure");
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    crypto::secret_key tx_key;
+    std::vector<crypto::secret_key> additional_tx_keys;
+    std::unordered_map<crypto::public_key, cryptonote::subaddress_index> subaddresses;
+    subaddresses[miner_accounts[n].get_keys().m_account_address.m_spend_public_key] = {0,0};
+    rct_txes.resize(rct_txes.size() + 1);
+    bool r = construct_tx_and_get_tx_key(miner_accounts[n].get_keys(), subaddresses, sources, destinations, cryptonote::account_public_address{}, std::vector<uint8_t>(), rct_txes.back(), 0, tx_key, additional_tx_keys, true, multi_out[n] ? rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof : rct::RangeProofBulletproof);
+    CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "failed to construct transaction");
+
+    if (post_tx && !post_tx(rct_txes.back(), n))
+    {
+      MDEBUG("post_tx returned failure");
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    //events.push_back(rct_txes.back());
+    starting_rct_tx_hashes.push_back(get_transaction_hash(rct_txes.back()));
+    LOG_PRINT_L0("Test tx: " << obj_to_json_str(rct_txes.back()));
+
+    for (int o = 0; amounts_paid[o] != (uint64_t)-1; ++o)
+    {
+      crypto::key_derivation derivation;
+      bool r = crypto::generate_key_derivation(destinations[o].addr.m_view_public_key, tx_key, derivation);
+      CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "Failed to generate key derivation");
+      crypto::secret_key amount_key;
+      crypto::derivation_to_scalar(derivation, o, amount_key);
+      rct::key rct_tx_mask;
+      if (rct_txes.back().rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rct_txes.back().rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
+        rct::decodeRctSimple(rct_txes.back().rct_signatures, rct::sk2rct(amount_key), o, rct_tx_mask, hw::get_device("default"));
+      else
+        rct::decodeRct(rct_txes.back().rct_signatures, rct::sk2rct(amount_key), o, rct_tx_mask, hw::get_device("default"));
+    }
+
+    while (amounts_paid[0] != (size_t)-1)
+      ++amounts_paid;
+    ++amounts_paid;
+  }
+  if (!valid)
+    DO_CALLBACK(events, "mark_invalid_tx");
+  events.push_back(rct_txes);
+
+  CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(generator.construct_block_manually(blk_txes, blk_last, miner_account,
+      test_generator::bf_major_ver | test_generator::bf_minor_ver | test_generator::bf_timestamp | test_generator::bf_tx_hashes | test_generator::bf_hf_version | test_generator::bf_max_outs,
+      8, 8, blk_last.timestamp + DIFFICULTY_BLOCKS_ESTIMATE_TIMESPAN * 2, // v2 has blocks twice as long
+      crypto::hash(), 0, transaction(), starting_rct_tx_hashes, 0, 6, 8),
+      false, "Failed to generate block");
+  if (!valid)
+    DO_CALLBACK(events, "mark_invalid_block");
+  events.push_back(blk_txes);
+  blk_last = blk_txes;
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool gen_bp_tx_validation_base::check_bp(const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx, const size_t *sizes, const char *context) const
+{
+  DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT(context);
+  CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.version >= 2);
+  CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(rct::is_rct_bulletproof(tx.rct_signatures.type));
+  size_t n_sizes = 0, n_amounts = 0;
+  for (size_t n = 0; n < tx_idx; ++n)
+  {
+    while (sizes[0] != (size_t)-1)
+      ++sizes;
+    ++sizes;
+  }
+  while (sizes[n_sizes] != (size_t)-1)
+    n_amounts += sizes[n_sizes++];
+  CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.size() == n_sizes);
+  CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs) == n_amounts);
+  for (size_t n = 0; n < n_sizes; ++n)
+    CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs[n]) == sizes[n]);
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool gen_bp_tx_valid_1::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
+{
+  const int mixin = 6;
+  const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
+  const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {10000, (uint64_t)-1};
+  const size_t bp_sizes[] = {1, (size_t)-1};
+  const bool multi_out[] = {false};
+  return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_1"); });
+}
+
+bool gen_bp_tx_valid_1_1::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
+{
+  const int mixin = 6;
+  const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
+  const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {5000, 5000, (uint64_t)-1};
+  const size_t bp_sizes[] = {1, 1, (size_t)-1};
+  const bool multi_out[] = {false};
+  return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_1_1"); });
+}
+
+bool gen_bp_tx_valid_2::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
+{
+  const int mixin = 6;
+  const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
+  const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {5000, 5000, (uint64_t)-1};
+  const size_t bp_sizes[] = {2, (size_t)-1};
+  const bool multi_out[] = {true};
+  return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_2"); });
+}
+
+bool gen_bp_tx_valid_4_2_1::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
+{
+  const int mixin = 6;
+  const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
+  const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1};
+  const size_t bp_sizes[] = {4, 2, 1, (size_t)-1};
+  const bool multi_out[] = {true};
+  return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_4_2_1"); });
+}
+
+bool gen_bp_tx_valid_16_16::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
+{
+  const int mixin = 6;
+  const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
+  const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1};
+  const size_t bp_sizes[] = {16, 16, (size_t)-1};
+  const bool multi_out[] = {true};
+  return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_tx_valid_16_16"); });
+}
+
+bool gen_bp_txs_valid_2_and_2::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
+{
+  const int mixin = 6;
+  const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
+  const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {1000, 1000, (size_t)-1, 1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1};
+  const size_t bp_sizes[] = {2, (size_t)-1, 2, (size_t)-1};
+  const bool multi_out[] = {true};
+  return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 2, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_txs_valid_2_2"); });
+}
+
+bool gen_bp_txs_valid_1_1_and_8_2_and_16_16_1::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
+{
+  const int mixin = 6;
+  const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
+  const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, (uint64_t)-1};
+  const bool multi_out[] = {false, true, true};
+  const size_t bp_sizes[] = {1, 1, (size_t)-1, 8, 2, (size_t)-1, 16, 16, 1, (size_t)-1};
+  return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 3, amounts_paid, true, multi_out, NULL, [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){ return check_bp(tx, tx_idx, bp_sizes, "gen_bp_txs_valid_1_1_and_8_2_and_16_16_1"); });
+}
+
+bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_not_enough_proofs::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
+{
+  DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT("gen_bp_tx_invalid_not_enough_proofs");
+  const int mixin = 6;
+  const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
+  const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {10000, (uint64_t)-1};
+  const bool multi_out[] = {false};
+  return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, false, multi_out, NULL, [&](cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t idx){
+    CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof);
+    CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(!tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty());
+    tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.pop_back();
+    return true;
+  });
+}
+
+bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_too_many_proofs::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
+{
+  DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT("gen_bp_tx_invalid_too_many_proofs");
+  const int mixin = 6;
+  const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
+  const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {10000, (uint64_t)-1};
+  const bool multi_out[] = {false};
+  return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, false, multi_out, NULL, [&](cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t idx){
+    CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof);
+    CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(!tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty());
+    tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.push_back(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.back());
+    return true;
+  });
+}
+
+bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_wrong_amount::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
+{
+  DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT("gen_bp_tx_invalid_wrong_amount");
+  const int mixin = 6;
