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| author | anonimal <anonimal@getmonero.org> | 2019-03-09 09:11:44 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | moneromooo-monero <moneromooo-monero@users.noreply.github.com> | 2019-06-14 08:48:01 +0000 |
| commit | 3c953d53696d9ccdd195e6a2f02578a154266882 (patch) | |
| tree | ee0004259555955445b28e5c18fe7fe1869a06ca /.travis.yml | |
| parent | epee: basic sanity check on allocation size from untrusted source (diff) | |
| download | monero-3c953d53696d9ccdd195e6a2f02578a154266882.tar.xz | |
cryptonote_protocol_handler: prevent potential DoS
Essentially, one can send such a large amount of IDs that core exhausts
all free memory. This issue can theoretically be exploited using very
large CN blockchains, such as Monero.
This is a partial fix. Thanks and credit given to CryptoNote author
'cryptozoidberg' for collaboration and the fix. Also thanks to
'moneromooo'. Referencing HackerOne report #506595.
Diffstat (limited to '.travis.yml')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions