/* $OpenBSD: getentropy_linux.c,v 1.20 2014/07/12 15:43:49 beck Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2014 Theo de Raadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>
* Copyright (c) 2014 Bob Beck <beck@obtuse.com>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "config.h"
/*
#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 199309L
#define _GNU_SOURCE 1
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#endif
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <termios.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <time.h>
#if defined(HAVE_SSL)
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#elif defined(HAVE_NETTLE)
#include <nettle/sha.h>
#endif
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_GETAUXVAL
#include <sys/auxv.h>
#endif
#include <sys/vfs.h>
#define REPEAT 5
#define min(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
#define HX(a, b) \
do { \
if ((a)) \
HD(errno); \
else \
HD(b); \
} while (0)
#if defined(HAVE_SSL)
#define CRYPTO_SHA512_CTX SHA512_CTX
#define CRYPTO_SHA512_INIT(x) SHA512_Init(x)
#define CRYPTO_SHA512_FINAL(r, c) SHA512_Final(r, c)
#define HR(x, l) (SHA512_Update(&ctx, (char *)(x), (l)))
#define HD(x) (SHA512_Update(&ctx, (char *)&(x), sizeof (x)))
#define HF(x) (SHA512_Update(&ctx, (char *)&(x), sizeof (void*)))
#elif defined(HAVE_NETTLE)
#define CRYPTO_SHA512_CTX struct sha512_ctx
#define CRYPTO_SHA512_INIT(x) sha512_init(x)
#define CRYPTO_SHA512_FINAL(r, c) sha512_digest(c, SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, r)
#define HR(x, l) (sha512_update(&ctx, (l), (uint8_t *)(x)))
#define HD(x) (sha512_update(&ctx, sizeof (x), (uint8_t *)&(x)))
#define HF(x) (sha512_update(&ctx, sizeof (void*), (uint8_t *)&(x)))
#endif
int getentropy(void *buf, size_t len);
#ifdef CAN_REFERENCE_MAIN
extern int main(int, char *argv[]);
#endif
static int gotdata(char *buf, size_t len);
#ifdef SYS_getrandom
static int getentropy_getrandom(void *buf, size_t len);
#endif
static int getentropy_urandom(void *buf, size_t len);
#ifdef SYS__sysctl
static int getentropy_sysctl(void *buf, size_t len);
#endif
static int getentropy_fallback(void *buf, size_t len);
int
getentropy(void *buf, size_t len)
{
int ret = -1;
if (len > 256) {
errno = EIO;
return -1;
}
#ifdef SYS_getrandom
/*
* Try descriptor-less getrandom()
*/
ret = getentropy_getrandom(buf, len);
if (ret != -1)
return (ret);
if (errno != ENOSYS)
return (-1);
#endif
/*
* Try to get entropy with /dev/urandom
*
* This can fail if the process is inside a chroot or if file
* descriptors are exhausted.
*/
ret = getentropy_urandom(buf, len);
if (ret != -1)
return (ret);
#ifdef SYS__sysctl
/*
* Try to use sysctl CTL_KERN, KERN_RANDOM, RANDOM_UUID.
* sysctl is a failsafe API, so it guarantees a result. This
* should work inside a chroot, or when file descriptors are
* exhausted.
*
* However this can fail if the Linux kernel removes support
* for sysctl. Starting in 2007, there have been efforts to
* deprecate the sysctl API/ABI, and push callers towards use
* of the chroot-unavailable fd-using /proc mechanism --
* essentially the same problems as /dev/urandom.
*
* Numerous setbacks have been encountered in their deprecation
* schedule, so as of June 2014 the kernel ABI still exists on
* most Linux architectures. The sysctl() stub in libc is missing
* on some systems. There are also reports that some kernels
* spew messages to the console.
*/
ret = getentropy_sysctl(buf, len);
if (ret != -1)
return (ret);
#endif /* SYS__sysctl */
/*
* Entropy collection via /dev/urandom and sysctl have failed.
*
* No other API exists for collecting entropy. See the large
* comment block above.
*
* We have very few options:
* - Even syslog_r is unsafe to call at this low level, so
* there is no way to alert the user or program.
* - Cannot call abort() because some systems have unsafe
* corefiles.
* - Could raise(SIGKILL) resulting in silent program termination.
* - Return EIO, to hint that arc4random's stir function
* should raise(SIGKILL)
* - Do the best under the circumstances....
*
* This code path exists to bring light to the issue that Linux
* does not provide a failsafe API for entropy collection.
*
* We hope this demonstrates that Linux should either retain their
* sysctl ABI, or consider providing a new failsafe API which
* works in a chroot or when file descriptors are exhausted.
*/
#undef FAIL_INSTEAD_OF_TRYING_FALLBACK
#ifdef FAIL_INSTEAD_OF_TRYING_FALLBACK
raise(SIGKILL);
#endif
ret = getentropy_fallback(buf, len);
if (ret != -1)
return (ret);
errno = EIO;
return (ret);
}
/*
* Basic sanity checking; wish we could do better.
*/
static int
gotdata(char *buf, size_t len)
{
char any_set = 0;
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
any_set |= buf[i];
if (any_set == 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
#ifdef SYS_getrandom
static int
getentropy_getrandom(void *buf, size_t len)
{
int pre_errno = errno;
int ret;
if (len > 256)
return (-1);
do {
ret = syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, len, 0);
} while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR);
if (ret != (int)len)
return (-1);
errno = pre_errno;
return (0);
}
#endif
static int
getentropy_urandom(void *buf, size_t len)
{
struct stat st;
size_t i;
int fd, cnt, flags;
int save_errno = errno;
start:
flags = O_RDONLY;
#ifdef O_NOFOLLOW
flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
#endif
#ifdef O_CLOEXEC
flags |= O_CLOEXEC;
#endif
fd = open("/dev/urandom", flags, 0);
if (fd == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR)
goto start;
goto nodevrandom;
}
#ifndef O_CLOEXEC
fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, fcntl(fd, F_GETFD) | FD_CLOEXEC);
#endif
/* Lightly verify that the device node looks sane */
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1 || !S_ISCHR(st.st_mode)) {
close(fd);
goto nodevrandom;
}
if (ioctl(fd, RNDGETENTCNT, &cnt) == -1) {
close(fd);
goto nodevrandom;
}
for (i = 0; i < len; ) {
size_t wanted = len - i;
ssize_t ret = read(fd, (char*)buf + i, wanted);
if (ret == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
continue;
close(fd);
goto nodevrandom;
}
i += ret;
}
close(fd);
if (gotdata(buf, len) == 0) {
errno = save_errno;
return 0; /* satisfied */
}
nodevrandom:
errno = EIO;
return -1;
}
#ifdef SYS__sysctl
static int
getentropy_sysctl(void *buf, size_t len)
{
static int mib[] = { CTL_KERN, KERN_RANDOM, RANDOM_UUID };
size_t i;
int save_errno = errno;
for (i = 0; i < len; ) {
size_t chunk = min(len - i, 16);
/* SYS__sysctl because some systems already removed sysctl() */
struct __sysctl_args args = {
.name = mib,
.nlen = 3,
.oldval = (char *)buf + i,
.oldlenp = &chunk,
};
if (syscall(SYS__sysctl, &args) != 0)
goto sysctlfailed;
i += chunk;
}
if (gotdata(buf, len) == 0) {
errno = save_errno;
return (0); /* satisfied */
}
sysctlfailed:
errno = EIO;
return -1;
}
#endif /* SYS__sysctl */
static int cl[] = {
CLOCK_REALTIME,
#ifdef CLOCK_MONOTONIC
CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
#endif
#ifdef CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW
CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW,
#endif
#ifdef CLOCK_TAI
CLOCK_TAI,
#endif
#ifdef CLOCK_VIRTUAL
CLOCK_VIRTUAL,
#endif
#ifdef CLOCK_UPTIME
CLOCK_UPTIME,
#endif
#ifdef CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID
CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID,
#endif
#ifdef CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID
CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID,
#endif
};
static int
getentropy_fallback(void *buf, size_t len)
{
uint8_t results[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
int save_errno = errno, e, pgs = getpagesize(), faster = 0, repeat;
static int cnt;
struct timespec ts;
struct timeval tv;
struct rusage ru;
sigset_t sigset;
struct stat st;
CRYPTO_SHA512_CTX ctx;
static pid_t lastpid;
pid_t pid;
size_t i, ii, m;
char *p;
pid = getpid();
if (lastpid == pid) {
faster = 1;
repeat = 2;
} else {
faster = 0;
lastpid = pid;
repeat = REPEAT;
}
for (i = 0; i < len; ) {
int j;
CRYPTO_SHA512_INIT(&ctx);
for (j = 0; j < repeat; j++) {
HX((e = gettimeofday(&tv, NULL)) == -1, tv);
if (e != -1) {
cnt += (int)tv.tv_sec;
cnt += (int)tv.tv_usec;
}
for (ii = 0; ii < sizeof(cl)/sizeof(cl[0]); ii++)
HX(clock_gettime(cl[ii], &ts) == -1, ts);
HX((pid = getpid()) == -1, pid);
HX((pid = getsid(pid)) == -1, pid);
HX((pid = getppid()) == -1, pid);
HX((pid = getpgid(0)) == -1, pid);
HX((e = getpriority(0, 0)) == -1, e);
if (!faster) {
ts.tv_sec = 0;
ts.tv_nsec = 1;
(void) nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
}
HX(sigpending(&sigset) == -1, sigset);
HX(sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, NULL, &sigset) == -1,
sigset);
#ifdef CAN_REFERENCE_MAIN
HF(main); /* an addr in program */
#endif
HF(getentropy); /* an addr in this library */
HF(printf); /* an addr in libc */
p = (char *)&p;
HD(p); /* an addr on stack */
p = (char *)&errno;
HD(p); /* the addr of errno */
if (i == 0) {
struct sockaddr_storage ss;
struct statvfs stvfs;
struct termios tios;
struct statfs stfs;
socklen_t ssl;
off_t off;
/*
* Prime-sized mappings encourage fragmentation;
* thus exposing some address entropy.
*/
struct mm {
size_t npg;
void *p;
} mm[] = {
{ 17, MAP_FAILED }, { 3, MAP_FAILED },
{ 11, MAP_FAILED }, { 2, MAP_FAILED },
{ 5, MAP_FAILED }, { 3, MAP_FAILED },
{ 7, MAP_FAILED }, { 1, MAP_FAILED },
{ 57, MAP_FAILED }, { 3, MAP_FAILED },
{ 131, MAP_FAILED }, { 1, MAP_FAILED },
};
for (m = 0; m < sizeof mm/sizeof(mm[0]); m++) {
HX(mm[m].p = mmap(NULL,
mm[m].npg * pgs,
PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANON, -1,
(off_t)0), mm[m].p);
if (mm[m].p != MAP_FAILED) {
size_t mo;
/* Touch some memory... */
p = mm[m].p;
mo = cnt %
(mm[m].npg * pgs - 1);
p[mo] = 1;
cnt += (int)((long)(mm[m].p)
/ pgs);
}
/* Check cnts and times... */
for (ii = 0; ii < sizeof(cl)/sizeof(cl[0]);
ii++) {
HX((e = clock_gettime(cl[ii],
&ts)) == -1, ts);
if (e != -1)
cnt += (int)ts.tv_nsec;
}
HX((e = getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF,
&ru)) == -1, ru);
if (e != -1) {
cnt += (int)ru.ru_utime.tv_sec;
cnt += (int)ru.ru_utime.tv_usec;
}
}
for (m = 0; m < sizeof mm/sizeof(mm[0]); m++) {
if (mm[m].p != MAP_FAILED)
munmap(mm[m].p, mm[m].npg * pgs);
mm[m].p = MAP_FAILED;
}
HX(stat(".", &st) == -1, st);
HX(statvfs(".", &stvfs) == -1, stvfs);
HX(statfs(".", &stfs) == -1, stfs);
HX(stat("/", &st) == -1, st);
HX(statvfs("/", &stvfs) == -1, stvfs);
HX(statfs("/", &stfs) == -1, stfs);
HX((e = fstat(0, &st)) == -1, st);
if (e == -1) {
if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) ||
S_ISFIFO(st.st_mode) ||
S_ISSOCK(st.st_mode)) {
HX(fstatvfs(0, &stvfs) == -1,
stvfs);
HX(fstatfs(0, &stfs) == -1,
stfs);
HX((off = lseek(0, (off_t)0,
SEEK_CUR)) < 0, off);
}
if (S_ISCHR(st.st_mode)) {
HX(tcgetattr(0, &tios) == -1,
tios);
} else if (S_ISSOCK(st.st_mode)) {
memset(&ss, 0, sizeof ss);
ssl = sizeof(ss);
HX(getpeername(0,
(void *)&ss, &ssl) == -1,
ss);
}
}
HX((e = getrusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN,
&ru)) == -1, ru);
if (e != -1) {
cnt += (int)ru.ru_utime.tv_sec;
cnt += (int)ru.ru_utime.tv_usec;
}
} else {
/* Subsequent hashes absorb previous result */
HD(results);
}
HX((e = gettimeofday(&tv, NULL)) == -1, tv);
if (e != -1) {
cnt += (int)tv.tv_sec;
cnt += (int)tv.tv_usec;
}
HD(cnt);
}
#ifdef HAVE_GETAUXVAL
# ifdef AT_RANDOM
/* Not as random as you think but we take what we are given */
p = (char *) getauxval(AT_RANDOM);
if (p)
HR(p, 16);
# endif
# ifdef AT_SYSINFO_EHDR
p = (char *) getauxval(AT_SYSINFO_EHDR);
if (p)
HR(p, pgs);
# endif
# ifdef AT_BASE
p = (char *) getauxval(AT_BASE);
if (p)
HD(p);
# endif
#endif /* HAVE_GETAUXVAL */
CRYPTO_SHA512_FINAL(results, &ctx);
memcpy((char*)buf + i, results, min(sizeof(results), len - i));
i += min(sizeof(results), len - i);
}
memset(results, 0, sizeof results);
if (gotdata(buf, len) == 0) {
errno = save_errno;
return 0; /* satisfied */
}
errno = EIO;
return -1;
}