+  const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
+  const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {10000, (uint64_t)-1};
+  const bool multi_out[] = {false};
+  return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, false, multi_out, NULL, [&](cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t idx){
+    CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof);
+    CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(!tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty());
+    tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.back() = rct::bulletproof_PROVE(1000, rct::skGen());
+    return true;
+  });
+}
+
+bool gen_bp_tx_invalid_switched::generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const
+{
+  DEFINE_TESTS_ERROR_CONTEXT("gen_bp_tx_invalid_switched");
+  const int mixin = 6;
+  const int out_idx[] = {1, -1};
+  const uint64_t amounts_paid[] = {5000, 5000, (uint64_t)-1};
+  const bool multi_out[] = {false};
+  return generate_with(events, out_idx, mixin, 1, amounts_paid, false, multi_out, NULL, [&](cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx){
+    CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof);
+    CHECK_TEST_CONDITION(tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.size() == 2);
+    rct::Bulletproof proof = tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs[0];
+    tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs[0] = tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs[1];
+    tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs[1] = proof;
+    return true;
+  });
+}
+
diff --git a/tests/core_tests/bulletproofs.h b/tests/core_tests/bulletproofs.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..25d1cbb8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/core_tests/bulletproofs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2014-2018, The Monero Project
+// 
+// All rights reserved.
+// 
+// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
+// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+// 
+// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
+//    conditions and the following disclaimer.
+// 
+// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
+//    of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
+//    materials provided with the distribution.
+// 
+// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
+//    used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
+//    prior written permission.
+// 
+// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
+// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
+// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+// 
+// Parts of this file are originally copyright (c) 2012-2013 The Cryptonote developers
+
+#pragma once 
+#include "chaingen.h"
+
+struct gen_bp_tx_validation_base : public test_chain_unit_base
+{
+  gen_bp_tx_validation_base()
+    : m_invalid_tx_index(0)
+    , m_invalid_block_index(0)
+  {
+    REGISTER_CALLBACK_METHOD(gen_bp_tx_validation_base, mark_invalid_tx);
+    REGISTER_CALLBACK_METHOD(gen_bp_tx_validation_base, mark_invalid_block);
+  }
+
+  bool check_tx_verification_context(const cryptonote::tx_verification_context& tvc, bool tx_added, size_t event_idx, const cryptonote::transaction& /*tx*/)
+  {
+    if (m_invalid_tx_index == event_idx)
+      return tvc.m_verifivation_failed;
+    else
+      return !tvc.m_verifivation_failed && tx_added;
+  }
+
+  bool check_tx_verification_context(const std::vector<cryptonote::tx_verification_context>& tvcs, size_t tx_added, size_t event_idx, const std::vector<cryptonote::transaction>& /*txs*/)
+  {
+    size_t failed = 0;
+    for (const cryptonote::tx_verification_context &tvc: tvcs)
+      if (tvc.m_verifivation_failed)
+        ++failed;
+    if (m_invalid_tx_index == event_idx)
+      return failed > 0;
+    else
+      return failed == 0 && tx_added == tvcs.size();
+  }
+
+  bool check_block_verification_context(const cryptonote::block_verification_context& bvc, size_t event_idx, const cryptonote::block& /*block*/)
+  {
+    if (m_invalid_block_index == event_idx)
+      return bvc.m_verifivation_failed;
+    else
+      return !bvc.m_verifivation_failed;
+  }
+
+  bool mark_invalid_block(cryptonote::core& /*c*/, size_t ev_index, const std::vector<test_event_entry>& /*events*/)
+  {
+    m_invalid_block_index = ev_index + 1;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  bool mark_invalid_tx(cryptonote::core& /*c*/, size_t ev_index, const std::vector<test_event_entry>& /*events*/)
+  {
+    m_invalid_tx_index = ev_index + 1;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  bool generate_with(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events, const int *out_idx, int mixin,
+      size_t n_txes, const uint64_t *amounts_paid, bool valid, const bool *multi_out,
+      const std::function<bool(std::vector<cryptonote::tx_source_entry> &sources, std::vector<cryptonote::tx_destination_entry> &destinations, size_t)> &pre_tx,
+      const std::function<bool(cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t)> &post_tx) const;
+
+  bool check_bp(const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t tx_idx, const size_t *sizes, const char *context) const;
+
+private:
+  size_t m_invalid_tx_index;
+  size_t m_invalid_block_index;
+};
+
+template<>
+struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {
+  const std::pair<uint8_t, uint64_t> hard_forks[4] = {std::make_pair(1, 0), std::make_pair(2, 1), std::make_pair(8, 69), std::make_pair(0, 0)};
+  const cryptonote::test_options test_options = {
+    hard_forks
+  };
+};
+
+// valid
+struct gen_bp_tx_valid_1 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
+{
+  bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
+};
+template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_valid_1>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
+
+struct gen_bp_tx_valid_1_1 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
+{
+  bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
+};
+template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_valid_1_1>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
+
+struct gen_bp_tx_valid_2 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
+{
+  bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
+};
+template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_valid_2>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
+
+struct gen_bp_tx_valid_4_2_1 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
+{
+  bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
+};
+template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_valid_4_2_1>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
+
+struct gen_bp_tx_valid_16_16 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
+{
+  bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
+};
+template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_valid_16_16>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
+
+struct gen_bp_txs_valid_2_and_2 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
+{
+  bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
+};
+template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_txs_valid_2_and_2>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
+
+struct gen_bp_txs_valid_1_1_and_8_2_and_16_16_1 : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
+{
+  bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
+};
+template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_txs_valid_1_1_and_8_2_and_16_16_1>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
+
+struct gen_bp_tx_invalid_not_enough_proofs : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
+{
+  bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
+};
+template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_invalid_not_enough_proofs>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
+
+struct gen_bp_tx_invalid_too_many_proofs : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
+{
+  bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
+};
+template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_invalid_too_many_proofs>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
+
+struct gen_bp_tx_invalid_wrong_amount : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
+{
+  bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
+};
+template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_invalid_wrong_amount>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
+
+struct gen_bp_tx_invalid_switched : public gen_bp_tx_validation_base
+{
+  bool generate(std::vector<test_event_entry>& events) const;
+};
+template<> struct get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_invalid_switched>: public get_test_options<gen_bp_tx_validation_base> {};
+
diff --git a/tests/core_tests/chaingen.h b/tests/core_tests/chaingen.h
index bbc9edd19..e44bcd37b 100644
--- a/tests/core_tests/chaingen.h
+++ b/tests/core_tests/chaingen.h
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, serialized_block, 0xcd);
 VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, serialized_transaction, 0xce);
 VARIANT_TAG(binary_archive, event_visitor_settings, 0xcf);
 
-typedef boost::variant<cryptonote::block, cryptonote::transaction, cryptonote::account_base, callback_entry, serialized_block, serialized_transaction, event_visitor_settings> test_event_entry;
+typedef boost::variant<cryptonote::block, cryptonote::transaction, std::vector<cryptonote::transaction>, cryptonote::account_base, callback_entry, serialized_block, serialized_transaction, event_visitor_settings> test_event_entry;
 typedef std::unordered_map<crypto::hash, const cryptonote::transaction*> map_hash2tx_t;
 
 class test_chain_unit_base
@@ -263,6 +263,30 @@ bool check_tx_verification_context(const cryptonote::tx_verification_context& tv
 }
 //--------------------------------------------------------------------------
 template<class t_test_class>
+auto do_check_tx_verification_context(const std::vector<cryptonote::tx_verification_context>& tvcs, size_t tx_added, size_t event_index, const std::vector<cryptonote::transaction>& txs, t_test_class& validator, int)
+  -> decltype(validator.check_tx_verification_context(tvcs, tx_added, event_index, txs))
+{
+  return validator.check_tx_verification_context(tvcs, tx_added, event_index, txs);
+}
+//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
+template<class t_test_class>
+bool do_check_tx_verification_context(const std::vector<cryptonote::tx_verification_context>& tvcs, size_t tx_added, size_t /*event_index*/, const std::vector<cryptonote::transaction>& /*txs*/, t_test_class&, long)
+{
+  // Default block verification context check
+  for (const cryptonote::tx_verification_context &tvc: tvcs)
+    if (tvc.m_verifivation_failed)
+      throw std::runtime_error("Transaction verification failed");
+  return true;
+}
+//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
+template<class t_test_class>
+bool check_tx_verification_context(const std::vector<cryptonote::tx_verification_context>& tvcs, size_t tx_added, size_t event_index, const std::vector<cryptonote::transaction>& txs, t_test_class& validator)
+{
+  // SFINAE in action
+  return do_check_tx_verification_context(tvcs, tx_added, event_index, txs, validator, 0);
+}
+//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
+template<class t_test_class>
 auto do_check_block_verification_context(const cryptonote::block_verification_context& bvc, size_t event_index, const cryptonote::block& blk, t_test_class& validator, int)
   -> decltype(validator.check_block_verification_context(bvc, event_index, blk))
 {
@@ -339,6 +363,26 @@ public:
     return true;
   }
 
+  bool operator()(const std::vector<cryptonote::transaction>& txs) const
+  {
+    log_event("cryptonote::transaction");
+
+    std::vector<cryptonote::blobdata> tx_blobs;
+    std::vector<cryptonote::tx_verification_context> tvcs;
+     cryptonote::tx_verification_context tvc0 = AUTO_VAL_INIT(tvc0);
+    for (const auto &tx: txs)
+    {
+      tx_blobs.push_back(t_serializable_object_to_blob(tx));
+      tvcs.push_back(tvc0);
+    }
+    size_t pool_size = m_c.get_pool_transactions_count();
+    m_c.handle_incoming_txs(tx_blobs, tvcs, m_txs_keeped_by_block, false, false);
+    size_t tx_added = m_c.get_pool_transactions_count() - pool_size;
+    bool r = check_tx_verification_context(tvcs, tx_added, m_ev_index, txs, m_validator);
+    CHECK_AND_NO_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "tx verification context check failed");
+    return true;
+  }
+
   bool operator()(const cryptonote::block& b) const
   {
     log_event("cryptonote::block");
diff --git a/tests/core_tests/chaingen_main.cpp b/tests/core_tests/chaingen_main.cpp
index c31655070..f662c68df 100644
--- a/tests/core_tests/chaingen_main.cpp
+++ b/tests/core_tests/chaingen_main.cpp
@@ -224,6 +224,18 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[])
     GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_multisig_tx_invalid_33_1_2_no_threshold);
     GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_multisig_tx_invalid_33_1_3_no_threshold);
 
+    GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_valid_1);
+    GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_valid_1_1);
+    GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_valid_2);
+    GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_valid_4_2_1);
+    GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_valid_16_16);
+    GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_txs_valid_2_and_2);
+    GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_txs_valid_1_1_and_8_2_and_16_16_1);
+    GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_invalid_not_enough_proofs);
+    GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_invalid_too_many_proofs);
+    GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_invalid_wrong_amount);
+    GENERATE_AND_PLAY(gen_bp_tx_invalid_switched);
+
     el::Level level = (failed_tests.empty() ? el::Level::Info : el::Level::Error);
     MLOG(level, "\nREPORT:");
     MLOG(level, "  Test run: " << tests_count);
diff --git a/tests/core_tests/chaingen_tests_list.h b/tests/core_tests/chaingen_tests_list.h
index 174610d5d..c12e97f95 100644
--- a/tests/core_tests/chaingen_tests_list.h
+++ b/tests/core_tests/chaingen_tests_list.h
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
 #include "v2_tests.h"
 #include "rct.h"
 #include "multisig.h"
+#include "bulletproofs.h"
 /************************************************************************/
 /*                                                                      */
 /************************************************************************/
diff --git a/tests/core_tests/rct.cpp b/tests/core_tests/rct.cpp
index 55401c4cb..342c3f1ee 100644
--- a/tests/core_tests/rct.cpp
+++ b/tests/core_tests/rct.cpp
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ bool gen_rct_tx_validation_base::generate_with(std::vector<test_event_entry>& ev
       CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "Failed to generate key derivation");
       crypto::secret_key amount_key;
       crypto::derivation_to_scalar(derivation, o, amount_key);
-      if (rct_txes[n].rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rct_txes[n].rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
+      if (rct_txes[n].rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rct_txes[n].rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
         rct::decodeRctSimple(rct_txes[n].rct_signatures, rct::sk2rct(amount_key), o, rct_tx_masks[o+n*4], hw::get_device("default"));
       else
         rct::decodeRct(rct_txes[n].rct_signatures, rct::sk2rct(amount_key), o, rct_tx_masks[o+n*4], hw::get_device("default"));
diff --git a/tests/performance_tests/check_tx_signature.h b/tests/performance_tests/check_tx_signature.h
index 693ea1866..79132ccee 100644
--- a/tests/performance_tests/check_tx_signature.h
+++ b/tests/performance_tests/check_tx_signature.h
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ public:
   {
     if (rct)
     {
-      if (m_tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeFull || m_tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof)
+      if (m_tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeFull)
         return rct::verRct(m_tx.rct_signatures);
       else
         return rct::verRctSimple(m_tx.rct_signatures);
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/bulletproofs.cpp b/tests/unit_tests/bulletproofs.cpp
index db14c050a..077e02d5f 100644
--- a/tests/unit_tests/bulletproofs.cpp
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/bulletproofs.cpp
@@ -78,58 +78,62 @@ TEST(bulletproofs, multi_splitting)
 {
   rct::ctkeyV sc, pc;
   rct::ctkey sctmp, pctmp;
+  std::vector<unsigned int> index;
+  std::vector<uint64_t> inamounts, outamounts;
 
   std::tie(sctmp, pctmp) = rct::ctskpkGen(6000);
   sc.push_back(sctmp);
   pc.push_back(pctmp);
+  inamounts.push_back(6000);
+  index.push_back(1);
 
   std::tie(sctmp, pctmp) = rct::ctskpkGen(7000);
   sc.push_back(sctmp);
   pc.push_back(pctmp);
+  inamounts.push_back(7000);
+  index.push_back(1);
 
   const int mixin = 3, max_outputs = 16;
 
   for (int n_outputs = 1; n_outputs <= max_outputs; ++n_outputs)
   {
-    std::vector<uint64_t> amounts;
+    std::vector<uint64_t> outamounts;
     rct::keyV amount_keys;
     rct::keyV destinations;
     rct::key Sk, Pk;
     uint64_t available = 6000 + 7000;
     uint64_t amount;
-    rct::ctkeyM mixRing(mixin+1);
+    rct::ctkeyM mixRing(sc.size());
 
     //add output
     for (size_t i = 0; i < n_outputs; ++i)
     {
       amount = rct::randXmrAmount(available);
-      amounts.push_back(amount);
+      outamounts.push_back(amount);
       amount_keys.push_back(rct::hash_to_scalar(rct::zero()));
       rct::skpkGen(Sk, Pk);
       destinations.push_back(Pk);
       available -= amount;
     }
-    if (!amounts.empty())
-      amounts.back() += available;
 
-    for (size_t j = 0; j <= mixin; ++j)
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < sc.size(); ++i)
     {
-      for (size_t i = 0; i < sc.size(); ++i)
+      for (size_t j = 0; j <= mixin; ++j)
       {
         if (j == 1)
-          mixRing[j].push_back(pc[i]);
+          mixRing[i].push_back(pc[i]);
         else
-          mixRing[j].push_back({rct::scalarmultBase(rct::skGen()), rct::scalarmultBase(rct::skGen())});
+          mixRing[i].push_back({rct::scalarmultBase(rct::skGen()), rct::scalarmultBase(rct::skGen())});
       }
     }
 
     rct::ctkeyV outSk;
-    rct::rctSig s = rct::genRct(rct::zero(), sc, destinations, amounts, mixRing, amount_keys, NULL, NULL, 1, outSk, rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof, hw::get_device("default"));
-    ASSERT_TRUE(rct::verRct(s));
+    rct::rctSig s = rct::genRctSimple(rct::zero(), sc, destinations, inamounts, outamounts, available, mixRing, amount_keys, NULL, NULL, index, outSk, rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof, hw::get_device("default"));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(rct::verRctSimple(s));
     for (size_t i = 0; i < n_outputs; ++i)
     {
       rct::key mask;
-      rct::decodeRct(s, amount_keys[i], i, mask, hw::get_device("default"));
+      rct::decodeRctSimple(s, amount_keys[i], i, mask, hw::get_device("default"));
       ASSERT_TRUE(mask == outSk[i].mask);
     }
   }